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Abstract: This dissertation investigates the causes, development, and the 
partial resolution of the Antarctic sovereignty dispute that took place between 
Britain, Argentina, and Chile between 1939 and 1959.  It has two interconnected 
arguments.  The first argument is that the dispute had its roots in a clash between 
British imperialism and South American nationalism, and, as a consequence, ought 
to be seen as part of the wider history of European decolonization in the years during 
and after the Second World War.  The second argument is that the history of the 
sovereignty dispute offers an excellent opportunity for “doing environmental 
history” due to the relative simplicity of human-nature-culture interactions in 
Antarctica.  By putting these two arguments together, it becomes possible to write an 
“environmental history of decolonization.”  Within the context of the sovereignty 
dispute, this dissertation asks the question: what happened to British imperial claims 
to “dominion over nature” during the decolonization of the British Empire in the 
 v 
mid-twentieth century?  Over the course of the sovereignty dispute, Argentina and 
Chile sought to challenge Britain’s claims to “environmental authority” in Antarctica 
with their own “environmental nationalism.”  Rather than conceding to the South 
American challenge, Britain initially responded by redoubling its efforts to maintain 
Antarctic sovereignty.  However, as the three countries learned more about the 
reality of the Antarctic environment, their political perceptions of the region 
changed.  The British, in particular, became less attached to exclusive sovereignty 
and successfully negotiated a limited international regime that would retain their 
political influence without the need for formal control.  The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 
brought a partial end to the sovereignty dispute by “freezing” all sovereignty claims 
for its duration. 
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Introduction: Imperialism on Ice 
On 17 February 1948, the Chilean President, Gabriel González Videla, 
became the first head of state to visit Antarctica.1  Speaking at Chile’s Base 
Soberanía on Greenwich Island, he declared the Antarctic Peninsula region to be an 
“integral part” of Chile’s national territory and lavished praise on the six “brave 
young men” who had endured the hardships of the previous winter at the base in 
order to demonstrate Chilean sovereignty.2  On the following day, at the inauguration 
of a second Chilean station, Base O’Higgins, the President spoke of the spirit of 
Bernado O’Higgins, the great liberator of Chile, and the need “to defend the 
sovereignty and unity of our territory, from Arica to the South Pole.”3  Upon his 
return to Santiago, González Videla attacked Britain’s over-lapping pretensions to 
the region.  The British claims to the so-called “Falkland Islands Dependencies,” 
thundered the President, were outdated vestiges of European colonialism: 
 
We would deny our glorious history, we would deny our past, if we were to 
renounce a single piece of our territory, only because there are those [the 
British] who believe that acts of imperialism today constitute a title of 
sovereignty.4  
 
                                                 
1 Gabriel González Videla, Memorias, 1. ed. (Santiago de Chile, 1975). 799. 
2 For an account of their year in Antarctica see Consuelo León Wöppke and Mauricio Jara Fernández, 
Valientes Muchachos Vivencias en la Antártica Chilena en 1947 (Valparaiso, Chile, 2007). 
3 González Videla, Memorias. 809. 
4 Ibid. 826. 
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British claims to Antarctica represented an imperial imposition on Chile’s national 
territory that all Chileans had a patriotic duty to oppose.  The politics of anti-
imperialism had arrived at the most unlikely of places. 
During the Second World War both Chile and Argentina advanced 
sovereignty claims to the Peninsula region of the Antarctic continent, directly to the 
south of South America.  These claims overlapped substantially with each other and 
with the British Empire’s claims to sovereignty over a vast territory known as the 
Falkland Islands Dependencies.5  The over-lapping assertions of sovereignty led to 
an active three-way dispute that would last for the next twenty years.  During this 
dispute, the three countries supported their rival claims by sending expeditions to 
Antarctica, constructing bases, launching diplomatic initiatives, disseminating 
cultural propaganda, searching for historical antecedents, and issuing legal protest 
notes.  At the center of the dispute was a contest over “environmental authority,” as 
Britain, Argentina, and Chile sought to appropriate the Antarctic environment itself 
for their own political ends.  At several times between 1939 and 1959 the conflict 
threatened to turn violent, but the wider demands of international diplomacy just 
about prevented an armed confrontation.  As the dispute progressed, increasing 
international interest in Antarctica, especially from the United States and the Soviet 
Union, culminated in the massive scientific research endeavor known as the 
International Geophysical Year (IGY) of 1957-58.  In December 1959, in the wake 
of the IGY, the signature of the Antarctic Treaty by twelve nations brought the 
Anglo-Argentine-Chilean dispute to a partial resolution through a “limited 
                                                 
5 In 1908, Britain had claimed the Antarctic Peninsula region by issuing Letters Patent (a form of 
government decree) that created an administrative unit, known as the Falkland Islands Dependencies.  
This original claim included a part of southern Patagonia.  This “oversight” was corrected by the issue 
of a second Letters Patent in 1917.   
 3 
internationalization” of the continent.  For the duration of the Treaty, Article IV 
“froze” all existing sovereignty claims, neither recognizing them nor rejecting them 
(For the official text of the Antarctic Treaty see appendix).6 
This dissertation sets out to explore the causes, development, and the partial 
resolution of the Antarctic sovereignty dispute between Britain, Argentina, and 
Chile.  It has two interconnected arguments.  The first is that the dispute had its roots 
in a clash between British imperialism and South American nationalism, and, as a 
consequence, ought to be seen as part of the wider history of European 
decolonization in the years during and after the Second World War.  This places the 
history of the dispute at an analytical level beneath the Cold War contest between 
East and West that was taking place during the same period.7  This choice to focus 
on decolonization does not mean that the Cold War was unimportant to the history of 
the dispute.  The history of the Cold War repeatedly interacted with the history of the 
sovereignty dispute: the Soviet Union, for example, attempted to take advantage of 
divisions between Britain, Argentina, and Chile within its anti-Western propaganda; 
fears of a permanent Soviet presence in Antarctica functioned as an important 
moderating influence in the dispute.  Nevertheless, the prominent use of anti-
imperial rhetoric, the relatively localized scale of the contest for Antarctic 
sovereignty, and the fact that the dispute took place between three countries that 
                                                 
6 The Antarctic Treaty was ratified in 1961 with an initial duration of 30 years.   It was extended in 
1991 by the Madrid protocol for a further 50 years and therefore remains in force today.  The pun on 
the word “frozen” was used by diplomats at the time.   
7 Several historians who have examined the history of Antarctica during this post-war period have 
seen it in terms of the Cold War struggle between East and West.  See for example, Frank Klotz, 
America on the ice: Antarctic policy issues (Washington, DC, 1990). Jason Kendall Moore, 
"'Diplomacy, Public Opinion and the 'Fractalization' of U.S. Antarctic Policy, 1946-1959" (University 
of Tasmania, 2006). 
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were nominal allies in the incipient Cold War, means that the wider context of 
European decolonization offers the most useful way of framing this history. 
The second argument is that the history of the Antarctic sovereignty dispute 
offers an excellent opportunity for “doing environmental history.”  Because of the 
relative simplicity of the environment, human-nature-culture interactions can be 
more easily understood in Antarctica than in places where there are more people and 
where the environment is more complicated.  By adopting a three-fold approach to 
environmental history that takes into account human actions, human understanding, 
and the material environment, this dissertation seeks to give a prominent role both to 
the Antarctic environment and to changing perceptions of that environment within 
the history of the sovereignty dispute.8  It is a central proposition of this dissertation 
that the history of the Antarctic sovereignty dispute cannot be separated from the 
history of the Antarctic environment or from the history of Antarctic Science. 
When these two arguments are put together, the history of the Antarctic 
sovereignty dispute opens up the possibility for writing an “Environmental History 
of Decolonization.”  Many historians have examined the connections between 
empire, science, and the environment during the rise of European imperialism, and 
into the early twentieth century, but relatively few have investigated what happened 
to these connections during the mid twentieth century decline of European empires.9  
This dissertation raises the question: what happened to British claims to “dominion 
                                                 
8 Donald Worster, The Ends of the earth: perspectives on modern environmental history, Studies in 
environment and history (Cambridge, 1988). 
9 For an excellent discussion of the connections between empire, science, and the environment see 
William Beinart and Lotte Hughes, Environment and empire, Oxford history of the British Empire 
companion series (Oxford ; New York, 2007).  Even though Beinhart and Hughes take their 
discussion into the post-colonial period, they do not really focus on the period of British 
decolonization. For a fuller discussion of the historiography of the environmental history of British 
imperialism see below.   
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over nature” during the period of decolonization?  Britain legitimized its political 
claims to Antarctica through assertions of environmental authority; during the 
Antarctic sovereignty dispute, Argentina and Chile developed forms of 
“environmental nationalism” that challenged these assertions.  This contest, 
however, was rooted in the material reality of the Antarctic environment.  As the 
three sides competed to demonstrate their sovereignty they learned more about the 
reality of Antarctica.  The environment itself played a direct role in this history, both 
as a constraining factor and, occasionally, as an active agent of change.  By the late 
1950s, in response to changing perceptions of the Antarctic environment, the British 
sought to reformulate their claims to environmental authority in order to retain 
political influence within an international treaty system. Argentina and Chile were 
reluctant collaborators in the negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty, but both South 
American countries found their political influence preserved by participation in its 
“exclusive club.”   
A focus on science, the environment, and decolonization, in turn has 
important implications for the history of the origins of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty.  
There is a tendency within the existing historiography to view the limited 
internationalization of Antarctica through a somewhat idealistic lens.  Historians 
such as Stephen Martin, Dian Olson Belanger, Stephen Pyne, and Tom Griffiths, 
have suggested that the Antarctic Treaty represented the triumph of science over 
politics, even to the extent of bringing the two Superpowers together at the height of 
the Cold War.10  By carefully examining the interaction of the environment, science, 
                                                 
10 Stephen Martin, A history of Antarctica ([Sydney, NSW], 1996).  Dian Olson Belanger, Deep 
Freeze: the United States, the International Geophysical Year, and the origins of Antarctica's age of 
science (Boulder, Colo., 2006).  Paul A. Berkman, Science into policy: global lessons from Antartica 
(San Diego, Calif.; London, 2001).  Stephen J. Pyne, The ice (London, 2003).  Tom Griffiths, Slicing 
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and politics, this dissertation presents a slightly less idealized view of the origins of 
the Treaty.  The scientific results of the IGY helped to convince Britain that the 
Antarctic Peninsula region was not worth the diplomatic and economic costs of 
maintaining exclusive sovereignty claims.  British officials, in loose alliance with the 
United States, Australia, and New Zealand, then deliberately manipulated scientific 
goodwill in order to bring about a transfer from formal claims to informal influence 
through a limited international regime.  Within the subsequent Antarctic Treaty 
System, science continues to function as the principal tool for the maintenance of the 
signatories’ political interests.  This more nuanced interpretation of the origins of the 
Treaty has important consequences: in a sense the Antarctic Treaty System itself can 
be seen as a “frozen empire.”   
During the Antarctic sovereignty dispute, the contest over the history of the 
region was every bit as intense as the contests over science, cartography, and 
effective occupation. Each side in the dispute looked to the Antarctic past in order to 
demonstrate its legitimate rights to sovereignty, and, conversely, to disprove the 
rights of the other two countries.  The history of the region has consequently become 
a particularly politicized and legalistic history.11  If ever the dispute were to go to 
                                                                                                                                          
the silence: voyaging to Antarctica (Cambridge, Mass., 2007).  Other historians have taken a less 
idealized approach to the connection between science and imperialism, see, for example, Peter Beck, 
The international politics of Antarctica (London, 1986).  Klaus Dodds, Pink ice: Britain and the 
South Atlantic Empire (London; New York, 2002).  But while these latter works have shown how 
politicians have exploited science and geography for their political ends, they do not fully explore the 
impact of science on politics.   
11 As a consequence of the sovereignty dispute, the history of the region has often been written by 
lawyers rather than historians.  Examples of lawyers or diplomats writing history can be found on all 
three sides of the dispute.  See for example, Oscar Pinochet de la Barra, La Antártica Chilena 
(Santiago de Chile, 1948).  Juan Carlos Puig, La Antártida argentina ante el derecho (Buenos Aires, 
1960).  Eric William Hunter Christie, The Antarctic problem; an historical and political study 
(London, 1951).  Such histories often focus teleologically on acts of discovery and administration in 
order to prove one particular point and usually lack any deep historical analysis of “why” claims were 
made when they were made, or what was intended by such actions.  The classic example of this style 
of history writing comes from Argentine and Chilean assertions that the Spanish American Empire 
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arbitration, history would be used to help determine the outcome.  The purpose of 
this dissertation is not to make a case for one particular side in the sovereignty 
dispute, but rather to explain why the question of Antarctic sovereignty became such 
a contentious issue in the 1940s and 1950s, why it took the form it did, and how and 
why it was partially resolved by the Antarctic Treaty of 1959.  An implicit argument 
is that, while the historical background is obviously important to the sovereignty 
dispute as it developed between 1939 and 1959, the dispute was not an inevitable 
outcome of earlier events in Antarctica.12  Rather, the “active phase” of the 
sovereignty dispute that took place between Britain, Argentina and Chile during and 
after the Second World War, originated out of the specific historical circumstances 
of the 1940s and 1950s and, most importantly, out of the complex interactions 
between British imperialism and South American nationalism.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
included the Antarctica Peninsula, even though the Peninsula was only discovered after Argentina and 
Chile had declared themselves independent.  Such a claim might be legally sound, but it is not 
necessarily good history.    
12 Even the chronology of this dissertation, focusing on the period 1939-1959, could be interpreted as 
a political statement about the ownership of the Antarctic Peninsula, since it reduces the importance 
of the historical antecedents.  
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Figure 1: Sketch Map to show sovereignty claims in Antarctic Peninsula region.  
BRITISH ANTARCTIC IMPERIALISM 
Until the beginning of the nineteenth century, Antarctica remained a purely 
hypothetical continent: geographers believed in its existence, but nobody had ever 
seen it.  In the late eighteenth century, Captain Cook became the first man to sail 
south of the Antarctic circle, but he failed to set eyes on the continent.13  Around 
                                                 
13 The classic account of Cook’s voyages can be found in J. C. Beaglehole, The life of Captain James 
Cook (Stanford, Calif., 1974). 
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1820, a number of expeditions made the first sightings of land in the far south.14  
Several of these expeditions were connected to the rapacious sealing industry, which 
was creating an “exploitation frontier” in the South Atlantic.15  These discoveries 
aroused some excitement, not least during the “magnetic crusade” of the mid-
nineteenth century, when expeditions set off in search of the south magnetic pole.  
But this interest quickly subsided.  For almost a century, the newly discovered 
territories defied the process of European imperial expansion that was going on in 
much of the rest of the world.  There was little to attract colonists to the icy shores, 
and much to defy them.  The same environmental conditions that had prevented the 
discovery of Antarctica for such a long time continued to repel explorers and would-
be settlers.  Antarctica contained no indigenous population, and – after the rapid 
extermination of most of the region’s accessible seal populations – little of any 
apparent economic worth.   
From the early twentieth century, however, the history of Antarctica became 
increasingly caught up with the wider history of the British Empire.  “Empire”, 
“imperialism”, and “colonialism” are ideologically charged terms that are difficult to 
define.16  The meaning of these words changes radically from place to place, time to 
time, and from one ideological position to the next.  The British Empire itself defied 
neat definitions.  Rather than being a coherent ideological enterprise, the British 
                                                 
14 There remains no consensus on exactly who discovered what, and when.  For an Argentine 
perspecitive on the discovery of Antarctica see Ernesto J. Fitte, El descubrimiento de la Antártida 
(1962).  Also see C. W. Poynter, R. J. Campbell, and Jay I. Kislak, The discovery of the South 
Shetland Islands: the voyages of the Brig Williams, 1819-1820 as recorded in contemporary 
documents and the journal of Midshipman C.W. Poynter (London, 2000). 
15 Alfred W. Crosby, Ecological imperialism: the biological expansion of Europe, 900-1900, Studies 
in environment and history (Cambridge; New York, 1986). 
16 For a recent discussion of the difficulties involved in defining such terms see Barbara Bush, 
Imperialism and postcolonialism, 1st ed., History: concepts, theories and practice (Harlow, England; 
New York, N.Y., 2006). 
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Empire was in fact a menagerie of contrasting constitutional arrangements.  If not 
quite acquired in a “fit of absence of mind,” the various constituents of the British 
Empire were in fact attained at different times and for different purposes, and 
governed in quite different manners.17  To make the situation even more 
complicated, some historians have suggested that the formal empire of territories 
painted pink on imperial maps was only the “tip of the iceberg” and that the British 
Empire in fact extended to a vast “informal empire” of free trade and political 
influence.18  Seen from the perspective of “informal imperialism”, it is possible to 
classify both Argentina and Chile as parts of Britain’s imperial system at the 
beginning of the twentieth century.19  At a general level, this dissertation adopts a 
broad definition of the British Empire as a system of unequal power relationships, in 
which Great Britain was clearly dominant.  Since this imperial system included both 
formal and informal empire, British “imperialism” did not consist solely in the 
acquisition of territory or the government of foreign peoples.  Within this imperial 
                                                 
17 John Robert Seeley, The expansion of England: two courses of lectures (London, 1883). 
18 Ronald Robinson and Jack Gallagher, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," The Economic History 
Review VI (1953). 
19 The literature on British influence in Argentina and Chile is fairly extensive.  See, for example, 
Harold Blakemore, British nitrates and chilean politics, 1886-1896: Balmaceda and North (London, 
1974). H. S. Ferns, Britain and Argentina in the nineteenth century (Oxford [Eng.], 1960). Carlos 
Escudé, Gran Bretana, Estados Unidos y la Declinacion Argentina 1942-1949 (Buenos Aires, 1983), 
microform. Andrew Graham-Yooll, The forgotten colony: a history of the English-speaking 
communities in Argentina, Rev. ed. (Buenos Aires, República Argentina, 1999). Roger Gravil, The 
Anglo-Argentine connection, 1900-1939, Dellplain Latin American studies (Boulder, 1985). C. A. M. 
Hennessy and John King, The Land that England lost : Argentina and Britain, a special relationship 
(London, 1992). Rodolfo Irazusta and Julio Irazusta, La Argentina y el imperialismo británico; los 
eslabones de una cadena, 1806-1833 (Buenos Aires, 1934). Rory Miller, Britain and Latin America 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (London; New York, 1993). Mario Rapoport, Gran Bretaña, 
Estados Unidos y las clases dirigentes argentinas, 1940-1945, Colección Conflictos y armonías en la 
historia argentina (Buenos Aires, República Argentina, 1981). Raúl Scalabrini Ortiz, Política 
británica en el Rio de la Plata; las dos políticas: la visible y la invisible, Cuadernos de F.O.R.J.A., 
(Buenos Aires, 1936).  
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system each constituent part had its own specific characteristics, and it is in the 
details rather than the generalities that most of the interest lies.   
In 1908 the British issued a Letter Patent (a form of government decree) that 
made provisions for the administration of the Antarctic Peninsula region as the 
Falkland Islands Dependencies: 
 
Whereas the group of islands known as South Georgia, the South Orkneys, 
the South Shetland Islands, and the Sandwich Islands, and the territory 
known as Graham Land, situated in the South Atlantic Ocean to the south of 
the 50th Parallel of South latitude, and lying between the 20th and 80th degrees 
of West longitude, are part of our Dominions, and it is expedient that 
provision should be made for their government as Dependencies of our 
Colony of the Falklands.20 
 
Since 1833, Britain had held possession of the Falkland Islands in the South Atlantic, 
after the forceful seizure of the archipelago from the government of Buenos Aires.21  
Henceforth, the British would also consider the Antarctic Peninsula region to be a 
formal part of the British Empire: a legal, political, and economic part of an imperial 
system that was already the largest in the world.  Unusually, since Antarctica 
contained no indigenous population, Britain’s “Frozen Empire” in the far south 
involved the exercise of sovereignty over territory but not people.  Antarctica really 
was the terra nullius of settler colonial fantasy.22  This was undoubtedly an 
                                                 
20 Christie, The Antarctic problem; an historical and political study. 301. 
21 Barry M. Gough, The Falkland Islands/Malvinas: the contest for empire in the South Atlantic 
(London, 1992). 
22 Throughout the colonial period, settler-colonists repeadly used the myth of empty lands to justify 
the appropriation of territory and the extermination of indigenous peoples.  See, for example, Patrick 
Wolfe, Settler colonialism and the transformation of anthropology: the politics and poetics of an 
ethnographic event, Writing past colonialism series (London ; New York, 1999). 
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anomalous situation, but perhaps, on close inspection, no more anomalous than any 
other constituent part of the vast imperial system.   
The principal motivation for Britain’s claim to Antarctica was economic. The 
British Government wanted to tax and regulate the nascent whaling industry.   
Beginning in the 1890s, whaling companies had begun to show an increasing interest 
in the marine wealth of the seas and oceans surrounding Antarctica.23  With whale 
populations in the northern hemisphere devastated by over-fishing, the Norwegians 
in particular began to establish whaling factories on South Georgia and other sub-
Antarctic Islands.  These operations proved remarkably successful and radically 
changed perceptions of the economic worth of Antarctica.  What had recently been 
considered nothing but a wasteland began to be seen as a potentially valuable 
territory worth controlling.  By the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, the 
Antarctic whaling had become a significant industry, with the Norwegian catch alone 
worth over £2 million annually.24 Between 1919 and 1931 the Falkland Islands 
Dependencies collected a little over £1 million in duty.25 
Alongside Britain’s economic motives for claiming the Falkland Islands 
Dependencies, there was also a growing emotional attachment to the region.  In 
1895, the Sixth International Geographical Congress held in London had ushered in 
the so-called “heroic era” with its provocative resolution that “the exploration of 
Antarctic regions is the greatest piece of geographical exploration still to be 
undertaken.”26  Delegates at the Congress viewed the almost complete lack of 
                                                 
23 J. N. Tønnessen and Arne Odd Johnsen, The history of modern whaling (Berkeley, 1982). 
24 See Ibid. 305.  For example, the catch value of the Norwegian fleet in 1914 was £2m.  See also 
Gerald Elliot, A whaling enterprise: Salvesen in the Antarctic (Wilby, Norwich [U.K.], 1998). 19. 
25 Tønnessen and Johnsen, The history of modern whaling. 302. 
26 G. E. Fogg, A history of Antarctic science, Studies in polar research (Cambridge [England]; New 
York, 1992). 110. 
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knowledge about the Southern Continent as an affront to civilization.  For ambitious 
European explorers, Antarctica’s environmental hostility suddenly became part of its 
attraction: it offered the perfect stage on which to prove to the world their 
masculinity and racial superiority.27  Antarctica came to occupy a special place in 
both the official mind and the popular imagination of British imperialism, and the 
names of Robert Falcon Scott and Ernest Shackleton etched themselves into the 
imperial pantheon.28  In the summer season of 1911-12, the heroic era climaxed with 
the famous “Race for the Pole” between the Norwegian Roald Amundsen and the 
British Captain Robert Falcon Scott.29  Proficient on skis, and utilizing dog transport 
to its fullest potential, the Norwegian team arrived at the Geographical South Pole on 
14 December 1911.30  By the time Scott and his four companions had reached the 
Pole over a month later, Amundsen had already arrived safely back to his base camp.  
Exhausted and out of food, Scott and his men died on the return journey.31  When the 
“sublime sacrifice” of Captain Scott and his men was reported to the world a year 
later it struck a resonant chord with the pre-First World War imperial spirit, nurtured 
on ideals of muscular Christianity and the white man’s burden.32  Nothing quite 
                                                 
27 Brigid Hains, The ice and the inland: Mawson, Flynn, and the myth of the frontier (Carlton South, 
Vic., 2002). Max Jones, The last great quest: Captain Scott's Antarctic sacrifice (Oxford; New York, 
2003). 
28 See for example Jones, The last great quest: Captain Scott's Antarctic sacrifice. 
29 The primary and secondary literature on the race to the South Pole is immense.  One of the classic 
works is Roland Huntford, Scott and Amundsen, 1st American ed. (New York, 1984). 
30 The Nowegian Party consisted of Amundsen, Bjaaland, Wisting, Sverre Hassel, and Helmer 
Hansen. 
31 Scott, Oates, Bowers, Wilson, and Evans. The British team had hoped to use horses to pull their 
sleds, but the horses could not cope with the extreme conditions, and the five men ended up having to 
man-haul across the polar plateau. 
32 Spufford argues that the romantic quest for the sublime lay at the heart of the British fascination 
with cold places. Francis Spufford, I may be some time: ice and the English imagination (London; 
Boston, 1996).For the impact that Scott’s tragic failure had on the English population see, Jones, The 
last great quest: Captain Scott's Antarctic sacrifice. 
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captured the British popular imagination as much as Titus Oates’ understated self-
sacrifice: “I’m stepping outside.  I may be some time.”33  Nurtured by such stories, 
the very remoteness of Antarctica gave the continent a great symbolic value to an 
imperial mentality that longed to rule the world.34  The empty white spaces offered 
the imperialist much of the glory of empire without the messy reality of ruling a 
colonial people.  
In 1919, Leopold Amery, under-Secretary at the Colonial Office, declared his 
intention to bring the whole of Antarctica into the British Empire. 35 Amery’s interest 
in the region rested on a combination of fact and fiction: the wealth of whaling, the 
prestige of exploration, and the potential for finding great mineral wealth.  At this 
time very little was known about the Antarctic environment and this void tended to 
be filled with dreams of a “Frozen El Dorado.”  At the Imperial Conference of 1926 
Amery’s plan became imperial policy: the Antarctic continent was to be 
incorporated, piece-by-piece, into the British Empire. 36  Britain’s desire to possess 
Antarctica perhaps represented the apogee of European imperial desires to control 
space and nature. In fulfilling its imperial aspirations in Antarctica, Britain relied on 
its Southern Dominions.37  New Zealand made a claim in 1924 to the Ross 
                                                 
33 British commentators at the time, deeply worried about the turn of world events in the lead up to 
the First World War, drew hope from the bravery displayed in the face of tragedy.  See, Beck, The 
international politics of Antarctica. 26. 
34 See Peter Beck, "Securing the Dominant ‘Place in the Wan Antarctic Sun’ For the British Empire: 
the Policy of Extending British Control Over Antarctica," Australian Journal of Politics and History 
29 (1983).  Leopold Amery was the leading proponent of British territorial aquisition in Antarctica.  
Such “futile and ironic” ambition might arguably deserve a place alongside Ronald Hyam’s five 
“flawed projects of empire.” Ronald Hyam, Britain's declining empire: the road to decolonisation, 
1918-1968 (Cambridge; New York, 2006). 
35 Peter Beck, "British Antarctic Policy in the Early Twentieth Century," Polar Record 21 (1983). 
36 Ibid. 
37 See Peter Beck, Beck, "Securing the Dominant ‘Place in the Wan Antarctic Sun’ For the British 
Empire: the Policy of Extending British Control Over Antarctica." For the importance of the White 
Dominions on British Antarctic policy at a later stage see Klaus Dodds, "The End of a Polar Empire?  
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Dependency, and in 1931 Australia claimed a vast swath of East Antarctica. A 
French claim to a small sliver of Terre Adélie in 1925, however, prevented the 
British Empire from fulfilling its continental ambition.  Nevertheless by the eve of 
the Second World War, two thirds of Antarctica would be painted pink on imperial 
maps. 
Along with assertions of prior discovery, acts of possession, and 
administration, Great Britain justified its claims to Antarctic sovereignty through 
recourse to  “environmental authority.”38  Building on a declensionist narrative of 
environmental degradation, which drew in particular upon the devastation wreaked 
by the nineteenth century sealing industry, British officials argued that they best had 
the scientific and administrative skills to manage the whaling industry.39  Sir Miles 
Clifford, the Governor of the Falkland Islands from the mid 1940s, made the case 
explicitly: 
 
The only true wealth that this area contains, so far as we know today, is still 
as in the past its marine wealth – its whales and seals; these, as we have noted 
earlier, could readily be exterminated by indiscriminate killing and it was the 
recognition of this danger which decided His Majesty’s Government to bring 
these industries under control and lead to the establishment of British 
sovereignty over the area now known as the Falkland Islands Dependencies.  
The motive was a purely unselfish one, to conserve the harvest of these seas 
for the benefit of mankind as a whole, “for the good of humanity.”40 
                                                                                                                                          
The Falkland Islands Dependencies and Commonwealth Reactions to British Polar Policy, 1945-61," 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 24 (1996). 
38 See, for example, the case made by Britain in International Court of Justice, Antarctica cases 
(United Kingdom v. Argentina; United Kingdom v. Chile): orders of March 16th, 1956: removal from 
the list (Hague, 1956). 
39 For a discussion of the use of degradation narratives in another colonial situation see Diana K. 
Davis, Resurrecting the granary of Rome: environmental history and French colonial expansion in 
North Africa, Ohio University Press series in ecology and history (Athens, 2007). 
40 Miles Clifford “Broadcast Address by His Excellency the Governor,” 22 February 1948.  RHL, 
MISS.  Brit Emp.s 517 4/1 “Falkland Islands 1946-1957: Clifford.” [Itallics added]. 
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This argument set up something of a “Tragedy of the Commons” scenario, whereby 
ownership by one country was better than an international free-for-all.41  British 
officials implied that the superior capacity to understand the Antarctic environment 
that they possessed by virtue of their scientific institutions and administrative 
experience, gave them both a right and a duty to claim possession of the Falkland 
Islands Dependencies.   
Britain’s claims to environmental authority assumed that the theory and 
practice of science was the best means of understanding the natural world.  Science 
is both a body of knowledge and a methodology, which generally relies upon 
empirical observation and experiment.  By the middle of the twentieth century, an 
established international community of scientists generally agreed on the correct way 
to “do science”, thereby setting the rules of the game.  By performing what they 
claimed to be “superior” science in Antarctica, the British asserted their 
environmental authority.  Science, they argued, gave them the ability to control and 
regulate the Antarctic environment “for the good of humanity,” and this in turn 
provided a moral justification for their sovereignty claims.  Definitions of science, 
however, were not uncontested.  Not all scientists thought about what they were 
doing in the same way, and politicians, officials, and the general public often had a 
different understanding of science than scientists themselves.  During the Antarctic 
sovereignty dispute, certain South Americans would define “science” in a 
significantly different way to the British understanding of the term.  The contest over 
                                                 
41 Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," Science 162 (1968). 
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the definition of science would play a part in the Argentine and Chilean challenge to 
Britain’s claims to environmental authority in Antarctica. 
In order to demonstrate Britain’s environmental authority, the Colonial 
Office initiated a project of oceanographic research known as the Discovery 
Expeditions.  Between 1926 and 1938, the vessels of the Discovery Committee made 
a series of research voyages around the Antarctic continent, funded by taxes on the 
whaling industry.42  British scientists investigated the marine life of the Antarctic 
oceans, counted whales, measured temperatures and charted ocean currents. “The 
direct object of this detailed research,” a Colonial Office Report claimed, “was to 
acquire the information necessary to formulate sound legislation for the proper 
control of whaling and sealing.”43  As well as providing a moral justification for 
Britain’s rule, such investigations produced useful information that helped to 
facilitate this rule.  Greater knowledge about the whale populations, for example, 
could make the whaling industry more efficient and add to the tax revenues collected 
by the government of the Falkland Islands Dependencies.44  The Discovery 
Investigations, along with other scientific endeavors such as the establishment of the 
Scott Polar Research Institute in Cambridge in 1920, and the Rymill expedition to 
Grahamland between 1935-38, helped to establish a strong connection between 
science and politics in Antarctica.   
                                                 
42 Ann Savours and Margaret Slythe, The voyages of the Discovery: the illustrated history of Scott's 
ship (London, 2001). 
43 Colonial Office Paper: “The Falkland Islands Dependencies: Basis of the British claim.  
29/12/1948.”  TNA, CO 78/245/3. 
44 Despite these lofty ambitions, many whalers were unimpressed by the work of the Discovery 
investigations, and the Norwegians in particular saw through the political motivations, see Elliot, A 
whaling enterprise: Salvesen in the Antarctic. 23. Harold Salvesen, the British director of the 
Salvesen whaling company, would later condemn the Discovery Expeditions: “the whole business has 
been conducted most inefficiently and at a criminal cost.”   
 18 
Britain’s appeals to environmental authority to support its sovereignty claims 
in the Falkland Islands Dependencies mirrored a similar strategy throughout its 
empire.  The imperial history of Antarctica fits neatly into a broad and growing 
literature that explores the relationships between empire, science and the 
environment.45  Building on the seminal idea of “improvement,” many authors have 
argued that science gave the British Empire a means of building and legitimizing 
their empire.46  Science provided imperialists with both the practical tools to win, 
govern and exploit their empires and a moral justification for their actions.  
Sometimes, as in the case of geography and anthropology, imperialists even 
“invented” entire scientific disciplines to serve their imperial purposes.47  By the late 
1930s, Britain’s sovereignty claims to the Falkland Islands Dependencies epitomized 
the broader assumptions of environmental authority throughout the empire. 
 
 
                                                 
45 For an excellent historiographical essay on this theme see Roy MacLeod, “Introduction” in Roy M. 
MacLeod, Nature and empire: science and the colonial enterprise (Chicago, 2000).  Other important 
works in the environmental history of British imperialism include Richard Harry Drayton, Nature's 
government: science, imperial Britain, and the 'Improvement' of the World (New Haven, 2000). 
Richard Grove, Green imperialism: colonial expansion, tropical island Edens and the origins of 
environmentalism, 1600-1860, 2 vols., Studies in environment and history (Cambridge, 1994).  
Richard Grove, Ecology, climate, and empire: colonialism and global environmental history, 1400-
1940 (Cambridge, 1997).  John M. MacKenzie, The empire of nature: hunting, conservation, and 
British imperialism (Manchester; New York, 1988).  David Arnold, The problem of nature: 
environment, culture and European expansion (Oxford, [Eng.]; Cambridge, Mass., 1996).  Tom 
Griffiths and Libby Robin, Ecology and empire: environmental history of settler societies (Seattle, 
Wash., 1997).  Peder Anker, Imperial ecology: environmental order in the British Empire, 1895-1945 
(Cambridge, Mass., 2001).  Daniel R. Headrick, The tools of empire: technology and European 
imperialism in the nineteenth century (New York, 1981). 
46 Drayton, Nature's government: science, imperial Britain, and the 'Improvement' of the World. 
47 Anne Godlewska and Neil Smith, Geography and empire (Oxford, UK; Cambridge, Mass., 1994). 
Felix Driver, Geography militant: cultures of exploration in the age of empire (Oxford, 1999). 
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SOUTH AMERICAN ANTARCTICA 
In Argentina and Chile, the history of the Antarctic sovereignty dispute was 
closely connected with the development of nationalism in both countries.  
Nationalism, like imperialism, is a notoriously difficult term to define.48  The 
meaning and connotations of “nation” and “nationalism” change with time, as does 
the relationship between these two ideas.49  The term “South American nationalism” 
is used in this dissertation as a collective for the various ideologies calling 
themselves nationalist, which existed in Argentina, Chile, and other countries in the 
region during the middle decades of the twentieth century.50 “Argentine nationalism” 
and “Chilean nationalism” were contested terms: not only did Argentine nationalism 
compete with Chilean nationalism and vice-versa, but also various strands of 
Argentine and Chilean nationalism competed internally with each other.  Over the 
course of the Antarctic sovereignty dispute, governments in Buenos Aires and 
Santiago attempted, with some success, to harness the question of Antarctic 
sovereignty to a unifying idea of national identity.  Argentines and Chileans had not 
always felt so strongly about Antarctica, but between 1939 and 1959, the fact that the 
                                                 
48 The Oxford English Dictionary defines nationalism as: “Advocacy of or support for the interests of 
one's own nation, esp. to the exclusion or detriment of the interests of other nations. Also: advocacy of 
or support for national independence or self-determination.”  It defines nation, most broadly as: “A 
people or group of peoples; a political state.” 
49 Despite an extensive literature, there are no universally accepted definitions of the terms 
“nationalism” and “nation.”  See, for example, Anthony D. Smith, Theories of nationalism, Harper 
torchbooks (New York, 1972). Ernest Gellner, Nations and nationalism, New perspectives on the past 
(Ithaca, 1983). Benedict R. O'G Anderson, Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and 
spread of nationalism (London, 1983). Umut Özkirimli, Contemporary debates on nationalism: a 
critical engagement (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York, 2005). 
50 For a specific discussion of nationalism in Latin America, see Sarah A. Radcliffe and Sallie 
Westwood, Remaking the nation: place, identity and politics in Latin America (London; New York, 
1996).  For a discussion of the literature on Latin American nationalism, see Nicola Miller, "The 
historiography of nationalism and national identity in Latin America," Nations and Nationalism 12 
(2006). 
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Antarctic Peninsula belonged to Argentina or Chile became a fact that could be 
agreed upon by a significant number – perhaps even a large majority – of Argentines 
and Chileans.  Such sentiments might be termed “territorial nationalism,” and in 
Argentina these feelings became closely connected with the irrendenta of Las 
Malvinas.51  By the end of the 1950s, such passionate beliefs would make any 
resolution of the Antarctic sovereignty dispute extremely difficult.  
The countries that would become Argentina and Chile gained their 
independence from Spain at the beginning of the nineteenth century.  In the wars for 
independence, armies from both sides of the Andes Mountains fought together 
against Spanish loyalists.  But despite the existence of vague hopes for continental 
unity, separate “Nation States” became the norm throughout South America.  As 
Argentines and Chileans attempted to create distinct national identities, they sought 
to distance themselves from each other.  Since they shared a similar religion, culture, 
language, ethnic-composition and history, environmental differences were among the 
few traditional markers of national identity that distinguished the two countries.  The 
idea of territory and territorial integrity consequently played a central role in defining 
Argentine and Chilean national identities.52 The Andes Mountains, for example, 
formed a looming frontier that added a sense of “natural difference” to their 
imagined communities.53 
                                                 
51 Carlos Escudé, La patología del nacionalismo argentino (Argentina, 1991). 
52 This is demonstrated by the popularity of “geo-politics” in both countries.  See, for example, Klaus 
Dodds and David Atkinson, Geopolitical traditions: a century of geopolitical thought, Critical 
geographies (London; New York, 2000). 
53 Anderson, Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. 
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For the first century after independence, territorial expansionism 
characterized the histories of both Argentina and Chile.54  Alongside the internal 
consolidation of their own territories, the two countries looked outwards with a view 
to enlarging their frontiers.  This expansionism brought the neighboring countries 
into competition, and the subsequent rivalry further helped to forge the developing 
sense of Argentine and Chilean national identity.  Following a protracted war against 
Paraguay, Argentina consolidated its possession of the Misiones and Chaco 
provinces in the north.  Then, after a genocidal war against the indigenous 
populations of the south, the Argentine state expanded into the vast Patagonian 
region on the eastern side of the Andes.  To the west, Chile gained control of the 
valuable nitrate fields of the Atacama Desert, took possession of Easter Island in the 
Pacific Ocean, and also expanded southwards into western Patagonia.  The combined 
Argentine and Chilean conquest of Patagonia, in particular, can be seen as a 
continental expansion similar to that of the United States into the West.55  Social 
Darwinism provided an ideology for this South American expansionism, and from a 
certain perspective – defining imperialism as the assertive actions of a dominant 
power in an unequal relationship – then this expansionism might itself be described 
as a form of imperialism.56  But unlike the British, few Argentines or Chileans 
considered their activities to be explicitly imperial.  In fact, in a similar fashion to the 
United States, a deep sense of anti-imperialism shaped the national identities of 
                                                 
54 For good general histories of Argentina and Chile, see respectively, David Rock, Argentina, 1516-
1987: from Spanish colonization to the Falklands War and Alfonsín (London, 1987)., and Simon 
Collier and William F. Sater, A history of Chile, 1808-2002, 2nd. ed., Cambridge Latin American 
studies (Cambridge [England]; New York, N.Y., 2004). 
55 C. A. M. Hennessy, The frontier in Latin American history, Histories of the American frontier 
(Albuquerque, 1978). 
56 Evelyn Fishburn and Eduardo L. Ortiz, Science and the creative imagination in Latin America 
(London, 2005). 
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Argentina and Chile due to their formation in the independence struggles against 
Spanish colonialism. 
Over time, the Governments of Argentina and Chile began to show a certain 
interest in the Peninsula region of Antarctica, directly to the south of South America.   
This interest can be seen as a continuation of the expansionist post-colonial histories 
of the two countries, and of the rivalry between them.  In the early nineteenth 
century, Argentine and Chilean citizens had played some role in the self-destructive 
sealing industry, but this participation went largely undocumented. 57   It was only at 
the very end of the nineteenth century, with the advent of Antarctic whaling and the 
beginning of the heroic era, that the two countries began to take a more public 
interest in Antarctica.   In 1904, Argentine capital founded the Pesca whaling 
company that operated out of South Georgia.58  This was the first commercial 
whaling company to operate in the Antarctic region.  Chileans founded a company to 
operate from Deception Island although it was less successful and would later be 
taken over by a Norwegian company.  Both of these enterprises served to 
demonstrate active Argentine and Chilean interest in the region.   
Although neither Argentina nor Chile played a direct role in the heroic era of 
Antarctic exploration with expeditions of their own, both countries were caught up in 
the excitement of the times.  Several expeditions stopped at Buenos Aires or 
Valparaíso on their way to and from Antarctica.  The Swedish expedition of Otto 
Von Nordenskjold particularly caught the Argentine imagination, partly because one 
                                                 
57 Due to the clandestine nature of sealing, in which knowledge of seal colonies tended to be kept a 
closely guarded secret, this interest went largely undocumented. 
58 Ian B. Hart, Pesca: the history of Compañia Argentina de Pesca Sociedad Anónima of Buenos 
Aires: an account of the pioneer modern whaling and sealing company in the Antarctic, Rev. ed. 
(Salcombe, 2002). 
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of the participants was the Argentine José María Sobral.59  When Nordenskjold’s 
ship the Antarctic became trapped in the ice, the Argentine government dispatched 
one of its naval vessels the Uruguay under the command of Irizar to rescue the 
stranded expedition.60  The rescue mission was a success and the Uruguay received a 
hero’s welcome upon its return to Buenos Aires.   Several years later, in 1916, it 
would be Chile’s turn to take part in a similar drama with the rescue of the crew of 
Ernest Shackleton’s wrecked Endurance.  Captain Prado sailed the Yelcho to 
Elephant Island on the tip of the Antarctic Peninsula, famously saving every single 
member of Shackleton’s expedition.61 
One year after the rescue of Nordenskjold, the Argentine government took 
over the running of a meteorological station on Laurie Island in the South Orkneys, 
which had recently been constructed by the Scottish explorer William Speirs 
Bruce.62   Since the British Government showed no interest in its upkeep, Bruce 
offered the station to the Argentine government.  Vaguely aware of the connections 
between the weather and climate of southern Argentina and the weather and climate 
of Antarctica, the Argentine government of General Julio A. Roca accepted the offer.  
An annual relief expedition maintained a small meteorological observation party on 
the remote island.  For almost forty years this station would be the most southerly 
part of the world to be permanently occupied, and the station produced the longest 
continuous series of meteorological readings from the Antarctic region. The 
                                                 
59 See, José M. Sobral and Jorge Rabassa, Dos años entre los hielos, 1901-1903 (Buenos Aires, 
2003). Laurio Hedelvio Destéfani, El alférez Sobral y la soberanía argentina en la Antártida (Buenos 
Aires, 1974). 
60 La Argentina en los mares antárticos,  (Buenos Aires, 1903). Laurio Hedelvio Destéfani, 100 años 
de un rescate épico en la Antártida: Nordenskjöld, Sobral, Irizar (Buenos Aires, 2003). 
61 Alfred Lansing, Endurance; Shackleton's incredible voyage, [1st ed. (New York, 1959).  In general 
the Chilean role in the rescue is not given much prominence in the Englsih language literature. 
62 P. Speak, William Speirs Bruce: polar explorer and Scottish nationalist (Edinburgh, 2003). 
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maintenance of this station would later prove very useful in demonstrating 
Argentina’s legal “effective occupation” of at least one part of the Antarctic 
Peninsula region.63 
In the face of potential rivalry in Antarctica, representatives from the 
Argentine and Chilean governments held meetings in 1906 and 1908 in an attempt to 
define a common frontier in the Peninsula region.64  Although these talks broke 
down without agreement, a vague idea of an “American Antarctica” began to 
emerge.65   Promoted most fervently by the Chilean geographer Luis Risopatrón, the 
idea of an American Antarctica proposed that the geological continuity of the Andes 
Mountains into the Antarctic Peninsula region suggested that this area was part of 
South America, and therefore belonged to the nations of the Western Hemisphere.  
Over time, the idea of an “American Antarctica” would develop into the more 
specific idea of a “South American Antarctica” belonging to Argentina and Chile.  
The use of the Antarctic environment itself to make a case for Argentine and Chilean 
sovereignty laid the basis for the “environmental nationalism” that the two South 
American countries would use against British imperial claims to environmental 
authority in Antarctica between 1939 and 1959.  In the short term, however, the idea 
of an American Antarctica reflected the inability of Argentina and Chile to reach any 
agreement concerning Antarctic sovereignty, and the breakdown of these talks 
highlighted the developing territorial rivalry between the two countries.  Following 
                                                 
63 Within international law “Effective Occupation” provides one of the strongest legal cases for 
sovereignty over a region.  The precise definition of what constitutes effective occupation in 
Antarctica would be contested throughout the sovereignty dipute.  The East Greenland Case (1933) 
appeared to reduce the requirements for effective occupation in polar regions.  See, for example, Puig, 
La Antártida argentina ante el derecho. 
64 Eugenio A. Genest and Instituto Antártico Argentino, Antartida sudamericana aportes para su 
comprension (Buenos Aires, 2001). 
65 Luis Risopatrón, La Antártida americana (Santiago, 1908).   
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the British claim to the Falkland Islands Dependencies in 1908, neither Argentina 
nor Chile would do much to advance their interests in Antarctica until the decade of 
the 1930s. 
Despite the post-colonial history of expansion in both countries, by the early 
decades of the twentieth century, popular perceptions in Argentina and Chile tended 
to be shaped by the idea of territorial loss.66  These feelings were closely connected 
with the emergence of new and more virulent strains of popular nationalist ideology 
in both countries.67  In Argentina, this developing popular nationalism set itself 
against the traditional “patriotism” of the elites, and condemned the “sell-out” 
relationship between Argentina’s upper classes and the British Empire.  Nationalist 
attacks on British possession of the Islas Malvinas and Antártida Argentina offered 
the ideal complement to their somewhat vague attacks on British economic 
imperialism in Argentina itself.68    Early in 1939, concerned British diplomats 
translated a nationalist pamphlet published by the Alliance of Nationalist Youth 
during celebrations of the anniversary of the “re-conquest” of Buenos Aires from the 
British during the Napoleonic Wars.69  The pamphlet linked these various 
grievances: 
                                                 
66 Carlos Escudé, Education, political culture, and foreign policy: the case of Argentina ([Durham, 
N.C.], 1992). 
67 For a discussion of the emergence of right wing ideologies in Argentina see Sandra McGee 
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132 years ago the native people of this country made the  
ENGLISH 
invaders bite the dust of defeat in the streets of Buenos Aires.  Today the 
vanquished of 1806 and 1807 dominate our Islas Malvinas (Falkland Islands) 
of which they deprived us by violence thus doing honour to their well 
established fame as 
PIRATES 
And now they are endeavouring to take possession of Antarctic Regions 
under Argentine sovereignty.  At the same time they control the essential 
factors which govern our economic life, and while they wax rich as a result of 
our Railways, our Urban Transport Systems and our Frigoríficos, the native 
population of the country suffers hunger and misery.  This is why we now 
proclaim the necessity for 
ANOTHER RECONQUEST. 
 
This emerging nationalism was explicitly anti-imperial, although it lost none of its 
expansionist, imperialist undertones and, it looked increasingly to European fascism 
for its inspiration.70  
In turn, this assertive Argentine nationalism worried nationalists in Chile, and 
helped to precipitate formal statements of Chilean ownership of the Antarctic 
Peninsula region. A feeling persisted among certain individuals that the whole of 
Patagonia belonged to them, and that Argentina’s southward expansion had taken 
lands that were rightfully Chilean.71  By the 1930s, the predominance of British 
                                                 
70 In fact, British diplomats suspected a German role in the production of such propaganda, see, for 
example, Ovey to Halifax, 21 October 1939.  TNA, CO 78/211/9. 
71 A leading proponent of this belief was Ramón Cañas Montalva, who would later become one of 
Chile’s leading Antarctic figures.  For a list of his writings see Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional, 
Donación General Cañas Montalva: Catálogo del Fondo Bibliográfico (Santiago, 1972). 
 27 
economic interests in Chile had long since declined, and there was less general anti-
British sentiment than in Argentina.72  Somewhat paradoxically, however, since the 
two South American nations shared many of the same legal arguments for Antarctic 
sovereignty it made sense, at times, for the Chileans to make common cause with the 
Argentines against the British, especially given the general post-Second World War 
zeitgeist of anti-imperialism.  It was out of this loose, and suspicious alliance that the 
idea of a South American Antarctica would reemerge during the 1940s and 1950s.    
 Given the centrality of the clash between British imperialism and South 
American nationalism, the history of the Antarctic sovereignty dispute should be 
seen within the broader context of European decolonization that was taking place at 
this time.73   Britain claimed the Falkland Islands Dependencies as a formal part of 
its Colonial Empire, painted pink on imperial maps.  Argentines and Chileans, in 
contrast, argued that the Antarctic Peninsula was an “integral part” of their national 
territories.  Therefore, according to South American nationalists, British pretensions 
to ownership of the Antarctic Peninsula region represented a claim to the colonial 
annexation of their territory.  From this perspective, South American nationalism 
might be considered a form of anti-colonial nationalism, and both countries drew 
inspiration from the worldwide campaign against European imperialism.  At the 
same time, however, despite the rhetoric of anti-imperialism in both Argentina and 
Chile, South American nationalists could never entirely escape the expansionist 
nature of their claims to Antarctica.  Even as they campaigned against the British 
                                                 
72 By the time of the First World War, British economic interests in Chile had largely been overtaken 
by the United States and Germany.  See, Miller, Britain and Latin America in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. 
73 Most works on British decolonization make no mention of Antarctica, although some references are 
made in Hyam, Britain's declining empire: the road to decolonisation, 1918-1968. 
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Empire in Antarctica, the Argentines and Chileans were, in a sense, promoting their 
own “Frozen Empires” in the far south.     
 
 
Figure 2: Sketch Map of South Orkney Islands. 
 
THE ANTARCTIC ENVIRONMENT 
Rather than merely being the stage upon which the contest between British 
Imperialism and South American nationalism took place, the Antarctic environment 
– and changing human perceptions of that environment – played dynamic roles in the 
course of the Antarctic Sovereignty dispute.  Writing about the natural history of the 
Antarctic Peninsula, the marine biologist Sanford Moss notes: 
 
Even though Antarctica is the fifth largest of the continents, it has the fewest 
forms of life inhabiting it.  This fact provides unparalleled opportunities for 
naturalists.  The plants and animals that visit, breed, and in some instances 
thrive here are of special interest to students of natural history.  They offer 
one of the least complex webs of ecological interrelationships to be found on 
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earth.  This is the place for the ecologist to formulate and test theory.  At the 
same time the adaptations, which make life possible for Antarctic plants and 
animals are often very special indeed.  They make wonderful study 
opportunities for the anatomist, the physiologist, and the evolutionist.74 
 
In a similar fashion, the relative simplicity of the Antarctic environment makes it 
easier to understand the interactions between human understanding, human activity, 
and the natural world.  This in turn offers the potential for overcoming the problem 
of causation in environmental history, since it becomes possible to see how 
“historical change and causation proceed.”75  This dissertation seeks to adopt a 
dynamic model of human-nature-culture interaction as outlined by Donald Worster 
and others.76  Such an approach offers a way of finding common ground between 
excessive constructivism and excessive materialism in the writing of environmental 
history, going beyond the traditional dichotomy between humans and the natural 
world.77   
One of the most remarkable features of the Antarctic sovereignty dispute 
between Britain, Argentina, and Chile, was that the three countries would be fighting 
over a virtually unknown territory.78  In 1928, the American Geographical Society 
published a collection of essays entitled Problems of Polar Research, which 
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described the existing state of knowledge about the Polar Regions.79  As the title 
suggested, the heroic era had barely scratched the surface, and the problems of polar 
research remained numerous.  Over the course of the 1930s, several advances were 
made in scientific understanding of the Antarctic continent through the expeditions 
of Rymill, Byrd, Ellsworth and others.  However, even as the 1930s drew to a close, 
there remained huge gaps in human understanding of Antarctica as speculation 
continued to substitute for scientific knowledge.  In 1938 the Australian Department 
of the Interior published a map of Antarctica, which contained the most up to date 
information available.80  Many of the map’s coastlines were drawn as dotted lines, 
indicating that the cartographer had no idea of their exact shape; most of the interior 
was simply left blank.   
The most relatively well-known parts of the Antarctic environment were the 
physical features and marine life of the oceans surrounding the continent.81  The 
Southern Ocean begins at the Antarctic convergence at around 60º South.  As early 
as the late eighteenth century, Captain Cook had realized that abrupt changes in 
temperature, salinity, and marine life take place where the cold waters at the south of 
the world meet the relatively warmer waters of the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian 
Oceans.  To the south of the convergence Cook noted a greater abundance of whales, 
seals, and other large marine life.  The oceanographic research of the Challenger 
expedition in the late nineteenth century helped to formalize this understanding, and 
Britain’s Discovery Expeditions added more detail to this knowledge.  Navigators 
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were also aware of a general ocean circulation from west to east.  Into the 1930s, 
however, the relationship between the meteorology of Antarctica and the 
surrounding oceans remained largely unknown, as did the dynamics of sea ice 
formation, which varied greatly from year to year.  
 The greatest obstacle in the way of a thorough meteorological understanding 
of the Antarctica climate was the absence of permanent meteorological stations.82  
Before the 1940s, the only permanent meteorological station anywhere near the 
Antarctic continent was the Argentine Laurie Island station in the South Orkneys, 
which had operated since 1904.  But this was only one station in a vast region, and as 
a consequence its usefulness to synoptic meteorology or weather forecasting was 
severely limited.  Various expeditions to Antarctica had taken meteorological 
observations, but these were relatively short term and were limited by the tendency 
for local conditions to over-ride large scale ones.  Meteorologists recognized the 
hostility of the Antarctic climate, but nobody knew quite how hostile it would be.  
Many of the most basic meteorological questions could not be answered: for 
example, the Antarctic climate appeared almost too cold for snow. 
 The large blank spaces on the Australian map of 1938 reflected the problems 
inherent in mapping a region that is covered in ice.  Not only did the ice cover most 
geographical features, but also the sea ice expanded and contracted with the seasons 
creating a “continent” that was around fifty percent larger during the winter than it 
was in the summer.  During the 1930s, Antarctic glaciology was still an academic 
discipline in its infancy, and nobody knew the depth of the continental Antarctic ice.  
Estimates varied wildly, but there was a tendency to assume that that the ice would 
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be relatively thin.  This “thin ice” hypothesis assumed that the Antarctic would be 
going through a similar period of glacial retreat that could be observed in the 
northern hemisphere.83  The thickness of the ice would therefore have important 
implications for the world’s climatic history.   
 The presence of ice also provided a major obstacle to geologists.  Until the 
1930s, nobody knew whether the Antarctic Peninsula was even attached to the 
Antarctic continent at all.  It was not until the British Rymill expedition of 1934-37, 
that the region was confirmed as a peninsula.84  Even then, geologists remained 
uncertain whether a large channel separated East and West Antarctica, and whether 
Antarctica might in fact be two continents, or an archipelago of small islands.  The 
nature of the land beneath the ice remained an almost complete mystery.  Less than 
two per cent of the land surface of Antarctica was free from the ice, giving geologists 
a severely limited area in which to work.  In geology in particular, the large gaps in 
the scientific understanding of tended to be filled with fantastic speculation about the 
potential mineral wealth and utility of the continent.  Much of this speculation came 
from non-scientists, but scientists themselves were not above suggesting that a 
continent the size of Antarctica would likely contain some riches, especially if in so 
doing they could win support for their research.  In the minds of many policy 
makers, Antarctica became a “Frozen El Dorado” brimming with mineral wealth.85  
This fantasy would have important political implications.   
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AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF DECOLONIZATION 
The Antarctic sovereignty dispute presents an opportunity to write an 
“environmental history of decolonization.”  At the center of the clash between 
British Imperialism and Latin American Nationalism was the contest over 
environmental authority.  Throughout the twenty-year dispute, the Argentines and 
Chileans challenged the assertions of scientific and administrative authority that the 
British used to legitimize their sovereignty claims.  In thinking about what happened 
to British imperial claims to “dominion over nature” during the process of 
decolonization, this dissertation draws upon Louis and Robinson’s influential 
“Imperialism of Decolonization” article.86  Rather than simply conceding to the 
Argentine and Chilean challenge, the British initially redoubled their efforts to assert 
their environmental authority in the Falkland Islands Dependencies.  The South 
Americans responded by increasing their own efforts to appropriate the region.  By 
the middle of the 1950s, after all possibilities for arbitration or compromise seemed 
to be exhausted, and in response to broader strategic changes within their empire, the 
British began to reconsider their position in the Antarctic Peninsula region.  In 
alliance with the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, the British pushed for a 
“limited internationalization” of Antarctica that would retain their political influence 
without the need for formal political control.  The idea of science, and the actual 
practice of scientific research, offered a useful tool for the retention of political 
influence.  Argentina and Chile were somewhat “reluctant collaborators” in this 
process of internationalization.  But the end result was, at least in some ways, much 
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to their liking: they found themselves members of an “exclusive club” that continued 
to govern Antarctica on the basis of science for the good of humanity.  
The material reality of the Antarctic environment played an ever-present role 
in shaping the history of Antarctica: sea ice trapped ships, freezing temperatures 
killed explorers, and disintegrating ice shelves carried off scientific stations.  Equally 
importantly, changing human perceptions of the environment over the course of the 
twenty-year period of the dispute had a major influence on the history.  One of the 
causes of the dispute was the widespread belief that Antarctica might prove to be a 
“Frozen El Dorado,” brimming with mineral wealth.  This belief was based on an 
almost total absence of scientific knowledge about the Antarctic continent.  As the 
three countries fought over Antarctica, and sought to demonstrate their 
environmental authority through scientific research, they learned more about the 
region.  As they learned more, their political perceptions of the environment 
changed, especially with the dawning realization that Antarctica was not the treasure 
trove that had recently been imagined.  By acting as an important catalyst for the 
change in British policy, these changing perceptions helped to lay the foundations for 
the limited internationalization of Antarctica through the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. 
In some ways the Antarctic environment remained a constant during the 
twenty-year period of the active sovereignty dispute.  The vast Antarctic ice sheet, 
for example, which covered the interior of the continent, remained more or less 
unchanged throughout this period.87  Battling to stay alive in such a hostile climate, 
explorers and scientists barely stopped to consider that their actions could have any 
impact whatsoever on the environment.  At the same time, however, as people 
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learned more about the natural environment of Antarctica, that environment was 
itself changing, both “naturally” and as a result of human influence.  The object of 
study was never absolutely fixed.  The most dramatic environmental change that 
took place between 1939 and 1959 was the rapid and almost terminal decline of the 
Southern Ocean’s whale populations, and the associated changes in the marine eco-
system.  Since over-fishing caused this decline, it was clearly an anthropogenic 
change.  It was also probably the only large-scale environmental change that took 
place during this period that had a direct influence on the course of the sovereignty 
dispute.  As whale populations declined, the whaling industry lost its luster, further 
contributing to changing economic and political perceptions of the region.  
Chapters One and Two examine the origins of the Antarctic sovereignty 
dispute.  The immediate cause of the dispute was the escalating Argentine and 
Chilean nationalist attack upon British possession of the Falkland Islands 
Dependencies, which in Argentina came alongside a challenge to British “informal 
imperialism” in the country itself.  By the late 1930s, this nationalism was beginning 
to exercise a strong influence on government policy.  The outbreak of the Second 
World War in 1939 offered the two South American countries an opportunity to 
assert their Antarctic claims without fears of an immediate British response.  The 
Argentines and Chileans framed their claims, at least in part, in the language of 
environmental nationalism: rather than conceding environmental authority to the 
British, the South Americans attempted to argue that the Antarctic environment itself 
made a case for their sovereignty rights, especially given the geological continuity of 
the Andes mountains.  Great Britain, however, did not give up on its claims to the 
Falkland Islands Dependencies, and almost as soon as the wartime situation allowed, 
the British Government dispatched the top secret Operation Tabarin in an effort to 
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occupy the region permanently and renew Britain’s scientific labors.  An underlying 
cause of the sovereignty dispute was the fact that all three countries believed that the 
Antarctic Peninsula region was a region worth claiming and holding onto.  This 
belief was closely connected to the idea of Antarctica as a “Frozen El Dorado” 
which came out of the absence of any real scientific knowledge about Antarctica.  
Whaling was the only known source of wealth. 
Chapter Three looks at the post-war “Scramble for Antarctica” that took 
place in the southern summer of 1946-47.  The election of new governments in 
Argentina and Chile revived South American interest in Antarctic sovereignty and 
encouraged an active response to Britain’s Operation Tabarin.  During this season 
Britain, Argentina, Chile, and the United States established new bases in and around 
the Peninsula region.  Alongside their principal purpose of establishing “effective 
occupation,” these new bases all sought to conduct scientific research in order to 
support competing claims to “environmental authority.”  The Chileans, in particular, 
supplemented this scientific research with a more literary form of environmental 
nationalism, as Chilean authors transferred the myths and legends of Southern Chile 
to the shores of the Antarctic Peninsula, thereby creating something of a folkloric 
case for sovereignty.  The Scramble for Antarctica ended in controversy amidst 
mutual accusations of robbery at the abandoned US East Base at Marguerite Bay. 
Chapter Four looks at the anti-imperial rhetoric employed by Argentina and 
Chile in their case for Antarctic sovereignty.  This anti-imperialism was most intense 
between 1946 and 1948 as the governments of Perón in Argentina and González 
Videla in Chile sought to harness the global mood of anti-imperialism in order to win 
domestic support and international recognition for their cause.  In Argentina, the 
intensification of anti-imperial assertions of sovereignty in Antarctica and the 
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Malvinas coincided with an escalating attack on British economic interests in 
Argentina itself.  On the other side of the dispute, the overlap of formal and informal 
empire continued to influence the dispute as British officials found themselves 
caught between the desire to take a strong line in the defense of Antarctic 
sovereignty and the attempt to preserve political and economic interests in South 
America.  This period marked a distinct deterioration in relations between Britain 
and the two South American countries.   
Chapter Five examines the various attempts that were made to diffuse the 
escalating sovereignty dispute, and bring about a brief period of Antarctic détente.  
The United States in particular feared that war might break about over the question 
of Antarctic sovereignty to the detriment of its developing “Free World” alliance 
against the Soviet Union.  The plans proposed included United Nations trusteeship, 
an eight power condominium (involving the seven claimant powers and the United 
States), and a “standstill” agreement suggested by Chile.  Although none of these 
proposals met with any success, Britain, Argentina, and Chile agreed to pull back 
from the brink, and signed a tri-partite naval agreement before the 1948-49 season.  
The relaxation of hostilities encouraged a greater focus on scientific endeavors and 
promoted a developing understanding of the Antarctic environment, particularly in 
the field of meteorology. 
Chapters Six and Seven focus on the renewed efforts of Argentina to win the 
sovereignty dispute between 1950 and 1955.  Perón brought to an end the brief 
period of Antarctic détente by threatening to “saturate” Antarctica with Argentine 
scientific bases.  This represented an attempt to beat the British at their own imperial 
game by asserting Argentine “environmental authority” and conducting more 
scientific research of a greater quality than their territorial rivals.  During this period, 
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armed force was used in Antarctica for the first (and only) time in confrontations at 
Hope Bay and Deception Island.  For a while, it looked like Perón’s “Antarctic 
Dream” might be successful, and the purchase of an icebreaker ship and the 
construction of Base Belgrano on the coast of the Weddell Sea attested to 
Argentina’s ambitions. Chile responded by withdrawing, to some extent, from direct 
participation in the struggle for scientific supremacy.  Its own claims to 
“environmental authority” increasingly fell back upon representations of the 
Antarctic environment that would not have been widely considered “scientific”.88  
Britain responded to Perón’s assertiveness with a unilateral submission of the case to 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, hoping to draw a line under the 
increasing Argentine penetration of the region.  Britain’s submission included an 
explicit reference to environmental authority as part of its legal case for sovereignty.  
Quite predictably, neither South American country accepted the jurisdiction of the 
ICJ in a case that they regarded as a domestic concern, and the case was withdrawn.  
In the end, it would be the overthrow of Perón by a military coup in September 1955 
that brought to an end to this particularly tense period of the sovereignty dispute. 
Chapter Eight explores the growth of international interest in Antarctica that 
took place around the middle of the 1950s.  One of the most important developments 
was the initiation of a large international research project known as the International 
Geophysical Year (IGY) that would take place between 1957-58 and would have a 
particular focus on Antarctica.  Also important was an Indian proposal to raise the 
“Antarctic Question” at the United Nations.  This suggestion threatened to bring 
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about a genuine internationalization of the Antarctic continent, and was fiercely 
resisted by Britain, Argentina, and Chile.  This joint resistance ultimately proved 
successful and demonstrated that the three countries could work together for their 
common interests despite the bitter dispute in the Antarctica Peninsula.  Throughout 
the 1950s, the intensification of whaling activities in the oceans around Antarctica 
led to a rapid decline in whale populations.  International attempts to regulate 
whaling and safeguard the whale populations took place alongside the sovereignty 
dispute.  But these attempts proved largely ineffectual, and by the end of the decade 
the whaling industry was entering a period of terminal decline.    
Chapter Nine focuses on the work of the IGY of 1957-58.  This massive 
international research endeavor had a major impact on the history of the Antarctic 
sovereignty dispute.  Contrary to the traditional interpretation of the relationship of 
the IGY to the political history of Antarctica, which stresses its scientific idealism, 
this chapter suggests that the most important political consequence came from the 
science itself.  During the IGY, tremendous advances were made in the scientific 
understanding of the Antarctic environment.  These developments revealed that 
Antarctica was not the “Frozen El Dorado” of popular imagination.  In the face of 
these scientific developments, the British in particular began to rethink their 
attachment to exclusive political sovereignty in Antarctica, and began to push for a 
limited internationalization of the continent.  The South Americans were somewhat 
“reluctant collaborators” during the IGY, and they initially opposed any moves to 
internationalize the continent.   
Chapter Ten investigates the immediate background to the signature of the 
Antarctic Treaty in December 1959.  Having decided that some form of limited 
internationalization would be the best political option for Antarctica, the British 
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initiated a series of secret negotiations with the United States, Australia and New 
Zealand in an attempt to lay the foundations for such an outcome.  In May 1958 the 
United States issued invitations to the other eleven nations participating in the IGY 
to attend a series of preparatory meetings in Washington D.C. in order to discuss the 
political future of Antarctica.  This decision to invite only those nations participating 
in Antarctic scientific research created an explicit connection between Antarctic 
science and Antarctic politics.   Following almost eighteen months of negotiations, 
representatives of these twelve countries met between October and December 1959 
for the official Antarctic conference.  After a overcoming a series of problems, the 
twelve countries signed the Antarctic Treaty on 1 December 1959.  The Treaty 
suspended all sovereignty claims to Antarctica for its duration and effectively 
brought an end to the active phase of the sovereignty dispute between Britain, 
Argentina, and Chile.  The limited internationalization of the continent represented a 
success for British diplomacy: they had transferred their interests from claims to 
formal control to informal influence, without even having to give up on their 
political claims.  In Argentina and Chile the internationalization of Antarctica proved 
less popular, but in the long term the Treaty offered the two South American 
countries full participation in an “exclusive club” that governed the Southern 
Continent.  The Antarctic Treaty System that developed after 1959 would continue to 
draw its legitimacy from claims to environmental authority and might also be seen as 
a form of “Frozen Empire.” 
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Chapter 1: South American Antarctica, 1939-1943 
On the eve of the Second World War, the governments of Argentina and 
Chile began to show a renewed interest in the question of Antarctic sovereignty.  The 
immediate catalyst for this change was a Norwegian invitation to attend a polar 
conference in the city of Bergen, where the question of Antarctic sovereignty would 
be discussed.1  This invitation stimulated the Argentine and Chilean Governments to 
think anew about their legal rights to Antarctica, and both countries established 
Antarctic Commissions to study the legal basis of putting forward their claims.  In 
Argentina, the embattled, elite-dominated Concordancia government of Roberto 
Ortiz found itself increasingly under attack from intellectual and popular nationalists.  
These nationalists accused the Argentine ruling classes of “selling out” their country 
to foreign interests, especially the British.  The promotion of Argentine interests in 
Antarctica offered President Ortiz a way to appease nationalist sentiment, while 
remaining in line with the traditional “territorial nationalism” of the Argentine elite.2  
In Chile, growing Argentine interest in Antarctica was viewed with suspicion.3  
Certain Chilean officials, especially those attached to the growing philosophy of 
“geopolitics,” thought that Argentine sovereignty in Antarctica would pose a direct 
challenge to their country’s security and they pressed their government to take pre-
emptive action. 
                                                 
1 Given their substantial interest in the Antarctic whaling industry, the Norwegian Government was 
keen on clarifying the legal situation of Antarctica.  Norway was also on the verge of making its own 
claim to a different part of Antarctica (Queen Maud Land, to the East of the Weddell Sea) in an effort 
to pre-empt a claim by Nazi Germany. Martin, A history of Antarctica. 189-190. 
2 For several years, the Argentine Government had been making periodic references to its possession 
of the South Orkney Islands. See Puig, La Antártida argentina ante el derecho. 
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Alongside the latent belief in both Argentina and Chile that Antarctica 
belonged to their respective countries, growing speculation about the economic 
potential of Antarctica heightened South American interest in the southern continent.  
The greatest promoter of Antarctica as a frozen El Dorado was the renowned US 
polar explorer Admiral Richard E. Byrd.  In late 1939, Byrd set off for an expedition 
to Antarctica that would be his third, but the first to have the official sponsorship of 
the US Government.  President Roosevelt handed the Admiral instructions to prepare 
a case for a US claim to sovereignty.  The expedition took with it observers from 
Argentina and Chile.  In early 1941, after two sections of the expedition had spent a 
winter in Antarctica, the expedition was canceled due to international pressures of 
war.  Nevertheless, Admiral Byrd reported to a Congressional hearing that his 
expedition had discovered no fewer than 147 different minerals in Antarctica, 
including gold, iron, copper, magnesium, zinc and petroleum.4  These reports would 
be widely repeated in South America, as the governments of Argentina and Chile 
looked for ways to justify their growing interest in Antarctica.  
The outbreak of the Second World War offered the two South American 
countries an opportunity to pursue their reawakened territorial ambitions in 
Antarctica with relative impunity.  While Argentina and Chile remained obstinately 
neutral, Great Britain – the only country with formal sovereignty claims to the 
Antarctic Peninsula region – became embroiled in a desperate struggle for survival.  
In the early years of the war, there would be very little that the British could do to 
protect their interests in Antarctica.5   In November 1940, after misreading US 
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intentions, the Chilean Government took the initiative and made a formal claim to 
the sector between 53°W and 90°W, which over-lapped substantially with Britain’s 
Falkland Islands Dependencies.  The Chileans were at pains to make clear that this 
was not a new claim, but rather a clarification of the extent of an existing claim that 
went all the way back to the Treaty of Tordesillas between Spain and Portugal of 
1494.  Shortly after the Chilean claim, the leaders of the respective Antarctic 
Commissions, the Argentine Ruíz Moreno and the Chilean Julio Escudero, met to 
discuss the question of sovereignty in Antarctica.  The Escudero-Ruíz Moreno 
negotiations failed to reach an agreement on the respective boundaries between the 
two countries in Antarctica, but they did reach agreement over the fact that the 
Peninsula region belonged to South America, and not to some distant colonialist 
country.6 
The idea of a South American Antarctica that emerged out of the Escudero-
Ruíz Moreno negotiations offers a fascinating example of a South American identity 
that transcended the nation state, at least for Chileans and Argentines.7  It also 
provides an early case study of South American “environmental nationalism.”  
Implicit in the idea of a South American Antarctica was the sense that the Antarctic 
Peninsula region belonged to Argentina and Chile, not just legally and historically, 
but also environmentally and geographically.  Geological continuity, shared weather 
systems, and paleontological evidence of similar flora and fauna provided “proof” 
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that the Antarctic Peninsula region was part of South America.  Such environmental 
nationalism presented a challenge to British claims of scientific authority in the 
region.  However, almost from its inception, the idea of South American Antarctica 
began to break down.  The idea was founded on mutual suspicion rather than a 
genuine alliance.  The Argentine expeditions that sailed to Antarctica in the middle 
years of the Second World War did so specifically to promote Argentine sovereignty, 




Figure 3: Sketch Map of Antarctic Peninsula Region. 
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THE CONFERENCE OF BERGEN 
In the middle of 1938, a Norwegian invitation to attend a polar conference in 
the city of Bergen began to reawaken Argentine and Chilean interest in the 
Antarctica.  In the context of Antarctica in 1938, Norway was one of the few non-
claimant countries to have any interest in the question of Antarctic sovereignty 
because of the massive Norwegian interest in the Antarctic whaling industry.8  In an 
attempt to resolve the question of sovereignty, the Norwegian government proposed 
to hold an international conference that would include all countries with an interest 
in Antarctica.  Great Britain, Argentina and Chile were among the countries invited 
to attend.  The invitation stimulated the two South American republics to start to 
think about their own rights to sovereignty in the Antarctic Continent, and how best 
they could assert these rights.   
Before the Bergen conference could be held, the Norwegian government 
accelerated its plans to make a sovereignty claim.  On 14 January 1939, facing the 
threat that Nazi Germany might annex large parts of Antarctica, the Norwegian 
Government issued a decree claiming for Norway the coasts of Dronning Maud 
Land, to the east of the Weddell Sea.  Upon hearing of the Norwegian claim, the 
Government of Chile expressly reserved “all and any right that the government of 
Chile might have upon the Antarctic territories in question.”9  The Chilean Foreign 
Ministry explained to its Consul that it was proceeding in this manner not because 
the territory was claimed by Chile, but because it was not certain that Chilean rights 
did not exist.  The Chilean reaction to the Norwegian claim demonstrates a renewed 
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interest in the Antarctic regions, tinged with an element of uncertainty.  Argentina 
shared with Chile this feeling of latent sovereignty rights, and in 1939 both countries 
set out to investigate exactly what their rights to the region were.    
In June 1939, the Argentine government of President Ortiz established a 
provisional Antarctic Commission in order to prepare Argentina’s position for the 
Conference of Bergen.10  The provisional commission was headed by Dr. Isidoro 
Ruíz Moreno, a distinguished international lawyer with close connections to the 
Foreign Minister.  It also included Captain Francisco J. Clarizza, representative of 
the Navy, and Alfredo G. Galmarini, representative of the Ministry of Agriculture.  
The text of the decree that created the provisional commission suggests that the 
Argentine government was already thinking in terms of how to make a case for 
Argentine sovereignty in the Antarctic continent: 
 
That the geographic position of its territory, situated in the most southern part 
of South America, assigns to Argentina, for both scientific and political 
reasons, a natural right to participate in the questions surrounding the 
problems of the Antarctic Continent. The geological similarity with our own 
territory, just as its probable link to the continent is also a fact that is worth 
elucidating.11  
 
At this moment, the Argentine government was using effective occupation, 
geographical proximity, geological continuity and scientific investigation to support 
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Argentina’s rights to a place at the negotiating table.12  But soon these very same 
arguments would be used to make a case for Argentine sovereignty in Antarctica. 
The formation of the provisional Antarctic Commission in Argentina under 
the leadership of Ruíz Moreno was a “top down” initiative.  But it also had its roots 
in the escalating nationalist challenge to the Argentine elite and their collaborative 
relationship with Great Britain.  A strong policy in Antarctica offered President 
Ortiz’s ailing government an opportunity to demonstrate its nationalist credentials in 
the face of stringent nationalist attacks. Faced with the prospect of the international 
discussion of Antarctic sovereignty rights at the conference of Bergen, the liberal 
nationalists of the Ortiz government wanted to know what the Argentine rights were.  
The announcement that Argentina would participate in the Bergen Conference to 
assert its sovereignty in Antarctica was made on 24 July 1939.13 
One month after the formation of the provisional Argentine Antarctic 
Commission, Señor Cantilo, the Argentine Minister of Foreign Relations handed a 
note to the Chilean Ambassador in Buenos Aires inviting Chile to collaborate with 
Argentina at the conference of Bergen.14  In September, Chilean President Pedro 
Aguirre Cerda issued a decree that created a Chilean Antarctic Commission.  This 
Commission, under the control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had a similar remit 
to its Argentine equivalent: to study Chilean titles to Antarctica.  The Commission 
was made up of Julio Escudero, a distinguished international lawyer, and 
Comandante Enrique Cordovez Madariaga, a retired Naval Captain who had headed 
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the Navy’s Institute of Navigation and Hydrography.  The timing of the decree, 
coming so soon after the creation of the Argentine Commission and Cantilo’s 
suggestion of co-operation, suggests that to some extent Chile was responding to 
Argentine initiatives.  But at the same time, as the earlier Chilean reply to the 
Norwegian claim had shown, the Chileans believed that they too might also have 
some rights to sovereignty in Antarctica. 
Unlike in Argentina, where the Antarctic question was connected to the issue 
of the Malvinas, Chilean interest in Antarctica at this stage lacked any real popular 
dimension.15  Instead, a small group of officials, centered upon the nascent Antarctic 
Commission, provided the driving force behind Chilean interest in the Southern 
Continent.  These officials shared something of the “liberal nationalism” of the 
Argentine elites, but with important differences.  Even more so than in Argentina, 
the notion of territorial loss marked the consciousness of the Chilean “official mind”.  
In 1881 Chile and Argentina had signed a treaty that left most of Patagonia under 
Argentine control.  With hindsight, certain Chileans had come to be very critical of 
this treaty, believing that the whole of Patagonia should have been Chilean territory.  
They wanted to be sure that such an error caused by careless oversight of Chilean 
rights would never happen again.16  Chilean officials therefore studied the Antarctic 
question with a view to showing that much of the Peninsula region belonged to 
Chile.  The more evidence they accumulated to support the Chilean case, the greater 
the fear became that Chile would once again lose its rightful territory.  Such fear 
                                                 
15 Enrique Cordovez Madariaga, La Antártida sudamericana (Santiago, Chile, 1945). 
16 Enrique Cordovez Madariaga, Newspaper Article written for distribution to provincial press: “La 
Antártica y Sus Posibilidades”, without date.  RR.EE., “Antártida Chilena, Varios, 1940-48”. 
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became a constant theme in the vocabulary of Escudero, Cordovez and others with 
an interest in the “Antarctic Problem.”   
On 9 September 1939, Great Britain declared war on Nazi Germany and 
began an all-embracing struggle that would last for nearly six years. The 
governments of Chile and Argentina, along with all other American republics, 
adopted a position of official neutrality.17  As an immediate consequence of the war, 
plans for the conference of Bergen had to be abandoned and the immediate prospects 
of resolving the question of Antarctic sovereignty through an international 
conference disappeared.  However, the interest in Antarctica that the invitation to the 
conference of Bergen had reawakened in South America did not go away.  With 
Britain obviously distracted by events in Europe, opportunities for the two South 
American countries to assert their claims to Antarctica increased.  With reference to 
Argentina, J.V. Perowne, head of the South American Department at the British 
Foreign Office noted: 
 
In normal times the Argentine Government probably do not regard the satisfaction 
of their claims to the Falkland Islands and their dependencies as a matter of practical 
politics, but as they have no other irredenta it is no doubt useful for them to keep the 
pot boiling.  Now that we are at war hopes of acquiring our possessions in the South 
Atlantic are probably a good deal higher.18 
 
Any direct action by Argentina to assert sovereignty in the inhabited Falkland 
Islands themselves would have constituted a hostile act of aggression.  In contrast, 
the unpopulated Antarctic Peninsula appeared to offer the governments of both 
Argentina and Chile a region where they could flex their nationalist muscles without 
                                                 
17 R. A. Humphreys, Latin America and the Second World War, 2 vols. (London, 1981). 
18 J.V. Perowne, Minute, 25 October 1939.  TNA, FO 371/22714. 
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directly confronting British nationals.  More importantly, in the uncertainty of 1939 
it appeared very possible that Britain might lose the war.  Should this happen, 
Argentina and Chile would be in line to assume sovereignty in the region. 
One of the severest threats to the British war effort was the possibility that 
Germany would cut off supplies to the British Isles.  In the battle to keep Britain fed, 
the South Atlantic would become one of the most important battlefields.19  The 
strategic importance of the British possessions in the South Atlantic was therefore 
profoundly connected to the commerce between Great Britain and South America, 
especially with Argentina.  Over the course of the war, Britain would receive 40% of 
its beef from Argentina in exchange for blocked sterling balances that would 
accumulate in London.20  German boats and submarines operating in the South 
Atlantic threatened this important source of food.  The islands and bays of the 
Falkland Islands and the Antarctic Peninsula potentially offered strategic bases for 
the German boats.  By controlling these regions the British believed that they could 
minimize the German threat.  In British eyes, the Argentine claims to the Falkland 
Islands and the Falkland Islands Dependencies therefore had the potential to threaten 
the export of foodstuffs from Argentina.21  Such a paradoxical situation, with 
Argentina seen as both a friend and an enemy, laid the peculiar foundations for the 
Antarctic sovereignty dispute as it would develop over the course of the Second 
World War.   
                                                 
19 The strategic importance of the South Atlantic had been revealed by the Battle of the Falkland 
Islands in the First World War, and would be very soon shown again in the Battle of the River Plate in 
December 1939. Mary Cawkell, The Falkland Islands (London, 1960). 151-159. 
20 Mario Rapoport, "Imagenes de la Política Exterior Argentina.  Tres Enfoques Tradicionales," in La 
Política Exterior Argentina y Sus Protagonistas, 1880-1995, ed. Silvia Ruth Jalabe (Buenos Aires, 
1996), 45. 
21 This threat was perceived to be even greater due to the connections that existed between certain 
Argentine Nationalists and Nazi Germany. 
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FROZEN EL DORADO 
With South American interest in Antarctica growing ever greater throughout 
1939, the attitude of the United States towards the region complicated the situation 
still further.  In late 1939 a two-part US expedition under the command of Admiral 
Richard E. Byrd set sail for Antarctica.22  In the 1930s, Admiral Byrd had become 
the world’s most famous living Antarctic explorer.  With his traditional Naval career 
cut short by recurrent injuries, Byrd turned to naval aviation as a way to 
advancement.  After flying across the Atlantic he progressed to Antarctica as a stage 
for his adventure.  In his first expedition to Antarctica in 1929-1930 Byrd became the 
first man to fly over the South Pole.  In his second expedition, he set out to become 
the first man to spend an Antarctic winter on his own at an inland station.  Byrd was 
a true Antarctic visionary.  In his best-selling account of his second expedition, 
Alone, he had set out a plan for colonies in Antarctica that would rectify the 
problems of the world.23  Antarctica, he believed, offered human civilization a 
possibility for a new beginning, cleansed of the sordid realities of the twentieth 
century. But he was also a formidable “Antarctic Booster,” acutely aware of the 
financial needs of Antarctic exploration.  In both of his first two expeditions, Byrd 
had perfected the art of attracting private sponsorship through speculating about the 
economic potential of the southern continent. 
 
Byrd’s expedition of 1939 was the first to be officially sponsored by the US 
government. Until then, the basic US position with regards to sovereignty in the 
                                                 
22 Headland, Chronological list of Antarctic expeditions and related historical events. 
23 Richard Evelyn Byrd, Alone (New York, 1938). 
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Southern Continent had been set by the Hughes Doctrine of non-recognition of 1924: 
the United States refused to recognize any sovereignty claims in Antarctica while 
reserving its own right to make a claim to any part of the continent.24  On this 
expedition, however, Byrd took with him instructions from President Roosevelt to 
perform acts of possession in various parts of the Antarctic Continent, which could 
form the basis of a potential US claim.  Byrd also set out to assess the economic 
potential of Antarctica for the United States.  He knew that political interest in 
Antarctica was dependent upon its economic potential, and that funding for future 
expeditions depended, at least in part, on the possibility of finding mineral resources.  
As a consequence, Byrd was very keen to suggest that Antarctica was a frozen El 
Dorado, brimming with mineral wealth.   
The Byrd expedition established two bases: Little America III on the Ross 
Sea, and East Base in the contested Antarctic Peninsula region.  During the long 
Antarctic winter of 1940, both sections of Byrd’s expedition conducted a program of 
scientific research.  Among the principal scientific objectives of Byrd’s expedition 
was an economic survey of the Antarctic continent.  Upon his return, Byrd testified 
before the Congressional Sub-Committee on Appropriations committee that his 
expedition had discovered 147 different types of minerals in Antarctica including 
iron, coal, and petroleum.25  These findings really said nothing about the economic 
                                                 
24 H.R. Hall, "The ‘Open Door’ into Antarctica: An Explanation of the Hughes Doctrine," Polar 
Record 25 (1989).  The Hughes doctrine reserved the right of the United States to make a claim to 
Antarctic territory while refusing to recognize the claims made by other countries: “It is the opinion of 
this department that the discovery of lands unknown to civilization, even when coupled with the 
formal taking of possession, does not support a valid claim of sovereignty unless the discovery is 
followed by actual settlement of the discovered country.” Quoted in Martin, A history of 
Antarctica.167.  More recently, British titles to the Falkland Islands Dependencies had been 
challenged by Professor Hobbs of the University of Michigan, in the Transactions of the American 
Philosophical Society.  See, Bertram to Wiseman, 26 April 1940.  TNA, FO371/24168. 
25 Pinochet de la Barra, La Antártica Chilena. 164.  Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Appropriations 76th Congress, 1st and 3rd Sessions. 
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potential of Antarctica, since the discoveries were often minuscule.  But Byrd’s 
enthusiastic belief in a frozen El Dorado would prove to be contagious.  South 
American authors repeatedly quoted his findings.  The results helped to convince 
both the Argentine and Chilean Antarctic Commissions that sovereignty claims 
would be worth making.   
Renewed US interest in Antarctic sovereignty – coming as it did at the same 
time as renewed South American interest – posed a problem for pan-American 
relations.  Roosevelt’s “good neighbor” policy aimed to create a harmonious pan-
American alliance between all the countries of the American continent.  The interest 
of Chile and Argentina in the Antarctic Peninsula meant that any US claim to the 
region would not only undermine Britain’s claims to sovereignty, but also present a 
snub to the two South American countries.  In an effort to reassure the two South 
American countries, the US sent them both a letter expressing a vague notion of 
American solidarity and inviting them each to send two officials on the expedition.26  
In stark contrast, the US government did not even inform the British that an 
expedition was leaving for territory Britain claimed as its own.27  At this stage, 
United States’ sympathies were clearly on the side of an “American Antarctica”, 
even if their own interests came above those of Chile and Argentina.   
While the two sections of Admiral Byrd’s expedition were still in the process 
of establishing American bases in Antarctica the US government sent another letter 
                                                 
26 Genest and Instituto Antártico Argentino, Antartida sudamericana aportes para su comprension. 
84. 
27 Bertram to Wiseman, 26 April 1940.  TNA, FO 371/24168.  Although no official notification had 
been given to the British, letters between scientists revealed not only that the United States was 
intending to set up a base in the Falkland Islands Dependencies, but also that the intention was to keep 
this base occupied for a number of years.  As a leading British polar scientist, Bertram pleaded with 
the Government that the question of British sovereignty in Antarctica “should not be allowed to lapse 
entirely.” 
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to the governments of Chile and Argentina.28  Reflecting Byrd’s belief in Antarctica 
as a frozen El Dorado, the letter explained that the American expeditions were 
researching and studying the lands and seas of Antarctica with a particular focus on 
the continent’s natural resources.  If such resources were to be found, the letter 
assured, they would be shared with the other American Republics.  The letter went 
on to discuss the delicate issue of potential sovereignty rights in the region.  The 
Argentines translated the important passage as follows: 
 
In order to avoid possible complications with respect to the disputed rights in 
the Antarctic regions investigated and studied by the United States, and in 
order to promote the development of those regions, it might prove to be 
convenient to make sovereignty claims upon them.  It is believed that such 
titles could be claimed with greater efficiency by an individual Government, 
and if such titles were consequently declared by the government of the 
United States as a result of the investigations and studies described above, it 
is desired that the other republics of the Americas know that those titles could 
be considered as a protection of the opportunity for all Governments and 
citizens of all the American Republics to participate in the development and 
utilization of the resources that the claimed regions might possess.29 
 
Officials in the Chilean Foreign Ministry translated the final lines of this letter 
somewhat differently.  Instead of reading the letter as a justification for a potential 
US claim, the Chileans saw it as a request by the North Americans for the Chilean 
government to make a claim to Antarctica: “It is desired that the said claims, in order 
to be more efficient, are made by one government individually, and that, upon being 
confirmed by the government of the United States...  the other republics of the 
                                                 
28 Genest and Instituto Antártico Argentino, Antartida sudamericana aportes para su comprension. 
85-86. 
29 Ibid. 85-86.  Original Argentine translation. 
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Americas would know...”30 The cause of Chile’s differing interpretation was a 
mistake in translating the North American letter from English into Spanish, as the 
Chilean Ambassador in Washington would point out several years later.31  The 
United States had not asked the Chilean Government to make a claim to Antarctica, 
but what mattered was that the Chileans thought they had.32   
The different interpretation of one line of the American letter led to very 
different reactions by Argentina and Chile.  Thinking that the United States was 
about to make claims that would extend to the peninsula region, the Argentine 
government responded diplomatically but firmly with a letter to the State Department 
that stated that their own claims to Antarctica had always been guided by the same 
pan-American concerns that the North Americans were now expressing: 
 
...as your Excellency knows, our country claims as its own property and 
sovereignty some parts of the Antarctic, based on geographic and historical 
reasons and in the acts of occupation that have been realized for a number of 
years.  In these regions it has been sensitive to an encounter of interests with 
the United States.33  
  
                                                 
30 Pinochet de la Barra, Medio siglo de recuerdos antárticos: memorias. 72. 
31 Nieto del Rio to Chilean Foreign Minister, Washington, 16 July 1948.  RR.EE., “Antártica Chilena, 
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33 Genest and Instituto Antártico Argentino, Antartida sudamericana aportes para su comprension. 
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The wording of the Argentine letter made it clear to the US government that a 
conflict of interests would occur should the North Americans make a claim to the 
portion of Antarctica that Argentina thought of as its own.  The precise area of this 
“Argentine Antarctic” remained unclear.  Considering the United States’ 
preoccupation with pan-Americanism, this letter may have had some effect on the 
North American Government’s decision not to make a claim on the Antarctic 
continent.  
In May 1940, the Argentine Antarctic Commission, which had been 
established on a permanent basis a month earlier, wrote a long letter to José María 
Cantilo, the Argentine Minister of Foreign Relations.34  This letter expressed in 
detail the Commission’s thinking with respect to Argentina’s rights in Antarctica.  
After an introduction to the history of the Antarctic continent, which acknowledged 
that Great Britain was the country that had demonstrated most interest in the region, 
the letter proceeded to examine the economic, strategic and aeronautical benefits that 
possession of the region would accrue to Argentina.  Unsurprisingly, whaling 
featured prominently amongst the potential economic advantages that the region 
could offer Argentina.  The Commission also stressed the geological continuity of 
the Antarctic Peninsula with Tierra del Fuego in making their case that Antarctica 
could potentially contain a treasure trove of mineral riches.  Furthermore, the region 
presented opportunities for developing new transcontinental flight routes, cutting the 
distance between Australasia and South America.  Interestingly, given the later 
geopolitical preoccupation with strategy, the Antarctic Commission’s letter noted 
that: “the lack of resources, the bad ports and the climate, at the present moment take 
                                                 
34 Comisión Nacional del Antártico to Señor José María Cantilo [Minister of Foreign Relations and 
Worship], Buenos Aires, May 1940.  MREYC, Organismos Internacionales, Paquete 20. 
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away from this region all military and naval strategic importance.”35  In 1940 it was 
economic and, above all, legal considerations that remained the driving force of 
Argentine Antarctic policy.   
The Argentine Antarctic Commission’s letter continued by asking the all-
important question: “within the American sector, does Argentina have rights and 
could it sustain them?  And, in the affirmative case, what are these rights and how far 
do they stretch?”   The letter summarized the theoretical and practical legal 
precedents that could be relevant to the sovereignty of Antarctica.  The principal 
problem from a legal perspective was that due to its inhospitable climate, the normal 
legal requirement for proving sovereignty, which was that of effective occupation, 
could not easily be applied.  In these circumstances, Argentina’s Laurie Island 
meteorological station gave them the legal advantage, shared only by the United 
States by virtue of the Byrd expedition, of being able to prove some kind of effective 
occupation of the region.  At the same time, following precedents set in the Arctic 
region, the Argentine Antarctic Commission also stressed the importance of the 
sector theory and the clear existence of an American Sector in Antarctica.36  This 
sector belonged to Argentina and Chile by undisputable virtue of its geographical 
“nearness”. Taken together the arguments put forward by the Commission’s letter 
presented a convincing case for Argentine sovereignty, with the only caveat that, due 
to the nature of the sector theory, the Chileans would have to be consulted as to 
                                                 
35 Although they did acknowledge that this might change in the future, with the advance of new 
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dividing the Arctic region into spheres of influence.  The idea was that a country would have rights to 
all regions directly to the north of their territory all the way to the North Pole, with the result that the 
Arctic would be carved up into various “pie pieces.”  The theory was rejected by Norway, but it did 
offer one legal precedent for the division of Antarctica.  See, Puig, La Antártida argentina ante el 
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limits within the American Sector.  Moreno and his colleagues concluded that 
Argentina ought to claim for themselves the sector between 25° and 68°34’ West, 
south of 60° South. 
Following the Argentine Antarctic Commission’s letter to the Minister of 
Foreign Relations, Argentina moved tentatively forward with its ambitions towards 
Antarctica.  Although no formal claim was made, the Argentine government 
suggested that another international conference should be convened, “insofar as the 
international political situation shall permit,” in order to discuss the question of 
Antarctic sovereignty.37   
Sir Esmond Ovey, the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires, did not think that 
Argentina was about to claim parts of the Falkland Islands Dependencies: 
 
I do not for a moment believe that it is the intention of the Argentine Gov. to 
take advantage of GB's present difficulties for the purpose of pressing 
Argentina's claims.  Nor is it clear that at an international conference 
Argentina would necessarily have the support of the USA, which is believed 
to have its own claim in Antarctica as a result of Admiral Bird's [sic] recent 
voyages.38 
 
Other Foreign Office officials in the British Embassy, however, were less optimistic, 
noting a split within the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs between the pro-
British faction headed by José María Cantilo and the nationalist faction headed by 
vice-President Ramón Castillo.39  The nationalists seemed to want to force the issue 
while Britain was at war.  Meanwhile, by the middle of 1940 the situation in the war 
                                                 
37 British Embassy, BA, to Foreign Office, 13 September 1940.  TNA CO 78/213/3. 
38 Ovey to Halifax, 13 September 1940.  TNA FO118/699. 
39 Hand-written memoranda attached to Ovey to Halifax, 13 September 1940.  TNA FO118/699. 
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had become so bad for Great Britain that certain British officials in the Embassy 
suggested forming some sort of condominium in the Falkland Islands with 
Argentina.40  Ovey decided against pursuing this proposal, thinking it better to “let 
sleeping dogs lie.”41  At this stage all the British could do in the Falkland Islands and 
their Dependencies was wait and see what direction events would take.   
 
THE CHILEAN CLAIM, 1940 
During 1940, the Chileans followed a similar course to their South American 
neighbors by investigating the legal basis for their sovereignty in Antarctica.  In 
Santiago, although Julio Escudero fulfilled a similar role to that of Ruíz Moreno in 
Buenos Aires, his companion Enrique Cordovez exercised a greater influence than 
the other members of the Argentine Antarctic Commission.  From the outset 
Cordovez stressed the economic, scientific and strategic bases for Chilean Interest in 
Antarctica.42  There were also other differences between the Argentine and the 
Chilean approaches to the Antarctic question.  Firstly, and most importantly, 
following the mistranslated letter of January 1940, the Chileans believed themselves 
to have the backing of the United States in the pursuit of Chilean sovereignty in 
Antarctica.  This gave them a confidence that otherwise they might have lacked.  
                                                 
40 After speaking to the American ambassador, R.H. Hadow noted: “Our sole interest in the Falkland 
Islands is its use to the Navy as a vital strategic point; while the only Argentine interest in the Islands 
is sentimental national pride.  Given the shadow of an Argentine flag waving somewhere - alongside a 
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management of the Islands - as a Naval Base - to us.  Moreover the naval officers of the Argentine 
Navy, who are alone likely to visit the place, are surely not hard to win over to our side?  I greatly 
doubt whether an Argentine could be found to take over the Governorship; so that here again our path 
should be a fairly smooth one?” Hadow, Minutes, 25 June 1940.  TNA FO118/699.  G.A. Wallinger 
agreed with him.  Wallinger, Minutes, 26 June 1940.  TNA, FO118/699. 
41 Ovey, Minutes, 23 July 1940.  TNA, FO118/699. 
42 See, for example, Cordovez, Lecture, 2 August 1940.  RR.EE., “Antártica Chilena, Varios, 1940-
1948.” 
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Secondly, the Chileans could not claim to have the recent history of effective 
occupation that the Argentines could demonstrate through their maintenance of the 
Laurie Island meteorological station.  Thirdly, the issue of Antarctica for the 
Chileans had no connection to the question of the Malvinas, although for the 
Chileans, even more than the Argentines, the rhetoric of territorial loss underpinned 
many of the arguments for securing Chile’s sovereignty rights in Antarctica.  
Consequently, although Chilean attitudes to Antarctica were superficially very 
similar to those of the Argentines, they were in some ways quite different. 
The arguments that Escudero and Cordovez produced to support Chilean 
claims to sovereignty in Antarctica fell into two groups: firstly, those of a “juridical-
historical” nature, and secondly those of a “scientific” nature.  The first group, the 
traditional legal arguments, followed a fairly conventional pattern.  Escudero looked 
for historical precedents for Chilean administration and occupation of Antarctica, 
citing Chilean whaling activities, the related administrative acts, and the rescue of 
Shackleton’s expedition.  He also cited the Argentine-Chilean negotiations that took 
place in 1906 and 1908 as international recognition of Chile’s rights.  Although the 
Chileans would later put a lot of emphasis on the legal rights that they had inherited 
from Spain, at this early stage the focus remained on the more modern period.  
In the so-called “scientific” arguments in favor of Chilean sovereignty, 
mainly advanced by Enrique Cordovez, the Chilean Antarctic Commission sought to 
prove that Chile was nearer and more similar to Antarctica than any other country.  
At the center of such arguments was the often-cited idea of geological continuity, 
which had earlier been used by Risopatrón in his 1908 argument for the existence of 
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an “American Antarctica.”43  Since the Antarctic Peninsula was a geological 
extension of the Andes Mountains, the argument went (with an interesting leap of 
logic), the region was part of the South American continent and clearly belonged to 
Argentina and Chile.  Cordovez went as far as proposing that Chile had a superior 
claim to Antarctica because continent’s snows and ice appeared very similar to the 
snow and ice of Chilean Patagonia.44 One danger of the Chilean “scientific” 
approach was that it put a great emphasis on the area of southern Patagonia that was 
also contested by Argentina.   
Also at the root of Cordovez’s arguments for Chilean sovereignty was the 
idea that Antarctica would prove to be economically productive.  Just as the idea of 
Antarctica as a frozen El Dorado had shaped Argentina’s decision to press ahead 
with its claims, the same belief convinced Chileans that they should not be left 
behind in the impending Scramble for Antarctica.  Over the next few years Cordovez 
would write a series of position papers outlining the economic potential of Antarctica 
and the ways in which Chile could take advantage.   
In the middle of 1940, Don Marcial Mora became the new Chilean Minister 
of Foreign Relations.  On the 8 August, Cordovez wrote a letter to the new minister 
setting out the Chilean case for polar sovereignty that had been developed by the 
Chilean Antarctic Commission.45 After summarizing the various arguments, the 
letter concluded that Chile had rights to the region between approximately 60° and 
80° West, this area being the same as that which had been discussed in the Chilean-
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Argentine negotiations at the beginning of the century.  Cordovez suggested to the 
new Minister that he should prepare a draft decree to present to Aguirre Cerda, the 
President of the Republic.  At the same time the Navy would prepare a detailed plan 
for an expedition to take formal possession of Antártica Chilena.  Once the decree 
had been passed, Cordóvez suggested that Chile should enter into negotiations with 
Argentina and with the United States in order to fix the precise limits of Chile’s 
claim to Antarctica: 
 
Once the decree concerning the Chilean possessions in the Antarctic has been 
passed, it would be apt to enter into discussions with Señor Ruíz Moreno in 
the Argentine Foreign Ministry.  Ruíz Moreno has been designated as the 
Argentine representative in discussions of the Antarctic question with Chile. 
 Opportunely, and maybe at the same time, it would be fitting to 
discuss the following problem with the US Embassy... in order to discuss 
with the representatives of the said country, in the beginning, the westerly 
frontier with the claim of the United Sates.46 
 
Such a policy – first pass the decree, then discuss it – suggests both a boldness in 
Chilean Antarctic policy and a certain flexibility.  As Cordovez envisioned the 
Chilean decree, its limits would not be set in stone, but would be open to negotiation 
with both Argentina and the United States.   
Cordovez’s letter to Marcial Mora achieved its objective.  The new minister 
of Foreign Relations quickly became a strong proponent of Antártida Chilena, and 
over the following months the Chilean Antarctic Commission formulated a decree 
delimiting Chilean sovereignty in Antarctica.  On the 6 November 1940, President 
Aguirre Cerda issued the following decree: 




[Decree 1747] The following form part of the Chilean Antarctic or Chilean 
Antarctic Territory: all the lands, islands, reefs, glaciers (pack ice), and 
everything else, known or unknown, and the respective territorial seas, inside 
the limits of the sector between 53°W and 90°W.47 
 
The President understood the difficulty and ridicule that such a decree might cause 
him.48  A friend of the Foreign Minister Marcial Mora had counseled him not to pass 
the “little decree” due to the international headache it would cause Chile.  The limits 
set by the decree were almost twice those proposed by Cordovez less than three 
months earlier.  These expanded limits would give Chile the room for the diplomatic 
maneuver that Cordovez had proposed.  On the same day as the decree was passed 
the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Relations issued a verbal note to the Argentine 
government inviting them to send a delegation to Santiago in order to discuss the 
question of Antarctic sovereignty.49   
Outside of Chile, Decree 1747 met with almost universal disapproval.  The 
first reply came from Argentina, where the Chilean claim had caused an outpouring 
of nationalist condemnation at all levels of society.  The Argentine government’s 
response stated that the only thing that they liked about the Chilean government’s 
measure was its apparent willingness to amend it.50  More of a surprise to Chile than 
the reply of Argentina was that of the United States, which it received on 10 
December 1940.  Far from endorsing the Chilean claim as had been expected, the 
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Government of the United States in fact politely refused to recognize it.51  Most 
unexpectedly of all, the Japanese Government refused to recognize the Chilean claim 
and reserved Japanese rights in the region.52  The Chileans replied in turn to 
Argentina, the United States and Japan.  In the case of Argentina and the United 
States, Chilean diplomats pointed out their willingness to negotiate the limits of 
Chilean Antarctica, but insisted on the existence of Chilean rights to the region.  In 
the case of Japan, Chilean officials rejected their reservation outright.53  According 
to the Chileans, the American sector of Antarctica belonged to Chile, and to 
Argentina and the United States: countries outside the Western Hemisphere had no 
sovereignty rights in the region.   
Almost three months later, the British Government rejected decree 1747, 
reminding the Chileans of the Letters Patents of 1908 and 1917, which had defined 
the limits of the Falkland Islands Dependencies.54  British officials noted privately 
that “these Antarctic claims should lead to an interesting diplomatic mêlée”, 
although they also recognized the united front that was developing against them: “by 
conveniently stopping short at Longitude 53°, Chile does not clash with the 
Argentine claim to South Orkneys.”55  Despite the delay, the British response was 
significant because it showed a continued interest in the region.  As if to demonstrate 
                                                 
51 United States Embassy in Santiago to Chilean Foreign Ministry, Santiago, 10 December 1940.  
Reprinted in Circular Confidential No.1, 2nd edition, December 1946.  RR.EE. “Antártica Chilena, 
Varios, 1940-48.” 
52 Legación del Japón a Ministerio de RR.EE., 13 November 1940.  Reprinted in Ministerio de 
RR.EE., Circular Confidencial No.1, 10 February 1941.  Ministerio RR.EE., “Antártica Chilena, 
Varios, 1940-48”. 
53 Ministerio de RR.EE. a Legación del Japón, 10 February 1941.  RR.EE., “Antártica Chilena, 
Varios, 1940-48.” 
54 The English magazine Cavalcade had discussed the ramifications of the Chilean Decree shortly 
after it had passed. Chilean Embassy, London to Chilean Foreign Ministry, 30 December 1940.  
ARNAD, “M.RR.EE. 4368.” 
55 Foreign Office Minutes on Argentine newspapers, 13 November 1940.  TNA, FO 118/699. 
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the firmness of its attitude, in March 1941 the British vessel HMS Queen of Bermuda 
landed at Deception Island and destroyed the fuel installations left by the Hektor 
Whaling Company in order to stop them falling into enemy hands.56  This early sign 
of imperial intransigence, coming despite the preoccupations of the war, helped to 
lay the foundations for the future sovereignty dispute in Antarctica.  
 
 
Figure 4: Sketch Map of South Shetland Islands, Showing Deception Island 
 
ESCUDERO-RUÍZ MORENO NEGOTIATIONS, 1941 
The Argentine government keenly accepted the Chilean proposal for a 
meeting to discuss the question of territorial limits in Antarctica, which had been 
made on the day of Chilean Decree 1747.  Ruíz Moreno, the head of the Argentine 
                                                 
56 Headland, Chronological list of Antarctic expeditions and related historical events. 
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Antarctic Commission, had repeatedly stressed the need to negotiate with the 
Chileans in order to strengthen the common South American position.57  Despite the 
overlap of their respective claims, legal theorists from both sides of the Andes saw 
the advantage to be accrued from working in partnership.  However, the Argentine 
government, in which Julio A. Roca (son of the former President) had recently 
become Foreign Minister for a second time, wanted to limit the scope of the 
negotiations.58  Argentina had still not formally advanced an official claim to 
Antarctica in the way that Chile had just done, and because of this its position 
remained more tentative.  Rather than sending the entire Antarctic Commission, the 
Argentines thought it better to send just Ruíz Moreno, considering that this would 
give the talks the appearance of preliminary conversations rather than a full-scale 
diplomatic mission.  The Argentine government gave Ruíz Moreno strict instructions 
not to enter into substantive negotiations with his Chilean counterpart on the future 
of the Antarctic region.  
In contrast to the Argentines, the Chilean government was keen for the 
negotiations to lead to an immediate and permanent settlement of the Antarctic 
problem.59  Julio Escudero received formal instructions in January 1941: 
 
                                                 
57 Comisión Nacional del Antártico to Señor José María Cantilo, Buenos Aires, May 1940.  MREYC, 
Organismos Internacionales, Paquete 20. 
58 Isidoro Ruiz Moreno to Julio Roca (jr.), 10 December 1941.  AGN, 7:3102.  Julio Roca had been 
Foreign Minister in the early 1930s and had signed the infamous Roca-Runciman Treaty with Great 
Britain.  His second tenure at the Foreign Ministry in the Ortiz-Castillo administration did not last 
long.   
59 In preparation for the Escudero-Moreno conversations, the Minister of Foreign Relations requested 
the Chilean Ambassador in London to search for historical antecedents to the Chilean claim in the 
archives in London. The documents that they were looking for included a letter from Bernard 
O’Higgins, the founder of the Chilean state to Coghlan, the British former head of the Chilean Navy 
written in 1833 and containing references to Chilean possession of the South Shetland Islands.  
Manuel Bianchi to the Chilean Ambassador in Great Britain, Santiago, 19 December 1940.  
Ministerio RR.EE., “Antártica Chilena, Comunicaciones con Gran Bretaña, 1940-47.” 
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The main object of the conversations in Santiago will consist of trying to 
determine what is the frontier line between Argentina and Chile in the 
American Antarctic region, because our claims are situated in this part of the 
Antarctic territory.60 
 
The instructions listed geographical continuity and similarity, geophysical similarity 
and glaciological similarity as scientific reasons for Chilean sovereignty, adding to 
these various legal titles derived from the colonial past, previous occupation and the 
concession of lands and fishing rights.61  As Escudero saw the case: “the juridical 
concept of effective occupation (the Argentine position) opposes the concept of 
continuity and geographical similarity (the Chilean position)”62 Interestingly, the 
Chilean instructions made very little mention of Great Britain’s claims in Antarctica.  
Instead they focused both on reaching an accord with Argentina and on challenging 
the Argentine claims to sovereignty.  For example, the instructions to Escudero 
criticized the hydrographic research conducted by Argentina in Antarctica.63  The 
Chileans hoped to set a legal trap for Argentina: Chile was able to use the idea of 
continuity (“contigüidad”) because the Argentines used it in their case against Great 
Britain in the Malvinas.  The instructions permitted Escudero to use the Monroe 
Doctrine in supporting Chile’s case, but prohibited him from including the 
                                                 
60 Manuel Bianchi, Instructions for the Chilean Delegate in the conversations with the Argentine 
Delegate, early 1941.  RR.EE., “Antártica Chilena, Conversaciones, 1941.” 
61 Bianchi a Escudero, early 1941.  RR.EE., “Antártica Chilena, Conversaciones, Marzo 1941.” 
62 Julio Escudero, Memorandum of Ideas Related to Limits with Argentina, 1941.  RR.EE., “Antártica 
Chilena, Conversaciones 1941.” 
63 Cordovez probably wrote this part of the instructions.   
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substantive discussion of other disputes such as the Beagle Channel or the 
Malvinas.64  
 The Escudero-Ruíz Moreno negotiations took place between the 14 and 26 
March 1941.65  During the negotiations, Escudero tried to argue that Antarctica was 
an extension of the American continent, and therefore the Monroe Doctrine could be 
applied to it without objections; Ruíz Moreno tried to interest the Chileans in shifting 
their claim to the west.66  Both negotiators asserted their sovereign rights through 
vicinity and the sector theory.  When it became clear that no solution would be 
reached, Escudero and Ruíz Moreno discussed the possibility of a transnational 
solution to the sovereignty problem.67 Although no positive agreement was reached, 
the two countries agreed to continue the discussion at a later meeting to be convened 
in Buenos Aires. They also issued a joint statement recognizing the mutual rights of 
both countries to a “South American Antarctica.”68 Escudero expressed his 
satisfaction at the result of the negotiations because the text of the final act made a 
specific reference to Chilean sovereignty in Antarctica.69  Indeed, Ruíz Moreno was 
welcomed in Santiago, and received all sorts of honors and banquets in his name.70  
In Buenos Aires suspicion existed that he had exceeded his brief by entering into 
                                                 
64 In relation to Las Malvinas, the Chileans clearly did not want to get dragged into Argentina’s 
dispute with Great Britain.  Common cause with Argentina in the question of Antarctica did not imply 
common cause in the question of the Malvinas.   
65 F. Donoso, Minutes of the Escudero-Ruiz Moreno Conversations, from 14 March 1941 to 26 
March 1941.  RR.EE., “Antártica Chilena.  Conversaciones, marzo 1941”. 
66 Pinochet de la Barra, Medio siglo de recuerdos antárticos: memorias. 37. 
67 Escudero, Memorandum, 31 March 1941.  RR.EE., “Antártica Chilena, Conversaciones, Marzo 
1941.” 
68 Argentine Republic. Comisión Nacional del Antártico, Soberanía argentina en la Antártida. Nota 
preliminar del Presidente de la Nación, Juan Perón. 71. 
69 Escudero, Memorandum, 31 March 1941.  RR.EE., “Antártica Chilena, Conversaciones, Marzo 
1941” 
70 See various Chilean and Argentine press cuttings regarding the negotiations. RR.EE., “Antártica 
Chilena, Conversaciones, Marzo 1941.” 
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discussions that went beyond merely preparatory dialogue.  In particular, many 
extreme Argentine Nationalists did not like the conversations.71 
Despite their professions of the ideal of a South American Antarctica, 
Argentina and Chile went away from the negotiations in Santiago thinking about 
how each could strengthen its own claim at the expense of the other.  An interesting 
result of the conversations was that Escudero decided to investigate in much greater 
detail the historical antecedents to the Chilean claim, especially those from the 
colonial era:  
 
I consider it equally indispensable to complete our studies related to our 
colonial titles, which up until now have only been very briefly studied; and to 
make a thorough examination of the judicial nature of the polar dominion, all 
without forgetting the consideration of the theory of the continuation of the 
Andes on which we await a pronouncement from the Argentine Antarctic 
Commission.72  
 
The negotiations with Argentina had shown him that vicinity and continuity alone 
were not enough to strengthen the Chilean claim against the Argentines, who could 
use precisely the same arguments for themselves.  Still unable to put together an 
expedition to Antarctica, the Chileans hoped to trump their South American 
neighbors by looking to the colonial past.  Meanwhile, the Argentines looked for a 
more direct way to assert their sovereignty rights in the region.   
 
                                                 
71 Crisol, [Argentine Newspaper] 28 March 1941.  RR.EE.  “Antártica Chilena, Conversaciones, 
1941.” 
72 Julio Escudero, Internal Memorandum: Report on the Argentine-Chilean Conversations on 
Antarctica, Santiago, 31 March 1941.  RR.EE., “Antártica Chilena, Conversaciones, 1940.” 
 71 
ARGENTINE EXPEDITIONS TO ANTARCTICA 
On 7 December 1941, the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.  A conference of 
American Foreign Ministers was immediately called to discuss the pan-American 
position with respect to this attack.73  At this meeting, held in Rio de Janeiro in early 
January 1942, the Argentine Government, now under the effective control of the 
nationalist leaning Vice President Castillo, conspired to further their territorial 
ambitions.74  The Argentines wanted to be given full responsibility for the defense of 
the Falkland Islands, which the Japanese had promised them in the event of a 
successful invasion.75  J.V. Perowne, head of the South American Department at the 
British Foreign Office, condemned the Argentine policy:  
 
These blackmail tactics are what might have been expected of the Government of 
acting President Castillo and Sr. Ruíz Guiñazu [Foreign Minister].  Either way they 
have something to gain.  If they do not get the Falklands they have an admirable 
excuse for staying out of the war; if they do get them they at once become national 
heroes instead of being disliked and despised by 90% of the Argentine public.76 
 
British officials successfully put pressure on the United States not to grant Argentine 
requests, noting that once such a concession had been made it would be virtually 
impossible ever to get the islands back. 77  The Argentines responded exactly as 
                                                 
73 For a full discussion of the Rio Conference see Humphreys, Latin America and the Second World 
War. 165-181. 
74 President Ortiz was incapacitated by diabetic blindness.   
75 Ovey to Foreign Office, 12 December 1941.  TNA, ADM 116/5104. 
76 J.V. Perowne, Minute, 20 December 1941. TNA, ADM 116/5104. 
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Perowne had predicted, refusing to break off relations with the Axis nations.78  Chile, 
which shared the Argentine problem of having a large population of German 
immigrants, and additionally feared a Japanese attack against its long, unprotected 
coastline, also refused to break off relations with the Axis.  The two South American 
countries involved in the growing Antarctic Problem were the only two states in the 
Americas that did not sever relations with Germany, Japan and Italy in the months 
following the raid on Pearl Harbor.   
As Argentine politicians and diplomats argued unsuccessfully for territorial 
concessions at the conference of Rio, the Argentine Navy put into action their claims 
to sovereignty in Antarctica.  The Argentine government had been planning an 
expedition to Antarctica since the conclusion of the Ruíz Moreno-Escudero 
negotiations early in 1941.  This had been one of the major recommendations of the 
Comisión Nacional del Antártico in its earlier report on Argentine sovereignty.79  In 
October 1941, in preparation for the expedition, Argentina’s Instituto Geográfico 
Militar published another map of Argentine Antarctica, this time at a scale of 
1:2,500,000.80  As if to emphasize the superficiality of any concept of South 
American Antarctica, this map made no mention of Chilean rights to Antarctica.  To 
strengthen further their legal title to the region, the Argentines established a Post 
                                                                                                                                          
reported a later meeting with Roosevelt: “the President at once said that there was only one difficulty, 
which was the Argentine whom he was at the present moment trying to ‘appease’ as much as possible.  
It would be a bore to get them upset just at this moment.” Halifax to Foreign Office, 28 January 1942.  
TNA, CAB 121/510. 
78 Humphreys, Latin America and the Second World War. 
79 Argentine Republic. Comisión Nacional del Antártico, Soberanía argentina en la Antártida. Nota 
preliminar del Presidente de la Nación, Juan Perón. 
80 Genest and Instituto Antártico Argentino, Antartida sudamericana aportes para su comprension. 
24. 
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Office at the Laurie Island meteorological station in the South Orkneys.81  Amidst all 
this escalating Argentine Antarctic activity, the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires 
reported that territorial nationalism was fast becoming an “integral part” of 
Argentine nationalist rhetoric.82 
The 1° de Mayo left Buenos Aires in January 1942 under the command of 
Captain Alberto J. Oddera.83  The ship first visited Deception Island, where it 
conducted an inventory of the abandoned factory of the Norwegian Héktor Whaling 
Company and hoisted the Argentine flag.84  From Deception Island it sailed on to the 
Melchior Archipelago where it put up a small automatic lighthouse in Dallman Bay.  
Next, the crew landed on Winter Island where it performed similar ceremonies of 
possession.  After a failed attempt to reach Marguerite Bay, the 1° de Mayo returned 
to Buenos Aires via the Melchior Archipelago and the Argentine Islands.  During the 
voyage Lieutenant Eduardo Lanusse, in a Stearman seaplane type 76-D-1, took the 
first aerial photographs of the region. 
In Santiago, the Argentine expedition to Antarctica caused certain unease.85   
Throughout 1942, the Ministry of Foreign Relations in loose partnership with the 
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Navy made renewed attempts to prepare the “Vidal Gomez” for an expedition to 
Antarctica, in large part as a response to the Argentine expedition.86  But just as in 
the previous two years, the Ministry of Marine decided that the vessel was unfit for 
sailing to Antarctica, and there was no other suitable vessel available.87  
In the midst of these logistical difficulties, the Chilean Government received 
an invitation from Buenos Aires suggesting that both countries should send an 
expedition to Antarctica in the season 1942-43.88  Without a suitable boat, the 
Chileans obviously could not accept this proposal.  In an attempt to make the most of 
a bad situation, the Chilean head of the Estado Mayor of the Navy suggested a 
compromise arrangement with the Argentines.  Under the terms of their proposal, 
Chilean officials would accompany the Argentine expedition this year, and in 
exchange Argentine officials would accompany the Chileans in the following year.  
The Chilean Navy, perhaps somewhat naively given the international situation, 
hoped that this promise would put pressure on its own Government to look abroad 
for a suitable ship to buy.89  The Argentine Naval Minister accepted the Chilean 
suggestion, and the two countries thus entered into a binding agreement.   
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The Argentine invitation to three officials of the Chilean Navy to accompany 
the 1942/43 expedition to Antarctica was accompanied by an exchange of notes 
reaffirming the existence of a “South American Antarctica”: 
 
Both governments signaled their desire to proceed in agreement in everything 
that concerns the Antarctic problem, to avoid every possible conflict, and 
through the agreement to undertake a joint action with the aim of affirming – 
without making new claims – the sovereign rights of both countries in South 
American Antarctica.90 
  
The 1° de Mayo under the command of Captain Silvano Harriague left Buenos Aires 
for a second voyage to Antarctica on the 4th February.  This expedition took three 
Chilean naval officials including retired Captain D. Enrique Cordovez Madariaga, 
one of the two members of the Chilean Antarctic Commission.  The Argentines 
promised that the purpose of the expedition was purely for the purposes of scientific 
inquiry.91  The expedition again visited the Melchior archipelago and then sailed to 
Port Lockroy.  From Port Lockroy the 1° de Mayo continued to Marguerite Bay, 
where Byrd’s East Base had been located throughout 1940.  The Argentine ship took 
away certain scientific instruments that had been left by the American expedition 
when it was evacuated.92  Despite promises to the contrary, the Argentine Expedition 
performed acts of possession at Port Lockroy (1 March, 1943), Marguerite Bay (5 
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March), and Deception Island (11 March).  In a top-secret report to the Ministry of 
Foreign Relations, Cordovez Madariaga noted that “These acts of possession 
represented a cause of shame for the Chileans who had traveled with the Argentine 
expedition.”93  In a sense, the idea of a “South American Antarctica” was flawed 
from the start.  
Following the second Argentine expedition to Antarctica there was a 
temporary lull in South American activity in the region.  In Argentina, a military 
coup in June 1943 ousted the government of Ramón Castillo and replaced it with a 
group of military officers.  Near the center of this coup was a secretive lodge of mid-
ranking officers known as the GOU, which included an ambitious Colonel called 
Juan Domingo Perón.  The overthrow of the Concordancia government represented 
the end, at least temporarily, of the elite rule that had supported British interests in 
Argentina.  The coup threw the country into a period of political uncertainty that 
would last for the next three years, and this uncertainty put a hold on Antarctic 
activity.94  The military officers were no less nationalistic than the Castillo 
government.  In fact, in the latter part of 1943, British officials feared that the 
Antarctic dispute was about to enter a “critical phase.”95  But, as it turned out, the 
new government gave a relatively low priority to the Antarctica.  The new military 
government worried about the negative diplomatic and military costs of continued 
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international isolationism.96  Therefore they played down, although by no means 
renounced, the most antagonistic of their foreign policies, including their claims to 
the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies.97 
Throughout 1943, Chilean officials continued to search abroad for a suitable 
vessel to sail to Antarctica.  They hoped to send an expedition to Antarctica both to 
assert Chilean sovereignty in the region, and in order to keep the previous 
December’s promise to Argentina that they would take with them several Argentine 
officials.98  As had been foreseen, certain officials, particularly in the Navy, used the 
promise to Argentina to put pressure on their government to purchase a boat.  
Unsurprisingly, however, given the circumstances of the war, no such boat could be 
found.99  The harsh conditions of the Antarctic environment put a check on Chilean 
political ambitions.  Despite the inability of the Chilean Government to send an 
expedition to Antarctica, Escudero and Cordovez in the Chilean Antarctic 
Commission continued to produce policy papers encouraging Chilean involvement 
with the Antarctic continent.  In particular, Cordovez and others focused upon the 
possibilities for Chilean whaling activities in the Antarctic region.100  The broken 
promise to Argentina remained at the back of Chilean official minds, and it was 
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hoped that Chile would be able to keep its word by sending an expedition South at 
the end of the war.101 
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Chapter 2: Operation Tabarin, 1943-1946 
Even in the darkest days of the Second World War, the British refused to give 
up on their Empire.  Whether this imperial intransigence would extend to the 
Falkland Islands and their Dependencies, however, was not immediately clear. In 
Argentina, the growing nationalist sentiment towards the Islas Malvinas and 
Antártida Argentina created an awkward overlap of formal and informal empire.  
Throughout the war, Argentina continued to supply a significant percentage of 
Britain’s food supplies.  As the Foreign Office continually pointed out, the 
maintenance of good relations with Argentina was therefore a vital part of the British 
war effort.  In the early years of the conflict, certain British officials had discussed 
using the Falkland Islands Dependencies as a bargaining counter to retain 
Argentina’s goodwill.  There had even been some discussion of a cession of the 
Falkland Islands themselves.  South American nationalism created a situation 
whereby Britain’s retention of its formal empire in the Falkland Islands and their 
Dependencies appeared to jeopardize retention of its “informal empire” in Argentina. 
However, as the war progressed, and as Britain’s position in the conflict 
improved, officials in London began to make plans not only for the maintenance of 
Britain’s informal empire in South America, but also for the retention of British 
sovereignty in the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies.  The inter-connectedness 
of the imperial system was both a weakness and a source of strength.  The need to 
retain good relations with Argentina constrained Britain’s freedom of action in 
Antarctica.  But at the same time, the need to maintain prestige and avoid setting a 
bad precedent encouraged the British to take a firm stand in Antarctica. 
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After reinforcing the security of the Falkland Islands themselves, Great 
Britain took the initiative in the nascent Antarctic sovereignty dispute by sending an 
expedition of permanent occupation to the region.  Operation Tabarin, as the 
expedition became known after a famous Parisian nightclub, sought to fulfill the 
legal requirement of “effective occupation” which would be useful if the dispute 
were ever to go arbitration.  In order not to upset the nationalist sensibilities of 
Argentina and Chile, the expedition was initially kept secret.  By the end of the war, 
Operation Tabarin had established four bases in the Falkland Islands Dependencies; 
a fifth base, at Stonington Island, was established in the 1945-46 season.  The British 
residents of these bases began to conduct various scientific programs, which 
examined the geology, meteorology, glaciology, and the biology of the Peninsula 
region.  The British were not exempt from beliefs in Antarctica as a potential El 
Dorado, and economic prospecting was high up the rudimentary scientific agenda.  
Although the scientific component of Operation Tabarin remained relatively modest, 
it helped to reinforce the connection between science and politics in Antarctica. 
The Second World War had led to a suspension of the profitable Antarctic 
whaling industry.  This hiatus helped whale populations to recover from the over-
fishing that had taken place in the late 1930s.  In the immediate aftermath of the war, 
British and Norwegian whaling vessels returned to Antarctic waters and the whaling 
industry resumed.  There was a desperate need for foodstuffs across war-ravaged 
Europe and whale oil was in great demand.  In an attempt to prevent a return to the 
unsustainable practices of the 1930s, representatives from the principal whaling 
nations met in Washington D.C. to negotiate the International Whaling Convention 
(IWC).  This convention sought to impose a quota on the total number of whales that 
could be caught in any given season.  Although the IWC was not directly related to 
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the sovereignty dispute, whaling remained the only profitable industry in Antarctica 
and therefore had a significant influence upon the way in which the continent was 
viewed economically.  In Britain’s eyes, empire had to pay for itself, and the whaling 
industry continued to offer the possibility that British sovereignty in Antarctica could 
be financially self-sufficient.1 
 
THE FUTURE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS 
Owing to the strategic importance of the South Atlantic, the British 
Government responded to the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 by 
establishing a volunteer garrison of 300 men in the Falkland Islands.  On top of its 
strategic value, the Falklands Islands Crown Colony also represented a very 
symbolic part of the British Empire, whose loss, Churchill would later note, would 
be a major blow to British prestige.  From the outset, defense of the colony had the 
twin objectives of guarding against the Axis threat and against the threat posed by 
Argentina.  The Falkland Islands Defence Scheme booklet, published by the War 
Office late in 1939, emphasized the Argentine threat:  
 
The islands are claimed by a foreign government, which might, if unfriendly 
to Great Britain, be tempted to profit by our temporary embarrassment in 
other parts of the world to throw in its lot with the enemy in order to 
endeavour to assert its alleged rights.2 
 
                                                 
1 J. O. Borley and Interdepartmental Committee on research and development in the dependencies of 
the Falkland Islands., Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on research and development in the 
dependencies of the Falkland Islands : with appendices, maps, ... : presented to Parliament by 
command of His Majesty (London, 1920). 
2 Falkland Islands Defence Scheme, 1939, p.6 "Scale and Form of Attack." TNA, CAB 120/516. 
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The Argentines did not take kindly to the garrisoning of the Falkland Islands, 
especially since many of the volunteers were drawn from the British community in 
Argentina.3  The defence of Britain’s formal empire weakened Britain’s informal 
connections in Argentina.  Tensions caused by the sovereignty dispute led to 
differences of opinion between the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office.  The 
Colonial Office wanted to protest the extension of Argentine claims from the 
Fakland Islands themselves to the Antarctic Peninsula region, while the Foreign 
Office resisted this suggestion, fearing a bad reaction from Argentina.4   
In the early months of the war, several Foreign Office officials, keen to 
preserve the traditional friendship between Britain and Argentina, even entertained 
suggestions that the Falklands should be handed over to Argentina.5  Others thought 
that ceding the Falkland Islands Dependencies, or at least the South Orkney Islands, 
could placate the Argentines.6  The Colonial Office, in contrast, adopted a very 
paternalistic attitude not only to the Crown Colony itself but also to the 
Dependencies, and refused to consider relinquishing any British territories in the 
South Atlantic.7  The differences of opinion between the Foreign Office and Colonial 
Office were highlighted by the strained relationship between the British Embassy in 
Buenos Aires and the Governor in Stanley.8 
                                                 
3 New York Times,  “Argentina moves to gain Falkland Islands”, 23 October 1939.  TNA, FO 
371/22715. 
4 Barlow, Minutes, 13 July 1939.  TNA, CO 78/211/9. 
5 Roberts to Ovey, 26 September 1939.  TNA, FO 118/699.   
6 Perowne, Minutes, 27 June 1939.  TNA, FO 371/22714. 
7 A Colonial Office official noted: “On the merits, it is hardly conceivable that we could hand over to 
a S. American Republic a population consisting almost exclusively of Scottish sheep farmers and 
shepherds.”  Barlow, Minutes, 13 November 1939.  TNA CO 78/211/9.  
8 Bevir, Minutes, 29 May 1939.  TNA CO 78/211/9. 
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The threat to the Falkland Islands did not come from Argentina alone.  
Japanese advances across the Pacific late in 1941 and into 1942 made British 
officials fear for the security of the Falkland Islands, guarded only by a small force 
of three hundred volunteers.9  As early as September 1941, Colonel Russell, the 
Military Attaché to Buenos Aires, had warned of the possibility of a Japanese 
invasion of the islands, and immediately considered the Argentine dimension of such 
a threat:  
 
The reaction in Argentina to a successful Japanese raid on the Falkland 
Islands would… be entirely unfavourable to us.  Almost the only success of 
German propaganda in this country has been the stirring up of the old 
controversy over the ownership of the Falkland Islands, and even our best 
friends would be tempted to think “serve you right, you ought to have handed 
them back to us if you cannot even protect them yourselves.”10 
 
Security concerns in the Falklands could not be detached from Argentine claims.  
Even the top secret “Scorched Earth Policy” devised for the Falkland Islands and 
South Georgia worried about the possible response by the Argentines to the 
destruction of their whaling stations in South Georgia.11  As the Japanese advanced 
                                                 
9 Extract from C.O.S. (41) 433 Meeting held on 24 December 1941. TNA, CAB 121/510.  The 
volunteer soldiers were armed with rifles, 13 miscellaneous automatic weapons, two 6-inch naval 
guns, two 12-pounders, and two 3-pounders.  Japanese advances in Asia notoriously resulted in the 
fall of Singapore, defended from a naval attack but exposed to an attack by land, in February 1942.   
10 Falkland Islands: Defenses and British Expedition to Falkland Island Dependencies, 1941-1944.”  
TNA, ADM 116/5104. 
11 “Scorched Earth Policy, Falkland Islands and South Georgia, 1942.”  TNA, CO 968/82/8.  At the 
Colonial Office Acheson noted: “The company and the Argentine gov. may not be on strong grounds 
in protesting against the destruction of their stocks, if that should be necessary: but they may have 
good ground for protesting against measures which in practice put them out of business before the 
enemy attack [no storing of stocks].  Moreover, if they are put out of business in South Georgia they 
may be induced to start up in South Shetlands or elsewhere in the Dependencies, and that would be a 
good deal more embarrassing politically as well as otherwise.  I should not have thought there was 
any great point in this particular stipulation…” Acheson, Minutes, 26 March 1942.  TNA, CO 
968/82/8. 
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relentlessly through Asia and across the Pacific, the perceived threat to the islands 
grew ever greater. 
Over-stretched British troops could scarcely be spared to defend the Falkland 
Islands, and the logistical difficulties of getting them there made such a move even 
less practicable.  The Chiefs of Staff, who were seriously worried about a Japanese 
invasion, therefore took the unilateral decision to plead with their new American 
allies for assistance.  On Christmas Eve 1941, the Chiefs of Staff cabled their 
mission in Washington with instructions to approach the Americans, without 
consulting either the Foreign Office or the Colonial Office.12  Three days later, 
before any contact had been made, the Colonial Office learnt of this telegram.  A top 
Colonial Office official wrote angrily to the Chiefs of Staff:  
 
We would very much like to have been informed that this proposal was under 
consideration.  We feel that suggestions for garrisoning a British colony with 
US troops may raise important and possibly embarrassing political issues 
which ought to be considered before the American Government is 
approached.13 
 
The Foreign Office, markedly hardening its line on the Falklands question, also 
complained to the Chiefs of Staff.14  General Ismay, head of the Chiefs of Staff, 
responded tersely to this criticism:  
                                                 
12 Chiefs of Staff, Minutes of Meeting, 24 December 1941.  TNA, CAB 121/510. 
13 Parkinson to Price, 27 December 1941. TNA, CAB 121/510. 
14 Sargent noted: “I am sure that you will agree that an invitation to a foreign power to occupy British 
territory is a matter for consideration by the War Cabinet.  In the case of the Falklands, a number of 
complicated political issues are involved.  The Argentines have long laid claim to the islands and, 
according to some recent information are actually submitting to Washington a scheme of defence for 
the South Atlantic which contemplates the cession to them, in complete sovereignty, of the colony.  
We do not know what the American reaction to this has been, but it may be supposed that, should they 
be willing to garrison the Falkland Islands at our suggestion, they will (on the analogy of the Brazilian 
association with the US defence of Dutch Guinea and the State Department's desire that Venezuela 
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As I believe the Chiefs of Staff see the problem, the alternatives are as 
follows: - (a) Assistance in the defence of the Falkland Islands by the USA 
with all its consequent political disadvantages: or (b) Occupation by the 
Japanese.  Between these two stark alternatives there does not seem to be 
much room for manoeuvre.15 
 
However, faced with such broad internal dissent, the Chiefs of Staff retracted their 
decision to approach the Americans, and set about finding another way to defend the 
islands.  
Facing an imperial problem, the British sought an imperial solution.  South 
African troops had already been considered and found to be unavailable; West Indian 
or African troops were thought unsuitable due to the inclement climate of the 
Falkland Islands.16  The Chiefs of Staff therefore made a decision, this time after 
consultation with the Foreign and Colonial Offices, to approach the Canadian 
government and request Canadian troops to garrison the Falkland Islands.17 
However, Mackenzie King, the Canadian Prime Minister, decided not to send 
                                                                                                                                          
should be associated with the US in the defence of Curacao and Aruba) at the very least, insist that the 
Argentines should be associated with them in any defence of the Falklands.  What view the 
Argentines might take of such a suggestion, in view of their claims, is not certain, but they are 
behaving thoroughly badly as regards the war, and we can be pretty sure that they will be reluctant to 
let slip any opportunity of twisting our tails or of blackmailing the Americans, who need to placate 
them in order to achieve a united pan-American front at the Rio Conference.”  Sargent to Ismay, 1 
January 1942.  TNA, CAB 121/510.  With the nationalist leaning vice-President Castillo now in full 
control of the Argentine government, the Foreign Office had less reason to “appease” the Argentina in 
the hope of making life easier for pro-British factions among the government.  There was increasing 
frustration in Britain about continued Argentine neutrality.   
15 Ismay to Sargent, 1 January 1942. TNA, CAB 121/510. 
16 Ismay to Churchill, 16 March 1942. TNA, CAB 121/510. 
17 For a detailed discussion of the Anglo-Canadian negotiations, see Galen Roger Perras, "Anglo-
Canadian Imperial Relations: the Case of the Garrisoning of the Falkland Islands in 1942," War & 
Society [Australia] 14 (1996).  Perowne sent instructions to Halifax that he should inform the US 
President of the approach to the Canadians, adding “For your information we are anxious to be able to 
reassure Canadian Prime Minister without appearing to refer to US Gov for permission to reinforce a 
British colony with British troops.”  Perowne to Halifax, January 1942.  TNA, CAB 121/510. 
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Canadian troops to the Falkland Islands, arguing that Canada was already fully 
involved in the war in Europe.18   
With reports circulating of an early Japanese seizure of the islands, the War 
Cabinet continued to face the stark question of how to defend their Crown Colony in 
the South Atlantic.19  Clement Attlee, Dominions Secretary, suggested that Churchill 
should apply pressure to Mackenzie King.  The Chiefs of Staff, annoyed by a 
continued failure to approach Washington, proposed that the Falklands should be left 
defenseless.  Winston Churchill chose this moment to intervene personally in the 
Falklands question.  Discovering that transport might be available, the Prime 
Minister stated that British troops should be sent to garrison the islands:   
 
The Falklands are very well known, and their loss would be a shock to the 
whole Empire.  They would certainly have to be retaken.  The object of the 
reinforcement would be to make it necessary for the Japanese to extend their 
attacking force to a tangible size.  This might well act as a deterrent.20 
 
Following the Prime Minister's orders, the Eleventh Battalion West Yorks were 
diverted from their intended duties in India and sent instead to the Falklands.  They 
arrived in Stanley at the beginning of August 1942.21 
                                                 
18 The telegraph informing the Dominions Office of this decision arrived in London on 13 March 
1942. TNA, CAB 121/510. 
19 Hadow to Foreign Office, 7 March 1942. TNA, CAB 121/510. 
20 Churchill to Ismay, 1 April 1942. TNA, CAB 121/510. 
21 The Japanese did not attack the Falkland Islands.  The two thousand soldiers of the West Yorkshire 
Regiment were left to sit out the war in the relative serenity of Britain’s South Atlantic outpost.  The 
officers’ official diaries recorded little more exciting than the changes in the bleak South Atlantic 
weather. TNA, WO 176/67.  In March 1943 a report from the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee 
concluded that there was "no likelihood of a Japanese attack on the islands.” Memorandum by the 
Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 19 October 1943. TNA, CAB 121/510.  However, due, in 
part, to a continued suspicion of Argentine territorial ambition, it would take several more official 
reports before the Eleventh Battalion West Yorks were relieved by soldiers from the Scots Guards, 
almost two years later, see Cawkell, The Falkland Islands.  Meanwhile, a note from the West 
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The arrival of 2000 British soldiers in the Falkland Islands effectively put an 
end to any debate over the Crown Colony’s future.  Henceforth any Argentine 
invasion would not only constitute a legal act of war, but would also almost certainly 
result in armed conflict between the two countries.  The British population of the 
Falklands, limited in numbers though it might be, severely limited the scope for 
Argentine activities in and around the Islands.  For the next twenty years the 
Argentine government would focus its efforts on the virtually unpopulated Antarctic 
Peninsula, where its freedom of action was much greater.  The Falkland Islands 
themselves would not become a central question again until the Antarctic Treaty of 
1959 had resolved the “Antarctic Problem.”22  
 
OPERATION TABARIN 
As the Argentines pushed their claims to the Antarctic Peninsula and 
surrounding sub-Antarctic Islands during the austral summer 1941/42, the British 
could not separate the question of the Falkland Islands Dependencies from the 
question of the Falkland Islands themselves.  Replying to Esmond Ovey’s note about 
the establishment of a Post Office in the South Orkney Islands, Foreign Office 
officials noted: 
 
Argentine Government are obviously seeking to build up a claim by 
occupation to sovereignty over the South Orkneys, and I am advised that 
                                                                                                                                          
Yorkshire Regiment’s medical officer warned that "the medical evidence is that the isolated and 
remote situation of the Falkland Islands, combined with constant high winds and general bleakness 
and monotony, induces a depressed mental outlook, which will cause deterioration in efficiency after 
eighteen months in the islands.” TNA CAB 121/510. 
22 In the 1960s, the “Falklands (Malvinas)” would become a significant issue in the United Nations, 
as Argentina pushed its rights.   
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there is some danger that unless we take counter-measures they may establish 
a claim which it would be difficult to contest.  It is desirable to take action to 
preserve our title (a) on strategic grounds (b) because the better our title the 
greater its value as a bargaining counter in any dispute concerning the 
Falklands.23 
 
At this stage, the Foreign Office clearly saw the Falkland Islands as being more 
valuable than the Dependencies, and even contemplated making concessions in 
Antarctica in order to strengthen their position in the Crown Colony.  For a time, 
British retention of the Falkland Islands Dependencies was based partly upon the 
potential of using the region as a bargaining counter in the Falklands dispute with 
Argentina.  Paradoxically, the possibility of giving up rights in Antarctica went hand 
in hand with the necessity of strengthening British titles to the region, since ceding a 
weakly claimed area meant much less than making a genuine territorial concession. 
As British officials debated the best way to defend the Falkland Islands, the 
South American threat to the Dependencies continued to grow.  The British 
Government had responded to the Argentine actions in the Antarctic season of 
1941/42 by sending a letter to Sir Esmond Ovey instructing him to make a formal 
protest to the Argentine Government.  The situation was complicated by the 
replacement of Sir Esmond Ovey as British Ambassador to Argentina by Sir David 
Kelly.24   Inheriting the orders from the Foreign Office to make an official protest to 
the Argentine Government, Kelly worried about the effect that such a protest would 
have upon already inflamed Argentine public opinion.  In the circumstances he 
deemed that an approach to the Argentine government would do more harm than 
                                                 
23 Foreign Office to Ovey, February 1942.  TNA, CAB 121/510. 
24 David Kelly, The ruling few; or The human background to diplomacy (London, 1952). 
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good to British interests, and he simply ignored the orders from London.  He 
justified his insubordination by resorting to the specter of Nazism in Argentina:  
 
I wish to make it clear that this [the Falklands issue] is one political question 
on which all Argentines are agreed and if (which of course may be untrue) 
Minister for Foreign Affairs is really pro-German and determined at all costs 
to avoid breaking off relations we might be presenting him with a heaven sent 
opportunity.25  
 
As the "man on the spot", Kelly enjoyed an inordinate influence in shaping the 
Anglo-Argentine relationship, and he clearly regarded the maintenance of good 
relations as being more important than legal wrangling over the sovereignty of an icy 
wasteland. 
In the 1942-43 season, in order to counter moves being made by the 
Argentine 1º de Mayo in the Falkland Islands Dependencies, the Admiralty 
dispatched HMS Carnarvon Castle to the region.  The precise nature of the orders to 
be given to this British ship became a hotly disputed, and at times almost farcical, 
topic.26  The Foreign Office wanted to avoid an armed confrontation at any cost.  
Throughout these discussions, the Foreign Office made repeated reference to the 
importance of Anglo-Argentine relations, which, according to Perowne "were of 
importance to His Majesty's Government in innumerable ways."27  "Apart from the 
British capital (£400,000,000) invested in Argentina and of our import and export 
trade," Perowne added, "an incident of this sort [a violent clash] would be the one 
                                                 
25 "Falkland Island Dependencies: Encroachment by Argentina, 1942-1943", Kelly to Foreign Office, 
telegram, 16 October 1942. TNA, ADM 116/4670. 
26 Minutes of meeting held at Foreign Office, 6 January 1943. TNA, ADM 116/4670. 
27 J.V. Perowne, Minutes of meeting held at Foreign Office, 11 January 1943.  TNA, ADM 116/4670. 
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thing which might imperil our essential meat imports from Argentina."  Not only did 
Foreign Office Officials remain hesitant about engaging in an active dispute with the 
Argentines, but they also queried the relative worth of holding onto the dependencies 
at all.  As it turned out, the Carnarvon Castle made no contact with the Argentines 
during its “administrative tour” of the Dependencies, although it did remove 
sovereignty markers left by the recent Argentine expedition.    
On 11 February 1943, Sir David Kelly, the British ambassador in Argentina, 
finally made an official communication – although not a formal protest – to the 
Argentine government.  Referring to the actions of the HMS Carnarvon Castle he 
said: “naturally we used the occasion to take away the cited objects [sovereignty 
markers].”  The Argentine Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores issued a 
memorandum on the 15 February answering the British note.  This memorandum 
challenged the British action and reaffirmed Argentine sovereign rights over all the 
Antarctic lands and dependencies.28  Apart from this official reply, nationalists in 
Argentina did not respond to the British statement in the extreme ways in which 
Kelly had previously feared. 
Amidst the debates surrounding the voyage of HMS Carnavon Castle to the 
Antarctic Peninsula in the season of 1942/43, the Foreign Office convened a series of 
meetings to discuss the longer-term possibilities of strengthening the British title to 
the Falkland Islands Dependencies.  Early in the proceedings, Anthony Eden, the 
Foreign Secretary, argued that the legal benefits of simply making protests in the 
Antarctic question were far from obvious, and added that a protest without some 
                                                 
28 Argentine Republic. Comisión Nacional del Antártico, Soberanía argentina en la Antártida. Nota 
preliminar del Presidente de la Nación, Juan Perón. 72. 
 91 
form of renewed administrative action would in any case be useless.29  Eden's 
comments effectively threw down the gauntlet to the Colonial Office and the 
Admiralty: either they would have to support their imperial rhetoric with actions, or 
they should let the matter drop.  The Colonial Office retained an unswerving 
commitment to British sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies, and with 
backing from the Governor of the Falklands, suggested a series of administrative 
visits.  The Admiralty supported the Colonial Office position by supplying the 
Foreign Office with a long list of strategic reasons for continued British sovereignty 
in the region, and sealed the issue by agreeing to finance an expedition of "effective 
occupation" out of its own Treasury Votes.30  Dogged attachment to the 
Dependencies from both the Colonial Office and the Admiralty, combined with 
assurances that no violent confrontation with Argentina would result, convinced the 
Foreign Office that no cession should take place.   
 
Informed, at last, by agreement among the Departments, the War Cabinet 
took the decision, early in 1943, to take all possible steps to safeguard British 
Sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies.31  The war cabinet took this 
                                                 
29 Perowne to Secretary of Admiralty, 23 October 1942. TNA, CAB 121/510 
30 H.N. Morrison to the Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office, 26 November 1942. This money, 
they hoped, would be recouped through taxes on the Whaling industry. TNA, CAB 121/510. 
31 Copy of letter, reference AS 1756/8/51 dated 25 March 1947 from the Foreign Office to the 
Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee.  TNA, CAB 121/510.  “In a memorandum dated 27th January, 
1943 (Cabinet Paper W.P. (43) 41), the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs drew the attention of the 
War Caninet to the situation created by Argentine encroachments against certain Antarctic 
Dependencies of the Falkland Islands Colony.  As a result, the War Cabinet decided that all possible 
steps should be taken to strengthen our title to these possessions and various measures to this end 
were set in train, chief among them being the despatch to carious points in the Dependencies of 
official parties who have wintered there in each year since 1943.  In making their decision, the War 
Cabinet were influenced to a considerable extent by strategic considerations and in particular by the 
need of denying to enemy raiders the use of possible refueling bases in the Dependencies in time of 
war.” 
 92 
decision in direct response to the Argentine encroachments in the Dependencies, 
although broader strategic reasons – the need to deny to enemy raiders the use of 
possible re-fuelling bases – also had a considerable influence on the decision.  In 
Churchill’s absence, the War Cabinet took the decision to send a top-secret military 
expedition to the Antarctic Peninsula in order to establish bases of permanent 
occupation.32  This decision effectively put to an end the official uncertainty over the 
future of Britain's South Atlantic territories.  For the remainder of the war it would 
be British official policy actively to safeguard both the Falkland Islands and the 
Falkland Islands Dependencies.  
Following the War Cabinet’s decision to establish bases of effective 
occupation in Antarctica, British officials in the Colonial Office, the Admiralty and 
the Foreign Office Research Department (F.O.R.D.) spent the rest of 1943 making 
preparations for the expedition.  These officials, the story goes, became so 
accustomed to working through the night that the expedition became known as 
Operation Tabarin, after a famous Parisian nightclub.  The Admiralty recalled 
Lieutenant Commander James Marr from services in the Far East to lead the 
operation.33  Marr had previously been to Antarctica as a Boy Scout as part of 
Shackleton’s final Quest expedition and had played a leading role in the inter-war 
Discovery Investigations.  Over the course of the year, Marr put together a small 
team of men, mostly with previous polar experience, to accompany him to the 
                                                 
32 Later, when he found out about the expedition, Winston Churchill would express his annoyance 
that the War Cabinet took the decision to send British military personal to such a distant region.  
Klaus Dodds, “Operation Tabarin” BBC Radio 4, broadcast December 2004. 
33 Interview with Back. SPRI, MS 1308/22/1.  Back says that Surgeon Commander Bingham was 
originally proposed as leader of the expedition, but the Navy would not spare him due to the war.   
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Antarctic Peninsula.  HMS Bransfield, a wooden-hulled former sealer, was 
designated as the vessel of expedition.   
At every stage of planning and organization, the top-secret nature of 
Operation Tabarin was maintained.  The main reason for this secrecy was to prevent 
the Argentine and Chilean Governments from hearing about the expedition and 
sending their own ships to Antarctica to confront the British.34  Even if Argentina 
and Chile were rivals in Antarctica, Argentina in particular remained an important 
commercial ally and source of food.  The Foreign Office repeatedly stressed that 
Britain could not afford an armed showdown with either South American country in 
Antarctica, since this would jeopardize the food supply.  In this way the broader 
inter-relationships of the Anglo-Argentine-Chilean triangle influenced the 
development of the sovereignty dispute in Antarctica.  In particular, the need to 
maintain commercial connections gave the dispute a particularly constrained and 
performative character in which a fierce rhetoric often diverged from a more benign 
reality.   
The overlap of formal and informal empire helped to create the conditions 
whereby the contest for environmental authority would come to the center of the 
Antarctica sovereignty dispute.  As the three countries attempted to prove their 
sovereignty rights without an outright display of physical force, the demonstration of 
superior scientific capabilities offered a convenient way to do this.  A major 
influence on this process was the fact that most Antarctic experts, especially in 
Britain, were scientists.  As the British officials looked for advice about Operation 
                                                 
34 Another reason for this secrecy was the war.  There is, however, no evidence to support the view 
advanced by one author that Operation Tabarin was merely an elaborate hoax to confuse German 
intelligence. Quoted in Dodds, “Operation Tabarin” Radio 4, broadcast December 2004. 
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Tabarin, they turned to polar scientists.  J.M. Wordie, Master of St John’s College, 
Cambridge and a preeminent polar scientist, played a major role in planning the 
expedition, and he proved to be quite outspoken. 35  The involvement of Wordie and 
other scientists in the Antarctic problem ensured that British interest towards the 
region continued to have an important scientific component.  Despite the pressures of 
the war, these scientists saw Operation Tabarin as offering a still rare opportunity to 
conduct scientific research.  As a consequence, Operation Tabarin would have a 
much greater scientific component than most wartime naval expeditions, and this 
connection between Antarctic politics and Antarctic science would set the tone for 
much of the ensuing Antarctic sovereignty dispute. 
 
BRITAIN IN ANTARCTICA 
Operation Tabarin arrived in Antarctica in early 1944.36  The members of the 
top-secret expedition initially attempted to build a base at Hope Bay, on the 
mainland of the Antarctica Peninsula, but adverse weather conditions prevented this.  
Instead they established two bases, one at Port Lockroy (Base A), just off the 
Antarctic Peninsula, and another at Deception Island (Base B) in the South 
Shetlands.37  At Deception Island the party used the whaling buildings that had not 
been destroyed by the Queen of Bermuda in 1941.  At Port Lockroy the party built a 
base using prefabricated huts. In performing the legal requirement of effective 
                                                 
35 Dominion Office Minute, 3 November 1943.  TNA DO 35/890/10. 
36 For a summary of the subsequent history of the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey and the 
British Antarctic Survey, see Vivian Fuchs, Of ice and men: the story of the British Antarctic Survey, 
1943-73 (Oswestry, Shropshire, England, 1982). 
37 During the winter, when the sea was frozen, it was possible to walk from Port Lockroy to the 
mainland.  However, officials at the time thought that because Port Lockroy was an island it had a 
little less legal value in demonstrating the effective occupation of the Antarctic Peninsula.   
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occupation, the governor of the Falkland Islands appointed Captain Marr as 
Magistrate, Post Master, and Harbor Master of Port Lockroy, and gave the leader at 
Deception Island similar responsibilities.38  In response to the establishment of an 
Argentine post office on Laurie Island the previous year, the British issued a set of 
stamps for the Dependencies, which proved to be popular with stamp collectors.39 
At the end of the polar summer, when the season for sending ships to 
Antarctica had closed, the British announced that they had established two bases of 
effective occupation in the Falkland Islands Dependencies.  By this time it was too 
late for the Chileans and Argentines to respond with an expedition of their own that 
season.  The reaction to Operation Tabarin in Chile and Argentina was generally 
muted.  Since neither government could immediately do anything about the British 
action, neither government wanted to highlight its own weakness.  In a handwritten 
memo in the Chilean Foreign Ministry, Julio Escudero wrote despondently that it 
now looked like the British were serious about upholding their claims to Antarctica, 
adding that the scientific component of the expedition showed that the British were 
prospecting for economic opportunities in the region.40   
Over the course of the polar winter, the parties at the two bases conducted 
rudimentary meteorological, biological, glaciological and geological research and 
began the important geo-political tasks of exploration and mapping.41  N.A. 
Mackintosh, head of the Discovery Committee, wrote that the object of the work was 
“to fill in part of the general picture of the Dependencies and to provide a 
                                                 
38 BAS Oral History interviews. 
39 Beck, "British Antarctic Policy in the Early Twentieth Century." 
40 Handwritten Memo (Escudero), 16 October 1944.  RR.EE. Antártica Chilena, Comunicaciones con 
Gran Bretaña, 1940-47. 
41 Dodds, Pink ice: Britain and the South Atlantic Empire. 
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comparison with other regions.”42  But, as Marr noted in a letter to the Governor of 
the Falkland Islands, there was always a political motive behind the scientific work 
being carried out: “Back [the meteorologist] is intensely interested in weather, and 
the faithful records he has kept, apart from their scientific value, will strengthen our 
political position…”43 Back took six meteorological readings a day and broadcast 
them to Stanley, from where they were included in the International Register. At 
Deception Island Mr. Flett conducted a geological survey of the island.44  At Port 
Lockroy Ivan Lamb, a botanist and the only trained scientist on the expedition, 
conducted detailed research into Antarctic lichen.45  In a sign of the British parties’ 
inexperience of polar conditions, the dogs at Port Lockroy were allowed to run free 
for the first six weeks, killing penguins and disappearing into the interior.46   
In October 1944 the British government announced their intention of sending 
a second expedition to Antarctica.47  This expedition, the Chileans believed, would 
include experts in the development of “radiolocación” (radar) from the Battle of 
Britain in an effort to develop the Antarctic whaling industry, to establish radar 
stations, and, somewhat surprisingly, to assist with the exploitation of minerals.   
                                                 
42 Ibid. 
43 Marr to Cardinall, 6 November 1944.  SPRI, MS 1308/22/1. 
44 Another geologist, Mr. Buck, had intended to accompany the expedition, but while still on the 
Bransfield he decided that he was not healthy enough to head south.   
45 Lamb has been described as the Edward Wilson of the expedition.  See BAS Back interview.  
46 These lessons were not immediately learned.  During the construction of Hope Bay in the following 
summer Andrew Taylor reported that: “The dogs are quite friendly to meet, but anything they fall 
upon is torn limb from limb in just a few seconds.  Dead penguins are scattered all along the beach.  
They do not eat them, they only kill”. Official Journal of Operation Tabarin as kept by Capt. Andrew 
Taylor, R.C.E., entry for 8 February 1945.  BAS, AD 6/1D/1945/B1 
47 Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, Santiago al Señor Ministro de Defensa Nacional, Subsecretaria 
de Marina.  25 October 1944.  RR.EE., “Antártica Chilena, Comunciaciones con Gran Bretaña, 1940-
47.” 
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In the austral summer of 1944-45 the Eagle, Scoresby, and Fitzroy sailed 
south from the Falkland Islands and Operation Tabarin constructed two new bases, 
one at Hope Bay (Base D), and one at Sandefjiord Bay (Base C).  The building of the 
Hope Bay base at the far north of the Antarctic Peninsula completed the aborted plan 
of the previous year, and fulfilled the legal objective of physically occupying the 
actual Antarctic Continent.  The members of Operation Tabarin, with a year’s 
experience of polar conditions, had meticulously planned the unloading of material 
in advance, making the construction of the new bases go much more smoothly.  
During the construction of Hope Bay, Captain Marr, the leader of Operation Tabarin, 
had to be evacuated to the Falkland Islands after a mental breakdown.48  He was 
replaced as leader by his second in command, Captain Andrew Taylor, who had 
previous experience of surveying in the Canadian Arctic.  It was Taylor who 
oversaw the building of Hope Bay.49  Towards the end of the short summer season 
there was some debate over whether an attempt should be made to establish a base at 
Stonington Island to the south of the Peninsula.  After some discussion the British 
decided not to make such an attempt.  They also decided that there were not enough 
men to occupy the newly constructed base at Sandefjiord Bay. 50 
 
                                                 
48 He informed Taylor and Flett of his decision to leave on 7 February 1945, and then collapsed the 
following day. Official Journal of Operation Tabarin as kept by Capt. Andrew Taylor, R.C.E., entry 
for 7 and 8 February 1945.  BAS, AD6/1D/1945/B1. 
49 One of Taylor’s tasks during the building of Hope Bay had been to survey an old hut, which had 
been left behind by the shipwrecked Nordenskjold expedition of 1902.  Members of the expedition 
had wintered at Hope Bay, living off penguin meat, before marching to rejoin the rest of their party at 
Snow Hill where they were rescued by the Argentine Uruguay expedition.   
50 See M.A. Martin and J. Rae, “Research Stations and Refuges of the British Antarctic Survey and its 
Predecessors”, (British Antarctic Survey Archives, 2001).  The hut was last seen standing on 
September 6 1950, and by 1955 it had collapsed (possibly blown down). 
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THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
Throughout 1945 the members of Operation Tabarin continued their 
programs of scientific research and exploration in the relative security of Britain’s 
Falkland Islands Dependencies.  Away from Antarctica, truly momentous events 
were occurring that would shape the future of the Anglo-Argentine-Chilean 
sovereignty dispute.  With Allied forces advancing on Berlin from all sides, Chile 
and Argentina finally declared war on the Axis Powers.51  A large part of this 
decision was based on their desire to take part in the formation of the United Nations 
and participate in post-war reconstruction.  On 28 March 1945 The Standard of 
Buenos Aires, one of two English language newspapers serving the English speaking 
community in Argentina, happily greeted the news that Argentina had declared war 
on the Axis: “To say that we are gratified at the decision reached would be to 
understate the case.  We are delighted...”52 Between April and June ministers from 
Argentina and Chile joined ministers from the other Allied countries at the United 
Nations conference in San Francisco.53  On 7 May 1945 Germany surrendered 
unconditionally; three months later, Japan would also surrender.54 
In July 1945 Clement Attlee’s Labour Party won a general election in Great 
Britain.  The promise of a “land of milk and honey” to a war weary nation proved 
                                                 
51 A year earlier both countries had broken off relations with the Axis powers.  See Humphreys, Latin 
America and the Second World War. 
52 The Standard 28 March 1945.  “Argentina at War.” 
53 The United Nations would later provide an important arena for discussion of the “Antarctic 
Problem.” 
54 In the terms of the subsequent peace treaties both defeated nations would be forced to give up their 
claims to Antarctica. In the case of Germany, this renunciation of claims to Antarctica put an end to 
Germany activity in the Southern Continent for over 25 years.  In 1981 West Germany was admitted 
to the Antarctic Treaty system as a consultative member.  Although Japan would not renew its 
tentative sovereignty claims to Antarctica, it did resume whaling in Antarctic waters shortly after the 
end of the war.  
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enough to defeat Churchill’s Tories.  With the Labour Party now in government, 
British officials began planning for the post-war continuation of Operation Tabarin 
and the effective occupation of the Falkland Islands Dependencies.  In May the 
Foreign Office had prepared a confidential 300 page handbook by Brian Roberts, 
titled “Territorial Claims in the Antarctic”, which summarized the legal, political, 
and logistical issues surrounding the question of sovereignty.55  In responding to this 
handbook, Wordie suggested that it was in Britain’s best interest to avoid an 
international conference on the question of Antarctic sovereignty, although he 
warned that the United Kingdom should be prepared for other countries to suggest 
this.56  He added that “even if the United States were not behind the Argentine and 
Chile, the moves of these two countries would not be unwelcome to the United 
States; a revival of US claims was to be anticipated and it was likely that the United 
States would wish to take a hand in the Antarctic whaling after the war.”  
Foreshadowing future interdepartmental rivalry, Wordie recommended that the 
Dominion Office should immediately reconstitute the Polar Committee, warning that 
it would be difficult to do so after the Foreign Office had established its own 
Antarctic Committee. 
On 17 July 1945 Operation Tabarin was renamed Falkland Islands 
Dependencies Survey.  The Colonial Office took over full responsibility from the 
Admiralty.  The Colonial Office named Surgeon Commander Bingham leader of the 
expedition, and set about recruiting 30 men to staff the bases.57  This raised the 
question of publicity for the expedition.  Acknowledging the continued sensitivity of 
                                                 
55 Document remained closed in the TNA during research. 
56 Wordie Memo, 14 February 1945. TNA, DO 35/1424. 
57 Perowne (FO) to Barton (CO), 25 July 1945.  TNA, CO 78/217/14.   
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the issue, the Foreign Office wanted to keep the location of the bases secret, and they 
determined to warn Sir David Kelly, in Buenos Aires, of all actions concerning 
Antarctica.  On 12 October 1945 Bingham received his instructions to “establish new 
bases in the South Orkney Islands (C) and in Marguerite Bay (E).”58  The 
establishment of a base at Laurie Island was the most important objective, since it 
demonstrated British title to the South Orkney Islands, and made it unnecessary to 
make a formal visit of protest to the Argentine Base at Scotia Bay.  The instructions 
to Bingham stated that the British base should be located far enough away from the 
Argentine base to “preclude chance meetings between the two parties”.  Occasional 
social visits were allowed, although Bingham was informed “You should not enter 
into any discussion concerning sovereignty with the Argentine Party.”   
The Colonial Office informed Bingham that the Falklands Islands 
Dependencies Survey should continue the scientific work that had been begun by 
Operation Tabarin: “apart from political objects, the purpose of the FIDS is to 
acquire knowledge of the topography, geological structure, glaciers, weather 
conditions, living, traveling, and navigating conditions, fauna and flora, and natural 
resources of the FID, more especially of Graham Land and the adjacent islands.”59  
“Such knowledge”, the instructions continued, “is needed for the future development 
not only of the Dependencies but also of other Antarctic regions, and it has an 
important bearing on the general meteorology (and to some extent the oceanography) 
of the Southern Ocean.”  Survey work, although “not fundamentally more important 
than other work,” was to be given priority, especially at Hope Bay.  The Falklands 
                                                 




Islands Dependencies Survey scientific work would focus on the geology of the 
Antarctic Peninsula in the hope that mineral resources might be found.  The Colonial 
Office acknowledged the crucial importance of understanding the Antarctic weather 
in order to develop these riches.   
In November, Dr. N.A. Mackintosh from the Discovery Investigations wrote 
to Barton at the Colonial Office with further suggestions about the scientific work of 
the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey. 60   His main suggestion was that the 
Discovery Investigations and the Survey should be amalgamated into a single 
service.  He strongly supported British claims to the Dependencies and suggested 
that the region could prove to be tremendously valuable to Great Britain.  Building 
upon the idea of Antarctica as a frozen El Dorado, Mackintosh noted that much of 
the continent remained practically unknown: “little prospecting has yet been carried 
out, but indications of very rich copper deposits have already been found and the 
rock formations of one locality offer the possibility of discovering petroleum.”  From 
a political and economic perspective he added: “the Antarctic may also become 
important in the future for air routes and for strategic purposes.”  Underlying this 
promise of wealth and power, Mackintosh repeatedly stressed the imperatives of 
scientific research.  “The products of the Antarctic whaling industry are worth 
between £10 and £20m a year” he claimed, “and it is no exaggeration to say that the 
regulation and maintenance of this industry cannot be achieved without research on 
whales.”  Finally, Mackintosh suggested that the Antarctic region offered the 
potential to learn more about the world’s weather conditions: 
 
                                                 
60 Mackintosh (Discovery Investigations) to Mr. Barton (CO), 27 November 1945.  TNA, CO 
78/217/16. 
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In high southern latitudes the atmosphere is less disturbed by geographical 
factors than in any other part of the world, and these regions thus offer a 
laboratory for pure meteorological research of world wide application.  The 
need for observing stations in the Antarctic and Subantarctic is widely 
recognized, not only for this reason, but also because they are essential to the 
development of weather forecasting in South Africa, Australia and NZ.  Here 
again the Dependencies occupy a key position.61 
 
Scientists and politicians had a mutual interest in holding onto Britain’s title to the 
Falkland Islands Dependencies.  Scientists provided political and economic 
justifications for politicians wanting to maintain British sovereignty.  In exchange, 
politicians had the power to promote and fund scientific research.  Antarctic science 
thus developed within a network of political patronage.   
 
RESUMPTION OF WHALING 
For most of the Second World War, very little whaling had taken place in the 
waters around Antarctica.62  Early in the war, the British had destroyed oil supplies 
at Deception Island in order to prevent them falling into enemy hands.  The German 
ship, the Penguin, had captured a large part of the Norwegian whaling fleet.  The 
Allies requisitioned almost all other whaling vessels to serve as transport and supply 
                                                 
61 The South Africans themselves realized the importance of Antarctica to their weather systems.  In 
December 1945, Brian Roberts noted General Smuts’ desire to have a South Polar Year (i.e. a large 
scale co-operative meteorological investigation in the Southern Hemisphere), although he and 
Brigadier Shonland did not wish to taken any precipitate action and considered November 1947 to be 
the earliest practical date for starting. Brian Roberts: Note on Discussion with Instr. Capt. J. Fleming 
of Admiralty Naval Meteorological Service, December 6th 1945.  TNA, CO 78/217/16.  Roberts 
added that: “Capt. Fleming is making unofficial enquiries to discover more about the South African 
plans.  He also wishes to investigate the possibilities of providing facilities through the FIDS for 
training one or two South Africans in Polar technique.  At present they have no-one with the 
necessary experience and this appears to be one of the chief reasons why official support is being held 
back.” 
62 Tønnessen and Johnsen, The history of modern whaling. 472-498. 
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ships.  German U-boats sank many of these, especially while making the treacherous 
crossing of the North Atlantic.  Salvesen, the major British whaling company, lost all 
of its factory ships and almost all of its catchers.63   
More positively for the prospects of the whaling industry, the suspension of 
most whaling activities for the duration of the war proved to be a reprieve for 
Antarctic whale populations.64  These populations had begun to show worrying signs 
of decline in the late 1930s, due to chronic over-fishing.  Marine biologists at the end 
of the war were aware of the benign affects of a prolonged period of recovery, and 
they suggested to their governments that whaling once again offered exciting 
economic possibilities.  Although these marine biologists tended to overstate their 
case for the revival of whale numbers, they also realized that if the industry were to 
survive more than a few years, whaling could not be allowed to return to the 
unregulated free-for-all of the 1930s.   
The British Government was particularly keen to resume Antarctic whaling 
operations.  Labour’s new postwar “Land of Milk and Honey” was desperately short 
of food-fats of any sort.  Rationing remained in place and the supply of food was a 
major political issue, as would be demonstrated by the fraught negotiations with 
Argentina over the continued export of beef to Britain.  In many parts of war-ravaged 
Europe, food shortages were even more acute, and famine was common.  Post-war 
planners in the British government feared that such scarcity might drive Europe into 
the hands of the Soviet Union.  Antarctic whaling appeared to offer a significant 
untapped source of food oil and meat.  The British Government therefore diverted 
shipbuilding programs to build new whaling factory ships to replace those lost in the 
                                                 
63 Elliot, A whaling enterprise: Salvesen in the Antarctic. 47-48. 
64 Tønnessen and Johnsen, The history of modern whaling. 
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war.  During 1945, British shipyards constructed two new factory ships built to 
modern specifications with the capacity to process whale meat as well as whale oil.65  
One of the new ships was sold to the British Salvesen Company.  The other was sold 
to Norway, where several factory ships had in fact survived the war.  Out of this 
somewhat eclectic mixture of old and new boats, a joint British-Norwegian 
expedition was put together to sail south in the 1945-46 Antarctic summer season.   
The British-Norwegian expedition of 1945-46 caught a total of 7,381 Blue 
Whale Units (BWU), which supplied food to thousands of hungry Europeans.  
Through taxes on the shore based whale stations, this expedition began to increase 
the revenues raised in the Falkland Islands Dependencies.66  The expedition was also 
significant for the continued co-operation, though sometimes grudging, of the 
Norwegian whalers with the British Government.  Before the Second World War, 
Norwegian acquiescence with British sovereignty claims – through the purchase of 
whaling licenses, the payment of whaling taxes, the submission to British legal 
authority and so forth – had constituted an important recognition of Britain’s legal 
status in the region.  This recognition now looked set to continue.  Norway, which 
now had its own claim to Antarctica to the east of Britain’s Falkland Islands 
Dependencies, made no renewed effort to host a polar conference to discuss the 
question of sovereignty. 
The resumption of whaling posed a problem for whalers, government 
officials, and scientists: how could they avoid a return to the laissez-faire situation of 
the 1930s and prevent another rapid decline of Antarctica’s whale populations?  In a 
                                                 
65 Elliot, A whaling enterprise: Salvesen in the Antarctic.  One problem during the 1930s had been 
that whalers wastefully discarded everything but their valuable whale oil. 
66 See Colonial Office Lists (H.M.S.O. 1939-1959) showing revenue. 
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pro-active attempt to prevent such a decline from happening, marine biologists and 
leading figures from the whaling industry met in Washington D.C. in early 1946 to 
discuss a new regime for global whaling – 90 percent of which took place in the 
waters around Antarctica.  Delegates from 15 countries participated in the 
conference.  Britain’s N.A. Mackintosh, from the pre-war Discovery Investigations, 
was one of the leading figures in the conference. 
British participation in the International Whaling Convention (IWC) recalled 
some of its original justifications for Antarctic Empire: assertions of environmental 
authority “for the good of humanity.”  But now this environmental authority was to 
be achieved through participation in an international organization, rather than simply 
through domestic laws regulating the whaling industry.  There was also a renewed 
British concern with economics.  In theory, if not always in practice, the mid-
twentieth century British Empire had its foundations on the mantra that empire 
should pay for itself.  British taxpayers had traditionally refused to foot the bill for 
empire, and such an attitude was particularly prevalent within Clement Attlee’s new 
Labour Government.  The post war British Empire was seen as a way of reinforcing 
the British economy, and numerous colonial development schemes, including a 
scheme for whaling around the Falkland Islands Dependencies, sought to make the 
Empire more economically productive.  In the eyes of many, Britain’s claims to 
Antarctica would not be worth maintaining if they weren’t economically self-
sufficient.   
The advent of factory ship based pelagic whaling during the 1920s had 
limited the British Government’s ability to tax the Antarctic whaling industry.  
Factory ships on the high seas were out of any nation’s jurisdiction.  Nevertheless, 
before the Second World War, the Falkland Islands Dependencies had generated a 
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profit for the British Empire.  Taxes on land-based whaling and the whaling service 
industry brought in revenue, while expenditure remained minimal.67  The renewed 
interest of Argentina and Chile in the region caused the cost of maintaining British 
sovereignty in the region to rise greatly.  From now on, the British would have to pay 
for expeditions of effective occupation, and this was not a cheap undertaking in the 
harsh conditions of the Antarctic environment.  Although it would take several years 
for Britain to put the Falkland Islands Dependencies on a sound financial footing, the 
renewed whaling industry at least held out the prospect that Britain’s presence in 
Antarctica could be economically self-supporting.   
 
                                                 
67 Expenditure was limited to one or two governmental positions in South Georgia and occasional 
administrative visits by the Governor of the Falkland Islands.   
 107 
Chapter 3: The Scramble for Antarctica, 1946-47 
During the 1946-47 summer season, an unprecedented “Scramble for 
Antarctica” took place in the Antarctic Peninsula region.  Chile, Argentina, Great 
Britain, and the United States each sought to put into practice an “effective 
occupation” of the region through the construction and maintenance of permanent 
bases.  One of the frequently cited legal precedents behind this race for bases was the 
late nineteenth century scramble for Africa, and the imperialist nature of the contest 
for Antarctic sovereignty was never far beneath the surface.1  The East Greenland 
Case of 1933 between Norway and Denmark had reduced the legal requirements for 
effective occupation of Polar Regions.  The ICJ had ruled that the Danes had done 
enough to demonstrate effective occupation with relatively few permanent bases.  
When international lawyers transferred this legal precedent to the South Pole, the 
harshness of the Antarctic environment came to have important legal implications for 
the politics of the nascent sovereignty dispute.   
Despite the growing interest of Argentina and Chile in the question of 
Antarctica during the Second World War, there was nothing inevitable about the 
scramble for Antarctica that took place during the 1946-47 season.  Continued South 
American interest in the Antarctic Peninsula region owed as much to the election of 
nationalist leaning governments in the immediate aftermath of the war as it did to the 
earlier interest in the region.  In many ways it was Chile that took the lead in the 
post-war Scramble for Antarctica.  Frustrated by the country’s wartime inability to 
send an expedition to Antarctica, the new Government of Gabriel González Videla 
                                                 
1 Jorge Berguño, “Intellectual Origins of the Antarctic Treaty.”  Paper presented to SCAR workshop 
in history of Antarctic science, Santiago, September 2006. 
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resolved to establish a Chilean base in Antártica Chilena.  The embattled president 
was quick to see the potential for national unification offered by the assertion of 
Chilean sovereignty in Antarctica.  In Argentina, the newly elected and radically 
different government of Juan Domingo Perón was slower to take up the question of 
Antarctic sovereignty.  But Argentina was unwilling to allow the Chileans to steal 
the initiative in Antarctic affairs, and the government responded to the Chilean 
expedition by putting into practice its own plans for the construction of a permanent 
base.  The notion of a South American Antarctica once again found itself strained by 
the conflicting ambitions of Argentina and Chile. 
Renewed and assertive South American interest in the question of Antarctic 
sovereignty put the British back on the defensive.  British politicians and officials 
remained broadly united by the desire not to set a dangerous precedent in the region 
that could adversely affect the British position in other parts of the colonial empire.2  
But there was no agreement on exactly what should be done with the Falkland 
Islands Dependencies.  There were significant differences of opinion between the 
Colonial Office, which generally wanted to protect Britain’s sovereignty in the 
Antarctic Peninsula region at all costs, and the Foreign Office, which continued to 
worry more about the preservation of good relations with South America, especially 
Argentina.  Once again, the overlap of formal and informal empire posed a major 
problem for British Antarctic policy making.   
The attitude of the United States continued to complicate the question of 
Antarctic sovereignty.  Rather than supporting any particular claim to the Antarctic 
                                                 
2 On a general level British officials continued to think in a similar fashion about the retention of 
political influence.  See, for example, Peter Cain and Tony Hopkins, British imperialism, 1688-2001, 
2nd ed. (Harlow, 2001).  
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Peninsula region, officials in Washington pursued their own confused and somewhat 
indecisive interests in Antarctica.  While the US Government continued to dither 
over whether or not to make a sovereignty claim of its own, it sent an expedition 
known as Operation Highjump to the Antarctic continent.  Under the command of 
Admiral Byrd, this would be the largest expedition ever to sail to Antarctica.  In an 
effort not to unsettle the precarious situation in the Antarctic Peninsula, Operation 
Highjump focused its efforts on other parts of the continent.  A private US 
expedition, however, led by Finn Ronne, posed a direct challenge to the three 
claimant countries by re-occupying the US East Base on Stonington Island in 
Marguerite Bay, which had been constructed by the Byrd expedition of 1939-1941.  
Together, these expeditions offered a resounding statement of US interest in 
Antarctica, although it continued to remain uncertain what form this interest would 
take.    
 
CHILEAN EXPEDITIONS 
In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, Chilean politics went 
through a period of relative instability.3  Despite Chilean neutrality throughout most 
of the war, the global conflict had severely disrupted the country’s economy, as 
demonstrated by its inability to purchase a ship suitable for sailing to Antarctica.  
There was a significant demand for political change, especially from the communist 
leaning left.  In the presidential election of 1946, an alliance between the Radical 
Party and the Communist Party brought about the victory of Gabriel González 
Videla.4  González Videla was a Radical Party politician on the left wing of his 
                                                 
3 Collier and Sater, A history of Chile, 1808-2002. 
4 González Videla, Memorias. 
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party.  He was a flamboyant and somewhat unstable figure, and his views did not 
endear him to the country’s right-wing establishment.  
The election of Gabriel González Videla with the support of the Communist 
Party created a feeling that Chile could be heading on a completely new political 
course.  However, the close connections between the Government and the 
Communist Party worried the United States.  Fearing the spread of communism in 
Latin America, the US State Department, under the influence of the dogmatic Latin 
American specialist Spruille Braden, was beginning to take a more interventionist 
approach in the region.  When González Videla’s government began to talk about 
land reform, the United States threatened to cut off export credits, which were vital 
for Chile’s economic stability.  Without a firm ideological foundation to fall back 
upon, the new President immediately gave in to US demands.  He outlawed the 
Communist Party, and broke off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, 
somewhat ironically accusing the Russians of interference in domestic Chilean 
politics.  Most infamously, these moves led to the forced exile of the poet and 
Communist Party senator Pablo Neruda, bringing vituperative criticism from 
communists and socialists throughout the world.5 
The proscription of the Communist Party left President González Videla in 
power, but in direct confrontation with one of his principal allies.  Amidst the 
political chaos, the question of Chilean sovereignty in Antarctica offered González 
Videla one of the few issues that could unite the vast majority of Chileans.  To the 
political left, the President could frame Chile’s claims to Antarctica in the language 
of anti-imperialism: British claims to the Falkland Islands Dependencies, he would 
                                                 
5 Pablo Neruda, Confieso que he vivido; memorias, 1. ed. (Barcelona,, 1974). 
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argue, represented an outdated vestige of European imperialism on Chilean territory.  
To the political right, González Vidal could appeal to popular patriotic sentiment and 
the latent fear of Argentina.  The simple “fact” that much of the Antarctic Peninsula 
belonged to Chile became a self-reinforcing justification for the promotion of 
sovereignty.  Antártica Chilena offered the President an arena where he could 
display his nationalist credentials, without too great a risk of immediate 
repercussions.  Over the next few years, González Videla’s political fortunes would 
become increasingly tied up with the question of Antarctica.6   
Under the new President, the plans for a Chilean expedition to Antarctica – 
previously put off every year since 1940 – went ahead at full steam.  The Chilean 
Antarctic Commission continued to present position papers.7   Chile acquired two 
ships from the United States of sufficient strength to withstand Antarctic conditions.  
These ships were renamed the Iquique and the Angamos.  They would be the first 
Chilean ships to sail to Antarctica since the Yelcho had rescued Ernest Shackleton’s 
expedition in 1916.  Everything was now in place for a Chilean voyage to 
Antarctica.8  Central to the Chilean plans was the establishment of a permanent 
Antarctic station.  The Chileans realized that they were falling behind in the “race for 
bases,” and the quest to fulfill the legal obligation of effective occupation.  Most 
Chilean officials believed that the best response would be to construct bases of their 
                                                 
6 Christie, The Antarctic problem; an historical and political study. 
7 For example, in May 1946, Cordovez circulated a paper entitled “The Province of Magallanes, 
Antarctica, and Petroleum – A Promising Trinity” in which he argued that foreign companies should 
not be allowed appropriate Chile’s petroleum wealth.   Cordovez al Ministro de RR.EE, 2 May 1946.  
RR.EE., Antártica Chilena, Varios, 1940-48.   
8 See British protest note of 11 November that explicitly challenged Chile’s “scientific grounds for 
sovereignty. Bianchi, Londres, a Ministro de RR.EE. 14 November 1946.  RR.EE., “Antártica 
Chilena, Comunicaciones con Gran Bretaña, 1940-47.” 
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own in the Antarctic Peninsula.9  The new base would be named after the national 
hero of Chile, Bernardo O’Higgins, who had led the independence struggle against 
the Spanish.  His was also the name that the Chileans gave to the entire Peninsula 
region: Tierra O’Higgins.  
On 21 January 1947, on the eve of the departure of the Angamos and the 
Iquique, Raúl Juliet, the Chilean Foreign Minister, made an impassioned speech 
before the Chilean Senate setting out Chile’s interests in Antarctica.10  In his 
discourse Juliet summarized at length the historical, geographical, juridical, 
diplomatic, and administrative antecedents to Chile’s claim in Antarctica.  He then 
described the Chilean efforts to send an expedition to Antarctica.  The Foreign 
Minister concluded his speech with a summary of the “values which the Chilean 
sector represents with respect to its riches and possibilities.”  In a rousing finale to 
the speech, Juliet exalted the national pride associated with Chile’s claims to 
Antarctica: 
 
The Antarctic territory embraces undoubted wealth and possibilities.  But 
even if there was nothing of value, even if in the Chilean Sector there was not 
but the cold and desolate prolongation of the fatherland, there would exist on 
our part the obligation to preserve and defend it, precisely for that reason: 
that it is the southern part of Chile, an integral part of her soil…  I am of 
those who believe that the national patrimony, whatever may be its 
importance, must be kept intact as we received it from our fathers, and passed 
on in the same form to future generations.  In this patriotic vigilance the 
Minister of Foreign Relations is sure that he may count upon the vigor and 
strength of all Chileans.11 
                                                 
9 But others, including Julio Escudero, were already skeptical about Chile’s chances of winning such 
a contest 
10 Address of the Minister of Foreign Relations, Mr. Raúl Juliet Gomez, Before the Chilean Senate, at 
the Special Session held on 21 January 1947, on the Government’s Foreign Policy.  RR.EE., 




Interestingly, the speech made little of the conflict with Great Britain.  Also missing 
from the speech given to the Senate was a reference to confraternity with Argentina 
and the possibility of an international conference, which had been crossed out in an 
earlier draft. 
On 15 Jan 1947, the Iquique set sail for Antarctica.  This was the ship that 
would do most of the work building Base O’Higgins, and the crew consisted mostly 
of military personnel from the army and the navy.  The Iquique sailed directly to 
Greenwich Island in the South Shetlands, the location identified as the best place for 
the Chilean base.  The island offered the benefits of relatively easy access without 
the difficulties of producing a direct confrontation with Great Britain or Argentina.  
After unloading the construction materials, the Iquique continued southwards 
towards Marguerite Bay, south of the Antarctic Circle, where the Byrd’s 1939-41 
expedition had constructed their East Base, and where the British were currently 
occupying a base on Stonington Island.  At Marguerite Bay the Chileans reported the 
British met them with “cordialidad, alegría y amistad” [cordiality, happiness, and 
friendship], although they turned down their host’s offer to make use of the Royal 
Mail Post Office.  A construction party remained behind at Greenwich Island to 
build Base O’Higgins, and members of the army’s Instituto Geográfico Militar 
began the task of reconnoitering and mapping the surrounding region.  The ship then 
departed northwards, calling at Base O’Higgins and leaving a party of five men 
under the leadership of Boris Kopic, who would spend the winter at the new base.  
The over-wintering party would continue to fly the Chilean flag and conducted a 
rudimentary program of scientific research. 
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Two weeks after the departure from Chile of the Iquique, the Angamos set 
sail from Valparaiso.  On board the Angamos was a coterie of Chilean officials, 
journalists, writers, and artists, all eager to participate in and describe the historic 
expedition.  The Chilean Government saw this voyage as an excellent opportunity to 
give publicity to its Antarctic claims.  Such Chilean literary figures and scholars as 
Francisco Coloane, Enrique Bunster, Eugenio Orrego Vicuña, Oscar Vila Labra, 
Oscar Pinochet de la Barra, and Miguel Serrano accompanied the Chilean expedition 
to Antarctica.12  Some of these men had a direct interest in Antarctica Affairs: Julio 
Ripamonti Barros, for example, was the architect who designed the Chilean base to 
be erected in Tierra O’Higgins.  Others were scientists, such as Humberto Barreras, 
Guillermo Mann, Parmenio Yáñez and Carlos Oliver Schneider.  There were also 
journalists and photographers to give publicity to the expedition: Genaro Medina, 
Pablo Estay, Guy Walrand, Hernán Correa, Pedro Peña y Lillo, and Hans Helfritz.  
On their voyage south, the officers and scholars on board the Angamos discussed the 
meaning of Antarctica for Chile and for the Chilean race.  Antarctica, they agreed, 
offered Chileans an opportunity to prove their racial fitness.13  One particularly 
fascinating figure on board was the fascist-sympathizing Miguel Serrano, who would 
later become Chilean ambassador to India.  Serrano believed that Ritscher’s German 
Schwabenland expedition of 1938-1939 to Queen Maud Land had constructed a 
secret bunker, to which Hitler had fled by submarine at the end of the war.14  Upon 
arrival at the Antarctic Peninsula, the light captivated Serrano, and his poetic 
enthusiasm spread to the others.   
                                                 
12 Pinochet de la Barra, Medio siglo de recuerdos antárticos: memorias. 60. 
13 Miguel Serrano, La Antártica y otros mitos ([Santiago de Chile], 1948). 
14 According to Serrano, the true reason for the US Operation Highjump was therefore to look for 
Hitler.  
 115 
The Angamos generally followed the same route as the Iquique, and its 
eclectic crew helped with the construction of Base O’Higgins.15  The Angamos also 
visited the British base at Stonington Island, taking the opportunity, as the crew of 
the Iquique had done, to look around the abandoned US East Base.  These visits to 
the North American base would later become quite controversial.   
Upon their return from Antarctica, the writers and journalists on board the 
Angamos set about publishing accounts of their experiences in Antártica Chilena.  
Rarely in the history of Antarctic exploration have so many participants published 
accounts of their experiences, especially in so short a time.  Collectively, what 
emerged from these various publications was a distinctively Chilean “vision” of 
Antarctica that contrasted starkly with the imperial vision of Great Britain.  The 
Chileans who visited Antarctica saw it as part of their national territory.  Writers 
such as Francisco Coloane sought to transplant the myths and legends of southern 
Chile to the shores of the Antarctic Peninsula, thereby making a folkloric claim to 
the territory.16  Chile’s vision of Antarctica tended to bring the continent closer and 
focus on similarities, whereas the British vision reveled in its distance and its 
otherness.  The literary and poetic focus of Chilean accounts of Antarctica differed 
greatly from the British tendency to see the continent though a predominantly 
scientific lens.  By refusing to accept science as the only way of “knowing” 
Antarctica, the Chilean Antarctic vision represented a subtle epistemological 
challenge to Britain’s imperial justifications of sovereignty through scientific 
superiority, although this carried little weight outside Chile.   
 
                                                 
15 Pinochet de la Barra, Medio siglo de recuerdos antárticos: memorias. 
16 Francisco Coloane, Los conquistadores de la Antártida (Santiago de Chile, 1945). 
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ARGENTINE EXPEDITIONS 
Postwar Argentina underwent political upheavals even greater than those in 
Chile.  At the center of these upheavals was the ambitious military officer Juan 
Domingo Perón. Perón had spent much of his youth in Patagonia, and entered the 
Army’s war college in Buenos Aires in his early teens.17  He graduated to become an 
experienced Army officer who had held posts as a lecturer in military history, as a 
military attaché in Chile, in the Andes Mountain Regiment, and, most notoriously, 
on an mountain warfare training program in Italy between 1939-1940.  He had 
returned to Argentina from Europe in 1940 with a heightened political awareness and 
a certain respect for the collective mobilization achieved by Italian Fascism and 
German Nazism.  In 1943, through a shadowy military lodge known as the GOU, 
Colonel Perón participated in the coup that overthrew the Concordancía government 
and established military rule in Argentine.   
By 1945 Perón had established himself in the military government of General 
Farrel and was serving as both Minister for War and Minister for Labor.  It was this 
latter position that enabled Perón to develop a political power-base outside the 
limited confines of the Argentine military.  Despite the dislocations of the Second 
World War, and its alleged “dependence” on Great Britain, Argentina was a rapidly 
industrializing country.  Factories and businesses sprang up around the edge of 
Buenos Aires.  The urban population swelled as economic migrants moved to the 
capital to work in the new factories.  Economic development was not a painless 
process and industrial disputes were common.  As Minister of Labor, Perón played a 
pro-active role in adjudicating these disputes.  More often than not he came down on 
                                                 
17 For full biographical details, see Joseph A. Page, Perón, a biography, 1st ed. (New York, 1983). 
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the side of the workers.  This earned him a reputation as a champion of the lower 
classes, a reputation that his relationship with Eva Duarte, “Evita”, a glamorous 
radio-actress from a lower class background, did much to enhance.   
The popularity of Colonel Perón presented a threat to other ambitious 
members of the military government.18  In particular, the military establishment 
looked down with scorn on Perón’s relationship with Evita, which they deemed 
unsuitable for a military officer and a government minister.  In October 1945 various 
members of the government conspired to have Perón removed from his government 
positions and placed under arrest.  This move caused tremendous resentment among 
the working classes in and around Buenos Aires, who had come to view Perón as one 
of the few figures in the government who cared about their interests.  On 17 October, 
a massive march took place in support of the arrested Colonel.  The marchers came 
mainly from the working class districts of Greater Buenos Aires, which surrounded 
the federal capital.  As the marchers convened in Plaza de Mayo, in front of the 
Presidential Palace, the presence of so many descamisados [literally, people without 
shirts] frightened the more genteel residents of the city center.  Worried about the 
consequence of such a large-scale popular mobilization, the military government 
released Perón and urged him to pacify the crowd.  In a symbolic act of solidarity the 
Colonel stood before the people and removed his jacket, declaring that he too was a 
descamisado, one of them.  With this gesture Perón established a populist reputation 
that would carry him through the rest of his career.  The politics of Argentina would 
never be the same again.   
                                                 
18 Felix Luna, El 45: cronica de un ano decisivo, 3. ed. (Buenos Aires, 1971). 
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In February 1946, Argentina held its first fair elections since the late 1920s.  
Colonel Perón stood as the Labor Party Candidate against José P. Tamborini, of the 
Democratic Union, a loose alliance of opposition parties.19  In a shameless attempt to 
influence the outcome of the election in favor of the Democratic Union, Spruille 
Braden, the United States Ambassador, published what became known as the “Blue 
Book”.  This small publication contained allegations that the Argentine military 
government, of which Perón had been a member, had secretly collaborated with Nazi 
Germany.  Braden was an ideologue with a lifetime of experience in Latin America.  
He personified the United States’ ongoing sense of betrayal at Argentina’s wartime 
neutrality.  He claimed that Colonel Perón was a fascist and openly campaigned 
during the election on the side of his opponent.  However, the North American 
Ambassador’s attempt at political interference backfired spectacularly.  In response 
to Braden’s allegations, Perón published his own “Blue and White Book” (the colors 
of Argentina’s flag), and he was able to present himself as the patriotic candidate 
against US meddling.  The enduring slogan of the campaign became “Perón or 
Braden?” 
The election polarized Argentine society as it became very clear that Perón 
would take Argentina in a direction very different from its traditional course.20  The 
charismatic colonel promised to end oligarchic rule and return Argentina to its 
people.  The election was hard fought, and up till the very last day the result was too 
                                                 
19 The Partido Laborista supposedly took its name from the British Labour Party, which Perón 
admired for its defeat of Churchill’s Conservatives in the General Election of 1945.  During the 
Argentine election campaign rumors circulated that the British were backing Perón, partly in an effort 
to undermine the United States.  Hugo Gambini, Historia del peronismo, 2 vols. (Buenos Aires, 
1999). 
20 Right up until polling day the Standard English language newspaper was still predicting that the 
Labor Party would lose.   
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close to call.  But as the results drifted in from across the country in the following 
weeks, it became apparent that Juan Domingo Perón had been elected the next 
President of Argentina.  Although it was by no means clear at the time, the election 
of President Perón would mark the beginning of the end of the close Anglo-
Argentine relationship (See Chapter 4). 
In March 1946, the outgoing Farrell Government had reorganized the 
Argentine Antarctic Commission, which had effectively lain dormant since the 
military coup of 1943. This reorganization appointed José Manuel Moneta as head of 
the Commission.  Moneta was a meteorologist with vast experience in the South 
Orkneys.  His book, Four Years in The South Orkneys, which recounted his life and 
work at the meteorological station on Laurie Island, had sold well.21  However, in the 
months following his appointment, Moneta received no support from the incoming 
President for his plans to renew Argentine activities in Antarctica and in September 
he resigned in protest.22 
With Perón’s initial support for Argentine Antarctica at most lukewarm, the 
Argentine Navy made a decisive intervention in Antarctic affairs.  Naval officers 
urged Atilio Bramuglia, Perón’s newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, to put 
into practice the recommendations of the Antarctic Commission.  The enthusiasm of 
the Navy for Antarctic affairs represented something of a double edged sword for the 
new President.  On the one hand, the assertion of Argentine rights to Antarctica was 
in keeping with the nationalist policies of the incoming government.  On the other 
hand, the Navy was the Argentine institution most hostile to Perón’s new style of 
                                                 
21 José Manuel Moneta, Cuatro años en las Orcadas del sur; narraciones y hechos salientes de las 
expediciones argentinas, 2. ed. (Buenos Aires, 1940). 
22 Comision Nacional del Antártico.  Expediente 44.  Año 1953.  “Antecedentes sobre la Comisión 
Nacional del Antártico.”  MREYC, Organismos Internacionales Paquete 15.  
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populist politics.  In keeping with his broader policy of giving the armed forces a 
loose rein, the President acceded to the Navy’s demands for greater Argentine 
involvement in Antarctica.23   
The appointment of Pascal La Rosa, from the Foreign Ministry, as head of 
the Argentine Antarctic Commission offered a new start.  The Commission began to 
receive full government support, and it instituted a series of legislation.  In October 
1946, the Chilean Embassy in Buenos Aires reported an Argentine decree 
prohibiting the publication of any maps that did not include the full extension of 
Argentine sovereignty, including the South Atlantic Islands and Antarctica: all maps 
had to be approved by the Instituto Geográfico Militar.24  On 8 November 1946, the 
Antarctic Commission, with the full backing of the Navy, sent Bramuglia a plan for 
an Argentine expedition to Antarctica in the upcoming Antarctica season.25 
The stimulus for adopting the plan, however, came largely from the outside. 
On 21 November 1946, the Chilean Ambassador in Buenos Aires handed a note to 
Bramuglia, inviting three Argentine officials to accompany a Chilean expedition to 
Antarctica that would sail in February 1947.26  This invitation represented the 
fulfillment of the promise that the Chilean government had first made in 1942.  
Rather than simply accepting the invitation, the Argentine Government decided to go 
ahead and send its own expedition to Antarctica.  Two weeks later, the Argentine 
                                                 
23 See, Robert A. Potash, The army & politics in Argentina (Stanford, Calif., 1969). 
24 Embajada de Chile en Buenos Aires al Ministro de RR.EE., 22 October 1946.  “Nuevas normas 
para la publicación de mapas de Argentina.”  RR.EE., Antártica Chilena, Comunicaciones Cambiadas 
con otros Ministros, 1940-49. 
25 Enrique Jorge Pierrou, La Armada Argentina en la Antártida (Buenos Aires, República Argentina, 
1981). 88. 
26 Embajada Chilena en BA al Ministerio RR.EE. “Viaje de una fragata de la Armada Nacional al 
Territorio Chileno Antártico e invitación a una Delegación de la Marina Argentina.”  5 December 
1946.  RR.EE., Antártica Chilena, Comunicaciones Cambiadas con otros Ministros, 1940-49. 
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Minister of Foreign Relations and Worship informed the Chilean representative that 
Argentina also had an expedition planned for the upcoming austral summer on board 
the Patagonia. The Minister added that his government was preparing an invitation 
to the Government of Chile inviting one Chilean naval officer, of a rank no higher 
than lieutenant, to accompany the Argentines.  This naval official would have to 
prepare quickly, since the Argentine expedition was leaving Buenos Aires on the 10 
December, only five days from when the invitation was issued.   
 
BRITISH EXPEDITIONS 
Unlike in Chile and Argentina, where the promotion of sovereignty in 
Antarctica was becoming a significant political issue, in post-war Britain the 
question of the Falkland Islands Dependencies remained relatively peripheral.  
Attlee’s Labour Government had to deal with pressing issues throughout the colonial 
empire, and had little time to devote exclusively to the escalating “Antarctic 
Problem.”  As a consequence, it was British government officials, rather than British 
government ministers, who did much of the day-to-day decision-making regarding 
Antarctica.27  The Antarctic problem continued to be complicated by the overlap of 
formal and informal empire.  A strong line in the Falkland Islands Dependencies 
threatened to undermine the remaining goodwill between Britain and Latin America.  
This problem continued to reflect significant differences of opinion between the 
Foreign Office, which generally advocated a softer approach, and the Colonial 
Office, which tended to demand a hard line.    
                                                 
27 Britain’s policy towards the Antarctic continued to be set by the 1943 Cabinet decision to protect 
British interests in the Falkland Islands Dependencies, 
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In contrast to Foreign Office appeals for restraint, officials from the Colonial 
Office tended to see the Antarctic problem through strategic, economic, and 
moralistic lenses.  Not only, they argued, might the region become crucial for 
communications in any Third World War, but also the cession of the Falkland 
Islands Dependencies in the face of South American pressure would set a terrible 
precedent for the rest of the colonial empire.  The Colonial Office position was 
underwritten economically by the continued profitability of the Antarctic whaling 
industry and the belief that valuable mineral deposits might be found in Antarctica.  
This was an argument that could be used to forestall talk of giving away any part of 
the Dependencies: it would be foolish, Colonial Office officials argued, to hand over 
territories that could, in the future, prove to contain valuable mineral resources.  In 
general, the Admiralty supported the Colonial Office position, and refused to 
contemplate any concessions in Antarctica.  However, this support was less 
forthright than it had been during the Second World War, when the Admiralty had 
funded Operation Tabarin.  Admiralty officials were less convinced of the strategic 
and economic potential of Antarctica, and they worried about the possibility of their 
ships getting stuck in the ice.  The Tory Opposition, meanwhile, were bullish in their 
support for the Falkland Islands Dependencies, and Conservative M.P.s periodically 
raised questions in the House of Commons asking why the Government was not 
doing more to protect British territory in the Antarctic. 
Sir Miles Clifford, the newly appointed Governor of the Falkland Islands and 
their Dependencies, personified the Colonial Office’s attitude towards Antarctica.  
“Ginger George,” as Clifford was widely known, was an imposing figure who had 
spent his entire career in the Colonial Service, mostly in West Africa.  Schooled in 
the economic quid pro quo of empire, Clifford was a pragmatist rather than an 
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idealist.  The conflict in the Antarctic Peninsula region offered the new Governor an 
exciting arena to demonstrate his talent, in what was otherwise a notoriously dull 
posting.  As the “man on the spot,” Clifford was able to exercise a disproportionate 
influence over the course of the sovereignty dispute, and his unwavering 
commitment to British sovereignty would help to ensure that few concessions were 
made. He passionately disliked the South American incursions into “British 
Territory,” and at one point would suggest the use of ice-cold water to deter 
Argentine landings at Admiralty Bay:  
 
A hosepipe – the water is very cold and would be most discouraging – could 
scarcely be construed as “armed force”?  It might be necessary to use it and I 
think it very unlikely that we should have to use anything else.28 
 
Although such a recourse was never taken, it revealed his commitment to the cause 
of the Falkland Islands Dependencies.   
After the British had taken the initiative in Antarctic Affairs with the dispatch 
of Operation Tabarin in 1944, the Chilean and Argentine expeditions of 1946-47 
threw them back onto the defensive.  The British Government responded to the 
South American challenge by issuing strongly worded protest notes to the 
Governments in Santiago and Buenos Aires, which, unlike in 1941-42, were 
delivered in a timely fashion by the respective ambassadors.  But apart from these 
gestures, Britain did nothing to prevent Chile and Argentina from establishing their 
                                                 
28 Miles Clifford to Mediterranean Department, 18 August 1948.  TNA, CO 537/4010.  The Secretary 
of State for the Colonies later wrote to the Governor of the Falkland Islands in order to curb his 
enthusiasm: “I do not consider that such a measure would be advisable unless we were prepared to 
back the use of force to the limit, and I regret that I am not prepared to approve it.” From the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Officer Administering the Government of Falkland Islands.  
4 November 1948.  TNA, CO 537/4010. 
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own bases of effective occupation.  During the 1946-1947 season, the British 
continued with the work of the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey, but there was 
no real expansion of the program.  The main reason for this somewhat lackluster 
response was the Foreign Office’s fear of upsetting the two South American 
countries, although it was also due to strategic over-stretch and scarcity of financial 
resources.   
Amidst the disagreements between the Foreign Office and the Colonial 
Office, scientific research in Antarctica offered an activity that could keep almost all 
British officials happy.  For the Colonial Office scientific research helped to fulfill 
the legal requirement of effective occupation.  Science also provided useful 
information that could help in the practical task of out-maneuvering the Argentines 
and Chileans in the Dependencies through the production of maps, charts, and 
weather forecasts.  For the Foreign Office, science offered a non-confrontational way 
to maintain a British presence in the region without directly or physically 
challenging Argentina or Chile.  This drew on traditional notions of science as an 
internationalist activity.  Scientific research also promised to reveal the true 
economic value of the Falkland Islands Dependencies, showing which parts, if any, 
were economically useless and therefore suitable to give up.  This aspect could also 
appeal to officials in the Treasury, who kept a watchful eye on the costs involved in 
maintaining British sovereignty. In a demonstration of the political importance of 
science, the British government established a “FIDS Scientific Committee” to co-
ordinate and disseminate British Antarctic research. 
Early in the dispute, the British realized the particular importance of 
Antarctic meteorology.  Meteorological readings from the five British bases were 
relatively easy to take, and they produced knowledge that was scientifically 
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interesting and potentially useful.  In no uncertain terms, Brian Roberts, of the 
Foreign Office Research Department (FORD), explained the political importance of 
“pure” Antarctic science to Gordon Howkins, the Falkland Islands’ newly appointed 
meteorological officer: 
 
An active programme of research, which can be justified on scientific 
grounds alone, is an essential part of the preparation of a case which can be 
used if necessary to demonstrate to Foreign Governments of a Tribunal that 
HMG is taking all reasonable steps to develop and exercise sovereignty over 
the area, and is not merely attempting to prevent foreign encroachments.  
There is no doubt that both the Chilean and Argentine Governments would 
like to set up meteorological stations in the Dependencies for political 
reasons.  It is essential therefore that while we have to exclude them from 
doing so we must take every possible step to ensure that we do not lay 
ourselves open to the same charge.  Whilst FIDS was political in origin, it is 
important to maintain it as far as possible as a normal administrative activity 
in which motives of research, exploration and development predominate.29 
 
The conduct of “better science” continued to provide the British with a justification 
for its imperial claims in the Antarctic Peninsula region.  Roberts went on to explain 
that in all but two bases scientific considerations dictated the conduct of 
meteorological research.  
Alongside the increasing focus on meteorology, the British continued the 
general work of the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey during the 1946-47 
season.  Parties at the five existing bases carried out mapping and surveying work, 
geology, and biology.  In London, the Colonial Secretary continued to hold onto the 
belief that valuable minerals might be found, passing on instructions that, “in the 
                                                 
29 Notes on a Conversation between Dr. B.B. Roberts (Foreign Office Reserach Department) and Mr. 
Howkins.  Secret. 13 September, 1946.  FIA, No. 255/46 “Main Natural History – Meteorological 
Records. Taking Over of the Falkland Islands Meteorological Station by Air Ministry (Establishment 
of a New Met Station).” 
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event of visits by members of other parties care should be taken to secrete any 
evidence, and specimens, of any minerals of commercial significance.”30  However, 
in reality the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey remained somewhat 
disorganized.  From Stanley, a member of the Survey wrote a letter to the Colonial 
Office criticizing the chaotic organization of the British Antarctic Expedition of 
1946/47: “Everyday whilst I am in Stanley, I see and hear something new which is 
not to the credit of the organization of the FIDS.  One efficient man in London, 
doing nothing else, and another of the same caliber down here in Stanley, would 
make a success of what has been, at least for some of us, an unhappy experience.”31  
This reveals something of the amateur “make-do-and-mend” mentality of the British 
in Antarctica in this immediate post-war period. 
 
UNITED STATES’ EXPEDITIONS 
In the United States, just as in Great Britain, the Antarctic Problem was 
relatively low down on the list of post-war priorities.  President Truman, who had 
taken office following the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt in April 1945, faced 
pressing problems at home and throughout the world.  Uncertainty and indecision 
continued to characterize Washington’s Antarctic policy.32  The official position 
continued to be defined by the Hughes doctrine of 1924, which stated that the United 
States refused to recognize any claims to Antarctica, while reserving the right to 
make future claims of its own to any part of the continent.  However, the growing 
interest of Argentina and Chile in the sovereignty of the Antarctic Peninsula, 
                                                 
30 Secretary of State for Colonies to Falkland Islands (Clifford), 20 January 1947.  TNA, CO 
537/4010.   
31 Dougal to Colonial Office, 20 January 1947.  TNA, CO 78/225/2. 
32 Klotz, America on the ice: Antarctic policy issues. 
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combined with the British Empire’s stubborn refusal to make concessions, put 
pressure on the Truman Administration to take a more decisive stance.  If the United 
States did nothing in Antarctica, some officials feared, it would lose the historic 
rights accumulated by the expeditions of Admiral Byrd and others.  At the same time 
the involvement of three of its allies in a potentially hostile dispute threatened to 
destabilize the region, and made the question of US involvement all the more 
sensitive.  Indirectly, the Antarctic sovereignty dispute between Great Britain, Chile, 
and Argentina was one of the principal factors shaping the United States’ post-war 
policy in Antarctica.  Fear of being seen to take sides helps to explain the 
indecisiveness at the heart of the US position.   
Despite its indecision on the question of making a claim, the US Government 
decided to send a large-scale expedition to the Antarctic Continent in the austral 
summer of 1946-47.  Operation Highjump, as the expedition became known, would 
be the largest expedition ever to sail to Antarctica.  The expedition had several 
objectives.  Firstly, and most obviously, it would boost the US presence in the 
continent and reinforce the country’s “historic rights” to Antarctic sovereignty.  
Secondly, by keeping a large number of servicemen in operation, the expedition 
would help to ease the domestic problem caused by post-war demobilization.  
Thirdly, an Antarctic expedition offered excellent opportunities for large scale, cold 
weather training.  Even in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, a 
confrontation with the Soviet Union was becoming a distinct possibility.  Such a 
confrontation would likely take place, at least in part, in and around the Arctic 
Circle.  An expedition to Antarctica offered a relatively unthreatening way to train 
armed forces for such a showdown in similar environmental conditions.  Finally, 
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Operation Highjump offered US policy makers an opportunity to assess the 
economic possibilities of Antarctica. 
The US Navy took command of Operation Highjump, with Admiral Byrd 
placed in overall control.  The name came from the prevalence of ship launched 
aircraft.  The expedition focused its attentions on the vast, apparently continental, 
regions of East and West Antarctica, which remained almost entirely unexplored.  
This focus prevented a direct challenge to the claims of Great Britain, Argentina, and 
Chile in the Antarctic Peninsula region, although some survey work was done in the 
contested area.  Operation Highjump was by far the largest single expedition ever to 
sail to Antarctica.  In terms of sheer scale, its 13 ships and 3000 men in fact eclipsed 
all previous scientific expeditions to Antarctica put together.  The US Government 
made no attempt to keep the expedition secret, and Operation Highjump received 
publicity throughout the world.  If the pre-war expeditions of Admiral Byrd had 
given a foretaste of North American pretensions to “dominion over nature” in 
Antarctica, then Operation Highjump was a clear statement that the United States 
had replaced Britain as the leading technological and scientific power in the 
Southern Continent.   
In keeping with the widespread fantasies of Antarctica as a frozen El Dorado 
– many of them generated by Admiral Byrd himself – United States scientists 
connected to Operation Highjump set out to assess the economic and strategic 
potential of the southern continent.  Scientists often felt they were treated like 
second-class citizens, since military training was clearly the operational priority of 
the expedition.  Nevertheless, the scientific work of the expedition was very 
important, as much for its negative results as for any positive findings.  If there were 
riches to be found amidst the Antarctic ice, the US government fully expected 
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Operation Highjump to find conclusive evidence of their existence.  A number of 
leading geologists such as Lawrence Gould sailed with the expedition and conducted 
extensive prospecting.  The aerial survey work of the expedition – although in some 
ways flawed by its lack of fixed points on the ground – also assisted in the quest for 
geological information.33 Apart from a few isolated discoveries, the scientists found 
little to suggest that Antarctica really was an untapped treasure trove.  This failure to 
discover economically exploitable minerals undoubtedly had an impact on US 
Government policy: had valuable mineral deposits been found the subsequent US 
position would almost certainly have been very different.  Even Admiral Byrd, 
previously a great believer in US sovereignty in Antarctica, began to stress the 
desirability for some sort of international regime.   
In some ways the private expedition to the Antarctic Peninsula led by Finn 
Ronne represented a greater threat to the territorial pretensions of Britain, Argentina, 
and Chile, than did Operation Highjump.  Ronne’s expedition had the official 
backing of the American Philosophical Society and the tacit backing of the US 
government.  Its plan was to re-occupy the US East Base at Marguerite Bay 
evacuated so rapidly by Commander Black in 1941.  The “private expedition” status 
allowed the United States government to challenge the rival territorial claimants in 
Antarctica without doing so explicitly.  One year earlier, in the 1945-46 season, 
Great Britain had established a base at Marguerite Bay, literally right alongside the 
evacuated US hut.  Foreign Office officials expressed that they were “not entirely 
easy as regards Finn Ronne’s intentions” and they did what they could to dissuade 
                                                 
33 George Dufek revealed that not enough grounding points had been taken during Operation 
Highjump to facilitate reliable mapping.  See George John Dufek, Operation Deepfreeze, [1st ed. 
(New York, 1957). 
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the Americans from re-establishing themselves at Marguerite Bay, but these efforts 
proved unsuccessful.34  The close proximity of the two bases would provide a 
fascinating microcosm of Anglo-American relations.  The already tense relationship 
was complicated by the presence of two women on the American expedition: Edith 
Ronne and Jennie Darlington.  The two women, both accompanying their husbands, 
would become the first women to spend a winter in Antarctica.   
Finn Ronne invited a Chilean official to accompany his expedition.  The 
Chilean government had to refuse this offer because the price demanded by the 
North American, $360.000 pesos (US$20,000) was too expensive, given the costs 
already incurred of sending a Chilean expedition to Antarctica.35 Ronne’s intentions 
to associate Chileans with his expedition made the British Foreign Office even more 
uneasy.36  The State Department denied that Ronne had applied for a Chilean visa to 
“visit the Chilean Antarctic.”37 
From an international perspective, Finn Ronne’s plans for an expedition to 
the Antarctic Peninsula region were not universally popular.  In particular, the 
British did not want a US presence, whether “official” or otherwise, in such close 
proximity to their base at Stonington Island, especially given Ronne’s fraternizing 
with the South Americans.  In their attempt to dissuade Finn Ronne from 
                                                 
34 Foreign Office to British Embassy, Washington, 3 January 1947, Instructions to approach the State 
Department with reference to Finn Ronne’s expedition.  SPRI, MS1278.  The Foreign Office noted 
that “It is within our knowledge that in 1940 he left claim sheets at two places at least and that a third 
claim was deposited by his supporting party within our territory; see pate 166 of print secret (16839).  
He boasted that this was done with the approval of the State Department.”  
35 Ministro de Defensa Nacional a Ministro de RR.EE., Santiago 6 January 1947 RR.EE., “Antártica 
Chilena, Comunicaciones Cambiadas con otros Ministros, 1940-49.” 
36 Foreign Office to British Embassy, Washington.  8 January 1947.  “Further Worries about Ronne’s 
expedition.”  SPRI, MS 1278. 
37 Cumming to Hadow, “State Department’s reply to Hadow’s letter of the 9 January,” 23 January 
1947.  SPRI, MS 1278.   
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establishing his party at Marguerite Bay, the British fell back upon environmental 
rhetoric and the idea of scientific supremacy.  Two expeditions, the British asserted, 
tacitly proclaiming the superiority of their Antarctic knowledge, would be 
environmentally unsustainable, due to the scarcity of seals. 38     
 
1946-47: THE MARGUERITE BAY ROBBERY 
Upon Ronne’s arrival at Marguerite Bay, Pierce Butler, the new British 
leader of the Stonington Island Base, welcomed him and offered any assistance 
within his power.39  Pierce Butler went on to surprise the newly arrived North 
American party with the statement that Miles Clifford, the Governor of the Falkland 
Islands: “deplores acts of hooliganism against American property by Chilean 
gangsters which we did our best to prevent.”  Ronne soon saw for himself the extent 
to which the American base appeared to have been ransacked in the years since 
Commander Black had left so hurriedly in 1941.  Rather than believing the British 
stories about the Chilean intruders, the Americans initially blamed the British for the 
equipment losses.  For a while the atmosphere at Marguerite Bay was incredibly 
tense.  The situation worsened when the US party attempted to raise an American 
flag.  Ronne went as far as writing directly to President Truman to complain about 
the presence of British intruders on US territory and the destruction of US property 
for which the British or others were possibly responsible.40  The conflict also came 
out in Ronne’s frequent reports for the New York Times. 
                                                 
38 Wordie, for example, argued that there were not enough seals to feed the dogs of two different 
parties.   
39 Pierce Butler to Ronne, “Welcome Note to Marguerite Bay”, 16 March 1947.  SPRI, MS1278. 
40 Foreign Office to British Embassy, Washington.  19 March 1947.  SPRI, MS1278. 
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The British, however, persisted with their accusations against the Chileans.  
From the Foreign Office, Perowne wrote a letter to Barton at the Colonial Office 
suggesting that “In view of the recent loss at the hands of the Chileans of the rest of 
the US stores at Marguerite Bay, it would, we imagine, be much appreciated by the 
Americans and perhaps help local relations if we are able to replace at least a part of 
the aviation fuel used by our party there.”41   
The Chileans first heard of their supposed looting of the American base from 
the French Press Agency on 20 March 1947.42  The Director of the French news 
agency told the Chilean Defense Ministry that the British were about to send the 
Chileans a protest note concerning the actions of their two ships.  The first “raid” had 
been by the Iquique on 20 February and the second had been by the Angamos on the 
8 March.  Major Pierce Butler reported that Chilean officials did not intervene when 
the men entered and “sacked” the American base.  At the Foreign Office, Perowne 
urged caution, since “a full dress protest to the Chileans will be necessary regarding 
their general and more important violations of our sovereignty in the Antarctic.”43  
The head of the American division at the Foreign Office wanted to know the extent 
of Chilean “wickedness” in British Antarctic possessions before any formal protest 
was made.  Perowne concluded:  
 
                                                 
41 Perowne (FO) to Barton (CO), 13 March 1947, SPRI, MS1278. In April 1947, the FIDS committee 
(Roberts, Barton, Wordie, Stirling, and Lloyd) met to discuss instructions for a modus vivendi for 
Pierce Butler at Stonington Island. FIDS Committee to Clifford, 16 April 1947.  SPRI, MS1278. Their 
suggestions included that the Americans and the British should be assigned specific areas to be 
investigated.  They also thought that a “full exchange of meteorological data is highly desirable.”  
With the Americans living alongside the British at Stonington Island, the initial assertion that the area 
would not be able to support two parties was quickly forgotten. 
42 Ministro de Defensa Nacional al Ministro de RR.EE. Santiago 20 de Marzo de 1947.  RR.EE, 
“Antártica Chilena, Comunicaciones Cambiadas con otros Ministros, 1940-49.” 
43 Perowne Minutes, Discussion of Chilean “hooliganism” at Stonington Island, 21 March 1947.  
SPRI, MS1278.   
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...we must not lose sight of the fact that it is the Chilean word against the 
word of our FIDS party and that it appears from its own confessions that the 
party has been much more liberal in helping itself to US equipment at 
Stonington than we hitherto dreamed of, and has now been accused of 
smoking cigarettes and consuming other goods from the US base by the 
Chileans. 
 
In the meantime, the Governor of the Falkland Islands resolved to get signed 
affidavits from the Falkland Island Dependencies Survey party concerning the 
alleged Chilean doings at Stonington Island.   
Arthur Creech Jones, the British Secretary of State for Colonies, denied any 
British involvement in the robbery at Stonington Island: “only Britons, penguins and 
seals have been there.  And the British did not loot the base.”44  An official from the 
Colonial Office made the obvious connection: “then it must have been penguins 
disguised in Chilean uniforms.”45  Apparently, some of the American equipment had 
been stacked on board the British Trepassy ready for shipment to America, when the 
Chileans looted it.  The Chileans did not take kindly to these accusations against 
personnel from their Navy. The Ministry of Defense prepared an official statement 
denying the robbery.46  This statement claimed that the Chilean officials found the 
base in a state of “disorder, destruction, and outright putrefaction.”  As a 
consequence the Commander of the Iquique had explicitly ordered his men not to 
touch anything for fear of infection.  In his private report to the Ministry of Defense 
the captain of the Iquique confessed that personnel who had not heard his order not 
                                                 
44 Ministro de Defensa Nacional al Sr. Ministro de RREE, Santiago, 22 March 1947, RR.EE., 
“Antártica Chilena, Comunicaciones Cambiadas con otros Ministros, 1940-49.” 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ministerio de Defensa Nacional al Ministro de RR.EE. Santiago, 22 March 1947.  “La declaración 
oficial sobre Bahía Margarita.”  RR.EE, “Antártica Chilena, Comunicaciones Cambiadas con otros 
Ministros, 1940-49.” 
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to touch any items in the East Base took articles as “souvenirs” that were 
subsequently requisitioned when they returned to the ship, however it proved 
impossible to return them because of the dark night.  He added that “the intrinsic 
value of the articles requisitioned is enormously less than the British press would 
suggest.”   
Whatever the truth behind the robbery at Marguerite Bay, the official Chilean 
protests of innocence contrasted starkly with the noble speech given by Raul Juliet in 
the Chilean Senate barely two months earlier.  For a short time, the emerging 
Antarctic who-dunnit of who robbed the American base caught the imagination of 
the press in the four countries involved.  The incident served as a microcosm for the 
broader dispute in Antarctica.  However trivial and amusing it may seem in 
retrospect, those involved did not take kindly to allegations of petty theft.  The 
question of robbery involved the question of property and ownership.  Three of the 
four countries involved in the robbery claimed sovereign rights over the region in 
question.  The one country that had no official sovereignty claim to the region was 
the country claiming to have been wronged.  Just as in the broader dispute, the 
question of who robbed the American base was not resolved.  Instead, the question 
slowly petered out over the course of the following year as more pressing issues 
came to the fore. 
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Chapter 4: South American Anti-imperialism, 1947-1948 
In the immediate post-war period, Argentina and Chile sought to frame their 
sovereignty claims to Antarctica in the language of anti-imperialism.  According to 
the South Americans, the Antarctic Peninsula represented a geological continuation 
of the Andes mountains, and hence an “integral part” of their national territories.  
Britain’s claims to the Falkland Islands Dependencies, they argued, therefore 
represented a colonial annexation of part of their sovereignty territory.  In Argentina, 
despite Perón’s relatively slow embrace of the Antarctic question, the sovereignty 
dispute in Antarctica – along with the smoldering irredenta of the Islas Malvinas – 
became increasingly caught up with the new President’s attack on British “economic 
imperialism” in Argentina itself.  Although Perón’s actions did not always match his 
booming economic nationalism, his policies certainly helped to bring about a rapid 
and terminal decline in British economic interests in Argentina.  Britain’s claims to 
the Falkland Islands and the Falkland Islands Dependencies provided concrete 
examples of piratical British imperialism, which neatly complemented the rather 
abstract idea of economic imperialism.1  In Chile, where British economic influence 
was much less marked, the Antarctic question gave the embattled President González 
Videla an opportunity to appeal to the moderate political left through the language of 
anti-imperialism.  
In making their respective cases for Antarctica sovereignty, Argentina and 
Chile once again found common cause in the idea of a South American Antarctica.  
                                                 
1 In fact, one of the indictments of Perón’s government, both at the time and afterwards, was that he 
was attacking an imaginary empire. Juan J. Sebreli, Los deseos imaginarios del peronismo: ensayo 
crítico, 5. ed. (Madrid u.a., 1985). 
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The idea appealed to abstract notions of pan-Americanism and anti-imperialism, and 
helped to reinforce the still controversial argument that the Antarctic Peninsula was 
indeed part of the American continent.  At the conference of Rio, Argentina and 
Chile successfully lobbied to have the boundaries of the Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Defense extended to the South Pole, thus including the Antarctica 
Peninsula region within the boundaries covered by the Treaty.  Any extra-continental 
aggression in this part of the Antarctic continent would theoretically lead to a 
combined response from all the signatories to the Treaty, although the United States 
and a number of other countries formally reserved their position on the question of 
boundaries.  
Once again, the British response to South American anti-imperialism in 
Antarctica was hampered by the overlap of formal and informal empire.  A strong 
defense of its position in the Falkland Islands Dependencies threatened to destabilize 
further its precarious economic position in Argentina.  Working in Britain’s favor 
was the fact that the rhetoric of anti-imperialism also caused problems for Argentina 
and Chile.  Most importantly, by arguing that the British presence in the region was 
“imperial,” the two South American countries came close to conceding that there 
was indeed a real British “effective occupation.”2  A second problem with the 
language of anti-imperialism was that in the incipient Cold War, Great Britain in fact 
lined up with Argentina and Chile on the side of anti-communism.  In broader 
national security questions it was the Soviet Union that was the real enemy now.  A 
third problem with the rhetoric of anti-imperialism was the fact that both Argentina 
and Chile could be accused of imperialism themselves. 
                                                 
2 Should the dispute ever go to arbitration such a presence would support British claims to 
sovereignty. 
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South American anti-imperialism in Antarctic reached its zenith in the 1947-
48 Antarctic season.  This was the most tense and hostile season so far and the US 
State Department secretly feared that a war might break out between the three 
countries involved.  During this season, President González Videla became the first 
head of state ever to visit the Antarctic continent.  With passions still high, the Ninth 
International Conference of American States, held in Bogotá in 1948, witnessed a 
full frontal attack on European imperialism in Central and South America.  In order 
to diffuse this attack the United States supported the idea that a separate conference 
should be held in Havana to address this issue, hoping that they could prevent a 
quorum being reached and make such a conference meaningless.  Although the 
North Americans failed to prevent the Havana conference from taking place in 1949, 
the absence of the Chileans from this conference severely limited the potential for 
discussing the Antarctic problem.   
 
ARGENTINE ECONOMIC NATIONALISM 
President Perón came to office promising a “New Argentina,” shorn of elite 
privilege and foreign domination.  One of his principal policy objectives was to 
industrialize Argentina and put an end to its economic dependence on Great Britain.  
This economic relationship was already in a fragile state following the upheavals of 
the Second World War.  Between 1939 and 1945, Britain had gone from being 
Argentina’s greatest creditor to being its greatest debtor, due to the purchase of vast 
quantities of foodstuffs.  By the end of the war Britain owed £150m to Argentina.  
This money was held as blocked sterling balances, meaning that it could not be 
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exchanged (for dollars) on the international currency markets.3  Until 1947, however, 
Britain remained Argentina’s second largest trading partner.4  Argentina continued to 
export massive amounts of beef to Great Britain.  In exchange, Britain increased the 
amount of coal it shipped to the South American country and in August 1947 the two 
countries agreed on the sale of £20m of British military ships and planes.  But this 
apparently favorable trading position merely papered over the numerous cracks that 
were rapidly developing in the Anglo-Argentine economic relationship.  
In terms of economic policy, Perón’s pragmatism almost matched his shrill 
nationalism.  He was never quite as nationalistic as he would have liked people to 
believe, and his actions did not always match his words.  A classic case of this was 
the economic rapprochement with the United States over the course of his first two 
Presidencies.  In the case of British economic interests, however, Perón had much to 
gain and little to lose from an all-out attack.  Britain’s days as an economic super-
power appeared to be over, and the British could be demonized for their close 
connection with the Argentine elite, which had recently been ejected from power.  
As in so many areas of national life, Perón proved adept at borrowing policy, and in 
relation to the Anglo-Argentine economic relationship, Perón sought to borrow 
policy from the anti-British nationalists of the 1930s.   
The nationalist campaign against the Anglo-Argentine economic relationship 
focused upon the British-owned railways in Argentina, which had been the 
centerpiece of Britain’s involvement in Argentina since the late nineteenth century.  
                                                 
3 On the suspension of convertibility in August 1947, see Susan Strange, Sterling and British policy: a 
political study of an international currency in decline (London, New York, 1971). 
4 Rock, Argentina, 1516-1987: from Spanish colonization to the Falklands War and Alfonsín. 
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This nationalist agitation had been ongoing since the 1930s.5  By publicizing the run-
down state of the railways, nationalists effectively challenged Britain’s 
“imperialistic” claims to technological superiority.  Early in 1947 – amidst the 
patriotic fervor generated by the construction of the Argentine base San Martín in 
Antarctica – the British railway companies sent Sir Montague Eady to negotiate with 
the Argentine Government.  After several months of negotiation Eady reached an 
agreement with the Argentine government for the sale of the British owned railways.  
The agreed cost of just over £150m effectively cancelled Britain’s debt to 
Argentina.6   More negatively for British interests, the sale of the railways 
precipitated a massive exodus of British nationals from Argentina.  Coming on top of 
the population loss during the Second World War – when many young Britons left 
Argentina to fight – this would prove to be a blow from which the British community 
would never recover.7   
Ever the self-promoter, President Perón seized upon the sale of the British-
owned railways in order to declare Argentina’s “Economic Independence.”  
Speaking in Tucumán on 9 July 1947 on the 138th anniversary of the country’s 
declaration of political independence from Spain, Perón declared that Argentina was 
now free from the economic shackles of the British Empire: “in 1810 we were 
liberated politically, today we long for economic independence.”8 The declaration of 
                                                 
5 Rock, Authoritarian Argentina: the Nationalist movement, its history, and its impact. Deutsch and 
Dolkart, The Argentine right: its history and intellectual origins, 1910 to the present. 
6 In the House of Commons, referring to the government’s plans for free dentistry in the NHS, 
Winston Churchill quipped “Labour has sold the railways to pay for Britain’s false teeth.” Protesting 
the sale of the railways, The Standard of Buenos Aires paraphrased an earlier speech by Churchill: 
“Those representatives have not met in Buenos Aires to give away, without protest, a series of 
railways which, more than any other single factor have developed the stupendous economic reserves 
of this the most favoured of countries.”  The Standard, 5 February 1947. 
7 Graham-Yooll, The forgotten colony: a history of the English-speaking communities in Argentina. 
8 Rock, Argentina, 1516-1987: from Spanish colonization to the Falklands War and Alfonsín. 275. 
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economic independence served a useful political purpose.  At this stage, President 
Perón was still not established firmly in power.  Throughout 1947 strikes swept the 
country, as the labor unions made more and more demands on their newly promoted 
benefactor.  The armed forces remained a powerful threat to the President, 
precariously balanced in a state of watchful mistrust.  Perón’s appeal to nationalism 
and populism represented an attempt to solidify his support.  On the one hand, this 
“boisterous and false” nationalism was little more than rhetoric, but on the other 
hand the anti-imperialism shaped the minds of Perón’s supporters against the 
British.9 
Throughout 1947 and 1948, Argentina and Britain continued their fraught 
financial negotiations at a governmental level.  In Britain, Harold Wilson, the 
Minister of Commerce, stood up in the House of Commons to proclaim the 
importance of Argentina to Britain’s economic recovery plan.10  This importance did 
not seem, however, to warrant the sending of a high-ranking politician to negotiate 
with Argentina, and even the English-language Standard newspaper took offense at 
the “colonial attitude” suggested by the dispatch of a career civil servant:   
 
Heads of State in these days are not accustomed to treat with civil servants 
alone: and rightly or wrongly, missions established on no better basis are 
regarded as an attempt to treat the visited country as a “colony” - a term far 
too often used in the local press during the course of the present 
negotiations...  The British mission has failed, no doubt, on economic 
grounds.  But it might have got nearer to a solution and certainly would have 
earned more sympathy, had it been more fully associated with British 
business, and had it been a little more courteous to the Press than it has 
been.11  
                                                 
9 The Standard, 9 July 1946.  “The Ninth of July.” 
10 The Standard, 22 January 1948.  “Argentina’s Importance.” 
11 The Standard, 11 September 1946. 
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Following the sale of the railways and the cancellation of British debt, the focus of 
these negotiations was the export of Argentine agricultural products to Great Britain, 
where food rationing persisted.  In a demonstration of President Perón’s pragmatism, 
the talks led to the Andes Agreement of 1948, which guaranteed the continued 
supply of beef to Britain, albeit at a greatly increased price.   
From a structural perspective, the policy that probably did most harm to the 
Anglo-Argentine economic relationship was the creation of Instituto Argentino para 
la Promoción del Intercambio (IAPI), a government export monopoly on agricultural 
produce.12 This policy was aimed at the Argentine land-owning elite as much as 
against the British.  Its intention was to facilitate import substituting industrialization 
through the transfer of funds from the traditionally wealthy agricultural sector to the 
nascent industrial sector.  Through IAPI the government bought agricultural goods at 
a price substantially below market value, and sold them on the world-market for a 
substantially higher price: the profits would then be diverted to industrialization.  
Indirectly, this represented a two-pronged attack on British economic interests in 
Argentina.  Firstly, it artificially inflated the prices of agricultural goods on the world 
market.  Secondly, it threatened to undermine Britain’s already faltering industrial 
exports to Argentina.  The real problem, however, was the medium-term damage that 
IAPI inflicted on the agricultural export sector.  Blessed with almost every 
conceivable comparative advantage, agricultural exports had long been the 
foundation of the Argentine economy.  Faced with the government’s agricultural 
export monopoly, landowners found themselves short of money to invest in 
                                                 
12 Susana Novick, IAPI: auge y decadencia, [2 ed. (Buenos Aires, 2004). 
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modernization.  In terms of productivity, Argentina rapidly fell behind other 
agricultural exporting countries such as Australia and the United States.  By the early 
1950s, one of the most pressing problems in the Anglo-Argentine economic 
relationship was that Argentina simply could not produce enough agricultural 
exports to satisfy Britain’s demands.  Economists and businessmen, both inside and 
outside Argentina, accused Perón of killing the goose that laid the golden egg, and in 
many ways these problems presaged the long-term decline of the Argentine economy 
in the second half of the twentieth century.13   
Just as damaging in its own way to the Anglo-Argentine relationship as the 
sale of the railways, the meat negotiations, and the creation of IAPI, was the British 
Government’s official shunning of Evita, President Perón’s charismatic wife. During 
the 1946 election Eva Perón’s charisma and lowly upbringing had helped the 
Colonel appeal to the urban and rural masses, the so-called descamisados.14  In mid-
1947 Evita made a highly publicized trip to Europe, which quickly became known as 
the “Rainbow Tour.”  Following visits to Spain, Italy, and France, the First Lady of 
Argentina planned to visit Britain, and expected to be invited to stay at Buckingham 
Palace.  British officials said that she would be welcome to come, but that she would 
not receive the honors of a full state visit and that she would not be invited to stay at 
Buckingham Palace.  Feeling slighted, Evita stayed away.  Many Argentines saw this 
snub as the result of oligarchic snobbery, reinforcing the notion of Great Britain as 
supporters of Argentina’s conservative landed classes.  In the wake of this episode, 
petty attacks on the British community in Argentina increased such as the burning of 
                                                 
13 Paul H. Lewis, The crisis of Argentine capitalism (Chapel Hill, 1992). 
14 Literally “those without a shirt.” 
 143 
Palermo Cricket Club, and anti-English sentiment grew among people who were not 
hardened nationalists.  
Both intentionally and unintentionally, President Perón presided over the 
decolonization of Britain’s “informal empire” in Argentina.  Throughout most of the 
first half of the twentieth century, Great Britain had been Argentina’s most important 
trading partner.  By the early 1950s, Britain’s position would plummet to eleventh 
place, and the close trading relationship would never recover.15  This dramatic fall 
accompanied a rapid and terminal decline in the British community in Argentina.  
The role played by the Antarctic sovereignty dispute in the decline of British 
interests is impossible to quantify, but the incessant propaganda about the Islas 
Malvinas and Antarctica undoubtedly damaged Britain’s standing in Argentina.16  
President Perón used the territorial disputes to give a foundation to his accusations of 
British economic imperialism in Argentina.  Such nationalist fervor proved easier to 
whip up than to dissipate, and the dispute over British claims to formal empire in the 
Falkland Islands and their Dependencies would last long after the decline of Britain’s 
“informal empire” in Argentina.   
 
SOUTH AMERICAN ANTARCTICA AND THE RIO TREATY 
Despite the fact that Argentina’s claims to Antarctica overlapped 
substantially with those of Chile, an alliance between the trans-Andean neighbors 
appeared to offer the best way to challenge the British Empire’s claims to the 
Falkland Islands Dependencies.  The two South American countries still did not 
                                                 
15 Rock, Argentina, 1516-1987: from Spanish colonization to the Falklands War and Alfonsín. 275. 
16 On several occasions, the Standard newspaper appealed to the British government not to put 
forward British claims to the Falkland Islands Dependencies too strongly.   
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agree fully on the Antarctic question.  Indeed, they couldn’t even decide on a 
common name for the southern continent.  While the Argentines preferred the word 
Antártida, the Chileans were starting to use Antártica, partly to differentiate their 
claim from their South American rival.17  Nevertheless, in the confrontation with the 
British Empire it continued to make sense for the governments of Argentina and 
Chile to work together under the vague notion of a South American Antarctica.  On 2 
March, 1947, Raul Juliet and Juan Atilio Bramuglia, the Foreign Ministers of Chile 
and Argentina, met to discuss the Antarctic question during a meeting of South 
American foreign ministers.18  Two weeks later, the Chilean chiefs of the Estados 
Mayores [political heads of the armed forces] met to discuss Antarctic policy.19  
They concluded that it would be necessary to discuss fully the question of Antarctic 
sovereignty with the government of Argentina.20  The military officers stressed the 
need for a speedy resolution of the conflict with Argentina since they feared that 
their neighbor would beat them in any race to establish effective occupation in the 
                                                 
17 After an inquiry from the Ministry of Foreign Relations, Miguel Luis Amunátegui Reyes, from the 
Chilean Academy of language, suggested that Antártida was just a bad pronunication.  Miguel Luis 
Amunátegui Reyes al Ministro de RR.EE., 21 January 1947.  RR.EE., “Antartica Chilena, Varios, 
1940-48.” 
18 Boletín Confidencial No.13 Expedición Antártica, 3 March 1947.  RR.EE., “Antártica Chilena, 
Comunicaciones Cambiadas con otros Ministros, 1940-49.” 
19 Apreciación de la Situación por los Jefes de los Estados Mayores, 19 March 1947.  RR.EE., 
Antártica Chilena, Comunicaciones Cambiadas con otros Ministros, 1940-49. 
20 The Chilean military officers initially suggested that negotiation with Argentina should only come 
after discussion with the United States and Brazil.   With the United States, the Chiefs of Staff 
recommended, the country should agree upon the limits of Chilean Antarctic territory.  With Brazil, 
the Brazilian government should be asked whether “it would view such an arrangement [an agreement 
between Chile and Argentina] as inconvenient, inopportune or unfriendly on the part of Chile.”  Such 
an attempt to include the Brazilian government in the decision making process represented a 
geopolitical strategy to win Brazilian support for Chile’s Antarctic claims. The Chilean Minister of 
Foreign Relations agreed on the need for a speedy resolution of the conflict with Argentina, and for 
consultation with the United States, but he disagreed about the need to bring Brazil into the question. 
The Brazilians, he argued, had not shown any interest in Antarctic sovereignty, and it was best to keep 
it that way. Juliet a Ministro de Defensa Nacional.  Soberanía de Chile en la Antártida, 25 April 1947.  
RR.EE., “Antártica Chilena, Comunicaciones Cambiadas con otros Ministros, 1940-49.” 
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Antarctic: “the time factor is against our interests, given that it is a fact that the 
government of Argentina is developing in every sense an extensive plan of 
penetration, with a rhythm of activity ever more intense.”21 
In preparation for international discussion of the future of Antarctica, the 
Chilean Antarctic Commission attempted to assemble all the scientific work 
conducted by the previous summer’s Chilean expedition to Antarctica.22  To fulfill 
its political purposes, the Commission required “exclusive use” of the scientific data 
gathered by the members of the expedition.  The Foreign Ministry suggested a few 
revisions to the Chilean IGM’s 1945 map of Chilean Antarctica changing some of 
the place names to ones with a more patriotic flavor: the Trinity Peninsula, for 
example, became Peninsula O’Higgins, after the famous Independence Era Liberator 
of Chile.23  Cordovez continued his indefatigable work on the economic possibilities 
of Antarctica.  In a report made in July, Cordovez noted that, following his journey 
to Antarctica on board the Angamos, Sr. Carlos Oliver Schneider had proved the 
correctness of Suess’ “Antarcandes” theory and the fact that the Antarctic Peninsula 
is a geological continuation of the Chilean cordillera.24  Schneider’s observations 
                                                 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ministerio de RR.EE. a Rector of the Universidad de Chile, Solicita informes para la Comisión 
Chilena Antártica, 2 June 1947.  RR.EE., “Antártica Chilena, Comunicaciones Cambiadas con otros 
Ministros, 1940-49.” 
23 Ministerio de RR.EE. al Director del IGM, 2 June 1947.  Sobre antecedentes para nuevo mapa de la 
Antártica Chilena.  RR.EE., “Antártica Chilena, Comunicaciones Cambiadas con otros Ministros, 
1940-49.”  On the Importance of mapping to the Antarctic sovereignty dispute see Dodds, Pink ice: 
Britain and the South Atlantic Empire.  In October 1947, German Riesco the Chilean Foreign Minister 
noted that the names “Grahamland” and the “Palmer Peninsula” had become political, and suggested 
that on a new Chilean map of Antarctica, these British and North American names should be replaced 
with Tierra O’Higgins.  In other words he wanted to rename the entire peninsula. Ministerio de 
RR.EE. a Ministro de Defensa Nacional, 24 October 1947.  Cartas de la Antártica Chilena preparadas 
por el Departamento de Navegación e Hidrografía de la Armada.  RR.EE., “Antártica Chilena, 
Comunicaciones Cambiadas con otros Ministros, 1940-49.” 
24 Estudios Economicos de la Antártida por Enrique Cordovez M., Miembro-representante de la 
Armada en la Comisión Chilena Antártica, 22 July1947. RR.EE., “Antártica Chilena, Varios, 1940-
48.” 
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proved the veracity of the report that Admiral Byrd had given before the US 
Congress in 1941.  Meanwhile, according to Cordovez, the United States were 
jealously guarding the research done by Operation Highjump during the 1946-47 
season.  Cordovez concluded: 
 
All that is previously mentioned is extraordinarily suggestive and revealing 
of the invaluable potential riches that the Sixth Continent is guarding, and 
because of this, we believe that whatever the forces that we deploy to 
demonstrate our rights, they should never be deplored, because our Antarctic 
rights, together with those of the Argentine Republic, to all of the American 
quadrant, which is the best zone of the frozen continent, signify unsuspected 
riches for the world of the future.25 
 
Antarctica, he asserted, would prove to be of unexpected value to the world of the 
future, reflecting once again the belief in Antarctica as a frozen El Dorado. 
In July 1947 Juliet and Bramuglia met again to discuss the question of 
Antarctica.  Once more, the two countries could not agree on a common frontier in 
Antarctica, but they could agree that the region belonged to them and to nobody else.  
On 12 July, the two foreign ministers issued a declaration calling for joint action 
between their two countries in Antarctica, and seeking continued negotiations in 
order to resolve the question of sovereignty.  This meeting laid the foundations for a 
joint Argentine-Chilean position at the Conference of Rio. 
In August 1947, Foreign Ministers from all of the American states met in Rio 
de Janeiro to negotiate and sign the Treaty of Inter-American Defense. 26  The 
                                                 
25 Ibid. 
26 Before the Conference of Rio, a South Atlantic Regional Aviation conference was held in Rio that 
discussed meteorological arrangements.  Attended by Britain.   N.K. Johnson (Meteorological Office 
Air Ministry) to Barton (CO), 23 July, 1947.  TNA, CO 78/244/4.   
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principal motivation for this Treaty was the creation of a strong anti-Communist bloc 
that would stand united in the event of any hostile act by the Soviet Union.  
However, several Central and South American states also saw the Treaty as an 
opportunity to rid the Western Hemisphere of colonialism in all its forms, including 
the British Empire.  With strong support from Chile, the Argentine representatives at 
Rio successfully sought to have the Islas Malvinas and the Antarctic Peninsula 
region included in the Western Hemisphere, covered by the Treaty.  Theoretically 
this would make any British military action in the Falkland Islands Dependencies an 
act of aggression against the American continent, and would consequently require a 
combined response from all the countries in the Western Hemisphere, including the 
United States.   
The inclusion of the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies within the Rio 
Treaty put the United States into an awkward situation.  Since the Monroe Doctrine 
(of 1823) it had traditionally been US policy to oppose extra-continental colonialism 
in the Western Hemisphere, but, since the British takeover of the Falklands in 1833, 
it had done very little to protest the British occupation.27  Neither Britain’s 
possession of the Falkland Islands, nor its claims to the Falkland Islands 
Dependencies were enough to provoke the United States to break its alliance with 
Great Britain.  However, as shown by the interest in American sovereignty in 
Antarctica, and by the tacit government support for Finn Ronne’s expedition, the US 
government clearly saw Britain’s claims to the dependencies as being much weaker 
than those to the Falkland Islands themselves.  Nevertheless, the US government 
                                                 
27 Indeed, Barry Gough shows that a North American raid on the Argentine colony in 1831 opened 
the door for the British takeover two years later. Gough, The Falkland Islands/Malvinas: the contest 
for empire in the South Atlantic. 
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issued a note of reserve to the Rio Treaty, which stated that the United States did not 
recognize the inclusion of the Antarctic region, nor the Falkland Islands, as lying 
within the boundaries of the treaty.28 
Following the Conference of Rio, the British Observer newspaper suggested 
that: “It is probable that Argentina will follow her success at the Rio Conference in 
getting the Falkland Islands and other British possessions in the South Atlantic 
classed as part of the Western Hemisphere by protesting at a future conference 
against the illegal occupation of the Latin American territory by Great Britain.”29  
The Chileans were also happy with the results of the Rio Conference.  They made a 
declaration in the final act of the conference, confirming: 
 
The Chilean delegation declare that inside the adjacent waters to the South 
American continent, in the extension of coasts corresponding to the Republic 
of Chile in the so-called zone of security, the existence of colonies or 
possession of European countries is not recognized and that we especially 
reserve and maintain intact the legitimate titles and rights of the Republic of 
Chile in the lands included inside the Chilean Antarctic Sector, upon which 
the Republic exercises corresponding sovereignty.30 
 
Despite the United States’ reservation about the territorial limits of the treaty, 
Chilean officials saw the treaty as offering protection against an attack in the 
Antarctic Peninsula, noting that such an attack did not even need to be armed. 
 
                                                 
28 La Prensa (Lima) 12 August 1947, “Posiblemente Canada plantee en Río de Janeiro el Status del 
Antártico.  RR.EE., “Recortes de Prensa (3).” 
29 Reported in the Standard, 1 September 1947. 
30 Ministerio de RR.EE. a Ministro de Defensa Nacional, 12 September 1947. RR.EE., “Antartica 
Chilena, Comunicaciones Cabiadas con otros Ministros, 1940-49.” 
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BRITISH RESPONSE 
With the American nations meeting in Rio to discuss Western Hemispheric 
Security, the sterling crisis of August 1947 gave an urgency to British discussions of 
the future of the Falkland Islands Dependencies, and especially the question of who 
should pay for their upkeep.31  With the backing of Brian Roberts at the Foreign 
Office Research Department, the Colonial Office pushed for an aerial survey of the 
Dependencies.  Anticipating that a showdown with Argentina could not be 
postponed beyond 1948, Roberts pragmatically argued “the survey would not only 
show that we were active in the area, but also show which areas we should hold on to 
and which areas we could, if necessary, abandon.”32  The British were not averse to 
ceding parts of the Dependencies, but they first wanted to know what they were 
giving up: a lack of scientific knowledge stood in the way of British concessions.  At 
the same time, the Colonial Office petitioned for a vessel for the Falkland Islands 
Dependencies Survey in order adequately to supply Britain’s seven bases in the 
region.33  The Treasury was keen that the revenues raised in the Dependencies 
should be used to finance the British expeditions, but it worried whether the 
exchequer would benefit under this financial arrangement if minerals should be 
found in the region.34  Under the surface of these discussions, there was a rumbling 
of discontent among certain Ministers and Departments: given Britain’s dire 
                                                 
31 Strange, Sterling and British policy: a political study of an international currency in decline. 
32 Minutes of a Meeting held in Air Ministry at 1430 hours on 18 June 1947 to discuss the Colonial 
Office request for an aerial survey of Grahamland.  TNA, CO 78/227/1. 
33 Foreign Office (South American Department) to Chancery (Buenos Aires), 22 July 1947.  TNA, T 
220/1358 W476. 
34 Foreign Office (South American Department) to Chancery (Buenos Aires) – encloses letter from 
Church to Edwards, 22 July 1947.  TNA, T 220/1358 W476. 
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financial circumstances what was the point in maintaining British territories in such a 
remote region?  
On 8 August 1947, senior Cabinet Ministers met in the Prime Minister’s 
room at the House of Commons to debate the question of British territories in 
Antarctica.35  The Foreign Office circulated a minute (written after extended 
consultation with the other interested Ministries), which suggested that although it 
was undesirable to take steps which might lead to friction with Chile and the 
Argentine – especially given the dependence on Argentina for food – it was 
nevertheless a matter of principle that Britain should maintain its rights in this area.  
The Foreign Office minute recommended that the Governments of Argentina and 
Chile should confidentially be informed of Britain’s intention to maintain its 
sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies, and given the chance to leave 
quietly.  Furthermore, the South Americans should be informed of His Majesty’s 
Government’s willingness to take the issue to the International Court of Justice.  As a 
last resort, and in the event that the South Americans should fail to comply with 
either of Britain’s demands, the Foreign Office minute recommended that the 
commander in Chief of the America and West Indies station should be instructed “to 
remove the Argentine and Chilean posts from British territory.”  The Foreign Office 
also circulated a report by the Law Officers stating that while British title to the 
South Shetland Islands as a whole was relatively secure, its title to Gamma Island, 
where the Argentines had established a base, was much less certain.  The Law 
Officers argued that if Britain did nothing to protest the Argentine occupation of 
Gamma Island, the Argentines might acquire a title to the island.  In contrast to the 
                                                 
35 Minutes of a meeting of Ministers held in the Prime Minister’s Room, House of Commons, on 
Friday 8 August 1947 at 3.30pm.  TNA, CAB 121/510. 
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hard line taken by the Foreign Office minute, the Law Officers suggested that in the 
event of the two governments failing to withdraw the posts, the Government should 
not use force to eject them but should forthwith take steps to bring the matter before 
the International Court.  The lawyers did not believe that such a procedure would 
prejudice Britain’s claim to sovereignty over either island or over any other area in 
the Antarctic.   
The meeting of Cabinet Ministers opened with Ernest Bevin, the British 
Foreign Secretary, stating that with so many things already on his hands he was most 
reluctant to set out upon yet another path which might lead to further international 
friction.36  He asked whether it was really necessary for the Government to pursue 
this matter at the present moment.  Creech Jones, the Secretary of State for Colonies, 
told his colleagues that as the Minister responsible for the region he thought that they 
should know about the encroachments taking place.  Responding to the circulated 
memorandum, the Prime Minister questioned the emphasis placed on the strategic 
value of the Falkland Islands Dependencies saying that he found it difficult to 
believe that this remote area would be of any strategic value to Great Britain in war.  
The Minister of Defense replied that the Chiefs of Staff has been asked for their 
views on the strategic importance of the Antarctic somewhat in the abstract.  He 
stressed the Chiefs of Staff wanted to be able to control the sea routes between the 
Atlantic and Pacific in times of war and to this end were keen on establishing 
meteorological and radar stations on the Antarctic continent.  He stated that, as far as 
he knew, the Chiefs of Staff had not been consulted on the possibility of ejecting the 
Chilean and Argentine posts by force, and added that they would have to be 
                                                 
36 Ibid.  This was the period of the “transfer of power” in India and Pakistan, Palestine was becoming 
troublesome, and rivalry with the Soviet Union was beginning to intensify.   
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consulted if such an action were to be contemplated.  Nonetheless, the Minister of 
Defense stressed the matter of principle:  
 
Quite apart from the strategic arguments in favor of early action, the fact 
remained that foreign Governments were encroaching on certain territories to 
which we had long laid claim.  If we did nothing to check this tendency our 
claim to the territories in question would go by default.  Argentina and Chile 
could establish a title to the territories they had occupied and we should be 
establishing a most undesirable precedent, embarrassing both to ourselves 
and the Dominions.37 
 
In conclusion, the Prime Minister said that he agreed on the importance of 
maintaining Britain’s title to the Dependencies, although he continued to doubt the 
strategic importance of the region.  He thought that protests should be made to the 
governments of Argentina and Chile, but that the course of action should be further 
considered if these protests were ignored.  The Committee “agreed in principle that 
our title to territories in the Antarctic should be maintained, and that protests at the 
recent encroachments should be made to the governments of Argentina and Chile.” 
The senior Cabinet Ministers’ decision to protect Britain’s title to the 
Falkland Islands Dependencies put British policy towards the region on firmer 
foundations.  But the commitment at the highest level towards maintaining British 
sovereignty in Antarctica remained shaky, and, in particular, nothing had been done 
to give the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey a solid financial structure.  A 
Cabinet Paper from September 1947 reported that the Ministers concerned had 
rejected alternative policies of internationalization or partition by agreement.38  The 
                                                 
37 Ibid. 
38 Cabinet Paper (47) 263 “The Antarctic,” 24 September 1947.  TNA, T 220/1358 
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paper summarized the reasoning behind the Ministers’ decision: “the arguments in 
favor of this policy [of making a protest to the governments of Chile and Argentina 
and encouraging them to take the case to the International Court of Justice], apart 
from the desire not to abandon claims established through our previous expeditions, 
are for the general strategic interest of the Antarctic and its potential importance 
from the standpoint of our communications and meteorology, and possibly of 
mineral production if means could be found to exploit it.”  It went on to note that 
actual expenditure was not large - £44,000, most of which would be recovered from 
a special stamp issue – but also explicitly stated “the line in this paper does not 
commit us now to policy in 1948-49.”  The paper concluded “the action proposed 
holds no greater dangers to our economic relations with Argentina than any other 
course of action.”   
In preparation for the 1947-48 season, Mr. Carter at the Colonial Office 
drafted a letter stating how far the British would go in defense of British rights to the 
Falkland Islands Dependencies.39  Questioning the policy of aggression in one place 
and of acquiescence in another, Carter noted: “If we are prepared to agree to the use 
of force, then we must be ready to back it to the last ditch.  Any action short of actual 
war is bound to be converted by the Argentines and Chileans to their advantage by 
reasons of their geographical propinquity.”  Protest without the threat of sanctions, 
he added, only becomes a source of ridicule.  By December 1947, the plans for an 
aerial survey of the Falkland Islands Dependencies, which had been discussed 
throughout the year, had to be cancelled due to cuts in RAF and Naval personnel.40  
                                                 
39 Draft letter from Mr. Carter (CO), 23 September 1947.  TNA, CO 537/4010.   
40 Shuckburgh (FO) to Group Captain Stapleton (Cabinet Offices), 15 December 1947.  TNA, CO 
78/227/1.   
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The financial and technical difficulties of the survey outweighed its strategic 
advantage.  The Foreign Office could see no political interest in pressing for this 
survey, since it would not contribute materially towards the strengthening of 
Britain’s political position in the Dependencies.  Nevertheless, despite the handicaps 
imposed by the financial constraints of Britain’s precarious economic situation, 
British officials continued to do as much as they could to maintain British claims to 
the Falkland Islands Dependencies.  Everyone feared that the 1947-48 season would 
see the challenge to Britain’s position intensifying even further. 
 
1947-48 SEASON 
South American anti-imperialism in Antarctica reached its zenith in the 1947-
48 season.  This summer would be the most hostile so far as Argentina and Chile, 
loosely allied behind the idea of a South American Antarctica, brazenly challenged 
Britain’s position in the Falkland Islands Dependencies.  The British Empire 
appeared to be in retreat throughout the world.  In August 1947, India and Pakistan 
had achieved their independence; Sri Lanka would follow in February 1948.  Trouble 
in Palestine threatened to place further strain on the relationship between Britain and 
the United States.  At home, the British economy remained in a precarious state.  
Many people believed that the British Empire was on its very last legs.  The 
governments in Buenos Aires and Santiago knew little of the British government’s 
decision to reinforce its position in Antarctica, and they sought to capitalize on this 
rising tide of anti-imperialism and colonial nationalism by pushing their own claims 
to the Antarctic Peninsula.  
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The Argentines got off to an early start in the 1947-48 season.  On 12 
December, 1947 the Argentine Navy established a base on Deception Island.  This 
represented a direct challenge to the British base already there.  The confrontational 
tone of this move set the tone for the season.  On the following day, Contralmirante 
Gregorio A. Portillo made a flight over the Antarctic Peninsula, leaving from an 
Argentine airbase in Patagonia.  Ironically, the Argentine Government had made 
arrangements to send a navigator to the Empire Air Navigation School at Shawbury, 
to study polar flying technique.41  They even planned to make a flight to the South 
Pole in a Lincoln plane, recently purchased from Britain.42  In February, Argentina 
established a temporary shore station at Admiralty Bay, near the British Base (G). 
Creech Jones, the British Colonial Secretary, was very disturbed at Argentine 
landings in the Falkland Islands Dependencies.43  In a paper prepared for a Cabinet 
meeting in early January 1948, he put three options to his colleagues: an appeal to 
the UN Security Council; the use of Naval Forces to help in enforcing domestic law; 
the use of Naval Forces to expel the intruders.  The Colonial Office paper pointed 
out that these options would all threaten serious friction with Argentina, at a time 
when the Anglo-Argentine economic negotiations were at a critical stage.  
Nonetheless, the Colonial Secretary clearly did not think that such conclusions 
should stand in the way of Britain’s defense of its Antarctic sovereignty.   
In response to the Colonial Office paper, Treasury officials acknowledged the 
awkwardness of the timing, adding that not only did hostility in Antarctica threaten 
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an on-going trade mission, but also the sale of the railways, which had yet to go 
through: “We have therefore at stake the fate of an external asset worth £150m, if we 
succeed in persuading Argentina to carry our the agreement to buy at that price.  If 
they run out of the bargain, the value of the asset will fall very sharply indeed.”44  
The Treasury once again questioned the worth of holding onto the Falkland Islands 
Dependencies at all, arguing that the Colonial Office had “not explained in what 
circumstances strategic points in the dependencies could be valuable.”45  They 
acknowledged that “the wider effects of a bad example here may be more serious,” 
but they went on to argue that “in no other instance have we anything like the same 
amount at stake.”46   
The overlap of formal and informal empire in the question of Antarctic 
sovereignty created a unique situation that was not replicated elsewhere.  In other 
colonial situations, Treasury Officials argued, “we should be in a position to react 
much more vigorously.”  This was an explicit statement that Britain’s relationship 
with Argentina was tying its hands in the Falkland Islands Dependencies.  
Furthermore, the British could not rely on American support in the Antarctic: “It 
may be both humiliating and infuriating to have to give way but the balance of 
advantage seems clear.”  The Treasury concluded its case resolutely: 
 
Nevertheless, we are scarcely in a position to judge to what extent the 
Argentines would press their claims if faced with a bold front.  What is 
perfectly clear is that if we hold our hands on Deception Island in the 
interests of our financial and commercial negotiations, we must push the 
                                                 





latter to a successful issue.  We must not give way in both places, and there is 
much to be said for keeping the Deception Island issue long, even for several 
months, pending the outcome of the financial negotiations.  This may be 
inconvenient in the view of the Governor’s projected tour, but much of the 
difficulty lies in timing.47 
 
In early February 1948, the Foreign Office Minister McNeil gave a speech to the 
House of Commons outlining the position taken by Britain in the Antarctic Dispute.  
Both Argentina and Chile, McNeil informed MPs, had rejected Britain’s offer to take 
the case to the International Court of Justice in The Hague.  He argued that such a 
refusal to submit to international arbitration could only be taken as a demonstration 
that the South Americans did not have much confidence in their legal titles.  
In comparison to earlier seasons, British activity in Antarctica during the 
summer 1947-48 was relatively muted. The financial position of the Falkland Islands 
Dependencies Survey had not been settled by the Cabinet decision of September 
1947, and to a large extent British Antarctic policy remained in limbo.  The British 
bases at Port Lockroy (A) and Admiralty Bay (G) were re-opened, but no new bases 
were constructed.  However, in one important development, the Falkland Island 
Dependency Survey purchased HMS Pretext and renamed it MV John Biscoe.  This 
meant that the Survey had its own ship and would be less reliant upon the Navy. 
Not to be outdone by the Argentines or the British, the Chileans sent two 
ships to Antarctica early in the Antarctic season. They established a new base on the 
Trinity Peninsula at the tip of the Antarctic Peninsula.  The Chileans, however, saved 
their trump card until late in the season.  In February, President González Videla 
himself sailed to the Antarctic Peninsula on board the Pinto and became the first 
                                                 
47 Ibid. 
 158 
head of state ever to visit the Southern Continent.  During his voyage González 
Videla made a series of patriotic speeches calling for Antarctica to be included in the 
Pan American Treaty of Mutual Defense, and railing against the “spent imperialism” 
of British claims to Antarctica.48  On 17 February, for example, González Videla 
gave a speech at the Chilean Puerto Soberanía base on Greenwich Island: 
 
You have completed with valor, self denial, and sacrifice your mission in 
these inhospitable regions of Antarctica, as befits the glorious tradition of our 
country.  You have guarded the national patrimony in the part of Antarctica 
that corresponds to the American continent, which was bequeathed to us and 
our patria by the heroes of our nation. The bad habits of antiquated European 
imperialism threaten, with armed violence, to snatch from Chile and America 
the possession of these lands of ours.49 
 
The President’s message was clear: Britain should abandon its “illegal and unjust” 
claims to the so-called Falkland Islands Dependencies.  The British Empire’s active 
assertion of sovereignty, the President continued, was in direct contravention of the 
terms of the recently signed Pan-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the 
boundaries of which stretched all the way to the South Pole.  He called upon the 
other Republics of America to assist against this external aggression, conveniently 
forgetting that Chilean claims also conflicted directly with those of neighboring 
Argentina. 
The President’s visit to Antarctica clearly had domestic as well as 
international motivations.  González Videla was in serious difficulty after the 
banning of the Communist Party.  His visit to Antarctica offered a welcome 
                                                 
48 Pyne, The ice. 
49 Ministerio de RR.EE. Circular No.15, 18 February 1948.  RR.EE.,  “Antártica Chilena, Varios, 
1940-48.” 
 159 
distraction that would appeal to the patriotic sentiment of Chilean citizens.  As a 
news report from Caracas revealed, however, there was some confusion over his 
motives.50  Upon his return to Santiago, early in March 1948, González Videla gave 
a curious speech to the crowds that welcomed him home.  In the speech he set out 
the now familiar list of Chilean rights to sovereignty in Antarctica, before attacking 
British imperial pretensions in the region: “We would deny our glorious history, we 
would deny our past, if we were to renounce one single piece of Chilean territory just 
because there are those who believe that acts of imperialism today constitute a title 
of sovereignty.”51  Then, with a rhetorical sleight of hand, he linked British 
Imperialism in Antarctica with Communist propaganda in Chile, which he saw as 
Soviet meddling in Chile.  The defense of Chilean national sovereignty involved 
both defending Chile’s rights to Antarctica and keeping communist influence out of 
the country.  This was clearly an attempt to sway United States’ opinion towards 
supporting Chile (and Argentina) against the British in Antarctica. 
Nieto del Rio, the Chilean Ambassador to the United States, sent the Chilean 
Foreign Ministry the transcript of a press conference with Secretary of State General 
George Marshall concerning the sovereignty dispute in Antarctica.52  Marshall said 
that he read the news about the dispute every day, and then he reminded the press of 
the reservation that the United States had made to the Treaty of Rio, saying that his 
country did not recognize the territorial limits of the treaty as incorporating the 
Antarctic region.  The US Secretary of State said that it was a matter to be resolved 
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between the three countries concerned, although he refused to be drawn on whether 
the question should be put before the International Court of Justice.  Under the 
headline “Antarctic Imperialism,” the Washington Post criticized the governments of 
Argentina and Chile for misunderstanding the terms of the Treaty of Rio, noting 
“Argentina’s attempt to misuse the Rio accord is especially unctuous, since she has 
not yet ratified the pact.”53  The newspaper called for the whole question of Antarctic 
territorial claims to be settled on a world basis.  For its part, the United States made a 
much smaller contribution to the 1947-48 season than it had done a year earlier.  
Operation Windmill – so named because of its use of helicopters – sought only to fill 
in some of the gaps left by Operation Highjump. 
 
PAN-AMERICAN CONFERENCES 
Early in 1948, the British-born novelist Christopher Isherwood, by then a 
naturalized citizen of the United States, traveled to Argentina.  He recorded his 
experiences in the travel book The Condor and the Cows, which was published the 
following year.  Having lived in Germany during the 1930s, Isherwood was in a 
good position to compare President Perón with Adolf Hitler and test the oft-voiced 
accusation that Argentina was a fascist country.  He rejected comparisons between 
Nazi Germany and Peronist Argentina: “where Hitler scowled, Perón beamed a 
large, confident all-embracing political smile.”54.  The Argentine president did, 
however, rely heavily on nationalist propaganda:  
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Actually, at the moment, Perón’s chief propaganda drive is directed against 
Great Britain, not the U.S.A.  It centers on the Antarctic – or, at any rate, that 
segment of it which is directly south of Cape Horn – and also includes the 
Falklands and their dependent islands....  Recently, the Peronist press has 
been full of demands that the Malvinas and a part of Antarctica shall be 
recognized as Argentinean territory.  In this demand, Argentina has allied 
itself with Chile, which is also to get its slice.  There are even reports that 
uranium ore has been discovered down there – in which case, of course, the 
dispute would become serious; provided that the uranium could ever be 
mined.  At present, however, it seems very doubtful that Perón really wants 
the Malvinas, much less the Antarctic.  He is simply whipping up nationalist 
sentiment and making an inexpensive bid for Chilean friendship.55 
 
According to Isherwood, the British were not much alarmed by this.  At a 
geopolitical level, they felt safe in the belief that the United States would support 
their continued occupation of the Falkland Islands.  However, at the same time, the 
strength of anti-British national feeling being whipped up by Perón was anything but 
trivial, and reveals how successful Argentine politicians had been in presenting the 
dispute as a South American struggle against British Imperialism. 
On 4 March 1948, Don Germán Vergara Donoso, the Chilean Minister of 
Foreign Relations, and Dr. Pascual de la Rosa, the head of the Argentine Antarctic 
Commission, met in Santiago to sign “a joint declaration on the indisputable rights of 
Chile and Argentina in South American Antarctica.”56  The declaration was the 
strongest yet of the mutual rights of both countries to sovereignty in Antarctica.  It 
established that both governments would act together in the protection and juridical 
defense of their rights in the Southern Continent.  In addition, it made provision for 
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the two countries to meet later in the year to continue the negotiations to arrive at 
jointly recognized frontiers in the Antarctica.  This latter provision represented a 
thinly veiled disguise of the fact that the two countries could still not agree upon the 
territorial limits of their respective claims.  Nevertheless, the Chilean press 
commented on the importance of the Donoso-La Rosa declaration and declared that 
it represented a practical example of the “cordial and democratic way in which the 
countries of Latin American know how to resolve their questions of territorial 
sovereignty.”  The first task for the newly confirmed Argentine-Chilean alliance 
would come at the Ninth International Conference of American States conference 
held in Bogotá at the very beginning of April 1948. 
The Bogotá conference gained notoriety for a communist coup d’état that 
temporarily overthrew the government of Colombia and sent the delegates fleeing to 
their embassies, but it also proved an opportunity for the countries of the Western 
Hemisphere to discuss substantive issues.  After order had been regained and the 
government restored, the member countries of the International Conference of 
American States continued their negotiations on the future of the Western 
Hemisphere.  Alongside such issues as economic development, regional transport, 
and agriculture, Argentina and Chile were keen to raise the question of Antarctica, 
and, in the case of Argentina, the Falkland Islands.  The central issue was whether 
the regions claimed by Great Britain in Antarctica and the South Atlantic were 
covered by the Inter-American Treaty of Defense, which had been signed at Rio the 
previous year.  In their vocal anti-colonialism, the representatives of the two 
Southern Cone countries made common cause with the Guatemalans, who had their 
own territorial dispute with Britain’s possession of British Honduras (Belize).  The 
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Standard reported “most of the major South American nations have formed an 
apparently solid bloc to drive European Colonies out of the Western Hemisphere.”57   
Bramuglia spoke of Chilean support for a Antarctic Conference to resolve the 
Antarctic question, but the Chilean Foreign Ministry re-iterated to their delegation 
that their instructions were limited to making the Chilean case for Antarctic 
sovereignty and seeking a “declaration of the conference expressing the sympathies 
of the American countries towards the position adopted by Chile and Argentina in 
the Antarctic question and of the general American interest in the question of South 
American Antarctica.”   
Rumors that the US might change publicly its policy towards Antarctica 
further complicated negotiations at the Bogotá conference.58  However, from 
Washington, Nieto del Rio wrote that the State Department denied that there was 
about to be any change in US policy.59  The Chilean Ambassador added that he knew 
confidentially that there was no agreement between the State Department and the 
Ministry of Defense about what US policy should be, although they were hoping to 
reach an agreement before the following Antarctic summer.  From Bogotá, 
Hernandez, the head of the Chilean delegation, informed his Ministry that the US 
delegation under Daniels had been preparing to make an official statement on US 
claims to Antarctica in response to any statements made by Chile or Argentina.60  
They had reconsidered this position, however, due to concern that such a statement 
                                                 
57 The Standard, 29 March 1948.  “Solid South American Bloc at Bogotá.” 
58 Vergara (Ministro de RR.EE.) a Embachile Washington, 16 April 1948.  RR.EE., “Comunicaciones 
con EE.UU. de América, 1948-1949.” 
59 Nieto del Rio a Ministro de RR.EE., 19 April 1948.  RR.EE., “Comunicaciones con EE.UU. de 
América, 1948-1949.” 
60 Hernandez (Bogotá) a Ministro de RR.EE., 19 April 1948.  RR.EE., “Comunicaciones con EE.UU. 
de América, 1948-1949.” 
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would be “badly understood by public opinion in both countries.”  As long as the 
Chileans and Argentines limited themselves to statements about Antarctica and did 
not seek a resolution of the Conference, Daniels told Hernandez, the United States 
would not make a declaration.  This veiled US threat seems to have convinced the 
two South American countries not to press the Antarctic question too far. 
Undoubtedly swayed by US pressure, neither the Argentine nor the Chilean 
delegations in Bogotá attempted to get a conference resolution concerning the 
Antarctic question.  Both countries did, however, make extended declarations 
concerning their rights.61  In what was by now becoming familiar rhetoric 
Hernandez, the head of the Chilean delegation, set out Chile’s rights to Antarctica, 
which he claimed dated back to the Spanish colonial period, attacked the British, and 
spoke of trans-Andean fraternity with Argentina.  Instead of addressing the question 
of European colonialism in the American hemisphere directly, many of the members 
of the International Conference of American States decided to re-convene later in the 
year specifically to discuss the question.  The chosen destination was Havana. 
The United States State Department believed that there was a real threat of 
war over the question of sovereignty in Antarctica, and worried about being caught 
in the middle of such a conflict. North American officials put pressure on countries 
not to attend the Havana conference, hoping unsuccessfully to prevent a quorum 
being reached.  Chile, however, was one of the countries that bowed to US pressure 
not to attend.  The non-attendance of Chile took away a lot of the tension, especially 
in Antarctica, since it made it impossible to promote the popular idea of a “South 
American Antarctica.”  Enrique Covarinos, the Argentine Delegate declared that 
                                                 
61 Discurso pronunciado en sesión plenaria por el Jefe de la Delegación Chilena a la Conferencia de 
Bogotá.  D. Juvenal Hernández.  21 April 1948.  RR.EE., “Antártica Chilena, Varios, 1940-48.” 
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Argentina would not be bringing the question of the Islas Malvinas or Antarctica 
before the meeting, since an agreement had been reached with Britain in London on 
the procedure to solve the dispute.62  According to the Standard, Covarinos believed 
that “the question of the colonies was not a matter that could be solved in a day or a 
year, but at its meeting the Inter-American Commission on Dependent Territories 
would be the first real step towards doing something towards an eventual solution.”  
Such reticence did not prevent Covarinos from outlining to the conference, in a two 
hour long speech, Argentina’s rights to the Islas Malvinas and all the territories 
claimed within the Dependencies.63  Argentina made an official reservation 
concerning the Malvinas and Antarctica.64 
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64 Nieto del Rio, Washington, a Ministro de RR.EE., La Comisión Americana de Territorios 
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Chapter 5: Antarctic Detente, 1948-1950 
Following the drama of the 1947-48 Antarctic season and the shrill anti-
imperialism of the Bogotá conference, the onset of winter imposed its annual brake 
on human activity in the continent.  As the oceans froze over and the ships sailed 
home, the exigencies of the Antarctic environment presented the various participants 
with an opportunity for reflection upon the increasing hostile dispute.  In Washington 
D.C. the State Department’s somber assessment that “nations have gone to war over 
lesser issues” focused attention on possible ways to resolve the dispute.1  The Iron 
Curtain had descended over Europe, and the United States could not afford to have 
its Cold War allies fighting among themselves.  North American politicians led the 
way in attempting to resolve the sovereignty question.  They received considerable 
support from the Chileans, who realized that their prospects in Antarctica would 
benefit from a close partnership with the United States (as demonstrated by their 
refusal to attend the Havana conference).  Between 1948 and 1950, the Antarctic 
sovereignty dispute went through a period of detente, with all sides agreeing not to 
push the issue to the brink.  It was to the great relief of the United States when Great 
Britain, Argentina, and Chile signed a tri-partite naval agreement in time for the 
1948-49 summer season, by which they agreed not to send warships south of 60°S.  
This agreement would subsequently be renewed every year until 1959.   
Beneath the surface of these goodwill gestures, however, lay expediency 
rather than idealism.  None of the proposals made in this period managed to resolve 
satisfactorily the underlying question of who owned Antarctica.  In this constrained 
                                                 
1 Antarctica.  Secret, National Security Council Report, NSC 21, July 13, 1948, 9pp.  NSA, 
Presidential Directives PD00070. 
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but still contentious atmosphere the performance of Antarctic science continued to 
offer the three sides one of the principal means with which to demonstrate their 
sovereignty in a relatively non-confrontational manner.  The British continued to 
focus on the science of meteorology.  The Antarctic climate offered something 
tangible to study, and the ability to forecast the weather held out the prospects of 
strategic, economic, and legal benefits.  These practical advantages came on top of 
the abstract notion of environmental authority: that the country with the best 
scientific work in Antarctica seemed to have a moral claim to Antarctic sovereignty.  
Rather than seeking to challenge the connection between science and sovereignty, 
Argentina in particular increasingly tried to beat Britain at its own imperial game.  
The continued recourse to scientific research reinforced the connection between 
Antarctic science and Antarctic politics.   
 
US PEACE PLANS 
In the immediate aftermath of the Bogotá conference, a National Security 
Council Report summed up the dilemma facing the United States in reference to the 
Antarctic sovereignty dispute: 
 
The dispute between Great Britain on the one side and Argentina and Chile 
on the other over conflicting claims in the Antarctic, while almost entirely a 
matter of prestige, is a source of embarrassment to the United States because 
of our close relation to Great Britain and our commitments in the Western 
Hemisphere.  This embarrassment is susceptible of exploitation by the USSR 
to the further disadvantage of the United States.2   
 
                                                 
2 Ibid. 
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The report continued in somewhat alarmist fashion: “while it seems unlikely that war 
could break out over disputed claims in Antarctica, it cannot be denied that wars in 
the past have grown out of disputes of even more trivial nature.”  The dispute placed 
the United States in a very awkward situation.  On both sides its allies were 
demanding that it take a stand against the other.  The possibility existed that the 
dispute would become openly hostile with the threat that the United States might get 
drawn into an armed conflict, or risk breaking its obligations to one side or the other.  
Just as the United States feared, the Soviet Union quickly latched onto the 
discord among the Western Alliance that was generated by the Antarctic sovereignty 
dispute.  The Chilean military attaché in Buenos Aires, for example, relayed to his 
ministry reports originating from Radio Moscow that alleged that the United States 
had reached a military agreement with Argentina over Antarctica.3  The Chilean 
Foreign Ministry clearly regarded the reports as false, especially given the US 
position at the conference of Bogotá, and attributed them to communist attempts to 
distance Great Britain from the United States.  Direct Soviet interest and presence in 
Antarctica was also increasing, with the establishment of an annual Antarctic 
whaling expedition, and statements about Russian sovereignty in Antarctica from the 
Soviet Geographical Congress.   
A further complicating factor in North American Antarctic policy making 
was the fact that the United States continued to believe that it had good claims to 
large parts of the Antarctic Continent, including areas of the Antarctic Peninsula.  
These claims rested on the extensive history of US exploration and discovery in the 
Southern Continent.  However, the recent “Highjump” and “Windmill” expeditions 
                                                 
3 Ministerio de RR.EE. al Ministro de Defensa (Guerra), July 1948.  Posición de Chile en el asunto 
antártico.  RR.EE., “Antártica Chilena, Comunicaciones Cambiadas con otros Ministros, 1940-49.” 
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had significantly changed perceptions of Antarctica.  Whereas the earlier expeditions 
of Admiral Byrd had deliberately fostered the idea of Antarctica as a “frozen El 
Dorado,” brimming with valuable minerals, the two postwar military expeditions in 
Antarctica suggested that there was little immediate potential for economic gain.  In 
particular, the postwar expeditions had revealed that the prospect of finding uranium 
was very small.4  Given the damage being done to US diplomatic relations on the 
one side, and given the small economic incentive for possession of parts of the 
continent on the other, the obvious policy for the United States Government was 
therefore to try to resolve the sovereignty dispute in a manner that would be 
acceptable to the three countries involved.  Although US Antarctic policy remained 
confused and uncertain, due to differences of opinion between the State Department 
and the Department of Defense, some form of internationalism seemed to offer the 
best prospect.5  “An international administration,” US Officials optimistically 
reasoned, “would also provide a solution to the dispute between Great Britain, 
Argentina, and Chile.  A surrender of sovereignty claims by all three disputants 
which did not give an advantage to any one of them would cause no loss of 
prestige.”6 
The first form of internationalism suggested by the United States was a form 
of UN Trusteeship.  This solution had the advantage that it did not ostensibly exclude 
any nation from the Antarctic continent, and in particular would not offend the 
Soviet Union.  Another benefit of such a policy was that it gave the impression that 
                                                 
4 Additionally, in the early 1950s, the United States found fairly abundant uranium supplies in Utah 
and Colorado, thereby lowering the desirability of any Antarctic uranium.   
5 For a good overview of US Antarctic policy in this period, see Jason Kendall Moore, "Tethered to 
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6 Antarctica.  Secret, National Security Council Report, NSC 21, July 13, 1948, 9pp.  NSA, 
Presidential Directives PD00070. 
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the United States was doing everything that it could to support the United Nations 
Organization.   In terms of the legal status of Antarctic Trusteeship, the 1948 
National Security Council Report argued: 
 
While the trusteeship system of the United Nations was established primarily 
“for the development of peoples, not penguins”, there is nothing in the 
Charter excluding the application of a trusteeship to uninhabited areas.  In 
fact the establishment of a trusteeship over Antarctica would appear to be 
justified by the first of the four basic objectives of the system as stated under 
Article 76, viz., “to further international peace and security.” 
 
Because “science” was the principal activity in Antarctica, US officials reasoned that 
the major purpose of a UN trusteeship council for the Southern Continent should be 
scientific administration.  “Since scientists in general subscribe to the doctrine that 
‘science knows no boundaries,’” the National Security Report added, “and since the 
bulk of the ‘population’ in Antarctica at any one time would be composed of 
members of scientific expeditions or stations, national frictions should be reduced to 
a minimum.”  In particular, scientific research in Antarctica offered great 
opportunities for developments in the science of meteorology.   
Although the North American proposal for United Nations Trusteeship in 
Antarctica envisioned its continued administration by interested nations, it clearly 
involved a renunciation of sovereignty rights to the continent.  In August 1948, the 
United States officially circulated its Trusteeship ideas.   Of the seven nations that 
had made claims to ownership of the Antarctic continent, only New Zealand met the 
US proposal with any enthusiasm.  The British were adamant that they did not want 
the Antarctic question submitted to the United Nations, which would, they argued, 
inevitably lead to Communist Bloc interest and involvement.  The Argentines and 
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Chileans shared Britain’s fears of communist penetration, adding that they could not 
contemplate any surrender of their rights over a “fundamental part” of their national 
territory.  France, Norway, and Australia, the other three claimant nations, advanced 
similar objections to the US Trusteeship proposal.  The United States underestimated 
the strengths of national feeling towards Antarctica, and also underestimated the 
levels of hostility against any form of Soviet involvement in the Southern Continent.  
The United States withdrew its trusteeship idea, but continued to pursue its search 
for an international solution to the Antarctic problem.   
The British objection to the idea of a UN Trusteeship for Antarctica 
presented the United States with the biggest problem.  Given Britain’s international 
standing, British support would be needed to give any form of internationalization a 
chance of success.  Following the withdrawal of their trusteeship proposal, United 
States diplomats discussed the question of Antarctica with their British colleagues.  
The British Foreign Office was open to some form of internationalization, but they 
were insistent that the Soviet Union should be excluded and, therefore, that the 
United Nations had to be avoided.  Instead of the United Nations, the British were 
prepared to accept some form of international condominium for Antarctica, through 
which the seven countries with territorial claims, plus the United States, would pool 
their individual sovereignties into a collective sovereignty over the entire continent.  
This proposal would involve a renunciation national sovereignty, but the 
continuation, and possible extension, of influence in the continent.  It would also 
have the benefit of permanently excluding the Soviet Union.  The British attitude 
towards the US peace plans reveals an openness to the idea of compromise in 
Antarctica in keeping with its broader post-war attitude towards its empire more 
generally, in which it was willing to “decolonize” certain parts with the hope that 
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these areas – such as India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka – would stay within the “British 
sphere.”7   
Shortly after the rejection of its trusteeship proposal, the United States 
circulated its new idea for an eight-power condominium in Antarctica.  British 
adherence to this plan was not advertised, but it was suspected in both Argentina and 
Chile, especially since the strategically important sub-Antarctic islands would be 
excluded by the terms of arrangement (and the South Americans feared that the 
British price for participation would be US recognition of British sovereignty in such 
places as Deception Island).  Except for Britain and New Zealand, none of the other 
five nations with claims to Antarctica supported the US proposal.  In rejecting the 
North American proposal, the Chileans cited various historical examples of failed 
condominiums, such as the Anglo-Egyptian arrangement in the Sudan.8  The 
underlying reason for the South American rejection, however, remained the same as 
with the Trusteeship proposal: politicians, officials, and increasingly the general 
public, were coming to believe that Antarctica was a part of the national territories of 
Argentina and Chile, and any form of renunciation of sovereignty would be seen as 
surrender.  The various forms of South American propaganda were raising the stakes 
of the dispute and having an active impact on international diplomacy.   
 
THE CHILEAN MODUS VIVENDI 
From the Chilean perspective, one of their greatest possibilities of “winning” 
the sovereignty dispute came from the prospect of US support for the Chilean claim.  
                                                 
7 See, for example, John Darwin, Britain and decolonisation: the retreat from empire in the post-war 
world, The Making of the 20th century (New York, 1988). 
8 Ministro de RR.EE. a Claude Bowers, 7 September 1948.  RR.EE.,  “Antártico, 1939-52.” 
 173 
Since at least 1940, Chilean Antarctic policy had been loosely linked to that of the 
United States, with Chilean officials closely following developments in North 
America.  However, the North American attitude towards Antarctica at the 
conference of Bogotá, and their subsequent ideas to bring a peaceful solution to the 
dispute, suggested that the US government was not openly going to favor South 
American rights to the Southern Continent at the expense of Great Britain.  This 
realization –together with recognition of the ill feeling being generated by the 
Antarctic dispute – led to a re-thinking of Chilean Antarctic policy.   
In the aftermath of the 1947-48 season, the Defense Minister, in particular, 
became critical of Chilean participation in a “race for bases” that he did not believe 
Chile was capable of winning. On 20 April 1948, the Chilean Minister of Defense 
wrote a letter to the Ministry of Foreign Relations setting out in detail his opinions 
about the Antarctic question.9  He did not think that the building of new Chilean 
bases would be feasible from either an economic or a political perspective.  Chile 
had already spent over 10 million pesos building its first two bases, and any further 
expenditure threatened the well being of an already weak national economy.  Besides 
this, any further Chilean activity in Antarctica threatened to stimulate accelerated 
building programs by Argentina and Great Britain, both of which had a much greater 
economic capacity than Chile.  Instead, the Minister of Defense thought that it would 
be in Chile’s best interest, at that time, to attempt to slow down the rapid penetration 
of the Antarctic continent.  If Chile were to build more bases in the following 
summer, this could lead to a clash with British units that might cause great offense to 
the Armed Forces to the detriment to the national honor.  According to the Defense 
                                                 
9 Ministro de Defensa Nacional al Sr. Ministro de RR.EE., 20 April 1948. RR.EE., “Antártica 
Chilena, Comunicaciones Cambiadas con otros Ministros, 1940-49.” 
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Minister, all the advice suggested that Chile should “delay for now this period of 
penetration and sovereignty and focus instead upon the more serene project of 
scientific investigation.”  This course of action would quiet the passions surrounding 
the complicated Antarctic issue.  Interestingly, the Minister of Defense concluded 
that a greater scientific program in the Southern continent would have the added 
benefit of revealing the probable riches of the region, and he explained that he had 
already been in discussion with the Rector of the Universidad de Chile about the 
possibility of forming a technical-scientific organization to carry out this work.   
The Minister of Foreign Relations did not completely agree with the analysis 
of his colleague in the Ministry of Defense, and he replied with a letter stressing the 
Foreign Ministry’s prerogative in Antarctic affairs.10  However, an internal Foreign 
Ministry discussion of the reorganization of the Antarctic Commission recognized 
that, despite the two Chilean expeditions to Antarctica, Chile “remained very behind 
in scientific investigation, especially relative to the British and North Americans.”11 
Julio Escudero, the international lawyer who had been influential in the initial 
Chilean decree of 1940 delimiting Chilean Antarctica, shared the Defense Minister’s 
attitude.  Escudero had long counseled against getting involved in a race for bases, 
believing that from a legal perspective, Chile’s best interests were served through its 
historic claims and titles, and through agreement with Argentina.  Escudero came up 
with the idea that for a period of five years (which would be renewable) scientific 
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research should be conducted in Antarctica without it affecting the question of 
sovereignty in any way.12   
Escudero first mentioned his ideas for an Antarctic modus vivendi during the 
visit of Caspar Green, the Antarctic representative of the US State Department, in 
July 1948.13  At the time, the United States was still proposing United Nations 
Trusteeship as the answer to the territorial question in Antarctica.  Initially, US 
officials were not particularly keen on the idea of a status quo agreement in 
Antarctica.  Following the failure of the United Nations Trusteeship proposal, as we 
have seen, the United States suggested an eight-power condominium for Antarctica, 
rather than the modus vivendi proposed by Escudero.  At a meeting in Washington 
held to discuss the US condominium proposal, Mr. Mills, the head of the State 
Department’s Pacific Coast Division of the American Republics, told the Chilean 
Ambassador Rodríguez that the State Department had studied with the greatest 
interest the plans handed by Escudero to Green, but concluded that the proposed 
formula would only dilate the problem, rather than resolving it.14  Rodríguez replied 
that Chile had always favored the friendly discussion of Antarctic sovereignty 
questions, as the Escudero plan had made clear.  He explained that it would very 
difficult for a country such as Chile, which was secure in its rights to Antarctica, 
simply to give them up to an international commission.  The benefit of the Chilean 
plan, he argued, was precisely that no government would have to renounce their 
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claims, and that this would encourage co-operative scientific work in Antarctica.  
After expressing complete agreement with the United States on the need to keep the 
Soviet Union out of Antarctica, Rodríguez concluded the meeting by encouraging 
the United States to use the Escudero plan as the basis for future negotiations in 
Antarctica. 
From the end of 1948, following the clear failure of the United States’ plan 
for an eight-power condominium in Antarctica, North American officials began to 
consider the Escudero modus vivendi more seriously.  The Chileans had informally 
distributed their idea to several of the governments with an interest in Antarctica, and 
it had proved to be relatively popular.  In France the Quai d’Orsay found the Chilean 
suggestions preferable to those of the North Americans.15  In Argentina, Pascal La 
Rosa, the head of the Argentine Antarctic Institute, responded that his government 
was at least willing to consider the modus vivendi suggestion. 16   
By the end of 1949, the Chileans and United States had entered into a form of 
loose partnership in order to move forward with the idea of the modus vivendi in 
Antarctica.  In November, the US Department of State informed the Chileans that 
they considered this solution to be the best way of resolving the Antarctic 
sovereignty issue.17  The North Americans said that they would give the Chileans a 
slightly modified version of the Escudero plan.  They then suggested that the South 
American country could take the lead in publicizing their idea, with the possibility of 
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convening a conference among the interested powers – explicitly excluding Belgium, 
South Africa, and the Soviet Union – to discuss the plan.  
On 10 January 1950, the Chilean Embassy in Washington D.C. received a 
letter from the State Department containing revisions to the Escudero Plan.18  The 
plan remained largely unchanged from the one handed by Escudero to Green in 
1948.  State Department officials had removed references to Antarctic fisheries, 
considering that this was already covered in the International Whaling Convention of 
1946.  In addition, the North American plan suggested that an international scientific 
committee should be formed, consisting of one representative from each of the eight 
member nations.  This committee would co-ordinate scientific research in Antarctica.  
The eight member nations would not authorize expeditions from other countries in 
Antarctica unless they were expressly not for the purpose of making territorial 
claims, they would promise to work together to protect their common interests in the 
zone, and they would declare themselves open to discussion of the problems of 
sovereignty.  The State Department suggested that the Chileans could either present 
this project to the other six governments themselves, or the United States would take 
the initiative by replying to the Chilean rejection of the US proposal of 
internationalization of 1948 by accepting and circulating the suggestions made by the 
Chileans.  The Chilean ambassador in Washington D.C. concluded his report to the 
Foreign Ministry suggesting that it looked increasingly likely that the United States 
would make a claim to Antarctica.  Green said that he would give the Chilean 
Government advanced warning of any such moves.  Later in the day Green 
                                                 
18 Embajada Chilena en Washington al Ministro de RR.EE., 10 January 1950.  RR.EE.,  “Antártico, 
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telephoned Rodríguez to inform him that the United States had discussed its attitude 
to the Antarctic question with Great Britain.19   
Rodríguez, the Chilean Ambassador, was rather taken by the idea of 
establishing the headquarters of the international scientific committee in Santiago.  
The United States draft document left this invitingly vague.  In a second letter to his 
department, Rodríguez added that from a personal point of view he thought that the 
US proposals were acceptable.20  He favored the second option of divulgation for the 
ideas, that of letting the US take the lead, since this put the onus on the United States 
and brought a higher likelihood of success, while leaving it clear that the origins of 
the ideas arose in Chile.  In Santiago, however, the Antarctic Commission dithered.  
They wanted to put Chile into the most advantageous possible position before 
officially launching the Escudero Plan.  As the Chileans delayed over the best time to 
go ahead with their scheme, events elsewhere, especially in Argentina, would make 
their discussions largely redundant.   
 
THE TRIPARTITE NAVAL AGREEMENT 
At the same time as the United States and Chile were proposing ideas to 
bring the sovereignty dispute in Antarctica to a peaceful conclusion, the government 
of Argentina appeared to be deliberately raising the political tensions.  As well as 
rejecting both US peace plans for Antarctica, throughout 1948, Perón increased the 
propaganda related to Antarctica and the Islas Malvinas.21  This increased domestic 
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focus on these contested regions coincided with the President’s campaign to replace 
the Argentine constitution for the first time in almost one hundred years, in order to 
allow for a second consecutive presidential term.  The main body responsible for the 
Antarctic and Malvinas propaganda campaign was the Argentine “National 
Committee for the Antarctic,” which British diplomats reported as being “a puppet” 
of Doctor Pascual La Rosa, its head.22  The Committee recommended, for example, 
that the Argentine Central Bank should inform the Bank of England that the Falkland 
Islands have been removed from the list of scheduled territories since they formed 
part of Argentina.   
From the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, Tony Lincoln wrote a letter to 
Robin Cecil at the Foreign Office that discussed the Argentine threat to the Falkland 
Islands and their Dependencies.23  An Argentine decree had recently set up a “flame 
of the Argentine spirit” that would burn in Ushuaia until it could be carried to the 
Falkland Islands.  Lincoln explained that “the preface to the decree states that 
hitherto it has not been practicable to carry out the Ceremony of installing the torch 
in the islands, and that the torch has been provisionally placed in the capital of Tierra 
del Fuego, awaiting its final destination.”  The British diplomat added that Embassy 
staff thought it unlikely that the Argentine government would risk a “coup de main” 
against the Falkland Islands unless Great Britain was fully extended in a distant war.  
Nevertheless Lincoln noted that account had to be taken of the following factors: 
 
                                                 
22 British Embassy Buenos Aires to Foreign Office, 27 October 1948.  TNA, CO 537/4023. 
23 Tony Lincoln (British Embassy Buenos Aires) to Robin Cecil (Foreign Office).  20 October 1948.  
TNA, CO 537/4023. 
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a) A belief in the justice of their claims is one conviction common to all 
Argentines, irrespective of class and party; it is perhaps the only reliable key 
to national unity. 
b) In December elections will be held for the Constituent Assembly to amend 
the Constitution.  Both at the election and while the Assembly is sitting Perón 
will need all the support he can win, especially if the amendments proposed 
are Radical, and the economic situation continues to worsen.  To announce to 
the Constituent Assembly that Argentine troops had landed in the Falklands 
would be a kind of melodrama that goes down well on their shoddy stage. 
c) The Peronist Government has conducted a Campaign on the territorial 
issue in the Press Radio and Schools which breaks all past records.  It is just 
arguable that the agitation would not be sustained at its present pitch unless 
the Government has some concrete climax in view. 
d) We have had a report that the Argentine Army has received “sealed 
orders” for a general mobilization in the middle of December to coincide 
with the occupation of the Falkland Islands.  We are investigating this report; 
and in the meantime pass it on with every kind of reserve.24 
 
The Naval Attaché thought that any Argentine “invasion” of the Falkland Islands 
themselves would take the form of a symbolic landing, complete with the “flame of 
the Argentine spirit.”  If challenged, the force would surrender to “overwhelming 
opposition” and then appeal to the Pan-American Union for help against such a 
British act of aggression.  Lincoln concluded by saying that this was not meant to be 
an alarmist letter but recalled “that early in 1935 many of us were convinced that the 
late Benito Mussolini, for whom Perón acquired in Rome more than a sneaking 
admiration, would have too much good sense to attack Abyssinia.”  The British 
Embassy official advised that the commanding officer of HMS Sparrow should 
receive instructions about action to take in the “hypothetical event of an Argentine 
descent on the Falkland Islands.” 
                                                 
24 Ibid. 
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In a radio broadcast of 7 January, 1949, to the local population, Sir Miles 
Clifford, the Governor of the Falkland Islands, tried to downplay the threat of an 
Argentine invasion of the British Crown Colony itself: 
 
There has been, I understand, a certain measure of idle but quite natural 
speculation locally as to the possibility of an attack upon us by a certain 
neighbor which has long had very acquisitive ideas about this Colony and has 
in recent months been expressing them rather assertively.  For myself I will 
say only that it is a possibility which need not cause us the loss of 5 minutes’ 
sleep at present; I repeat at present.25 
 
Nevertheless, Clifford spoke of the need for reviving the Falklands Islands Defense 
Force: “we must build up our depleted numbers and we must train ourselves to 
handle the new weapons and to carry out the rather different role which these will 
impose upon us; the only role which will be of the least use if we are to put up an 
effective defense.”  In order to do this the Governor noted that the members of the 
Defense Force would have to increase their annual number of attendances from the 
customary twelve.  In London, even the Foreign Office was sufficiently concerned 
about an Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands to request the Chiefs of Staff 
Committee to consider the question of sending reinforcements.26 
In early November 1948, the Argentine Foreign Minister Bramuglia traveled 
to Britain, ostensibly to discuss the future of the Anglo-Argentine economic 
relationship.  Bramuglia was in an increasingly uncertain domestic position, due to 
the whims of President Perón and his wife Evita, but he continued to enjoy 
                                                 
25 Sir Miles Clifford, Broadcast Address, 7 January 1949.  RHL, MISS. Brit Emp.s 517 4/1.  
“Falkland Islands 1946-1957: Clifford.” 
26 A.S. Fordham (FO) to J.S. Bennett (CO), 29 June 1949.  TNA, CO 537/4940. 
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international prestige because of his presidency of the United Nations Security 
Council.  In a meeting with Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Minister, the two men 
discussed the question of the Falkland Islands and Antarctica.  Bramuglia confirmed 
Argentina’s rejection of the US plans for internationalization and once again 
reaffirmed his country’s claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands themselves.  
Nevertheless, a spokesman for Bramuglia added that all questions relating to the 
disputed islands “will always be discussed within the legal sphere because two 
countries as traditionally friendly as Argentina and Britain must find in the 
traditional way and the direct approach, the method to solve the problems in 
harmonious ways.”27  The niceties of diplomatic language contrasted sharply with 
the Argentine propaganda campaign against British claims to the Falkland Islands 
and Antarctica.   
The Argentine and British Foreign Ministers went even further than mere 
statements of goodwill in the territorial disputes.  As a demonstration of the search 
for “harmonious” solutions, the British and Argentine foreign Ministers agreed to 
avoid naval demonstrations in the Antarctic region during the coming season (1948-
1949).28  For Great Britain such an agreement made perfect sense.  The country’s 
armed forces were already over-stretched and the economy was in a weak position.  
Anything that could be done to avoid an intensification of hostilities in Antarctica 
without a cession of sovereignty claims was to be welcomed. British officials at the 
time had difficulty explaining the Argentine motivations for such an agreement, 
especially given the recent escalation in Antarctic and Falklands propaganda.29  
                                                 
27 Quoted in The Standard, 6 November 1948.  “Anglo-Argentine Relations Discussed.” 
28 The Standard, 8 November 1948.  “Anglo-Argentine Agreement.  Naval Demonstrations to be 
Avoided.” 
29 Very little documentary evidence exists from the Argentine side on this agreement. 
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Argentina appeared to be “winning” the race for bases in Antarctica.  The country 
was relatively prosperous, and had none of the overseas commitments demanded of 
the British Empire.  Only the so-called “escape clause” – which allowed for “routine 
movements such as have been customary for a number of years” – provides any real 
clue as to why Argentina signed up to such an agreement.  The agreement did not put 
an absolute prohibition on sending warships south of 60° South, and Argentine 
warships were accustomed to sailing to the region.  The agreement therefore offered 
the opportunity for the Argentine government to sound conciliatory, while 
continuing its regular expeditions to the Antarctic Peninsula region.  Tellingly, in 
Argentina this agreement was widely seen as recognition by Great Britain of 
Argentine rights to the region.30 
The pledge between Bramuglia and Bevin quickly developed into a tri-partite 
naval agreement between Britain, Argentina, and Chile, which was also endorsed by 
the United States. Pascual La Rosa reported to the Chilean Ambassador that the 
agreement had been the suggestion of Ernest Bevin.31  The head of the Argentine 
Antarctic Institute told the Chilean representative that Argentina would be keen to 
accept this proposal if Chile did the same.  The Chilean Ambassador had the 
impression that Bramuglia had already informed the British Government of the 
Chilean acceptance of the proposal.  But the Chileans – looking for ways to slow 
down the penetration of Antarctica – nevertheless believed that it was in the 
country’s best interests to sign the agreement.  The United States also received the 
                                                 
30 Christie, The Antarctic problem; an historical and political study. 276. 
31 German Vergara D. (Embajada Chilena en Buenos Aires) al Ministro de RR.EE., 11 November 
1948.  RR.EE., “Antártico, 1939-52.” 
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tri-partite declaration enthusiastically, and, although it didn’t sign the agreement, it 
did give it its full endorsement and agreed not to send warships south of 60° South.   
On 30 November 1948, Great Britain, Argentina, and Chile simultaneously 
issued the following statement: 
 
Being anxious to avoid any misunderstanding regarding the situation in the 
Antarctic which might affect the friendly relations between this country and 
Argentina (and Chile) H.M. Government in the UK are willing to inform the 
Argentine (Chilean) Government that, in present circumstances, they foresee 
no need to send warships south of latitude 60 degrees during the 1948-1949 
Antarctic season apart, of course, from routine movements such as have been 
customary for a number of years.32 
 
This agreement would be renewed every year until the 1959, when the Antarctic 
Treaty would bring an effective end to direct hostilities in Antarctica.  The spirit, if 
not the letter, of the agreement would be broken several times over the next few 
years as all three signatories continued to send warships to Antarctic waters.  
Nevertheless, the decision to sign the naval agreement in 1948 represented an 
important step in the sovereignty dispute, as the three parties involved agreed not to 
push the question to the brink.  The Antarctic dispute would remain relatively 
constrained and the tri-partite naval agreement would be an important foundation of 
the 1959 Antarctic Treaty.   
 
POLITICAL METEOROLOGY 
A combination of the recently signed tripartite naval agreement and 
extremely cold weather combined to reduce direct political tensions in Antarctica 
                                                 
32 Colonial Office to Falkland Islands (Mr. M. Clifford), 17 November 1948.  TNA, CO 537/4013. 
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during the 1948-49 Antarctic season.  The three disputing countries were anxious not 
to break the recently signed agreement, although each of them did send “customary” 
warships south of 60° South.  But it was the cold, as much as political idealism, that 
did most to prevent a recurrence of hostilities.  The 1948-49 summer was the coldest 
for a long time, and the various national expeditions to Antarctica had their work cut 
out struggling against the harsh environment.  Cold summers in Antarctica mean that 
the sea stays frozen, making transport almost impossible.  The Chileans sailed 
around in vain looking for a place to establish a third Antarctic base, but the ice 
conditions prevented them from finding a suitable location.33  The British were 
unable to relieve Base E, Stonington Island, and the winter party under the leadership 
of Dr. Vivian Fuchs had to settle in for a second year amidst the polar darkness.   
During the 1948-49 season, Sir Miles Clifford, the Governor of the Falkland 
Islands, made what was becoming an annual “administrative” voyage to the Falkland 
Islands Dependencies.  This expedition allowed him to see at first hand the 
environmental conditions, which in turn shaped his political thinking.  The season 
had begun in tragic fashion for the British with a fire at Hope Bay (Base D) that 
burned down the base and resulted in the deaths of two FIDS members, O. Burd and 
M.C. Green.  Later in the season, the British Frigate HMS Sparrow got stuck in the 
ice for several days.  The British considered sending the cruiser HMS Glasgow to its 
rescue, and, since this would have been a contravention of the recently signed naval 
accord, the Admiralty requested that the Foreign Office get in touch with the 
                                                 
33 See, for example, Sergio Labarca y Oscar Pinochet al Ministro de RR.EE., 10 February 1949.  
RR.EE., Antartica Chilena, “Comunicaciones Cabiadas con otros Ministros, 1940-49.” 
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Argentine and Chilean Embassies.34  In the event, HMS Sparrow freed itself before 
HMS Glasgow sailed south of 60°S.   
During his administrative visit, the Governor of the Falkland Islands noted 
that the meteorological reports from bases A, G, and E were “quite valueless” due to 
the tendency for local weather conditions to over-ride large scale ones.  Additionally, 
there were problems between Survey personnel and the Navy, which was “quite 
inimical to the spirit of comradeship in a common enterprise which I am anxious to 
foster.”  Clifford did not think much of Fuchs’ leadership qualities: “Fuchs is no 
judge of a horse; all the Leaders selected by him have without exception fallen down 
– Scadding, Barry, Nicoll, Platt and Laws – and of these only the last-named has 
produced any useful work by himself.”35 
A career in the Colonial Office had taught Clifford to be a political realist.  In 
November 1948, at around the same time as the tri-partite naval agreement, a 
Cabinet meeting had decided against the use of violence in Antarctica. 36  This 
confirmed the limitation upon what the British could do against incursions by 
Argentina and Chile.  “From the strategic point of view,” Clifford noted, “all we 
need to concern ourselves about is the Falklands, South Georgia and Deception.37  
He also knew that there was an important economic bottom line to British colonies in 
such places as the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies: the British taxpayer was 
accustomed to demanding that the British Empire pay its own way.  And, in the late 
                                                 
34 Ministro de Defensa Nacional al Señor Ministro de RR.EE., 16 Februay1949.  RR.EE., Antártica 
Chilena, “Comunicaciones Cambiadas con otros Ministros, 1940-49.” 
35 Sir Miles Clifford’s Personal Diary, 3rd Southern Journey, 5 April 1949.  SPRI, MS1507/1/11. 
36 A Colonial Office Official noted: “We are obliged on account of Cabinet policy to submit passively 
to the Argentine bases, and it follows that any continuing of activity on their part provided it is not 
likely to lead to local incidents must be accepted.” Carter Memo, 15 Septermber 1948.  TNA, CO 
78/245/2. 
37 Sir Miles Clifford’s Personal Diary, 3rd Southern Journey, 16 March 1949.  SPRI, MS1507/1/11. 
 187 
1940s, with the British economy struggling, the Treasury was subsidizing the 
Falkland Islands Dependencies.  In the 1948-49 season the Survey had significantly 
overspent its budget.  Clifford realized that, in the medium term, apathy and 
resentment from within Great Britain posed as much of a threat to the future of the 
Falkland Islands Dependencies as did any South American pretensions.  Following 
his administrative visit in the 1948-49 summer season, the Governor of the Falkland 
Islands resolved to put the Dependencies on a more rational administrative and 
economic basis. 
At the center of Clifford’s plan for re-organizing the Falkland Islands 
Dependencies was the science of meteorology.  Clifford wanted to establish an 
effective “meteorological chain” consisting of four Antarctic bases E, F, B, and H, 
and South Georgia.  He argued, “neither ship nor organization nor our finances can 
support more than four bases efficiently.”38  Such thoughts led to a change in the 
way in which the Falkland Islands Dependencies would be financed and 
administered.  The Governor’s idea would cut back the expenditure of the Falkland 
Islands Dependencies Survey so that it could be financed exclusively from taxes on 
the whaling industry.  In a neatly circular argument Clifford reasoned that since a 
large part of the Dependencies’ revenue came from taxes on the whaling industry, it 
was important that some of that tax money was put back into that industry.  A string 
of meteorological bases would supply useful data to the whaling companies, which 
would help to justify the taxation.  The plan would also have the advantage of 
                                                 
38 Sir Miles Clifford’s Personal Diary, 3rd Southern Journey, 6 April 1949.  SPRI, MS1507/1/11.  
Clifford also noted that the John Biscoe needed to be refitted with a new bow to give it the cutting 
edge to get through the ice. 
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putting British bases in more accessible locations, so that the difficulties of re-supply 
suffered during the 1948-49 season were not repeated.   
As the 1949-50 season approached, the Admiralty was more reluctant than 
ever to send more of the Navy’s ships to “show the flag” in the Falkland Islands 
Dependencies, following the difficulties of the previous year.39  They suggested to 
the Colonial Office that the John Biscoe could be commissioned and fitted with a 
gun to turn it from a supply ship into something more politically effective.  The 
Colonial Office concurred that the “icing up” of one of His Majesty’s ships “might 
cause us some embarrassment of which Argentina and Chile would not be slow to 
take advantage.”  But Colonial Office officials rejected the idea of modifying the 
John Biscoe, since it performed a vital service as a supply ship, and since 
“ostentatiously to arm a research vessel would be sure to invite adverse political 
comment, to lend color to the view that FIDS is a kind of piratical exercise, and to 
provoke retaliation in kind by Argentina and Chile.”40  If the Admiralty persisted 
with their refusal to supply a warship to the Dependencies, the Colonial Office 
wanted, at the very least, that the tripartite naval agreement of the 1948-49 season 
should be continued into the 1949-50 season.  Ideally, the Colonial Office wanted to 
eliminate the “escape clause”, which had been added to allow the Sparrow to sail 
south, but which also permitted the South Americans to continue with their “routine” 
naval operations.  
British officials got much of what they wanted when the three disputing 
countries renewed the previous year’s tripartite naval agreement along exactly the 
same lines in November 1949.  Britain was unable to remove the “escape clause”, 
                                                 
39 Bennett (CO) to Dodds (ADM), 28 June 1949.  TNA, CO 537/4940. 
40 Ibid. 
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but at least the agreement had been renewed. From the British perspective the 
Tripartite naval agreement was an expedient response to naval weakness in the 
region rather than an idealistic move to diffuse political tensions. 41   
 
                                                 
41 “I am confining this letter to the position in the Dependencies.  We note however, from paragraph 6 
of your letter that in certain circumstances it might, in the Admiralty view, be impossible to send a 
warship South at all.  This presumably means that even the Falkland Islands Colony itself would be 
left defenceless from the Naval point of view.  The position of the Colony is quite different from that 
of the Dependencies.  We are committed to defend it, not only in general terms because it is inhabited, 
but specifically by Mr. Bevin’s warning to Dr. Bramuglia last year that if the Argentine attempted 
anything there, there “would be hostilities”.  In order not to confuse the issue, I shall be writing to you 
separately about the question of the availability of HM’s ships for the defence of the Colony in case of 
need.  Meanwhile, we hope the circumstances envisaged in paragraph 6 of your letter will not arise, 
and we are greateful for your offer in paragraph 3 that, things being normal, a frigate should at least 
be maintained in the waters of the Colony (and South Georgia) during the Southern Hemisphere 
summer.” Bennett (CO) to Dodds (ADM), 28 June 1949.  TNA, CO 537/4940. 
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Chapter 6: Perón’s Antarctic Dream, 1950-54 
The 1949-50 Antarctic summer season was the least contentious since the end 
of the Second World War, notable more for the on-going US-Chilean plans to 
resolve the territorial dispute than for any friction in Antarctica.  However, as the 
Chileans procrastinated over the most advantageous way to take forward their 
“modus vivendi,” President Perón’s Government began to press its claims to 
Antártida Argentina with full force.  By the early 1950s, several of the obstacles that 
stood in the way of Perón fully embracing the cause of Argentine sovereignty in the 
Antarctic Peninsula had been removed.  Colonel Hernán Pujato, a true Antarctic 
visionary, arrived on the Argentine Antarctic stage and acted as a catalyst to 
President Perón’s emerging “Antarctic Dream.”1  Between 1950 and 1954, the 
Argentine Government set about “saturating” Antarctica with Argentine bases – 
doing everything it could to win the sovereignty dispute against Great Britain and 
Chile.  Perón sought to challenge the British directly at their own imperial game.  
The Argentines used science and the rhetoric of “mastery over nature” to 
demonstrate and justify their claims to Antarctica.  Between 1950 and 1953, 
Argentina initiated a systematic program of scientific study of the southern 
continent.  This program resonated with other Peronist schemes to demonstrate 
Argentina’s scientific modernity.  For a while this strategy appeared to be close to 
achieving its goal and Argentina became, by many indicators, the leading scientific 
power in Antarctica.  
                                                 
1 The idea of an “Antarctic Dream” comes from Tomás Eloy Martínez, The Perón novel, 1st 
American ed. (New York, 1988). 
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In Britain, the Conservative Government of Winston Churchill, which was 
elected in October 1951, responded to renewed Argentine aggression in Antarctica 
with a much tougher line than the previous Labour administration.  Despite the 
attempts by Sir Miles Clifford and others to scale back and rationalize the British 
presence in the Falkland Islands Dependencies, there was a general feeling that 
Perón’s challenge to British sovereignty had to be met head on.  Meanwhile, because 
of the Korean War, the United States had largely lost interest in Antarctica, and 
during the first half of the 1950s there were no US expeditions.2  This removed one 
of the most important steadying influences on Antarctic politics.  The stage was set 
for a period of intense territorial rivalry in Antarctica which saw the first shots ever 
fired in anger on the Southern Continent, and also saw the navies of Chile and 
Argentina mobilized for war against Great Britain.  
 
“THE FIRST ARGENTINE SCIENTIFIC EXPEDITION TO ANTARCTICA” 
President Juan Domingo Perón’s interest in Antarctica had begun rather 
ambivalently following his election in 1946.3  In one sense, the assertion of 
Argentine rights to Antarctic dominion, especially set against Britain’s colonial 
claims, fitted neatly into his broader nationalist agenda and with his campaign 
against British economic “imperialism” in Argentina, and between 1946 and 1950 
Perón had given his support to Argentine expeditions to the Southern Continent and 
the construction of bases there.  But this support remained lukewarm and relatively 
                                                 
2 For a detailed discussion of US Antarctic Policy at the beginning of this period, see Policy 
Statement Polar Regions (Secret) Department of State, 1 July 1951. USNA 702.022/7-151.  US 
policy, however, was never really settled.  For evidence of the Korean War’s negative affect on US 
Antarctic expeditions see, S.W. Boggs (OIR/GE) to Mr. Ronhovde (BNA), 12 June 1953. USNA 
702.022/6-1253. 
3 See Chapter 3.   
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distant.4  Two important factors prevented Perón from fully embracing the cause of 
Argentine Antarctica during the late 1940s.  Firstly, the dominant role of the Navy 
put the President in an awkward situation.  While Perón, as a former colonel in the 
mountain regiment, had largely won over the Army, the Argentine Navy was the 
national institution most critical of the President and it remained a threat to the 
President’s position.5  Any prestige acquired by Argentine activity in the Southern 
Continent went as much to the Navy as to Perón himself.  A second obstacle to an 
all-out Argentine assault on Antarctica was the lingering importance of the economic 
relationship with Great Britain.  Throughout the 1940s, the Argentine economy 
continued to rely upon agricultural exports to Great Britain, and the territorial 
conflicts in the Islas Malvinas and Antarctica could not be allowed to jeopardize 
these exports.      
By the end of the 1940s, however, domestic and international circumstances 
were changing, and the obstacles in the way of a Peronist Antarctic policy were no 
longer so pressing.  The tripartite naval agreement with Great Britain and Chile, 
signed in 1948 and renewed in subsequent years, effectively froze the number of 
naval ships that could sail to Antarctica at the level of the 1947-48 season.  Whether 
by accident or design, this agreement weakened the Argentine Navy’s position in 
Antarctic affairs.  The 1948-49 and 1949-50 summers had seen no increase in the 
Navy’s activity in Antarctica, and the prospect of a rapidly increasing naval presence 
was ended.  The second factor that changed Perón’s attitude towards the Southern 
Continent was the decline of the Anglo-Argentine economic relationship.  By 1950, 
                                                 
4 For example, Perón had not attended the “National Antarctic Day” celebrations held in Buenos 
Aires in 1948.  Argentine Republic. Comisión Nacional del Antártico, Soberanía argentina en la 
Antártida. Nota preliminar del Presidente de la Nación, Juan Perón. 
5 Potash, The army & politics in Argentina. 
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the policies of Perón’s government had largely “broken the chains” of Argentina’s 
economic dependence upon Great Britain.6  By 1951, Britain had fallen to being only 
Argentina’s eleventh largest trading partner, and many British industries in 
Argentina – most notably the railways – had been sold or nationalized.7  Whereas in 
the past the Anglo-Argentine economic relationship had acted as a brake on any 
territorial conflict, by the early 1950s, this constraint had largely ceased to exist.  
The catalyst for Perón’s embrace of the “Antarctic Dream” came quite 
unexpectedly during a state visit to Bolivia in 1949.  In La Paz, Perón met Colonel 
Hernán Pujato, the Argentine military attaché.  Hernán Pujato shared a similar 
background to President Perón: both, for example, had served as officers in the 
army’s mountain division.  While Perón had been furthering his political ambitions, 
Pujato had become fascinated by Antarctica, and by the idea of Argentine 
sovereignty in the Southern Continent.  Pujato was a true Antarctic visionary in the 
same league as Admiral Byrd and Ramón Cañas Montalva.  He envisioned 
Antarctica as a fundamental part of Argentina’s national territory and believed that 
the continent offered quasi-mystical possibilities for the regeneration of the 
Argentine nation.8   During the Presidential visit to Bolivia, Pujato presented Perón 
with a five-point plan for furthering Argentina’s presence in Antarctica, which 
included detailed plans for an army expedition to the Southern Continent and the 
establishment of permanent colonies of settlement.9  This plan offered the President a 
                                                 
6 Argentine nationalist authors had referred to the economic relationship in terms of “chains.”  See, 
for example, Raúl Scalabrini Ortiz, Política británica en el río de la Plata (Buenos Aires, 1940). 
7 Rock, Argentina, 1516-1987: from Spanish colonization to the Falklands War and Alfonsín. 
8 Similar to some of the ideas expressed by the North American Admiral Byrd.  See, for example, 
Griffiths, Slicing the silence: voyaging to Antarctica. 
9 At the beginning of the 1950s, there were several “crazy” schemes for establishing settler colonies in 
Antarctica.  The Antarctic Colony Associates, for example, based in Jacksonville, Florida, wanted to 
take the North American pioneering spirit to the southern continent, in order to establish claims for 
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ready-made formula for advancing Argentine interests in Antarctica, while at the 
same time breaking the Navy’s monopoly.   
Upon his return to Argentina, Perón set about putting Pujato’s ideas into 
action.  The two men faced stubborn resistance from the military establishment, 
particularly the Navy, and the first vote on Pujato’s plans was defeated.  
Nevertheless, in typical Peronist fashion, the preparations continued and moves were 
made to by-pass any obstructions.  In a maneuver that mirrored his tactics in other 
areas of national life, Perón created a whole new administrative body for Antarctic 
affairs – the Instituto Antártico Argentino – and then favored this organization with 
patronage.  The Institute was given the full name “Instituto Antártico Argentino 
‘Colonel Hernán Pujato’” and for the next five years the Argentine Army, under the 
leadership of Hernán Pujato, would dominate the Argentine expeditions to 
Antarctica.   
Pujato traveled to Alaska to take part in a US-army cold weather training 
program.  When he returned to Argentina he brought back sixty husky dogs and 
sledging equipment, paid for by a fortuitous personal win in the Argentine lottery.10  
In the winter of 1950 Pujato ran a training program in the Andean mountains.  This 
ended in tragedy when two men got lost in the snow and died from exposure.  The 
                                                                                                                                          
the United States.  “According to George Gamow (Biography of the Earth, pages 141, 144, 185, etc) 
and others,” they reasoned, “average earth temperatures are moving steadily up toward a high level 
similar to that which permitted rich growths of vegetation responsible for coal deposits on the 
Antarctic continent.  It is apparently obvious to many nations that now is the time to establish claims 
to this continent which is gradually moving toward weather conditions more favorable for human 
habitation.  There is a remote possibility that a technical program might be developed for hastening 
the process of glacial retreat around colony sites.”  Antarctic Colony Associates (Jacksonville, 
Florida) to Dean Acheson, 7 July 1950. USNA, 702.022/7-750.  See also, Office Memorandum from 
Boggs (OIR/GE) to Hulley (BNA), 1 September 1950.  USNA, 702.022/9-150. 
10 In June 1951, Clifford sent word to the Secretary of State for Colonies that the Argentines had 
established a base at Marguerite Bay and were contemplating sledging. From Falkland Islands (Sir M. 
Clifford) to S of S for Colonies, 19 June 1951.  TNA, CO 537/7429. 
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biggest obstacle faced by the expedition was the fact the Navy refused to supply a 
ship, hoping that this would put an end to the idea. But Perón and Pujato simply 
chartered a ship, the Santa Micaela, and circumvented the Navy’s hostility.  In a 
move undoubtedly intended to belittle the Navy’s achievements in Antarctica, 
Pujato’s expedition was named “The First Argentine Scientific Expedition to 
Antarctica.”11  Such a title bought into the growing rhetoric that connected science 
and politics in Antarctica by implying that previous naval expeditions had lacked 
scientific substance.   
On 12 February 1951, the Santa Micaela set sail from Buenos Aires en route 
to Antarctica.  The Second Secretary of the US Embassy described the departure as 
taking place “with all possible fanfare and publicity.”12  “The affair,” he reported, 
“received more newspaper space, including photographs, than the Queen of Carnival, 
proclaimed the day before, who thus saw herself relegated to the position of runner-
up in the national news.”  But there was also a more threatening tone to the official 
send off.  President Perón spoke in language described by the American diplomat as 
“fight talk,” although the aggression was perhaps directed into scientific fields: 
“even the plain-spoken threat of the eventual use of force in the area is probably to 
be considered as made in the interests of science.”  The Second Secretary concluded 
his report by making clear the importance given by Perón to the Antarctic: 
 
                                                 
11 Perón’s obvious hostility towards the Navy was not lost on the United States diplomat who 
watched the departure of the Santa Micaela: President Perón expressly thanked Perez Companc S.A. 
for the loan of a LST, so that it might be clear to all that the ship in question was not the property of 




The first Order of the Day was signed by the President, and referred to 
“inalienable rights of sovereignty permanently proclaimed before the world.”  
And stated that the scientific mission was necessitated by the need for 
information concerning the region “necessary for adequate government 
action.”  The differences between this expedition and such disinterested 
scientific expeditions as have visited the poles for the purpose of 
meteorological and other research of value to the race in general was thus 
clearly established.13 
 
The rhetoric of Peronism, the American diplomat realized, was rapidly attempting to 
make Antarctic science serve Argentine – and specifically Peronist – politics.   
The Santa Micaela arrived at Marguerite Bay in the far south of the Peninsula 
two weeks after leaving Buenos Aires.  The sea ice conditions were sufficiently 
benign to allow a safe passage, but the journey was not without incident: Fontana, 
one of the members of the wintering party, injured himself while unloading the ship 
and had to return.  The “First Argentine Scientific Expedition” rapidly constructed 
Base San Martín – named after the Army’s hero in the independence wars – across 
the bay from the recently abandoned British Base at Stonington Island and the 
remains of the US East Base.14   
Perón’s newfound enthusiasm for Antarctica put a serious stumbling block in 
the way of a peaceful solution to the problem along the lines proposed by Chile’s 
modus vivendi.15  In the middle of 1951, the Chilean Ambassador in Buenos Aires 
sent an insightful report on the developing Argentine Antarctic policy to the Foreign 
Ministry in Santiago that noted that instability rather than stability characterized the 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
14 Which had been the scene such intrigue in the 1946-47 Antarctic summer season.  See Chapter 3.   
15 US diplomats and others realized that Argentina had its own distinct objectives.  See, State 
Department Memorandum (Hilliker – BNA), 20 September 1950.  USNA 702.022/9-2050.  Also see 
Policy Statement Polar Regions (Secret) Department of State, 1 July 1951. USNA 702.022/7-151. 
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Argentine policy in Antarctica.16  The Chilean ambassador thought it very likely that 
the Argentine government would be keen to re-open bi-lateral negotiations on the 
future of Antarctica, although he thought it less likely that the two countries would 
be able to reach agreement on their respective boundaries in the far south.  As the 
Argentines strongly pushed their claims to sovereignty in Antarctica, the 
fundamental problems in the idea of a “South American Antarctica” re-emerged.  
Perón was happy to work alongside the Chileans in the pursuit of his Antarctic 
Dream, but he always wanted to be the senior partner in this relationship, and he 
could not accept any form of territorial concession.   
 
HOPE BAY 
On 25 October 1951, Winston Churchill’s Conservative Party won the British 
general election and returned to power.  The new government upheld the Cabinet 
decision taken in March 1951 to expand the level of British activity in the Falkland 
Islands Dependencies.  The Tories were more inclined than the Labour Party to 
defend British sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies as a matter of 
principle, fearing the bad precedent that would be set by a passive acceptance of the 
Latin American “trespass.”17 While in opposition, Conservative MPs had repeatedly 
attacked Labour’s “soft” position in the Dependencies.18    Responsibility for 
                                                 
16 Embajada de Chile en Buenos Aires al Ministro de RR.EE., 31 July 1951.  RR.EE., Antartico, 
1939-52. 
17 The idea of a bad precedent had been around for a while.  In February 1951, for example, a 
Colonial Office brief had noted: “The FO are concerned because of international interest in the 
Antarctic generally and, in particular, the Argentinian and Chilean claims and also because of the 
possible repercussions on territorial claims elsewhere...  Since the territories are uninhabited it is only 
necessary to consider the interests of the UK.” FIDS: Draft Brief(s) for the Secretary of State for 
Colonies.  23 February 1951.  TNA, CO 537/7433. 
18 See, for example, La Unión, 5 April 1951. “Se planteo en los comunes el caso de la Antártica.”  In 
discussing British Antarctic policy with the Admiralty, one Foreign Office Official stated, “there is 
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defending the Falkland Islands Dependencies fell to Alan Lennox Boyd, Churchill’s 
choice as Secretary of State for the Colonies.  Lennox Boyd was an imperialist of the 
old school.19  Although he was sufficiently pragmatic to understand that the times 
were changing with regards to much of the colonial empire, he had no intention of 
succumbing to Argentine or Chilean aggression in Britain’s Antarctic territories.   
Upon taking up his position as Secretary of State at the Colonial Office, 
Lennox Boyd inquired about “the possibility of using more forceful measures against 
Argentine and Chilean encroachments in the Falkland Islands Dependencies.”20  
Although no naval vessel could be spared exclusively for the use of the Falkland 
Islands Dependencies, the Admiralty conceded that a frigate could be sent south of 
60°S, in order to show the flag at Deception Island and possibly Laurie Island.21  Sir 
Thomas Lloyd informed Lennox Boyd of the constraints on the Colonial Office 
position: 
 
There could, as I see it, be no hope of persuading the Admiralty to send to the 
Antarctic now, or in the near future, a naval force of the size that would be 
required if H.M.G. are to take a stronger line over this and by public gesture 
to show that that is their intention.  The Admiralty attitude of a few months 
ago... is not likely since to have changed.22 
 
                                                                                                                                          
currently a good deal of agitation in Parliament on this subject.” Maclean (FO) to Newell (ADM), 30 
April 1951.  TNA, CO 537/7433. 
19 Philip Murphy, Alan Lennox-Boyd: a biography (London, 1999). 
20 Martin memo (to T. Lloyd), 13 November 1951.  TNA, CO 537/7431. 
21 At the Colonial Office, Carter had earlier raised the question of formal protests at Argentine bases: 
“Do we want protests delivered at Deception Island and Signy?  I think the answer is Deception 
Island, yes; Signy (includes Laurie Island), no because we recognize the strength of the Argentine 
Title there…” Carter memo.  25 Septermber 1951.  TNA, CO 537/7431. 
22 Thomas Lloyd memo, 3 December 1951.  TNA, CO 537/7429. 
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He added that the Foreign Office had just renewed the tripartite Naval Agreement, 
which provided “another argument against more forceful measures now.”  
Nevertheless, the new Conservative Government implemented the newly changed 
policy of re-building bases on the mainland and the decision was taken to re-build 
Hope Bay on the tip of the Antarctic Peninsula, which had been evacuated after 
burning down at the beginning of the 1948-49 season.   
In January 1951 a party from the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey 
sailed to Hope Bay on the northwest coast of the Antarctic Peninsula with 
instructions to re-build the British Base.  However, when they arrived they found that 
the Argentines were already there.  On 31 January, Sir Miles Clifford received word 
from Elliott, the leader of the FIDS party, that the Argentines were on shore building 
huts 400 yards west of the former British base.23  The Falklands Governor ordered 
the British party to proceed with the re-building of the British base, in accordance 
with his orders.  Clifford also directed Elliot to make a protest to the leader of the 
Argentine party.  In a telegram to the Colonial Secretary, Clifford complained: 
 
As stated in earlier correspondence, Argentina, with close proximity to 
Antarctica and apparently unlimited call on armed services, are able to match 
us base for base, wherever we may be installed, and it is clearly their 
intention to do so.  It is for consideration as to what extent we can continue 
this unprofitable and expensive competition with Argentine escort vessels.24 
 
The Governor had been responsible, in large part, for Britain’s retreat from the 
Antarctic mainland over the previous two seasons.  Indeed, he had specifically made 
                                                 




a case against Hope Bay as one of the least scientifically useful bases.  Clifford now 
found himself implementing a policy that he had strongly argued against.  
Nevertheless, his experiences in various parts of the Colonial Empire had prepared 
him for acting authoritatively, and, faced with a direct Argentine challenge, the “man 
on the spot” did not consider backing down.    
The Argentine decision to build a hut on Hope Bay was part of Perón’s 
broader policy of constructing bases throughout Antártida Argentina.  The Argentine 
Government knew about Britain’s intention of re-building their base at Hope Bay 
and decided to get there first.25  As early as late December 1951, the British Embassy 
in Buenos Aires reported that knowledge of British projects to re-establish bases at 
Hope Bay and Marguerite Bay was “public property” in Argentina, despite the fact 
that both the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office treated the plans as secret.26  
After the incident, the Foreign Office clearly blamed the Falkland Islands’ 
Government for the security leaks.27  The Colonial Office put the leak down to a 
newspaper report following the departure of the John Biscoe from Southampton in 
October.28   
In the morning of 1 February, Elliott landed the first load of stores in 
compliance with Clifford’s instructions to proceed with the building of the hut.29  
                                                 
25 A Foreign Office official noted, “It looks very much as if the Argentines knowing of our intention 
to reestablish the base at Hope Bay made sure to be there before the British party.  Dr. Roberts minute 
on A15211/2 has a considerable bearing on this matter.  I think we should point our to the CO that be 
might better be able to forestall the Argentines if the security of our plans were improved.  It is 
unlikely that there is a leak in London, as I know the CO as well as ourselves, treated the plans as 
secret until a late date.”  Anstee (FO), Minute,  5 February 1952.  TNA, FO 371/97375. 
26 Reported in Foreign Office Out File Draft Letter to Colonial Office, 8 February, 1952.  TNA, FO 
371/97375. 
27 Ibid. 
28 From Colonial Office to Foreign Office (Cecil), 15 February 1952.  TNA FO 371/97375. 
29 From Falkland Islands (Sir Miles Clifford) to Secretary of State for Colonies, 1 February 1952.  
TNA, FO 371/97375. 
 201 
The leader of the Argentine party informed Elliott that his commanders had 
instructed him to prevent the building of a British base, using force if necessary.  
Undeterred, the British continued with their activities.  Johnson, the Master of John 
Biscoe, immediately sent a message to Clifford explaining what happened next: 
 
At noon a few bursts of machine gun fire were fired over our shore party’s 
heads and Argentines, armed with rifles, commenced surrounding base party.  
At 1400, armed Argentines closed our party and ordered us into their launch, 
which came to our landing beach. Our party obeyed Argentine officer’s 
cocked pistol and are now all on board.  Have now received official protest 
that any further attempt at landing stores will be fired on.  Request 
instructions.30 
 
With the unarmed British party huddled on board John Biscoe, the Argentine naval 
tanker Punta Ninfas sailed into the Bay to join the Buen Suceso and add further 
pressure to the British position.  Clifford forwarded the message to the Colonial 
Secretary, asking for immediate directions, and stating, “this presumably constitutes 
act of war.”31  Clifford believed that the Argentine Government had ordered the 
aggression.  He informed Lennox Boyd that the Naval Vessel HMS Burghead Bay 
was due in Stanley the following day, and suggested that military personnel should 
proceed at once to the scene of the incident in order to provide armed cover for the 
construction of the base.   
In Buenos Aires, the Argentine Foreign Ministry informed the British 
Embassy of what had happened at Hope Bay.32  The Argentine government 
                                                 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Buenos Aires to Foreign Office, 2 February 1952.  TNA, FO371/97375.  The explanation given to 
the British Embassy was the same as that given by the Argentine Government to its own Antarctic 
Commission several days later.  
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explained that the “action taken was in error and due to over-literal interpretation by 
Commander of his instructions to prevent by force landing of civilians but not of 
naval or military personnel, though in each case formal protest was to be made.”  
They added that these instructions had been intended against countries that were not 
part of the tripartite naval agreement between Argentina, Britain, and Chile, claiming 
“they had not anticipated landing of civilian personnel from ‘British Naval 
Auxiliary.’”  The Argentine government concluded its explanation by stating: 
“Instructions to Argentine Commander have been rectified but Argentine 
Government state that this should not be regarded as modifying in any way their 
attitude with respect to sovereignty over these territories.”  
The British Ambassador in Buenos Aires believed the Argentine 
government’s explanation: “I am convinced that the action of the Argentine 
commander was taken in all good faith and that explanation offered by the Argentine 
Government reflects genuine concern to avoid any steps actually hostile or offensive 
to HMG.”33  In a more detailed explanation sent to the Foreign Office the following 
day, Richard Allen wrote that he had been summoned in the evening to the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs where he met with the Minister and Under-Secretary together with 
the Minister of Marine.34  The Argentine Ministers had just returned from a meeting 
with Perón and they were “obviously worried and anxious to smooth matters over as 
completely as possible.”  Although Allen repeated that he was sure there could have 
been nothing premeditated in what happened, he added: 
 
                                                 
33 Buenos Aires to Foreign Office, 2 February 1952.  TNA, FO371/97375. 
34 Richard Allen (British Embassy, BA) to Robin Cecil, American Department, FO, 2 February 1952.  
TNA, FO371/97375 
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This is of some significance since rumours have been floating around here all 
this week that Perón might be going to attempt something sensational and 
silly in the South to distract attention from his internal troubles.  According to 
the rumours, this was possibly to have been some kind of a coup against the 
Falkland Islands; or some new “act of sovereignty” in the Dependencies; or 
some move to alter the present status in the Magellan Straits.35 
 
As of yet, Allen reported, there was nothing in the news about the Hope Bay 
incident, although, he added, it was too much to hope that this would last.36  
In the Falkland Islands, Clifford did not believe the protestations of 
innocence made by the Argentine Government.37  On the day after the incident, 
Johnson sent word from the John Biscoe that the Argentines had returned some of 
the stores and informed the British verbally that they would fire on any attempted 
landing.38  Later that day, however, the senior Argentine naval officer boarded the 
British ship and apologized for “action taken prematurely.”39  Despite the limited 
Argentine concessions, the Governor continued to urge a robust response to the 
                                                 
35 Ibid. 
36 On the following day the Chilean press were reported the incident.  La Union, 3 February 1952.  
On the same day in Argentina Richard Allen reported: “The story was published in the English 
language newspapers here this morning in the form of reports from Port Stanley which had reached 
Reuters, A.P. and U.P..  Of the Spanish papers only the independent “Nación” carries the story.  None 
of the government, or government influenced papers have anything about the incident at all, although 
each of them subscribes to at least one of these agencies.”  The reports given out by the Government 
in Port Stanley suggested that it was the British Embassy in Buenos Aires that approached the 
Argentine Foreign Ministry, whereas, as Allen pointed out “it was of course the Argentines – to do 
them justice – who took the first step themselves and weighed in with what amounted to an apology 
before we had heard anything about the incident.” Richard Allen (British Embassy, BA) to Robin 
Cecil (American Department, FO), 3 February 1952.  TNA, FO 371/97375. 
37 For example, Clifford wrote, “I do not (repeat not) share the generous interpretation quoted in 
(your) Fidep No.12 in reference to the mendacious and evasive explanation from Buenos Aires...” 
Clifford to Secretary of State for Colonies, 2 February 1952.  TNA, FO3 71/97375.  This disbelief of 
Argentine motives became even more pronounced when Clifford arrived in the Dependencies on 
board HMS Burghead Bay.  See, Governor to Secretary of State for Colonies, 5 February1952.  TNA, 
FO 371/97375. 




Argentine aggression.  He argued that something forceful needed to be done to 
restore the morale of the FIDS personnel, and to make sure that no such Argentine 
action of this sort would take place again.40  Following discussions with the 
Admiralty in London, Lennox Boyd agreed that, if ice conditions permitted, HMS 
Burghead Bay should sail to Hope Bay in order to oversee the construction of the 
base.41  Noting the peaceful course the incident seemed to be taking, the Colonial 
Secretary did not think it necessary, or even desirable, that Clifford should 
accompany the expedition, although he conceded that his Governor could sail south 
if he absolutely wished.  As the man on the spot, Clifford had no intention of being 
left behind, and he quickly made preparations for one of his customary 
administrative visits to the Dependencies.42 
The Commander in Chief of the British Navy’s Americas and West Indies 
Station sent the Captain of HMS Burghead Bay his full approval “to act as the 
situation demands.”43  The frigate sailed to Hope Bay with Clifford on board.  Under 
the protection of the guns of HMS Burghead Bay the FIDS party re-built the British 
hut, while the Governor of the Falkland Islands prudently maintained a low profile. 44  
There was no further incident.  A small British party settled in for a long winter, next 
door to the Argentine party.  The Argentine hut was manned by a Commanding 
                                                 
40 Ibid. 
41 Secretary of State for Colonies to Falkland Islands (Clifford), 2 February 1952.  TNA, FO 
371/97375. 
42 Clifford to SoS Colonies, 4th February 1952.  TNA, FO371/97375.  Justifying his decision he 
wrote: “My departure on BURGHEAD BAY dictated by a) recognition of the necessity for re-
establishing base in whatever circumstances. b) My personal duty to support expedition for which I 
am responsible.” 
43 Commander in Chief America and West Indies to BURGHEAD BAY, 2 February 1952.  TNA, FO 
371/97375. 
44 Officer Administering the Government (FIDS) to Secretary of State for Colonies, 22 August 1952.  
TNA, FO 371/97375. 
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Officer, a civilian doctor, and three men.  The British base leader believed that all 
radio communications were being reported to Buenos Aires, but all communications 
of a “Secret” or “Confidential” nature were passed in cypher. 
At a diplomatic level, the Foreign Office instructed the British Ambassador 
to make a formal protest to the Argentine Government.45  On receiving the protest 
note, the Minister of Foreign Relations fell back on racial stereotypes: “His 
countrymen,” he explained,  “as Latins, were liable to be a bit emotional and hot-
headed.” 46  He hoped that the British would take this into account and do everything 
possible to dampen down the publicity surrounding the incident, adding that he did 
not want this to become an international dispute.  In fact, both sides were anxious to 
play down the incident.47  Nevertheless, the British Embassy reported that strong 
rumors circulated among journalists in Buenos Aires that “six to eight British 
warships are in Antarctic waters one of which has removed by force 4 Argentines 
from Gamma Island, Palmer Archipelago.”48  The Embassy suggested that the BBC 
should issue an early denial of these stories.  In England, news of the King’s death 
caused the Hope Bay incident to drop entirely from the British papers, and the 
Foreign Office did not want to re-open the incident by making such a public 
statement.49   
Despite being informed by the Colonial Office that his claims could not be 
substantiated, Clifford continued to believed that the actions taken by the Argentines 
at Hope Bay were pre-meditated: “I cannot escape the conclusion that they thought 
                                                 
45 Foreign Office to Buenos Aires, 3 February 1952.  TNA, FO 371/97375. 
46 Buenos Aires to Foreign Office, 4 February 1952.  TNA, FO 371/97375. 
47 Foreign Office to Buenos Aires, 5 February 1952.  TNA, FO 371/97375. 
48 Buenos Aires to Foreign Office, 6 February 1952.  TNA, FO 371/97375. 
49 Foreign Office to Buenos Aires, 7 February 1952.  TNA, FO 371/97375. 
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that this display of force would bluff us into withdrawal, which, happily, it failed to 
do.”50 In the immediate aftermath of the Hope Bay incident, the Colonial Official 
reluctantly considered arming British personnel in the Falkland Islands 
Dependencies.  In a letter to the Foreign Office, Bennett discussed the potential for 
an armed raid on a British base over the course of the long Antarctic winter, noting 
that “Even if these risks are unlikely to materialize, we are bound now to consider 
the morale effect of the Hope Bay incident on our civilian parties, of being expected 
to maintain our position alongside potentially trigger-happy South Americans.”51  
Bennett conceded that arming civilian parties was not a favorable option since “the 
whole purpose and character of the operation is a civilian one,” adding: “Weapons 
do not go with either scientific exploration or with civil administration.”  He 
preferred that the South American parties be disarmed, although he made clear that 
“I do not of course suggest that we should do this ourselves, as at Ismailia.”  
Bennett’s suggestion was that some sort of agreement should be reached between the 
three disputing parties along the lines of the tri-partite naval accord, that they should 
not carry weapons in Antarctica, beyond what was reasonable for harmless purposes 
such as shooting seals for dog food.  Cecil replied to Bennett, saying that the Foreign 
Office opposed this suggestion because they felt that there was no possibility of the 
Argentines agreeing to this: “It would be unlike the proud and sensitive Argentines 
to allow members of their armed forces to be deprived of their arms at our 
                                                 
50 Governor to Colonial Office, 16 May 1952.  TNA, FO 371/97375 
51 J.S. Bennett (CO) to Cecil (FO), 5 February 1952.  TNA, FO 371/97375.  At the end of the letter 
Bennett added the caveat: “This letter is simply an idea which has occurred to us in the Department 
and carries no higher authority here at present.  I put it forward for you to shoot at and should be 
interested to have your reactions.” 
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suggestion.”52  Cecil also noted that the situation would be made even more difficult 
if the British made this suggestion and then the Argentines rejected it.  
The Hope Bay incident set a tone of suspicion and hostility that persisted 
throughout 1952.53  When the Argentine Naval personel involved in the dispute 
returned to Argentina, President Perón met them with a hero’s welcome at a 
luncheon in their honor at the Naval Engineering School.  In a tacit reference to the 
Hope Bay incident, the Argentine President proclaimed: 
 
Soldiers and sailors when they are carrying out so sacred a duty as that of 
serving their country are permitted to err through displaying too much 
energy, but they are never permitted to err by displaying too much weakness.  
For this reason the attitude of these sailors of Hope Bay can be an example 
for every Argentine who wishes to inspire himself with the articles of faith of 
men of arms whose attitude is only despicable when they do not comply 
energetically with their duty.54 
 
The British Embassy in Buenos Aires reported the speech with great annoyance: 
“Unfortunately the Minister of Marine and the President of the Republic have 
recently chosen gratuitously to revive this matter in a manner which could hardly fail 
                                                 
52 Cecil (CO) to Bennett (FO), 14 March 1952.  TNA, FO 371/97375. 
53 For example, the United States and Chile realized that they would not be able to get the Argentines 
to approve their modus vivendi.  However, Argentine Naval authorities, the British naval attaché in 
Buenos Aires reported, attempted to distance themselves from the political tensions generated by 
Perón’s policies: “Increasing friendliness of the Argentine Naval authorities, particularly D.N.I. at 
private dinner at my home, convinced my that the Naval attitude of regarding the Antarctic as political 
matter which should not be allowed to interfere with the traditional friendship of the sea, and between 
Navies, is entirely genuine.  Other service Attachés are being partially or wholly boycotted 
particularly United States Military Attaché and Air Attaché.” Buenos Aires to Foreign Office, 5 
February 1952.  TNA, FO 371/97375. 
54 British Diplomats noted: “These statements, although worded in very general terms, refer to 
congratulations from the President to the Commander of the Task Force at the time of ‘difficult 
circumstances for his command’ in February – circumstances, in which the latter took an ‘energetic’ 
decision in a matter concerning Argentine national rights and sovereignty, a decision which was 
‘appreciated by the Military talents of the Supreme Commander’, i.e. the President.” British Embassy 
Buenos Aires to Foreign Office, 3 May 1952.  TNA, FO 371/97375. 
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to appear discourteous to HMG.” After the speech, Mack, the British Ambassador, 
went to see Dr. Remorino, the Minister of Foreign Relations, in order to protest.  The 
Minister informed him that: “They [the President’s remarks] could only have been 
meant to congratulate the Task Force on the whole course of their labors and 
especially on the useful scientific work which they had courageously accomplished, 
with extremely restricted means, during their three months stay in Hope Bay.”  In 
London, the Foreign Office did not believe Remorino’s explanation.  In a Foreign 
Office minute Cecil noted “I think that Sir H. Mack should not let Perón forget that 
we dislike the blatant manner in which the Argentines have cast doubt on the 
sincerity of their own earlier apology.”55 
Even greater fanfare and propaganda greeted the return of Hernán Pujato to 
Argentina after an entire year spent at Base San Martín in the far south of the 
Antarctic Peninsula.56  The head of the Argentine Antarctic Institute, gave a speech 
about his experiences in southern continent.  After the speech Perón awarded 
Peronist Medals to the recently promoted General and his men.  When questioned by 
the Mundo Peronista magazine about his most memorable experience in Antarctica, 
Pujato dutifully replied that it was when he and his men had cast their votes for 
Perón in the 1951 election: “eight criollo hearts, eight Peronist votes.”57  Loosened 
from the grip of his rivals in the Navy, President Perón was now at liberty to extract 
maximum possible propaganda value from Argentina’s exploits in Antarctica.   
 
                                                 
55 R.Cecil, Minute concerning speech made by Perón, 20 May 1952.  TNA, FO 371/97375. 
56 Argentine News Agency (Official), 11 May 1952.  TNA, FO371/97375. 
57 Mundo Peronista, 15 May 1952. 
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DECEPTION ISLAND 
The British Conservative Government responded to the aggression at Hope 
Bay and to the growing crescendo of Argentine Antarctic propaganda by redoubling 
their determination to resist South American incursions in the Falkland Islands 
Dependencies.  Indeed, the Hope Bay incident served to reawaken concern about 
Antarctica at a time when the Admiralty and the Colonial Office had been losing 
interest in the region.   Shortly after the Argentine aggression at Hope Bay, Churchill 
decided that a naval frigate should be made available for a standing naval patrol in 
Antarctic waters during the Antarctic season.58  The Foreign Office strongly 
supported the “indefinite application” of this decision, although they noted:  
 
The deterrent effect on the aggressiveness of individual Argentine 
commanders which we hope to derive from the stationing of a frigate in 
Falkland Island Waters, will be much reduced in relation to bases situated 
beyond its southward range in a normal Antarctic season.  I do not wish to 
propose a serious limitation of the FIDS program for next year, but the 
complications of the Hope Bay incident certainly merit further study.59   
 
The Antarctic environment continued to play an important role in the development of 
the sovereignty dispute, as the sea-ice conditions influenced the decision making 
over the location of bases and activities in the region.   
Some sense of the hardening British position towards the Falkland Islands 
Dependencies reached the South Americans.  In both Buenos Aires and Santiago, the 
respective Antarctic Commissions discussed the forthright British response to the 
Argentine action in Hope Bay and the increasingly angry tone of the subsequent 
                                                 
58 Cecil (FO) to Bennett (CO), 14 March 1952.  TNA, FO371/97375. 
59 Ibid. 
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diplomatic exchanges.  But this did nothing to persuade either the Argentines or the 
Chileans to reduce their activities in Antarctica.  In September 1952, Ibañez had won 
the Chilean Presidential election.  He was immediately courted by Perón and it 
appeared that a new era of Argentine-Chilean relations was beginning.  The Pan-
South Americanism envisioned by Perón stretched all the way to “South American 
Antarctica.”  Early in the 1952-53 Antarctic season both South American countries 
constructed new bases on Deception Island, which was by far the most strategically 
useful island in the region due to its naturally protected deepwater harbor.60  For the 
Argentines this was their second base on the island; for the Chileans it was their first.  
In a deliberately provocative move both of these bases were built alongside the 
airfield that the British used for reconnaissance flights.61   
The construction of these two new bases offered the British an opportunity to 
put into practice their new hard-line approach towards South American “trespass” in 
the Falkland Islands Dependencies.  In February 1953, the frigate HMS Snipe sailed 
to Deception Island.  Armed British marines landed at the airfield.  The Chilean hut 
was deserted, but two soldiers were in the Argentine hut.  The marines proceeded to 
demolish both huts and arrest the two Argentines, who were charged under Falkland 
Islands civilian law with “trespassing” on British territory.62  The Argentine soldiers 
were taken to the Falkland Islands, from where they were returned to Argentina. 
                                                 
60 United States Embassy Buenos Aires to Department of State.  23 February 1953.  USNA, 
702.022/2-2353. 
61 This runway had been established by Sir Herbert Wilkins in 1928. Ibid. 
62 The United States Embassy in Buenos Aires pointed out that since the two Argentines were in 
military uniform they were technically military “aggressors,” and could therefore have been dealt with 
under military law. United States Embassy Buenos Aires to Department of State, 23 February 1953. 
USNA, 702.022/2-2353.     
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Immediately after the incident, the British informed the Argentines what had 
happened.  The Argentine Government had agreed with the British to keep the 
incident quiet, but probing by the Buenos Aires correspondent of the New York 
Times soon made public what had happened, and forced the British Foreign Office to 
make a statement.63  The Chileans first heard of the demolition of their hut through 
these news reports and not from the British themselves.64  This did nothing to 
improve the state of rapidly fracturing Anglo-Chilean relations.  Both Chile and 
Argentina considered requesting the withdrawal of the respective British 
Ambassadors, although this did not happen.65  The US Ambassador, Claude Bowers, 
analyzed the incident for the State Department: 
 
Great Britain could not have chosen a more inopportune time for action on 
Deception Island.  On some other occasion it would have been relatively easy 
to placate Chile but not in the face of the Congressional election and visit of 
Perón.  Latter of course given new note to sound on Falklands drum which 
under any circumstances he would make most of.  Now GB gives Perón 
wonderful opportunity express more convincing reasons why Chile should 
side with his country.66 
 
                                                 
63 United States Embassy Buenos Aires, to Secretary of State, 22 February 1953. USNA, 702.022/2-
2253.  The New York Times article of 20 February 1953 actually cites Reuters as the source of this 
story: “British Dismantle Disputed Argentine Base in Antarctic After Expelling 2 Perón Men.” 
64 United States Embassy Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State.  22 February 1953.  USNA, 
702.022/2-2153.  The British defended themselves by saying that they had to go public with the story 
since an exaggerated version of the incident was developing.   
65 Ibid.  It helped that the British ambassador in Chile was away from Santiago – fishing in Patagonia 
– at the time when the story broke.   
66 US Embassy Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State. 22 February 1953.  USNA, 702.022/2-21533.  
Bowers noted that the Canadian ambassador also thought that Great Britain had “really put its foot in 
it.”  The US Embassy in Buenos Aires added that the incident gave Argentina an excellent 
opportunity to “be protector of South American interests.”  United States Embassy Buenos Aires to 
Secretary of State.  23 February 1953. USNA 702.022/2-2353. 
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President Perón happened to be in Santiago on the day when the news of the incident 
broke.  Both Perón and Ibañez demanded that Britain rebuild the huts and issue a 
formal apology to their two countries.67 On February 21, El Diario Ilustrado of 
Santiago published the Chilean protest notes handed to the British Embassy.68  These 
notes contained the open threat to invoke the Rio Treaty.  Similarly, Argentina 
considered an appeal to the OAS and shortly after the incident Jose Carlos Vittone, 
the Argentine representative to the Organization in Washington, was summoned to 
Buenos Aires to discuss making an appeal.69 
The Chilean and Argentine threats to invoke the Rio Treaty in defense of 
their rights in Antarctica gave much greater international importance to what was 
otherwise a relatively local dispute.  United States officials reacted unfavorably to 
this suggestion, since it would put them in a very awkward position of publicly 
having to choose between their British allies or their hemispheric neighbors.70  If the 
United States voted against OAS action this would offer excellent propaganda 
opportunities for Chilean Communists as well as giving right-wing factions in the 
Chilean Congress an excuse for demanding the withdrawal of Chile from the Pan-
American organization.  US officials also pointed out that raising the Deception 
Island incident at the OAS would likely stimulate existing “anti-colonial” attitudes 
                                                 
67 La Estrella, 20 February 1953 “Cancilleres de Chile y la Argentina harán declaración conjunta 
sobre la Isla Decepción.” 
68 United States Embassy Santiago (Bowers) to Department of State,  20 February 1953. USNA, 
702.022/2-2053. 
69 Department of State to US Embassies in Santiago and Buenos Aires, 12 March 1953.  USNA, 
702.022/3-1253. 
70 In contrast to the United States, several other Latin American countries, such as Guatemala, offered 
the Chileans and Argentines their full support.  US Embassy Guatemala to Department of State, 28 
February 1953. USNA, 702.022/2-2853.  The United States lobbied other governments in the OAS in 
an attempt to dissuade them from supporting the Chileans and Argentines.  See, for example, USNA 
702.022/3-1553.  United States Embassy Caracas to Secretary of State, 15 March 1953. USNA, 
702.022/2-2853. 
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among the Latin Americans, at a time when both the United States and Britain were 
relying on their co-operation regarding broader issues in the United Nations and 
elsewhere.71   
The Deception Island incident became a test case for Argentine-Chilean 
relations and the idea of a South American Antarctica.  Despite the initial prospect of 
a coordinated response, the Argentines and Chileans could not decide upon a 
common path to follow.  The Chilean government was divided between taking joint 
action with Argentina against the British or standing alone in protection of its 
rights.72  President Ibañez supported alliance with Argentina, and was also keen on 
maintaining good relations with the United States, while his Foreign Minister 
Olavarría preferred unilateral Chilean action backed up by an appeal to the OAS.73  
After two meetings of intense debate, the Chilean Antarctic Commission decided 
that no action should be taken conjointly with Argentina, since Argentina had no 
rights to sovereignty in Deception Island.74  One week later Olivarria, the Chilean 
Foreign Minister, reported to Bowers, the United States’ Ambassador, that Perón’s 
emissary Vittone had gone as far as offering a “fifty-fifty division whole Antarctic 
region, Chile to remain with portion south this continent while Argentina would get 
                                                 
71 Department of State (Smith) to United States Embassy London.  10 April 1953.  USNA, 
702.022/4/753. 
72 The question of raising the Deception Island incident at the OAS further complicated the Anglo-
Chilean relationship.  In discussion of the incident with the British, the Argentine government said 
that it did not want to take the case to the OAS.  However, a minor Argentine Foreign Office official 
told the American Embassy that Argentina had agreed that Chile should take initiative, with Argentina 
seconding, because Chile had better claim and could rally broader support in OAS.  See, United States 
Embassy Buenos Aires (Nufer) to Secretary of State, 2 April 1953. USNA, 702.022/4-253. 
73 United States Embassy Santiago to Secretary of State, 4 April 1953. USNA, 702.022/4-453. 
74 United States Embassy Santiago to Secretary of State, 23 March 1953. USNA, 702.022/3-2353.  
The Chilean position, dating back to the negotiations of the early twentieth century, was that 
Argentina had rights to the South Orkneys, while the Chilean claim encompassed the whole of the 
South Shetlands, of which Deception Island was a part.   
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remainder on other side of the globe.”75  The Chileans, Olivarria added, had not 
taken this offer seriously, and had resisted Argentine insistence on joint action.  
Alluding to divisions within the Government, he continued: 
 
...Chilean decision taken after full consultation (1) with Antarctic 
Commission most whose members are retired officers appointed thereto by 
previous administration and (2) with Foreign Affairs Committee of Congress 
majority of whose members not Ibañistas.  On this question he said there is 
no opposition but complete agreement with government.76 
 
As the Chilean reaction to the Deception Island incident became caught up in 
broader domestic debates over the future course of Chilean foreign policy, British 
and North American officials noted with surprise that the Chilean response was “less 
reasonable” than that of Argentina.77 
Meanwhile, the Chilean Government continued its direct negotiations with 
Britain in an attempt to reach an arrangement that would satisfy both sides.  On 31 
March, the British Embassy made inquiries in Santiago about the Chilean mission to 
Queen Elizabeth’s coronation.78  The Chilean Foreign Ministry replied that if 
favorable progress was made over the Deception Island incident then the Foreign 
Minister would attend the coronation, if not, the Chilean party would be headed by a 
lesser official.  Such a threat represented the more pedantic side of a Chilean policy 
that was rapidly becoming more obdurate.  On the same day, Olivarria met with 
                                                 
75 United States Embassy Santiago to Secretary of State, 31 March 1953. USNA, 702.022/3-3153. 
76 Ibid. 
77 United States Embassy London (Aldrich) to Secretary of State, 7 April 1953. USNA, 702.022/4-
753. 
78 United States Embassy Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 31 March 1953. USNA, 
702.022/3-3153. 
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Bowers in Santiago to warn him of the hard line that Chile was proposing to take.79  
Olivarria said that Chile “with its warlike traditions” could not take lying down 
destruction of its shelter on Deception Island and that it must be restored “even if it 
costs us our whole fleet.”  The Chilean Foreign Minister reported that a “fully 
munitioned” Chilean fleet was heading to Punta Arenas from where it would proceed 
to Deception Island in order to restore the Chilean hut under armed protection.  The 
Rio Treaty would be simultaneously invoked.80   
The following day, 1 April, Claude Bowers arranged to meet Olivarría at 
11:00 in the morning.81  When the United States’ Ambassador arrived at the Foreign 
Ministry he was informed that the Chilean Foreign Minister had just resigned.  
Bowers noted to the State Department, “this probably had no connection with 
Deception incident.”  However, that same morning the Chileans had received an 
“extremely stiff” letter from the British, refusing to concede to any of Chile’s 
demands, which they thought was simultaneously being read in the Commons by 
Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary.82  Olivarría   told the United States 
Ambassador that this note ended any hope for amicable settlement, adding that he 
had no other recourse than to act at once and evoke the Rio Treaty, “to see what the 
Organization of American States is worth.”  When he had been called to see the 
                                                 
79 United States Embassy Santiago to Secretary of State, 31 March 1953. USNA 702.022/3-3153. 
80 Asesoria Juridica, 1 April 1953.  RR.EE., Departamento de Limites: Comisión Chilena Antártica, 
1949-56.  1958. However, the Chilean Judicial Assessor did not believe that an appeal to the OAS 
would be successful, citing, for example, the fact that the Chileans could not prove that the British 
action in Deception Island was not “police action” as the Falkland Islands authorities claimed.    
81 United States Embassy Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 1 April 1953. USNA, 702.022/4-
153. 
82 It turned out that this letter was not read out in Parliament.  Rather, Minister of State, Selwyn Lloyd 
in reply to Parliamentary question stated that the Chilean Government had been informed that its 
memorandum of 24 March “did not hold prospect of mutually satisfactory solution.”  United States 
Embassy London (Aldrich) to Secretary of State.  7 April 1953. USNA 702.022/4-753. 
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President to receive news of his dismissal, he had been discussing plans for naval 
action in Deception Island with the Minister of Defense, who had also been asked to 
resign.83    While this “cabinet crisis” was not wholly precipitated by discussion of 
Chile’s response to British aggression, it clearly reflected major differences of 
opinion that were brought to the surface by the Deception Island incident.  President 
Ibañez – as his subsequent climb-down revealed – did not want to take military 
action in Deception Island, or take the matter to the Organization of American 
States.84  Olivarría later sought to distance himself from the “cowardly” policy 
adopted by the Ibañez Government, and said the worst thing about losing his job was 
having to tell the brave soldiers and sailors.85 
In the weeks that followed, Bowers acted as an intermediary between the 
governments of Chile and Great Britain.86  Although he was not able to broker any 
positive agreement between the disputing countries, the US Ambassador did help to 
diffuse the tensions, and, most importantly, prevent the question being raised at the 
OAS.87  The threat that Chile might “declare war” on Great Britain lingered for a 
                                                 
83 This information came out three years later in a letter by Olivarría to El Mercurio on 13 April 1956, 
containing a rigorous defense of his position during the Deception Island incident.  Olivarría 
attributed his dismissal to a “cabinet crisis.” 
84 In the aftermath of Olivarría’s dismissal, the State Department wrote to Bowers asking whether 
efforts could be made to prevent Chile raising the incident at the OAS.  Bowers wrote back saying 
that the President and his new Foreign Minister Fenner, “who was appointed because of Ibañez’s faith 
in his personal devotion,” would probably not take the question to the OAS, although he saw no harm 
in making clear the US position.  Department of State to United States Embassy Santiago, 3 April 
1953. USNA 702.022/4-153.  See also, United States Embassy Santiago to Secretary of State.  4 April 
1953. USNA, 702.022/4-453. 
85 El Mercurio, 13 April 1956. 
86 See, for example, Ministerio de RR.EE. a Embachile: Washington, Londres, Buenos Aires, 10 
April 1953.  RR.EE., Departamento de Limites: Comisión Chilena Antártica, 1949-56.  1958. 
87 Countries such as Mexico were keen that if an American country wished to raise an issue at the 
OAS it should be debated.  See United States Embassy Mexico D.F. to Department of State, 10 April 
1953.  USNA, 702.022/4-1053.  For a detailed discussion of the reasons why the United States and 
Britain did not want the question raised at the OAS, which focused on not wanting to inflame anti-
colonial sentiment, see,  Memorandum of Conversation with Mr. PA Wilkinson, First Secretary, 
British Embassy, 10 April 1953. USNA, 702.022/4-1053. 
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couple of weeks after the dismissal of Olivarria, but the Chilean government was 
gradually able to let its public threat to raise the matter at the OAS drop quietly 
without losing face.88  Throughout the rest of the year the Chileans continued making 
demands regarding Deception Island.89  The US Embassy in London reported that 
the British were not too concerned: 
 
... The British do not therefore see an early end to this incident but they are 
far less worried than previously; this series of disputes has been continuing 
for some time and, although everyone would like to see it solved, the 
situation is a long way from the boiling point.  The FO has by no means 
given up in its search for a solution, however, for it would like to have this 
troublesome and potentially very serious question cleared up.90 
 
The threat persisted that the issue of “Colonies and Territories” might be discussed 
by the OAS at its tenth meeting in Caracas, and the OAS threat continued to be 
raised in diplomatic negotiations.91  
Attempts to resolve the Deception Island dispute revived a certain interest in 
the Chilean plans for a modus vivendi, which had first been introduced in 1948, as a 
possible way out of the diplomatic impasse.92  In August 1953, for example, the 
                                                 
88 The expression “Declare War” was used, somewhat sarcastically, by a State Department Official.  
Albert H. Gerberich (OSA) to Mr. Bernbaum (OSA) and Mr. Barall (OSA), 10 April 1953. USNA, 
702.022/4-1053. 
89 See, for example, Embajador de Chile en Washington a Señor Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, 
15 May 1953.  RR.EE., Departamento de Limites: Comisión Chilena Antártica, 1949-56.  1958. 
90 United States States Embassy London (Margaret Joy Tibbetts, 2nd Sec) to Department of State, 16 
July 1953. USNA, 702.022/7-1653. 
91 John C. Dreier (US Ambassador to OAS) to Mr. Jamison (AR), 5 June 1953. USNA, 702.022/6-
553.     See also, Ministerio de RR.EE. a Embachile Washington, 30 July 1953.  RR.EE., 
“Departamento de Limites: Comisión Chilena Antártica, 1949-56.  1958.” 
92 See, for example, United States Embassy Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 24 February 
1953. USNA, 702.022/2-2453.  Immediately after the incident, the Chilean Ambassador in Buenos 
Aires had raised the possibility of opening negotiations about some sort of status quo agreement with 
the Argentine Foreign Ministry.  Although later, Olivarría   stated that the matter was not taken up 
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Chileans included the consideration of a status quo agreement for Antarctica in part 
of a three point plan that would also see the Chileans quietly rebuild their hut, 
probably in a different location, and the governments of Great Britain and Chile 
officially closing the incident.93  However, by this stage the American Defense 
Department had raised serious objections to the idea of a modus vivendi.  Eisenhower 
had won the 1952 Presidential election and the Korean War was coming to an end: 
the United States military was ambitiously looking to the South with plans that it did 
not want to see shackled by international agreements.  As a consequence, although 
the State Department remained keen on the idea, they could only react lukewarmly to 
the Chilean suggestion.94   
Late in 1953, Argentina took up the idea of some kind of modus vivendi and 
suggested an extension of the annual tri-partite naval accords to include something 
more substantial.95  Early in 1954, a report from the United States Embassy in 
London to the State Department had summed up the dilemma that the Argentine 
proposal posed for the British Government: 
 
Basically, the British attitude appears to be heavily conditioned by the 
possibility of a public outcry in both the House of Commons and the Press 
against any seeming diplomatic concessions in the area.  While there are 
apparently sincere misgivings that with a modus vivendi or some variation of 
                                                                                                                                          
with the Argentines since it was not considered a practical time to do so.  United States Embassy 
Santiago to Secretary of State, 31 March 1953. USNA 702.022/3-3153. 
93 Milton Barall (OSA) to Woodward (ARA).  19 August 1953. USNA, 702.022/8-1953. 
94 For example, State Department officials noted that with the upswing in US-Argentine relations the 
timing was now much more propitious for negotiating such an agreement than it had been in previous 
years.  See, W. Tapley Bennett, Jr. (OSA) to Ronhovde (State Department) Office Memorandum, 31 
August 1953. USNA 702.022/8-3153. 
95 Argentina’s suggestions were not accepted by Britain or Chile and the three countries signed the 
traditional tripartite agreement on 26 November.  Memorandum para la reunión de la Comisión 
Chilena Antártica, Santiago, 24 November 1953.  RR.EE., “Departamento de Limites: Comisión 
Chilena Antártica, 1949-56.  1958.” 
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the Argentine proposals would have a tendency to recognize squatter’s rights 
on “British Territory” in the Antarctic, which once taken up would be most 
difficult to dislodge later, the underlying fear is public opinion and the 
difficulty of explaining why “Latinos” were permitted rights on “British 
soil.”  Admittedly, this super-sensitivity, as it might be described, to public 
opinion is a reflection of the considerable criticism to which the present 
Government has been subjected for allegedly “abandoning” it positions in the 
Sudan and the Suez Canal.96 
 
Although relatively distant from the central concerns of British foreign policy in the 
early 1950s, the problem of maintaining British rights in the Falkland Islands 
Dependencies continued to be caught up in wider currents of British imperial affairs 
and domestic politics. 
Two years later, in the Antarctic season 1954-55, the Chileans reconstructed 
their hut in a less provocative location on Deception Island.97  The British quietly 
ignored this action.  Even if plans to negotiate an official modus vivendi had stalled, 
a de facto means of living together, both in Antarctica and in the wider diplomatic 
sphere, prevailed.  Argentina, for its part, made no effort to restore the hut the British 
                                                 
96 United States Embassy London (2nd Secretary, Zimmerman) to Department of State, 5 February 
1954. USNA, 702.022/2-554. 
97 The meeting of the Chilean Antarctic Commission to discuss this action took place on 26 October 
1953.  Several members of the Commission remained keen on taking control of the runway, by force 
if necessary, and building an airbase next to it.  Cordovez and others argued against such a move.  The 
Commission decided to build a small hut on Deception Island, but in a different location. Acta de la 
Reunión sobre la Antártica con los Representantes del Estado Mayor de las Fuerzas Armadas, 26 
October 1953.  RR.EE.,  “Departamento de Limites: Comisión Chilena Antártica, 1949-56.  1958.” 
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had demolished, although there was a Naval standoff near Deception Island between 
Britain and Argentina early in 1954.98  Perón and Pujato had much grander plans for 
Argentine Antarctica, which would see the opening up of a new front in the contest 
for polar sovereignty.  
                                                 
98 United States Embassy London to Department of State, 18 March 1954. USNA, 702.022/3-1854. 
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Chapter 7: A New Polar Front, 1954-55 
Between 1954 and 1955, Argentina continued to take the lead in pursuing 
claims to Antarctic sovereignty.  The Hope Bay and Deception Island incidents had 
galvanized Argentine public opinion behind Perón’s “Antarctic Dream” and anti-
British propaganda became clamorous.  Colonel Pujato remained dominant in 
Antarctic affairs and he won support from the government to open up a new front in 
the Antarctic sovereignty dispute in the Weddell Sea.  This vast region to the east of 
the Antarctic Peninsula was claimed by Argentina and Britain, but not by Chile.  The 
sea ice conditions, combined with the difficulty of landing on the Filchner Ice Shelf, 
made this region one of the most inaccessible parts of the disputed territory.  With 
the purchase of an icebreaker in 1954, the Argentine government made possible the 
penetration of the region and, early in January 1955, Pujato oversaw the construction 
of Base Belgrano on the eastern side of the Weddell Sea.  From this base, Pujato 
intended to demonstrate Argentina’s environmental authority over a region that 
remained virtually unexplored.  In the back of his mind, Pujato even harbored a plan 
of launching an expedition to the South Pole, which, if it had been successful, would 
have been only the third expedition ever to cross overland to the bottom of the world.   
Without an icebreaker, this was a region that could not easily be reached by 
the British.  Indeed, it was in the Weddell Sea that Shackleton’s Endurance had sunk 
almost forty years earlier.  Argentina’s expansion into the Weddell Sea seemed to 
suggest that Perón’s Antarctic Dream knew no limits, and that the sovereignty 
dispute would continue to grow.  Anthony Eden’s Conservative government 
responded pragmatically with an attempt to draw a legal line under the escalation of 
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the dispute.  Rather than trying to match the Argentines by purchasing an ice-breaker 
of their own, the British Government instead submitted a unilateral application to the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in an effort to resolve the dispute with both 
Argentina and Chile through international arbitration.  British officials believed that 
this would prevent any further Argentine advances in Antarctica being used against 
them in the future, as well as giving Britain the moral high ground.  Claims to 
environmental authority featured prominently in Britain’s submission to the ICJ, as 
British lawyers sought to demonstrate their legal rights over the whole of the 
Falkland Islands Dependencies.  Argentina and Chile, however, refused to accept the 
jurisdiction of the ICJ in a case that they claimed to regard as “purely domestic.”  
Since the ICJ could only function through the consent of the countries involve, the 
Antarctic Case was never heard.   
The period of escalating Antarctic hostilities that began at the very start of the 
1950s came to an end in September 1955, when a military coup in Argentina 
overthrew President Perón.  Perón’s Antarctic Dream was perhaps symptomatic of a 
Presidency that was increasingly losing touch with reality and losing its grip on 
power.  Important sectors of Argentine society – most importantly the Catholic 
Church and the Armed Forces – turned against the President and forced him into 
exile.  The so-called Revolución Libertador disrupted Argentina’s scientific program 
at a vital moment, and allowed other countries to catch up and overtake.  Hernán 
Pujato was left stranded at Base Belgrano as a curious vestige of Peronism.  He 
retained token control of the base, but without the support of the new government his 
plans for an expedition to the South Pole were shattered.   
 
 223 
BASE BELGRANO  
The tremendous escalation of Argentine activities in Antarctica during the 
first half of the 1950s actually accompanied a gradual erosion of President Perón’s 
grip on power. From around 1953, the Argentine economy went into a downward 
spiral and, despite strict censorship, opposition voices began to be heard above the 
clamorous propaganda.1  Despite all his nationalist rhetoric, the economic crisis 
forced Perón to seek a closer relationship with the United States.  A sense prevailed 
in many quarters that Perón was losing touch with reality.  In these changing 
circumstances, Argentina’s Antarctic policy merged ever more closely with Perón’s 
erratic “Antarctic Dream.”2  Following his return from leading “the First Argentine 
Scientific Expedition to Antarctica,” Hernán Pujato pushed ahead with his plans for 
an Argentine expedition to the Weddell Sea, on the southeastern side of the Antarctic 
Peninsula.  From the most southerly base on the continent, the Director of the 
Argentine Antarctic Institute (which bore his name) then hoped to launch an 
expedition to the South Pole.  The two Generals, Pujato and Perón, fed off each 
other’s ambitions and perpetuated their own delusions.  The plan to plant the 
Argentine flag at the bottom of the world encapsulated the spirit of Peronist 
Argentina towards the middle of the 1950s. 
Pujato’s plans required the acquisition of an icebreaker that could operate in 
the frozen seas around Antarctica.  Such a ship would significantly enhance the 
geographic range of activities and the temporal season in which they would be 
possible.  Initially, Perón was not keen on the purchase of an icebreaker, noting that 
                                                 
1 For details of Argentina’s economic decline over this period, see Lewis, The crisis of Argentine 
capitalism. 
2 Martínez, The Perón novel. 
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it would cost between 8 and 14 million pesos to buy and take two to four years to 
construct.3  Pujato, however, was undeterred.  He went ahead and negotiated the 
construction of an icebreaker with a German company for a cost of three million 
dollars, to be built within nine months.  The Argentine Government approved this 
plan and the order was placed with G.Weser, Seebeck Werke, in Bremerhaven, 
Germany.  The ship was equipped with an oceanographical laboratory, a 
meteorological center, and the capacity to launch radiosonde weather balloons.  The 
ship was named General San Martín and it arrived in Argentina in November 1954 
in time for the 1954-55 Antarctic Summer season.   
While Pujato was planning his expedition to the far south, the Argentine 
Antarctic Commission continued to meet sporadically.  However, the Commission 
became increasingly estranged from the real decision making over Argentine 
Antarctic policy, especially that concerning Argentine activity within Antarctica, 
which now took place entirely within the Argentine Antarctic Institute “Hernán 
Pujato.”4  The work of the Commission was limited to the propaganda and foreign 
relations aspects of Argentina’s territorial claims, as demonstrated by their extensive 
discussion of a “Plan Malvinas” throughout 1953 and beyond.5  The plan went to 
                                                 
3 Eugenio A. Genest, Pujato y la Antártida Argentina en la década del cincuenta ([Buenos Aires, 
Argentina], 1998). 47. 
4 For example, at a meeting of the Argentine Antarctic Commission held on 10 June 1955, Brigadier 
Bernard attacked the autonomy with which the Intituto Argentino Antártico functioned and requested 
that the Antarctic Commission should be informed of activity in Antarctica, rather than having to read 
about it in the newspapers.  Comisión Nacional del Antártico, Acta de la Reunión, 10 June 1955.  
MREYC, Organismos Internacionales Paquete 20. 
5 Discussion of the “Plan Malvinas” by the Argentine Antarctic Commission at their meetings of 27 
May 1953 and 12 June 1953. MREYC, Organismos Internacionales Paquete 20.  In 1955, the US 
Embassy in Buenos Aires reported a typical editorial concerning the Islas Malvinas which appeared in 
Democracia newspaper: “The years of imperialism which did not need further justification than its 
own interest and its power has already passed or at least is near its end... and sooner or later the 
Malvinas will return to the fold of the ‘patria.’”  American Embassy Buenos Aires to Department of 
State, 21 April, 1955. USNA, 702.022/4-2155. 
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great lengths to foster a sense of national grievance at the illegal occupation of the 
Islas Malvinas, but it suggested little that could be done constructively to reclaim the 
islands.6  In January 1955, the US Embassy in Buenos Aires reported to the State 
Department that the Argentine Antarctic Commission had voted to distribute 200,000 
copies of a booklet presenting the Government’s claims to sovereignty over 
Antarctica.  A different US Embassy report noted the success of these various 
propaganda campaigns: 
 
The idea of Argentine sovereignty in the special piece of pie Argentines have 
claimed for themselves in the Antarctic is upheld by all political parties.  
Moreover, the people have been so indoctrinated with the idea that they 
believe it as a matter of natural right; and they are aware of the fairly 
extensive operations carried out by Argentines there, the string of manned 
bases, the heavy expense incurred, etc.  Accordingly, any Argentine 
administration of any political party will be faced with serious problems 
when the time comes to face up to the rights of others in the Antarctic.7 
 
In Argentine Antarctic policy, as in so many other areas of public life, the Peronist 
administration had successfully created expectations among the Argentine people 
without fulfilling them. 
Despite their propaganda successes, the members of the Argentine Antarctic 
Commission felt an increasingly palpable sense of frustration with their limited role.  
At a meeting held on 18 June 1954, the Commission actually became quite critical of 
                                                 
6 The propaganda work of the Commission had already reached comic levels at a meeting in 
November 1951, when Doctor Mendez Puig, a distinguished international lawyer, proposed the 
creation of two cartoon characters – named “Pinguacho” and “Malvina” – who would help to generate 
anti-English sentiment among Argentine youth.  Reunión celebrada por la Comisióñ Nacional del 
Antártico, 27 November 1951. MREYC, Organismos Internacionales Paquete 15. Comisión Nacional 
del Antártico.  Expediente 37.  Año 1951. 
7 American Embassy Buenos Aires to Department of State, 16 April 1955. USNA, 702.022/4-655. 
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the Government’s policy statement towards Antarctica proposed by General Molina 
on behalf of President Perón.  This policy centered on General Pujato’s plans for a 
base on the Weddell Sea, which several members of the commission thought was 
expensive and unworkable.8  Tellingly, this meeting was attended by several high 
ranking naval officers, but none from the Army.  The inter-service rivalry between 
the Army and the Navy, exacerbated by differences of opinion regarding President 
Perón, was not dissipating.  This would become a dangerous tendency in the months 
to follow.     
The objections raised by the Argentine Antarctic Commission towards the 
plans for a base on the Weddell Sea were ignored.  One week after the arrival of the 
General San Martín, the Argentine Government passed a decree, which authorized 
the establishment of a new base – to be called Base Belgrano – in the Weddell Sea.9  
With echoes of the famous resolution of the 1896 International Geographical 
Conference that started the heroic era of Antarctic Exploration, the decree noted 
“there remains an extensive zone of our sector neither explored nor occupied.”  
General Pujato entertained the ambition of leading what would be only the third 
expedition to set foot on the South Pole, after the expeditions of Amundsen and Scott 
in the season 1911-1912.  The publicity and propaganda surrounding the Weddell 
Sea expedition did not highlight this idea of planting an Argentine flag at the South 
Pole, but it clearly emphasized the idea of man against nature.  In the mid 1950s the 
Argentines were re-living the excitement of an earlier era of polar exploration.   
                                                 
8 Comisión Nacional del Antártico, 18 June 1954.  MREYC, Organismos Internacionales Paquete 15 
9 Genest, Pujato y la Antártida Argentina en la década del cincuenta. 49. 
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The General San Martín arrived at the shore of the Weddell Sea on 1 January 
1955.10  The members of the expedition constructed Base Belgrano within two 
weeks, and it was inaugurated on 18 January.  At a latitude of 78°03’, this new base 
was the most southerly on the Antarctic Continent, only 1300km from the South 
Pole.  General Pujato and 14 men, including pilots, settled in for a long polar winter.  
The expedition took two planes with it, which were used to explore a large area 
surrounding the base which had previously been unseen by human eyes. 
The news of the establishment of Base Belgrano caught the United States and 
others by surprise, despite vague suggestions by Defense Minister Sosa Molina that 
the United States should be invited to send an observer on the expedition. 11  In 
December 1954, a US Embassy official had discussed Antarctic plans with the 
Argentine Foreign Ministry, and had not been informed of Pujato’s plans to build a 
base on the Weddell Sea Coast12.  The United States Embassy reported that the 
Argentine Foreign Minister apologized for the miscommunication, claiming that on 
December 21, 1951, the Foreign Ministry itself had not known the details of the 
expedition: “he said the Ministry of the Navy had apparently not fully informed the 
Foreign Office and he said he would take the matter up with the Minister and the 
President.”  The US Embassy official commented: 
 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 51. 
11 American Embassy Buenos Aires to Department of State, 16 April 1955. USNA, 702.022/4-655.  
In September 1954, in a conversation with Assistant Secretary Holland, Perón had suggested “the 
United States and Argentina should try to work out their mutual problems in the area in a frank and 
friendly manner in order to avoid unrestrained competition over Antarctic rights.”   
12 The construction of Base Belgrano particularly annoyed to the United States, since, in October 
1954, Embassy Officials had informed the Argentine Foreign Ministry of North American plans to 
build a base at a nearby location. 
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Although it is possible that the [Argentine] Foreign Office was not aware of 
the plan to establish the new base, since other evidence indicates a lack of 
coordination and inter-service rivalry in regard to Argentine Antarctic 
operations, it is to be noted that he has not subsequently offered any 
explanation.  Furthermore, sometime later a minor official of the Foreign 
Office let slip the fact that that the plan to establish a new, far southerly 
Antarctic Base was known to him and others in the FO.  He said that they had 
in jest asked General Pujato (commander of the new base) to pose with them 
for pictures before his departure.  They wanted, they said, to have a personal 
memento of the “soon to be dead hero.”13 
 
The fact that Argentine Antarctic policy was characterized by a mixture of half-
truths and bitter rivalries did nothing to alleviate the provocative nature of the 
construction of Base Belgrano.   
The US Embassy report continued: “The Argentine announcement of a base 
was probably a particularly bitter pill for the British since, only the week before, 
wire service dispatches had announced British and Commonwealth plans for a joint 
expedition to the pole, to be launched from a base to be established more or less 
where the Argentines located.”  As part of their plans for the up-coming International 
Geophysical Year (IGY), the British Commonwealth was planning an expedition that 
would attempt to fulfill Ernest Shackleton’s failed ambition of crossing the entire 
Antarctic continent over land.14  The expedition would be led by Vivian Fuchs and 
would include Sir Edmund Hillary, the recent conqueror of Mount Everest.  Just as 
the Argentines were attempting to revive the zeitgeist of the heroic era of Antarctic 
exploration, the British were doing exactly the same.  However, there was practically 
                                                 
13 American Embassy Buenos Aires to Department of State, 16 April 1955. USNA, 702.022/4-655. 
14 There is a tremendous literature on Ernest Shackleton’s Endurance expedition of 1914-1916, which 
became stuck in the pack ice of the Weddell Sea.  The ship had to be abandoned and Shackleton made 
a heroic voyage across the Scotia Sea to get help for his stranded men.  The entire party survived, but 
the plan for crossing the continent barely got started.  See, for example, Lansing, Endurance; 
Shackleton's incredible voyage. 
 229 
no publicity surrounding the competition between Pujato and Fuchs to get to the 
South Pole.  The geopolitical stakes were by now too high to risk everything on a 
race across the ice.  Nevertheless, the location of Base Belgrano on the Weddell Sea 
coast, far to the southeast of the Antarctic Peninsula, opened up a second front in the 
struggle for polar sovereignty, which would be bitterly contested during the IGY and 
the years leading up to it.  
 
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
In January 1955, the British Government wrote to the Governments of both 
Argentina and Chile suggesting in the strongest possible diplomatic language that the 
three countries should take their sovereignty dispute in the Antarctic Peninsula to the 
International Court of Justice in The Hague.15  The British stated that they were sure 
that the two South American countries would want to resolve the dispute 
definitively, but added that if this invitation were rejected, Great Britain reserved the 
right to take whatever action it deemed appropriate in defending its sovereignty 
rights to the Falkland Islands Dependencies.  These threats included the unilateral 
submission of the case to the International Court and an appeal to the United Nations 
Security Council.  This was not the first time that Britain had suggested that the three 
countries submit their dispute to legal arbitration, but it was the first time that the 
British suggestion carried with it such a threat of serious consequences if the offer 
were rejected.  Taking the case to the International Court of Justice offered the 
Conservative Government several advantages, as an official at the United States 
Embassy in London noted:   
                                                 
15 See, for example, Reunión de la Comisión Nacional del Antártico, 27 January 1955.  MREYC, 
Organismos Internacionales Paquete 20, Expediente 47, Comisión Nacional del Antártico. 
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A decision by the International Court... would be saleable to Commons and 
the press.  The Foreign Office believe this would be true regardless of 
whether a defeat might be suffered at the hands of the Court on a number of 
the British claims, and the Foreign Office in fact recognizes the possibility of 
adverse decisions on some points.16 
 
In the twilight of Churchill’s premiership, at a time when the Conservative 
Government was coming under ever increasing pressure throughout the Colonial 
Empire, a ruling by the International Court of Justice seemed to offer a way to end, 
one way or the other, the unwanted dispute in the Falklands Islands Dependencies.17  
An unfavorable decision could not be portrayed as an imperial “cave in,” but rather a 
demonstration that Great Britain upheld the principles of international law, while a 
favorable decision would settle the question of sovereignty once and for all in the 
eyes of the international community.18 
The prospect of taking the Antarctic sovereignty dispute to the International 
Court of Justice in The Hague appealed much less to the two South American 
countries than it did to Great Britain.  Well aware of this, British officials hoped to 
imply that any refusal by Argentina and Chile to submit the case to legal arbitration 
simply reflected the South Americans’ fears that they would lose the case.  The 
British saw a certain irony in the fact that although the Argentines and Chileans 
pedantically made formal protests and statements at every conceivable opportunity in 
preparation for an international ruling, they were not actually willing to put their case 
                                                 
16 United States Embassy London (2nd Secretary, Zimmerman) to Department of State, 5 February 
1954. USNA, 702.022/2-554. 
17 Churchill retired in April 1955 to be replaced by Anthony Eden.   
18 Indeed, the United States Government was worried that any ruling by the international court would 
give the winner a very strong legal foundation for their claim, thereby undermining the US position of 
“reserving” its rights. 
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to the test.  However, beneath the British bravado there was also fear.  Argentina had 
recently purchased an icebreaker, and at the very same time as the British lawyers 
were suggesting arbitration, General Pujato was establishing the most southerly base 
in the disputed region on the shores of the Weddell Sea.  Many British officials 
realized that they were being “outclassed” by Argentina in Antarctica.19  They 
confided to the North Americans that they saw an appeal to the International Court 
as a way of applying a “cut off date” to the Argentine advances in Antarctica, 
preventing any future activities in Antarctica from having any legal implication. 20 
The South American reasons for not wanting to take the dispute to the 
International Court were as much political as legal.  Antarctica had a very different 
meaning to the people of Argentina and Chile than it did to the British, especially 
after several years of intense government propaganda campaigns.  South Americans 
on both sides of the Andes had come to see Antarctica as a fundamental part of their 
national territory.  However, the political circumstances were quite different in the 
two countries, and, although British officials tended not to realize the fact, Argentina 
and Chile did not share the same reasons for rejecting the decision.  
In Argentina, the southern continent mattered more to President Perón as an 
anti-imperialist “irrendenta” than as an undisputed part of the national territory.21  
Perón believed that Argentina was winning the contest for Antarctic sovereignty, and 
saw no reason why the glory should be taken away at the stroke of a judge’s pen.  A 
                                                 
19 Dodds, Pink ice: Britain and the South Atlantic Empire. 26. 
20 United States Embassy London (Aldrich) to State Department, 21 January 1955. USNA, 
702.022/1-2155. 
21 The lack of archival resources, especially personal papers, makes it very difficult to know what 
Perón was thinking about Antarctica.  Nevertheless, in his speeches and writings on Antarctica, the 
Argentine president almost always put as much emphasis on the struggle itself, as on the eventual 
outcome.  The only way that Perón wanted to “win” the contest was by a straight defeat of Great 
Britain.   
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sense prevailed that any ruling by the International Court of Justice would probably 
involve some form of compromise and division of territory.  There would be winners 
and losers, but probably not total winners and losers.  Given the success of Argentine 
propaganda in making the people believe that the whole of “Argentine Antarctica” 
belonged to Argentina, anything short of total victory could be presented as a defeat: 
the further dismemberment of Argentine territory.22  The only way Perón could 
really “win” the dispute would be through a triumphant Argentine victory and a 
humiliating British surrender.  A meeting of the Argentine Antarctic Commission in 
January 1955 discussed Argentina’s response to the British note in a slightly more 
somber fashion.23  Some of the members of the Commission noted a distinct change 
in the tone of Britain’s letter, and they worried that in any Antarctic showdown the 
United States would almost certainly back Great Britain.  However, other members 
of the Commission, with closer connections to President Perón and the Argentine 
Antarctic Institute “General Hernán Pujato” argued that Argentina should not be 
pushed into defensive action, but rather should go on the legal counter-attack.   
In Chile there was a genuine fear that their country would lose a case at the 
International Court of Justice.  While most officials believed that Chile had excellent 
historical and geographical claims to the Antarctic Peninsula region, they realized 
that their efforts to “effectively occupy” the region had been less successful than 
those of Great Britain and Argentina.  Julio Escudero, the country’s legal specialist 
on Antarctic affairs, had repeatedly counseled against getting involved in a “race for 
                                                 
22 Escudé, La patología del nacionalismo argentino. 
23 Reunión de la Comisión Nacional del Antártico, 27 January 1955.  MREYC, Organismos 
Internacionales, Paquete 20, Expediente 47, Comisión Nacional del Antártico. 
 233 
bases,” which he felt Chile had no chance of winning. 24  Chilean officials generally 
clung on to the idea of a modus vivendi agreement followed by an international 
conference that would negotiate rather than adjudicate territorial questions in 
Antarctica.  In such a conference Chile believed that it would have the backing of 
much of the international community, including the United States.  In the strictly 
legalistic atmosphere of the International Court, there would be little room for 
sentimental appeals to Chilean rights to the Peninsula. 
Later in January 1955, both Argentina and Chile replied that they would not 
accept the British suggestion that the three countries should jointly take the case to 
the International Court of Justice.  The British therefore decided that they would 
unilaterally appeal to the Court.25  Professor Waldock, an eminent international 
lawyer, prepared the case.26  Without the consent of the two South American 
countries, the US State Department was skeptical of Britain’s ability to achieve any 
kind of determination of its Antarctic rights, since the International Court had no real 
authority beyond the consent of the plaintiffs.27  No decision of the International 
Court could be imposed upon an unwilling party, unless there was some form of yet 
untried United Nations action behind it.  The British also realized that their actions 
had very little chance of definitively resolving the dispute.  But they saw an excellent 
                                                 
24 Acta de la Reunion de la Comisión Chilena Antártica, 1 December 1953.  RR.EE., “Departamento 
de Limites: Comisión Chilena Antártica, 1949-56.  1958.”   
25 United States Embassy London (Aldrich) to State Department, 21 January 1955. USNA 702.022/1-
2155. 
26 Waldock had recently accompanied Dag Hammerskjold, the United Nations Secretary General, to 
Beijing. 
27 The State Department feared the legal implications for its own claims to Antarctica if the case 
should ever go to the International Court, and there was certainly no encouragement from the United 
States for this course of action.  Department of State (Dulles) to American Embassies in London, 
Buenos Aires and Santiago, 28 January 1955.  USNA, 702.022/1-2855. 
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opportunity to take the legal and moral high ground, and also the chance to make 
their case in the strongest possible terms to the international community.   
In May 1955, the British Government submitted an eighty-page document to 
the International Court of Justice outlining the case for British sovereignty in the 
Falkland Islands Dependencies.28  The first half of the application dealt with the 
British case against Argentina, and the second half against Chile.  In making 
Britain’s case, Government lawyers used the precedents established by the final act 
of the Berlin Congress of 1885, which had carved up the continent of Africa between 
the European imperial powers.29  This act codified the nineteenth century state 
practice regarding the acquisition of overseas territories, and put the emphasis on 
acts of discovery, formal claims, and administrative activity, rather than on any 
“natural rights” to the territory in question.   By appealing to the imperialistic 
precedent established by the Berlin Congress, British lawyers hoped to put their 
claims to the Falkland Islands Dependencies on firm legal foundations.30   
Britain’s submission opened with a list of the numerous geographical 
discoveries made by British nationals in the region.31  South Georgia, the summary 
began, “may well” have been discovered by the English merchant Anthony de la 
Roche as early as 1675.  Captain Cook conclusively rediscovered the island one 
hundred years later, formally taking possession of it and naming it in honor of King 
George III.  In the same year the British navigator discovered the South Sandwich 
                                                 
28 International Court of Justice, Antarctica cases (United Kingdom v. Argentina; United Kingdom v. 
Chile): orders of March 16th, 1956: removal from the list. 
29 See Jorge Berguño, “Intellectual Origins of the Antarctic Treaty.”  Paper presented to second 
SCAR workshop on history of Antarctic Science, Santiago, September 2006.   
30 Berguño, “Intellectual Origins.” 
31 International Court of Justice, Antarctica cases (United Kingdom v. Argentina; United Kingdom v. 
Chile): orders of March 16th, 1956: removal from the list.Argentine and Chilean authors have 
contested almost all of these claims.   
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archipelago, which he named after the First Lord of the Admiralty.  In 1819, English 
sea captain William Smith discovered the South Shetland Islands, and in 1821 the 
British sealing captain George Powell became the first to sight the South Orkney 
Islands.  Both island groups were named after Scottish islands.  Perhaps most 
contentiously, the British submission claimed that it had been the British Naval 
Officer Edward Bransfield who had been the first person to see a part of the 
Antarctic Peninsula, thereby becoming the “discoverer” of the Antarctic continent.  
This assertion contradicted strong claims by both the United States and Russia that 
one of their nationals had been the first to discover Antarctica.32  According to the 
British lawyers, Bransfield made his sighting of the Trinity Peninsula at the tip of the 
Antarctic Peninsula on 30 January 1820, although they conceded that the weather 
had been hazy.  Bransfield had named what he saw Trinity Land, in a compliment to 
the board of Trinity House, the British institution responsible for pilotage.  In 
summarizing the British case for geographical discovery, the submission to the 
International Court of Justice stressed the political importance of place names: 
 
The first discoveries of South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands, the South 
Orkneys, the South Shetlands, and Graham Land were thus all made by 
British nationals – a fact reflected in the names given to these territories by 
which they have been known, and have figured in maps and charts, ever 
since....  Some discoveries of particular parts of these principal groups of 
territory were made by explorers or seamen of other nationalities; but the 
initial discoveries of all five principal groups were British.  There were no 
Spanish or Argentine discoveries.33 
 
                                                 
32 See Introduction. 
33 International Court of Justice, Antarctica cases (United Kingdom v. Argentina; United Kingdom v. 
Chile): orders of March 16th, 1956: removal from the list. 12. 
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In the hands of international lawyers, the romantic history of Antarctic exploration 
and discovery became highly politicized since it laid the basis of legal rights to the 
region.   
Following its summary of British discoveries, the British submission to the 
International Court of Justice went on to outline the administrative acts through 
which Great Britain had demonstrated its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands 
Dependencies.  In 1908, the British Government issued a Letters Patent, which 
provided for the government and administration of this most southerly part of the 
British Empire.34  According to the submission, the Letters Patent merely confirmed 
and defined a legal title that had already been in existence for many years.  As early 
as 1843, when the British Government were making administrative provisions for 
their newly acquired territory in the South Atlantic, the language spoke of 
“Settlements in the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies.”  Since 1887, the 
Colonial Office Year Book had been referring to South Georgia as part of the 
Dependencies.  It was South Georgia that was at the center of the “Whaling 
Ordinances” of 1906 by which the Falkland Islands Government sought to tax and 
regulate the nascent industry.  These ordinances made taking whales without a 
permit unlawful.  After the Letters Patent of 1907, the ordinances were revised, but 
the principle remained the same: companies interested in whaling in the oceans 
around Antarctica had to apply to the Falkland Islands Government for permission.  
Most importantly, according to the British submission to the International Court, 
                                                 
34 The Letters Patent of 1908 included a large part of southern Patagonia in the territory that it 
claimed for the British Empire.  This “oversight” was corrected in 1917 by a second letters patent 
defining the limits of the Falkland Islands Dependencies. 
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Norwegian, Argentine, and Chilean companies did actually apply for licenses, 
thereby confirming Britain’s territorial rights.   
In a reflection of the growing importance of science and the environment 
within the sovereignty dispute during the 1950s, the British legal submission 
incorporated the idea of conservation into its case for sovereignty over the Falkland 
Islands Dependencies.  The British lawyers claimed “one of the chief objects of the 
legislation was the conservation of stocks by regulating the number and tonnage of 
whaling vessels, the number of whaling licenses, [and] the number of whales to be 
taken by each license holder.”  Although the effectiveness of these regulations was 
reduced from the mid-1920s, following the advent of pelagic whaling from large, 
self-sustained, factory ships, the British continued their efforts to preserve whale 
stocks.  Most importantly, in 1925, the Colonial Office began an annual expedition 
of oceanographic research known as the Discovery Investigations in an attempt to 
put whale conservation policies on a firm scientific foundation: 
 
...the Dependencies during this period were covered literally by a network of 
patrols undertaken by the Discovery Committee.  The main focus of the 
Committee’s research was on the natural history of whales, the most 
important economic resource of the Dependencies, and especially intensive 
observations were made on the whaling grounds of South Georgia, the South 
Shetlands and Graham Land.  But the Committee also collected very 
extensive information on the hydrography and biology of the Dependencies, 
on the navigation and charting of their waters, and on Antarctic ice and ice-
navigation.  A large and important body of scientific material has been 
published by the Committee in the 27 volumes of “Discovery Reports,” and 
its research on the natural history of whales is admitted by expert opinion to 
have made a vital contribution towards the effective solving of the 
international problem of the conservation of whale fisheries.35 
                                                 
35 International Court of Justice, Antarctica cases (United Kingdom v. Argentina; United Kingdom v. 
Chile): orders of March 16th, 1956: removal from the list. 
 238 
 
In contrast to the British preoccupation with conservation – albeit from the 
perspective of maximizing economic resources – neither the Argentine nor the 
Chilean governments had shown any inclination towards the protection or scientific 
study of Antarctic whales.  British lawyers noted: “in the first quarter of the present 
century, when the territorial waters of the Dependencies were the base of operations 
of several whaling companies of different nationalities, Argentina took no measures 
(as a prudent sovereign would have done, or sought to do) to regulate these activities, 
or to conserve the stocks of the principal economic resource of the territories 
concerned.”36  Argentina had not participated in the 1927 League of Nations 
conference on whaling held in Geneva.  According to the British submission, the 
message was clear: Great Britain had demonstrated its moral rights to possession of 
the Antarctic Peninsula region while Argentina and Chile had not.   
The British submission concluded by detailing the ways in which Argentina 
and Chile had “embarked on a definite policy of encroachment” in the Antarctic 
Peninsula region.  The lawyers hinted at the cowardly nature of the South American 
claims, made while “the United Kingdom Government was occupied in the North 
and South Atlantic in dealing with attacks by Axis naval forces on Allied and 
Neutral sea-borne trade.”37  Despite its preoccupation with fighting Nazism in 
Europe and around the world, Great Britain had found the resources to respond to the 
Argentine and Chilean challenges in Antarctica.  Through the wartime Operation 
Tabarin, it was the British who had become the first country permanently to occupy 
the Antarctic Peninsula, thereby fulfilling the legal requirement of “effective 
                                                 
36 Ibid. 27. 
37 Ibid. 
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occupation.”  And the post-war Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey had continued 
and expanded the permanent British presence in Antarctica, while protests had been 
made at every opportunity against the South American pretensions.  The British 
Government’s submission to the International Court of Justice argued not only that 
the Falkland Islands Dependencies belonged to Great Britain from every legal 
perspective, but also implied that the South Americans were morally inferior and had 
no rights to the territories in question.   
Officials in Argentina and Chile agreed with very little of the British case, 
but they were not prepared to submit to the arbitration of the court.  Both South 
American countries went to great lengths to explain to the world why they could not 
accept arbitration of the Antarctic Sovereignty Dispute by the International Court of 
Justice.38  Central to the cases of both Argentina and Chile was the claim that the 
Antarctic Peninsula formed an “integral part” of their national territories, and was 
therefore exempt from an international ruling.  In an appeal to Pan-American 
sentiment, both countries also argued that they couldn’t accept arbitration since it 
would violate their obligations to the Rio Treaty of Reciprocal Defense.39  The 
Argentine and Chilean press stood firmly behind their governments and developed 
the legal and moral case against submission.  In Santiago, El Mercurio, the leading 
establishment newspaper, argued that the unilateral procedure followed by Great 
Britain represented an “innovation in international life,” which disregarded the 
principle of self-determination as an essential attribute of sovereignty.40  Reverting 
once again to the rhetoric of anti-colonialism, the establishment newspaper 
                                                 
38 For example, American Embassy Buenos Aires to Department of State, 17 May 1955. USNA 
702.022/5-1755. 
39 See, American Embassy Santiago to Department of State, 16 May 1955. USNA 702.022/5-1655.   
40 Ibid. 
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concluded that no government “may be compelled to do something against its will, 
without annulling its independence and converting the state into a protectorate or 
reducing it to the status of a colony.”41 
The refusal of Argentina and Chile to accept the authority of the International 
Court of Justice meant that the Antarctic case was never heard.  There was nothing 
the British or the international community could do to force the Court to hear the 
case, and in March 1956, the case was quietly removed from the Court’s list.  
Britain’s inability to get the case heard represented both a success and a failure for 
British diplomacy.  On the one hand, by showing a willingness to accept 
international legal arbitration, the British were able to take the moral high ground in 
the dispute.  From now on they could defend their actions by referring back to their 
willingness to comply with international legal norms.   On the other hand, this moral 
high ground counted for little if there was no chance of arbitration or negotiation, 
and, in the virulently anti-colonialist atmosphere of the mid-1950s, the moral 
authority was successfully countered in much of the world by the South American 
accusation that British claims were fundamentally imperialist in their nature.  The 
episode meant that there would be no conventional resolution of the sovereignty 
dispute in the way that, for example, the 1933 East Greenland Case had been decided 
in Denmark’s favor.  With hindsight, the failure to hear the case at the International 
Court of Justice can be seen as laying an important foundation for the Antarctic 
                                                 
41 The Argentine Government used similar language in a note explaining why it was rejecting 
international arbitration: “The acceptance of the course proposed by the British ‘would be 
incompatible with the aspirations of the peoples and governments of this Continent who have 
confirmed in the 10th Inter-American Conference at Caracas their desire finally to eliminate 




Treaty of 1959.  But at the time the South American refusal to go to the Hague 
looked like it would indefinitely prolong the dispute. 
 
OVERTHROW OF PERÓN 
Throughout the first half of the 1950s, officials on all sides of the sovereignty 
dispute had noted that the Argentine President was a major obstacle in the way of 
any compromise being reached.  Perón had become obsessed by his “Antarctic 
Dream,” and, in many ways, he had more to gain by keeping the dispute alive than 
by winning any partial victory.  During the early 1950s, the Argentine population 
was becoming increasingly polarized by Perón’s government.  On one side, Perón 
maintained a firm base of support from his traditional constituency among the 
working classes.  Whipped up by government propaganda, this support became 
almost religious in its fervor.  On the other side, a growing number of people – led 
by the hierarchy of the Catholic Church and many among the military – were 
becoming exasperated by Perón’s policies.  The traditional middle and upper classes 
believed that Perón was wasting the riches of Argentina and destroying their country.  
Nevertheless, the vast majority of Perón’s opponents shared the belief that the 
Malvinas and the Antarctic Peninsula belonged to Argentina.  The promotion of 
Argentine sovereignty in Antarctica therefore offered the embattled President a 
chance to flex his nationalist muscles and a hope of bringing together a divided 
country.   
Unfortunately for Perón, his hard line policy in Antarctica was not enough to 
quell the rising tide of opposition.  In particular, the economy was in rapid decline.42  
                                                 
42 For a detailed description of the economic problems of Argentina, see Lewis, The crisis of 
Argentine capitalism. 
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The policies which Perón had used to challenge the alliance between the Argentine 
oligarchy and foreign business – his nationalist crusade against economic 
imperialism – led to major structural adjustments in the Argentine economy.  The 
boom years immediately after the Second World War had allowed Perón to make 
economic promises that soon proved difficult to fulfill in areas such as welfare, 
pensions, health, and education.  The establishment of IAPI, the government 
monopoly on export agriculture, proved to be a major disincentive to private 
investment in agriculture.  As a consequence, Argentina did not share equally in the 
surge in agricultural productivity that accompanied the end of the Second World War 
in much of the rest of the world.  The nationalization of the railroads and other 
privately held businesses did not end industrial unrest, and in many industries days 
lost to strikes actually increased.  More often than not, Perón responded to worker’s 
demands by making concessions and raising pay.  This led to inflation and began the 
classic downward spiral that has come to be associated with populist economics.43   
Opposition to Perón was led by the Catholic Church, but also contained 
significant elements from the military, especially in the Navy.  On 15 June 1955, 
Naval aircraft flew over the center of Buenos Aires dropping bombs on the 
presidential palace, the Casa Rosada, killing hundreds of people.  Perón himself 
survived unhurt, and he emerged defiantly to order the destruction of the forces of 
oligarchy.  Nevertheless, the attack marked the beginning of the end of Perón’s 
presidency.  Three months later a military uprising took control of the city of 
Cordoba, the largest city in the Argentine interior.  In response to this event, the 
armed forces split in two, but it quickly became apparent that the anti-Perón forces 
                                                 
43 Ibid.   
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were much stronger than those of Perón’s supporters.  After minor skirmishes across 
Argentina, the President fled the country, first to Paraguay and then to Spain.  To the 
delight of many among the Argentine elite, the Revolución Libertador, as the 
uprising became known, had successfully toppled Perón’s democratically elected 
government and replaced it with a military dictatorship headed by General 
Arumburu.  
The Revolución Libertador marked not only a new phase in the national life 
of Argentina, but also a new phase in the Antarctic sovereignty dispute.  Although 
the military officers who took over the Argentine Government were no less 
nationalistic than Perón, they were slightly less obstinate and more willing to 
negotiate.44  Several of the officers involved in the coup had direct experience in 
Antarctica, and the administrative transition in Antarctic affairs was a smooth one.  
Soon after taking power, the military government stripped General Pujato of his 
position as head of the Argentine Antarctic Institute and removed his name from the 
title of that institution.  Admiral Panzarini, a naval officer who had served on the 
Antarctic Commission, became the new head of the Institute.  The military 
government continued its de-Peronization of Antarctica by removing all the 
Antarctic names with associations with the overthrown regime: “Bahía Eva Perón,” 
for example, was simply crossed out of school textbooks.  Pujato himself remained at 
Base Belgrano in the Weddell Sea, a curious vestige of the Perón Government.45  
                                                 
44 One of the complaints against Perón was that he had isolated Argentina from the world community 
to the detriment of Argentina’s diplomatic and defense position.  One of the major foreign policy 
goals of the new government was to maneuver the country into a closer relationship with the Western 
anti-communist alliance.  This meant that they at least had to appear more cooperative on such issues 
as Antarctica.  Juan Archibaldo Lanús, De Chapultepec al Beagle: política exterior argentina, 1945-
1980 (Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1984).   
45 This untouchable Peronist outpost deep in the frozen south must have been one of the most curious 
anomalies of the new political situation in Argentina. Susana Rigoz, Hernán Pujato: el conquistador 
del desierto blanco (Buenos Aires, 2002). 
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When he finally returned to Buenos Aires eighteen months later, he was informed of 
his removal and he left the country in self-imposed exile.  Perón’s Antarctic dream 
was shattered, but Argentine interest in Antarctica would continue.  
The removal of Perón from power delighted the other two powers with direct 
political interests in Antarctica.  In Great Britain, the recently retired Winston 
Churchill apocryphally declared “the overthrow of Perón is the best thing that has 
happened to the British Empire since the end of the Second World War.”46  For 
Chile, the overthrow of Perón removed some of the ambiguity of its Antarctic policy.  
Perón’s pan-Americanism and the idea of a South American Antarctica had created 
an awkward situation for Chilean politicians.  On the one hand, alliance with 
Argentina offered a way of promoting Chilean Antarctic interests without having to 
pander to US or British interests; on the other hand, it was always clear that Perón 
saw himself as the dominant partner in this relationship.  With Perón gone and a 
military government now in power, Chilean Antarctic policy could simply define 
itself against Argentina’s overlapping claims.  Perhaps most importantly for all 
countries involved in Antarctica, the overthrow of Perón brought back an element of 
trust and predictability to Argentine Antarctic policy, both of which would be 
necessary for any international agreement.   
 
                                                 
46 Perón responded with a vituperative pamphlet written immediately after the coup that even went as 
far as claiming, almost certainly incorrectly, that Great Britain had co-operated with the oligarchic 
forces that had overthrown him.   
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Chapter 8: Internationalization and its Enemies, 1955-57 
The period from 1955 to 1957 marked a decisive shift in the politics of the 
Antarctic sovereignty dispute.  Growing international scientific and political interest 
in Antarctica meant that the conflict between Britain, Argentina, and Chile ceased to 
be a purely regional matter.  Plans for an International Geophysical Year (IGY) – a 
massive, coordinated scientific study of the world, to be held in 1957-58 – brought 
Antarctica into the focus of the global scientific community.  The relative lack of 
scientific understanding of the continent combined with its unique geographical 
position made it one of the central subjects of IGY research.  Out of the twelve 
nations with plans for IGY work in Antarctica, the prospective programs of the 
United States and the Soviet Union were by far the largest.  With the age of “Big 
Science” about to come to Antarctica, many feared that super-power rivalries would 
bring the Cold War to the bottom of the world.  Amidst this contradictory climate of 
co-operation and suspicion, India made a proposal that the Antarctic question should 
be discussed at the United Nations.  From being on the very edge of international 
affairs, Antarctica seemed to be becoming a truly international question.   
Despite these wider developments, the Anglo-Argentine-Chilean sovereignty 
dispute continued to play a central role in shaping Antarctic politics.1    In Argentina, 
                                                 
1 For example, vacillations in United States policy towards Antarctica can be explained, in large part, 
by the fact that three of its Cold War allies had conflicting claims to the Antarctic continent.  For 
investigations of US Antarctic policy see, for example, Klotz, America on the ice: Antarctic policy 
issues. Moore, "Tethered to an Iceberg: United States Policy toward the Antarctic, 1939-49." Jason 
Kendall Moore, "Bungled publicity: Little America big America and the rationale for non-claimancy 
1946–61," Polar Record 40 (2004).  The basic cause of friction between the State Department and the 
Defense Department was whether the United States should continue to reserve its rights to the entire 
continent (the Defense position) or whether it should make a claim to the unclaimed sector (the State 
position).  Both policies originated out of differing opinions over the best way to respond to the 
presence of other “friendly” claims.   
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the new military government was no less nationalistic than that of Perón, and it 
continued to pursue an extensive Antarctic program.  In Chile, although the 
government of Carlos Ibañez del Campo paid less attention to the active promotion 
of Antártica Chilena, there was no willingness to give anything away.  In both South 
American countries, Antarctica had become a powerful nationalist symbol, 
somewhat detatched from the material reality of the continent: the question of 
ownership mattered more, for its own sake, than the potential for finding economic 
riches.  Neither Argentina nor Chile wanted a broad international discussion of 
Antarctica, which they feared might lead to some form of internationalization of their 
Antarctic territories.  In their desire to keep Antarctica off the agenda of the United 
Nations, the governments of Buenos Aires and Santiago shared a common cause 
with Great Britain, which, for its part, had no wish to see Antarctica added to the 
long list of anti-colonial grievances already being discussed.  As a consequence, 
despite the sometimes bitter dispute, Argentina, Chile, and Great Britain worked in 
loose alliance to oppose the Indian proposal to raise the Antarctica question at the 
United Nations.  This ability to make a common cause despite disagreements 
established an important precedent for the future of the southern continent. 
Between 1955 and 1957, Britain’s commitment to the retention of exclusive 
political sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies was, in fact, beginning to 
wane.2  On a global scale, the Suez Crisis of late 1956, and Harold Macmillan’s 
ensuing assumption of the premiership, led to an extensive review of British foreign 
policy objectives.  This review, in turn, preceded an acceleration of the process of 
                                                 
2 Ronald Hyam notes that in 1955, the Falkland Islands Dependencies were the only part of the 
colonial empire in which Anthony Eden would contemplate any form of concession.  After 
discussion, however, no concessions were made.  Hyam, Britain's declining empire: the road to 
decolonisation, 1918-1968. 
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decolonization.3  In Antarctica, Britain’s IGY program would become closely tied up 
with its reevaluation of empire.  Before Britain made concessions in any part of the 
Falkland Islands Dependencies, officials wanted to know the economic potential of 
the territory they might be losing.  The IGY promised to function as an economic 
survey of Britain’s Antarctic possessions, revealing what should be kept and what 
could be disposed of without loss of resources.  On a local level, the Antarctic 
whaling industry – Britain’s principal source of revenue in the region – entered a 
period of near collapse.  Despite the good intentions of the International Whaling 
Commission (IWC) and the imposition of quotas, there had been a return to massive 
over-fishing in the post-war period.  Since the beginning of the 1950s, the cost of 
Britain’s presence in Antarctica had exceeded the revenues generated in the region, 
as Britain had responded to Perón’s Antarctic Dream by increasing its activities in 
the region.  The prospective collapse of the whaling industry chipped away at the 
belief in the economic potential of Antarctica.  As increasing scientific research 
revealed dreams of the continent as a frozen El Dorado to be pure fantasies, more 
and more British politicians and officials began to question the retention of exclusive 
political sovereignty.   
 
ORIGINS OF THE IGY 
The International Geophysical Year originated out of Anglo-American 
scientific partnership.   In April 1950, a group of North American scientists held a 
                                                 
3 As Hopkins demonstrates, the connection between the review and the subsequent acceleration of 
decolonization is a contentious issue.  Macmillan liked to give a pretence of orderly intention to what 
was often a chaotic uncontrolled affair.  See A.G. Hopkins, “Macmillan’s Audit of Empire, 1957” in 
P. F. Clarke and Clive Trebilcock, Understanding decline : perceptions and realities of British 
economic performance (Cambridge ; New York, NY, USA, 1997). 
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dinner in Silver Spring, Maryland, in honor of the visit of Sydney Chapman, a 
leading British geophysicist.4  Inspired by the suggestions of Lloyd Berkner, a 
leading figure within the US scientific establishment, the dining scientists came up 
with the idea of holding a third International Polar Year.5  This should take place, 
they thought, in 1957-58, 25 years after the previous polar year, and during a period 
of maximum sunspot activity.  They argued that advances in many of the world’s 
unanswered geophysical questions required a coordinated international scientific 
research program on a massive scale, especially in the polar regions.  Recent 
technological advances also offered new opportunities for scientific investigation, 
many emerging directly from the Second World War.6   
From its inception, the IGY had significant political undertones.  Berkner 
made his suggestion for holding an International Polar Year at the same time as he 
was working on a paper entitled “Science and Foreign Relations” for the State 
Department, and his motivations for holding an International Polar Year were not 
purely scientific. 7  The report stated “certain definite benefits which are highly 
essential to the security and welfare of the US, both generally and with respect to the 
progress of science, stem from international co-operation and exchange with respect 
                                                 
4 Lewis, A continent for science; the Antarctic adventure. 62.  Sydney Chapman was Sedleian 
Professor of Natural Philosophy at Queens College, Oxford.  He had constructed a model of the 
earth’s atmosphere and the space surrounding it in order to investigate the effects of “outbursts from 
the sun.”  See Walter Sullivan, Assault on the unknown; the International Geophysical Year, [1st ed. 
(New York, 1961). 20. 
5 Previous Polar Years had been held in 1882-1883 and 1932-1933.  See 
http://classic.ipy.org/development/history.htm (accessed on 18th February 2007). 
6 Sullivan, Assault on the unknown; the International Geophysical Year. 23. 
7 See Allan A. Needell, Science, Cold War and the American state: Lloyd V. Berkner and the balance 
of professional ideals (Amsterdam, 2000). 299. 
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to scientific matters.”8  A secret annex to the report added that increased 
international contacts would offer enhanced opportunities for intelligence gathering.9  
In the months following the Maryland dinner, the scientists’ ideas became a 
working project.  After lobbying by Berkner and Chapman, the Mixed Commission 
on the Ionosphere (MCI), an international scientific organization with an interest in 
the upper atmosphere, endorsed the proposal for an International Polar Year.  From 
the MCI the plans for a Polar Year were taken to other international scientific 
organizations such as the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics and the 
World Meteorological Organization, as well as to national scientific academies.10  In 
late 1951, the project was approved by the International Council of Scientific Unions 
(ICSU), an umbrella group for all the world’s major scientific societies, and it was 
decided to substitute the word “Polar” with “Geophysical.”11   In May 1952, the 
ICSU Bureau sent out planning invitations to its various component academies, and 
it established a Special Committee, known as CSAGI, to oversee the organization of 
IGY.12  Sydney Chapman was elected President of the Special Committee, Lloyd 
Berkner Vice President, and Marcel Nicolet, a geophysicist from Belgium, Secretary 
                                                 
8 Quoted in Ibid. 
9 Ibid.  On page 298 Needell writes “Another consideration, more difficult to document, was that by 
the mid-1950s the capabilities of Soviet science and technology had become a deep and disturbing 
mystery to American military planners.  Enticing the Soviet Union to make public statements and 
analyzable demonstrations of just what it had been able to accomplish, especially in rocketry, became 
a high-priority goal of American intelligence organizations.”     
10 Ibid. 300. 
11 ICSU had been founded at the beginning of the 1930s.  It was the third attempt to unify the world’s 
various scientific unions.  It was essentially a non-governmental organization and ran parallel to 
UNESCO.  The decision to change the name to the International Geophysical Year was taken at a 
meeting in Canberra because there was a feeling that the focus on the polar regions alone was too 
restrictive.  The World Meteorological Organization (WMO), in particular, did not like the exclusive 
focus on the polar regions.  See Sullivan, Assault on the unknown; the International Geophysical 
Year. 26. 
12 The Special Committee was known as CSAGI from its French initials, Comité Spécial de l’Année 
Geophysique Internationale.   
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General.13  The Committee decided upon nine program areas: meteorology, latitude 
and longitude determinations, geomagnetism, the ionosphere, aurora and airglow, 
solar activity, cosmic ray, glaciology, oceanography.14  Although research would be 
conducted throughout the world, Antarctica and outer space were singled out for 
special attention.    
In late September and early October 1954 a plenary meeting of CSAGI was 
held in Rome, to which all interested countries sent delegates.  The meeting began to 
make detailed plans for the scientific research of the IGY.  At the opening session of 
the conference, the Soviet Embassy declared that the Soviet Academy of Sciences 
would participate. 15  The head Russian delegate would be Vladimir V. Beloussov, an 
expert in geotectonics.  The inclusion of the Soviet Union brought Cold War rivalries 
into the heart of the IGY, especially in the field of satellites and space exploration, 
but it also ensured that the enterprise would be a genuinely worldwide endeavor.  
Initially, however, the Soviets made no mention of their plans for Antarctica, and 
they did not send delegates to the meetings discussing plans for Antarctic research.  
At these meetings, the participating countries made plans to occupy fourteen new 
sites across Antarctica.  Ten of these sites were provisionally allocated and the 
remaining four were left undecided.  With echoes of the heroic era of Antarctic 
exploration, the conference report proudly stated that the assault on Antarctica was to 
be “the first really thorough world effort” to uncover the geographic secrets at the 
                                                 
13 At a planning meeting in late June and early July 1953. 
14 See Needell, Science, Cold War and the American state: Lloyd V. Berkner and the balance of 
professional ideals. 309. 
15 Sullivan, Assault on the unknown; the International Geophysical Year. 29. Two years later the 
Soviet government would issue a decree giving IGY research priority access to workers, facilities, and 
instruments 
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bottom of the world.16  The delegates decided to re-convene in June 1955, for a 
conference specifically discussing Antarctica.   
The United States had been absent from Antarctica for five years, but the 
plans for the IGY encouraged the Eisenhower administration to think again about its 
policy towards the Southern Continent. With the Korean War having ended, the US 
military once again had resources to spare for Antarctic operations.  The IGY offered 
the United States the opportunity to re-engage with Antarctica in a way that would 
not directly threaten the sovereignty claims of its Cold War allies.17  Several high-
ranking US officials saw the IGY as an economic survey of the Southern continent.  
For example, Admiral Duncan, the Navy’s representative on the National Security 
Council, stated “we should carry out our plans to achieve our scientific purposes, but 
do nothing about establishing claims to Antarctica until we see what is actually 
revealed about the resources of the area in the course of carrying out our program for 
the IGY.”18  President Eisenhower supported a continuation of the traditional policy 
of refusing to recognize any claims to Antarctica, while reserving the sovereign 
rights of the United States to any part of the continent, although he saw no need to 
conduct reconnaissance in Antarctica “over and beyond what was required for 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 30.  The conference also selected five other areas to receive special treatment: the Arctic, the 
equatorial region, and three meridions stretching from pole to pole.   
17 All seven claimant states were part of the Cold War’s “Western Alliance”: Britain, Argentina, 
Chile, France, Norway, Australia, and New Zealand.   
18 Memorandum of Discussion at the 272nd Meeting of the NSC, Washington, 12 January 1956.  
FRUS, 1955-57, Volume 11, United Nations and General Matters.  No. 313. (Source: Eisenhower 
Library, Whitman File, NSC Series.  Top Secret.  Prepared by Gleason on Jan 13). The State 
Department also stressed the importance of conducting scientific research before making a claim: “... 
Perhaps more importantly [than maintaining and extending US rights] such expeditions add to the 
present meager knowledge of the area and in time will permit a more accurate estimate of its future 
possibilities.  For the present, it is doubtful whether we yet know enough to decide the basic question 
of how much of Antarctica the US should attempt to acquire.”  Suggested reply to letter from 
Representative Charles E. Bennett regarding US policy in Antarctica, 24 February 1955.  USNA, 
702.022/2-1755. 
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scientific purposes.”19  If the United States were going to upset its allies by making 
overlapping claims, officials reasoned, it should at least first make sure that these 
claims were worth making: scientific investigations would show which parts, if any, 
were economically valuable.  US scientists, eager to receive government funding, 
were keen to play up the potential economic and political utility of their work: 
Berkner, for example, stressed the defense related research of the program, under 
which he included meteorology, upper atmosphere research, and electronic 
communications.20  Perhaps most importantly, in the grand strategy of the Cold War, 
US officials believed, perhaps somewhat naively, that participation in the IGY, with 
its rhetorical shield of science, offered the possibility that renewed US presence in 
Antarctica might not provoke a Soviet response.21  The United States was keen that 
the Cold War should not spread southwards, but they wanted to ensure their piece of 
the frozen pie.   
In Britain, leading scientists had been behind the IGY from its inception, and 
occupied leading roles in the leadership of CSAGI.22  As insiders to the project, the 
British scientific establishment strongly supported an impressive showing.  Officials 
in the government, while generally supportive of the IGY, had two different visions 
                                                 
19 Memorandum of Discussion at the 272nd Meeting of the NSC, Washington, 12 January 1956.  
FRUS, 1955-57, Volume 11, United Nations and General Matters.  No. 313. (Source: Eisenhower 
Library, Whitman File, NSC Series.  Top Secret.  Prepared by Gleason on Jan 13). 
20 See Needell, Science, Cold War and the American state: Lloyd V. Berkner and the balance of 
professional ideals. 214. 
21 Several NSC Papers from the mid-1950s concerning Antarctica had this as their major policy 
objective.  See, for example, National Security Council Report, NSC 5424/1, 19 July 1954.  NSA, 
Presidential Directives PD00414. 
22 Not only was Sydney Chapman the President of CSAGI, but in 1956 the CSAGI Bureau appointed 
Vice Admiral Sir Archibald Day, recently retired as the Royal Navy’s Hydrographer, to be the IGY 
coordinator. Immediately before its start, Chapman described the IGY as the “greatest example of 
world wide co-operation in the history of our race” and Prince Philip gave a television lecture on the 
importance of the project.  Sullivan, Assault on the unknown; the International Geophysical Year. 35 
and 48. 
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of its purpose.  Along with high-ranking officials in the United States, many British 
officials viewed the enterprise as a vast economic survey of Antarctica.23  Not 
enough was known about the economic potential of the continent, they argued, to 
make a rational decision about whether or not to maintain some or all of Britain’s 
sovereignty claims.  This group generally favored the plan for a large-scale aerial 
survey of the Falkland Islands Dependencies.24  A second group of officials drew on 
the traditional imperial connection between science and empire and viewed the IGY 
as an opportunity to demonstrate Britain’s continued scientific authority on an 
international stage, in order to prove once and for all the validity of Britain’s claims 
to the region.25  This group strongly supported Sir Vivian Fuchs’ idea of a trans-
Antarctic expedition.  This expedition would complete Ernest Shackleton’s shattered 
dream of crossing the entire Antarctic continent without ever having to leave 
territory claimed by the British Commonwealth.  The proponents of a strong 
scientific showing also supported the establishment by the Royal Society of a base 
on the coast of the Weddell Sea, close to where General Pujato had recently 
established Base Belgrano.  The majority of British officials fell somewhere between 
these two positions and supported the strengthening of British title at the same time 
as assessing whether that title was worth the trouble.   
In contrast to the United States and Great Britain, Argentina and Chile were 
less enthusiastic about IGY research in Antarctica.  The proposals for open scientific 
access to all parts of the continent appeared to undermine their sovereignty claims.  
Both countries worried that, in the words of Chile’s General Cañas, “beneath the 
                                                 
23 Future Constitutional Development in the Colonies.  May 1957.  TNA, CAB 134/1551. 
24 P. G. Mott, Wings over ice: an account of the Falkland Islands and Dependencies Aerial Survey 
Expedition 1955-57 (Long Sutton, 1986). 
25 For a discussion of the connections between science and empire see “Introduction.” 
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appearance of a scientific meeting a political process is in march,” and both feared 
that the Soviet Union might establish hostile bases in the region. 26  They also 
continued to make references to the “colonial activities” of Great Britain in 
Antarctica, which included British science.27  At the time of the planning meetings in 
late 1954 and 1955, Argentina was going through a period of political instability that 
would culminate in the overthrow of Perón.  This uncertainty took attention away 
from the Antarctic.  The recent acquisition of an icebreaker and Pujato’s expedition 
to the Weddell Sea had demonstrated that Argentina could more than hold its own in 
any display of scientific strength.  Nevertheless, there was little enthusiasm for a 
project that could potentially undermine Argentina’s sovereignty rights.   
In Chile, mistrust of the IGY was greater still.  Chilean politicians shared 
Argentina’s legitimate fears that the IGY had underlying political motivations.  
Additionally, unlike Argentina, and as Julio Escudero had consistently maintained, 
Chile could not compete in a straight scientific contest with its rivals in Antarctica.28 
Chile lacked the economic resources and scientific expertise to conduct scientific 
research on a similar scale to either Britain or Argentina, and it could certainly not 
compete with the United States or Soviet Union.  At the CSAGI meeting in Rome, 
Chile had not been present at the Antarctic planning sessions, and before the Paris 
planning meeting had still not formed an IGY National Commission.  On 27 May 
1955, the Chilean Antarctic Commission met to discuss whether Chile should send a 
                                                 
26 Reunión de la Comisión Chilena Antártica, 27 May 1955.  RR.EE., Departamento de Limites: 
Comisión Chilena Antártica, 1949-56.  1958. 
27 See for example, American Embassy Santiago to Department of State, March 14 1955.  USNA, 
702.022/3-1455. 
28 Julio Escudero had argued this point several years earlier while putting forward his plans for a 
modus vivendi.  See Chapter 5, “Antarctic Detente.” 
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delegation to the upcoming Paris Conference.29  However, by this stage, the 
momentum behind the IGY was such that it would have been difficult and politically 
disadvantageous for Chile to remain on the outside.  Señor Melo, the Foreign 
Minister, noted how scientific decisions could have political consequences, and 
argued that Chile needed to be on the inside. 30  General Cañas was another 
proponent of participation.31 Convinced by these arguments, the Chileans decided to 
attend the Paris meeting, but they petitioned for a delay in order to allow them to 
prepare their program.  This was granted and the Paris meeting was pushed back to 
July.   
 
THE CONFERENCE OF PARIS 
In early July 1955, representatives from twelve nations met in Paris to discuss 
plans for the Antarctic section of the IGY.  Georges Laclavère, a French Colonel 
with a strong personality, was elected chairman.  At the opening session, to the 
apparent surprise of the assembled delegates, Laclavère announced that the Soviet 
Union intended to send an expedition to Antarctica as part of the IGY.  If US 
officials had seriously expected to be able to keep the Soviet Union out of 
Antarctica, they had failed.32  The IGY in fact offered the Soviets an excellent 
opportunity to get directly involved with the science and politics of the Antarctica 
                                                 
29 Reunión de la Comisión Chilena Antártica, 27 May 1955.  RR.EE., “Departamento de Limites: 
Comisión Chilena Antártica, 1949-56.  1958.” 
30 Ministerio de RR.EE. Concurrencia de Chile a la Conferencia Antártica de París, 20 May 1955.  
RR.EE., “Departamento de Limites: Comisión Chilena Antártica, 1949-56.  1958.” 
31 Reunión de la Comisión Chilena Antártica, 27 May 1955.  “RR.EE., Departamento de Limites: 
Comisión Chilena Antártica, 1949-56.  1958.” 
32 Although exclusion of the USSR was one of the central tenets of official US policy towards 
Antarctica – as revealed in several NSC documents – one of the broader political motivations for the 
IGY was to force Russia to display its scientific expertise.  See, Needell, Science, Cold War and the 
American state: Lloyd V. Berkner and the balance of professional ideals. 
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continent.  From their activities in Siberia and the Arctic, Soviet scientists already 
had vast experience of polar conditions.33  From the late 1940s, the Soviet 
Government had started to show an increasing interest in the Southern Continent, 
through whaling expeditions and declarations of interest.34 The IGY offered the 
Soviet Union a world stage upon which to show off its scientific and technological 
prowess.  Given the IGY’s emphasis on Antarctic research, it seemed only natural 
that the Soviets would want to participate.   
Three days into the meeting, Dr. Belousov, the head Soviet Union’s IGY 
program, arrived.  He apologized for his lateness and declared that the Soviet Union 
would participate fully in IGY research in Antarctica.  He added that the Soviets 
would build a base at the South Pole.  This suggestion caused a stir among all the 
other delegates, since the United States had already stated its intention to build a base 
at the world’s most southerly point.  Oscar Pinochet de la Barra, a member of the 
Chilean delegation, recalled that a pin could have been heard dropping in the 
conference room.35  In a moment of quick thinking Belousov changed his country’s 
plans: if the South Pole were already occupied, then the Soviet Union would build a 
base at what he called the “Pole of Relative Inaccessibility” – the point in the 
continent furthest from any ocean.  The Russians could trump their Cold War rivals 
                                                 
33 With the possible exception of Norway, the Soviet Union probably had more experience in polar 
regions than any other country with interests in Antarctica. 
34 For example, in June 1950, the Soviet Union had issued a statement setting forth its interest in 
Antarctic affairs and demanding to be included in “any international consideration of that area.” See, 
State Department Memorandum of Conversation, 9 June 1950.  USNA, 702.022/6-850.  The US 
Embassy in London discussed the reasons for the Soviet declaration: “Foreign Office has no idea what 
inspired Russian note or what next steps Russians contemplate.  Cecil felt that remote possibility 
might be carefully worded resolution, suggesting some form trusteeship, for GA since current Russian 
tactics vis-a-vis Latins seem to include fomenting Latins’ anti-colonial sentiments and USSR has 
always had greater success in Assembly’s Fourth Committee than elsewhere.”  United States Embassy 
London to Secretary of State.  19 June 1950.  USNA, 702.00/6-1950. 
35 Pinochet de la Barra, Medio siglo de recuerdos antárticos: memorias. 82. 
 257 
for sheer scientific and technological bravado, even if the South Pole had already 
been taken.   
Throughout the meeting in Paris, the Chilean delegation, along with that of 
Argentina, sought to establish a clear distinction between IGY scientific research and 
politics in Antarctica.36  Early in the meeting, Argentina and Chile proposed a 
motion stating that none of the scientific research conducted as part of the IGY 
should have any implications for questions of sovereignty in Antarctica.  Initially, 
Laclavère rejected such a proposal.37  He argued that even such a negative motion 
would bring politics into what was essentially a scientific organization.  But the 
Argentine and Chilean delegations remained insistent, and they also drew upon the 
rhetoric of science to argue that lurking political considerations would jeopardize the 
scientific integrity of the IGY. Although neither South American government was 
happy to see the spread of communism to the Southern Continent, the Soviet 
presence at the Paris meeting in some ways played into their hands.38    The other 
“free world” delegations feared the consequences of the Soviet Union using its IGY 
activity to stake a sovereignty claim to the continent, and the South American 
proposal seemed to offer at least a token gesture against such a prospect.   The 
meeting therefore established a “Gentleman’s Agreement” by which none of the 
research and activity of the IGY would have any bearing on the question of Antarctic 
sovereignty. 
Despite this success, both Argentina and Chile remained suspicious of the 
IGY, and worried about the increasing Soviet presence in Antarctica.  Writing from 
                                                 
36 Ibid. 80-84. 
37Sullivan, Assault on the unknown; the International Geophysical Year. 293. 
38 Miguel Echenique Zegers, Ministro Consejero al Señor Ministro de RR.EE., 26 September 1955. 
RR.EE., “Conferencias Antárticas A.G.I., 1955-56.”  
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Paris, Miguel Echenique Zegers, counselor to the Chilean Minister of Foreign 
Relations, noted ominously: 
 
This Russian interest in Antarctica is of great importance to us, because it is a 
powerful element that enters into the game with respect to the United States 
and Great Britain, the latter of which we consider, above all, as our principal 
adversary in those regions.  Although, at the moment, the Russian bases are 
very far from our own, it would not be strange if tomorrow they built inland 
stations inside our sector.  This would not be extraordinary considering that 
the great powers have encountered a formula of “acting in the name of 
science” in order to take possession of Antarctica...  It is clear that the bases 
solicited now by the Soviet Union are but the beginning of a series.39 
 
For the time being, Britain remained the “principal threat” to Chile’s Antarctic 
claims, but the Soviet Union represented a much more hostile adversary looming 
ever larger.  For their parts, Britain and the United States worried about the Soviet 
presence in Antarctica, but they also hoped that this threat could be used to make 
Argentina and Chile more compliant and less dogmatic in their sovereignty claims.40  
In this way the stage was set for a dangerous game of bluff and double-bluff, 
throughout which science would be used to play out political intentions.   
 
INDIA AND THE UNITED NATIONS 
On 17 February 1956, Arthur Lall, India’s permanent representative to the 
United Nations, circulated a letter to the Secretary General asking for the question of 
Antarctica to be raised as an item on the provisional agenda of the eleventh session 
                                                 
39 Ibid. 
40 The Soviet presence also worried Britain and the United States.  See, for example, Edwin D. 
Crowley (BNA) to various internal State Department recpipients, 30 September 1955.  USNA 
702.022/9-3055. 
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of the General Assembly.41  The initial proposal contained no explanatory 
memorandum, but at a meeting with the other Commonwealth Delegations in New 
York, Lall said that he thought some form of United Nations Trusteeship was a 
possibility.42  The Indian representative told his Commonwealth colleagues that the 
current interest in Antarctica generated by the IGY was one reason for the proposed 
UN debate; another was the question of the various territorial claims that existed 
there.  
The leading figure behind the Indian proposal was Krishna Menon, a veteran 
anti-colonial campaigner who was continually looking for new ways to challenge 
European imperialism.  Until recently, Menon had served as India’s permanent 
representative to the United Nations, and at the General Assembly meeting to be held 
in November he would be the head of the Indian delegation. 43  Educated in India and 
England, Krishna Menon had been a staunch member of the British Labour Party’s 
left wing, with close associations with the British Parliamentary Group for World 
Government.44  He had played a leading role in championing Indian independence 
and had been rewarded by Nehru with a leading position in India’s Foreign Service.  
Menon had a reputation as a skilled diplomat, but someone who was difficult to work 
with – a reputation that his proposal to raise the Antarctic question at the United 
Nations did nothing to diminish.  The British Commonwealth Relations Office 
                                                 
41 United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations to Foreign Office, 21 February 1956.  TNA, FO 
371/119835 
42 Ibid. 
43 Oxford Dictionary of National Biography [online].  In 1940 Menon had been expelled from the 
Labour Party due to his close connections with the Indian independence movement.   
44 J.S. Whitehead Minute, 25 February 1956.  TNA, FO 371/119835.  The World Government Group 
in the British Parliament showed a particular interest in the creation of an international regime for 
Antarctica.  See also M.C.G. Man Minute, 7 May 1956.  TNA, FO 371/119836.  Another member of 
this group was Edward Shackleton, the son of the famous polar explorer. Whitehead Minute, 31 May 
1956.  TNA, FO 371/119836. 
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suggested that Menon was making this move at this time for lack of any other cause 
to champion at the United Nations.45 “This is quite a good selection,” one official 
wryly noted, “since it will cause the maximum amount of irritation to the largest 
possible number of countries.”46  The Foreign Office branded Menon and his 
colleagues “professional mischief makers.”47  If Menon’s main intention had been to 
cause trouble, he had certainly succeeded.   
The British government privately fumed at the Indian proposal to raise the 
Antarctic question at the United Nations.  “This raises all sorts of problems” was the 
first response of Morgan Man, the Foreign Office official with responsibility for 
Antarctic affairs.48  A day later he added that a debate in the United Nations “might 
cause us all a lot of trouble and embarrassment and give the Russians a splendid 
opportunity for mischief making.”49  A minute by I.F.S. Vincent set out Britain’s 
main objections to the Indian proposal: 
 
(i) HMG has steadfastly refused for several years to accept the idea 
that territories over which they have sovereign rights should be submitted to 
UN control. 
 (ii) Important discussions are going on with the United States and 
interested Commonwealth Governments, which we hope will lead to a 
territorial settlement in Antarctica.  These negotiations may, however, take 
several months, and we should not want them interrupted. 
                                                 
45 Man Minute, 20 February 1956.  TNA, FO 371/119835.  This assumption was confirmed in a 
conversation between Lall and an official from the State Department’s United Nations Department.  
Lall confirmed “the genesis of the idea had in fact been Indian determination to play a more active 
and leading role at the General Assembly this year than last.” See, British Embassy Washington to 
Foreign Office, 12 March 1956.  TNA, FO 371/119835. 
46 R.L.D. Jaspar (CRO), 20 February 1956.  TNA, FO 371/119835. 
47 Pink Memo, 20 February 1956.  TNA, FO 371/119835. 
48 Man Minute, 20 February 1956.  TNA, FO371/119835. 
49 C.G. Man to Muirhead (British Embassy Washington D.C.), 21 February 1956.  TNA, FO 
371/119835. 
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 (iii) With increasing exploration of the Antarctic continent, new 
strategic possibilities and dangers are becoming apparent.  Bases on the 
continent could threaten Atlantic and Pacific sea routes and could affect the 
stability of e.g. Argentine or South African defense.  Mr. Dulles has also 
referred to the possibility of “weather control.” 
 (iv) The one point on which all territorial claimants are agreed is that 
Russia must be kept out.50 
 
Vincent suggested that action should be taken to persuade India not to ventilate the 
subject at the United Nations.  At the same time he saw a need “to educate public 
opinion as to the reasons for His Majesty’s Government’s unwillingness to entertain 
the trusteeship proposal.”51 Man added that it should be pointed out to the Indians 
that the idea of UN Trusteeship in Antarctica was quite inappropriate, since the 
“whole object of trusteeship is to safeguard interests of local inhabitants who do not 
exist in this case.”   
Perhaps most annoying to Britain, Australia, and New Zealand was the fact 
that India had not consulted its Commonwealth partners before writing to the United 
Nations.52  At a meeting of Commonwealth Delegations at the United Nations four 
days after the initial Indian proposal, representatives of Britain, Australia, and New 
Zealand expressed their unhappiness that the Indians had made such a move without 
prior discussion.53  The British delegation reported to London: “My Australian and 
                                                 
50 I.F.S. Vincent minute, 22 February 1956.  TNA, FO 371/119835.  In a later minute Vincent added 
more British objections to the Indian proposal, including “We want to avoid a general resolution on 
Antarctica which might inhibit us later from taking action against Argentina and Chile in defense of 
our rights.” IFS Vincent minute.  7 September 1956.  TNA, FO 371/119838. 
51 I.F.S. Vincent minute, 22 February 1956.  TNA, FO 371/119835. 
52 R.L.D. Jaspar (CRO) minute, 20 February 1956.  TNA, FO 371/119835. 
53 The affair would later raise niggling questions about the question of “two-tier” consultation within 
the Commonwealth, with Britain and the former White Dominions maintaining much closer contacts 
with each other than with the newer members of the Club.  See Commonwealth Relations Office to 
J.V. Rob (New Delhi), 1 March 1956.  TNA, FO 371/119835. 
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New Zealand colleagues with whom I briefly discussed the position after the meeting 
felt as I did that the ventilation in the United Nations of any ideas such as a possible 
trusteeship over Antarctica might be seriously at variance with the objectives of the 
discussions proceeding between the Americans, ourselves, and the Old 
Commonwealth.”54  However, the members of the self-proclaimed “Old 
Commonwealth” found themselves constrained in the extent to which they could 
oppose India.  Diplomats pointed out that Britain was reliant upon support from 
India in other areas of the world, particularly in Cyprus, and suggested that open 
opposition to the inscription of the item on the agenda of the Eleventh General 
Assembly would cause unnecessary friction.  The Commonwealth Relations Office 
advised that Britain should not react too sharply, but “should concentrate on lining 
up those interested.”55  The interested countries included both Argentina and Chile.   
The reactions of Argentina and Chile, the two claimant nations in dispute 
with Great Britain, were equally indignant.  Shortly after the Indian proposal La 
Unión newspaper of Valparaiso declared on behalf of the Chilean government, 
“Chile would not accept the Indian proposition.”56  In late February the Chilean 
delegation in New Delhi officially protested the Indian move, on the grounds that it 
was “a matter within the field of Chilean sovereignty.”57  The Argentine government 
was slower to respond, but it soon became clear that the two South American 
countries would take a united stand at the United Nations to oppose the discussion of 
Antarctica.58  At a meeting of the Latin American Caucus held on February 29, 1953, 
                                                 
54 United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations to Foreign Office, 21 February 1956.  TNA, FO 
371/119835. 
55 R.L.D. Jaspar (CRO) minute, 20 February 1956.  TNA, FO 371/119835. 
56 La Unión, 22 Febrary 1956. “Chile no acepta una proposición de la India sobre Antártica.” 
57 UK High Commissioner in India to Foreign Office, 27 February 1956.  TNA, FO 371/119835. 
58 British Embassy Buenos Aires to Foreign Office, 1 March 1956.  TNA, FO 371/119835. 
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the delegates of Argentina and Chile requested full support for opposition to the 
inscription of the Indian item onto the General Assembly’s agenda.59  The 
Nicaraguan representative reported to the United States that he thought, “almost all 
Latin American delegations would back up Chilean-Argentine request.”  However, 
the Mexican delegate spoke for several members of the caucus when he stated that, 
while he felt sympathy with the South Americans’ request, it had been Mexico’s 
traditional policy that “any country had the right to inscribe any item.”60  Therefore, 
despite the widespread support, Chile and Argentina were not guaranteed the 
backing of all the members of the Latin American bloc.   
In comparison to the British Commonwealth and South American reactions, 
the United States responded more ambivalently to the Indian proposal.61  US officials 
dismissed as “mere speculation” a British suggestion that the Soviet Union was 
behind the Indian proposal.62  Instead the North Americans took the Indian proposal 
at face value and saw it as offering both advantages and disadvantages to US policy 
in Antarctica.  On the one hand, an open debate in the United Nations threatened to 
circumscribe the United States’ much vaunted freedom of action in the Antarctic, 
and conflicted “with the spirit, if not the letter” of the United States’ latest policy 
                                                 
59 US Delegation to United Nations to Secretary of State, 1 March 1956. USNA 702.022/3-156. 
60 In fact the British representative at the United Nations later suggested that an additional advantage 
of opposing inscription in alliance with the Latin American Caucus would be that it would “strike a 
blow at the arguments used by some Latin American delegations that, on principle, all items should be 
inscribed.” UK Delegation to UN to Foreign Office, 25 May 1956.  TNA, FO 371/119836. 
61 For a general discussion of the US response, see, for example, Office Memorandum form Strong 
(ODA) to Crowley (BNA), 8 March 1956.  USNA, 702.022/3-856. 
62 “[It] cannot be excluded that the Russians have put the Indians up to this, since they must be well 
aware that their chances of obtaining a foot-hold in the Southern Continent are slim, unless they can 
cover up their motive by propaganda and other means.” I.F.S. Vincent minutes, 22 February 1956.  
TNA, FO 371/119835.  For the US response, see Merchant (EUR) to Under Secretary, 24 February 
1956.  USNA, 702.022/2-2456. 
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statement on Antarctica.63  An Operations Coordinating Board memorandum 
referred ominously to the possibility that Antarctica “might later be a most valuable 
site for manufacturing and processing of a dangerous nature,” adding that 
“internationalization could preclude this type of activity.”64  Discussion at the United 
Nations also presented the danger that the dispute between Britain, Argentina, and 
Chile – three important Cold War allies – would get a very public airing to the 
benefit of communist propaganda.  On the other hand, the possibility of some form 
of United Nations Trusteeship for Antarctica offered the United States a way out of 
the political impasse in Antarctica, both domestic and international.  Domestically, a 
favorable United Nations resolution on the internationalization of Antarctica offered 
a way of overcoming the difference of opinion between the State Department and 
Defense Departments by presenting both with a fait accompli.  Internationally, the 
United Nations offered a way of forcing its disputing allies to resolve their 
differences while retaining some form of US influence in the region.  Therefore, 
despite the potential dangers raised by debate at the United Nations, the United 
States had very little incentive to upset India by openly opposing inscription. 
The Soviet Union had nothing to lose through an international debate of the 
“Antarctic Question” since its policy centered upon making sure that it was not shut 
out of the decision making process in the southern continent.  Although it did little 
actively to promote the Indian proposal, it was taken for granted that the Eastern bloc 
would vote for inscription.  The Soviet Union was happy to sit back and watch its 
Cold War rivals squabble.   
                                                 
63 NSC5424/1.  NSA, Presidential Directives PD00414. 
64 OCB Memorandum, included in Office Memorandum form Strong (ODA) to Crowley (BNA),8  
March 1956. USNA 702.022/3-856. 
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As claimant countries, France and Norway were the only other countries with 
a direct interest in the Indian proposal.  The French government took a position of 
quiet opposition, part of a solid Western European bloc that the British believed they 
could count on to oppose inscription.  The government of Norway was more vocal in 
raising its objections, and the Norwegians worked hard to form a united 
Scandinavian bloc to oppose inscription.65  They hoped that such an approach 
“would start a snowball of opposition” which would make the Indians drop the item.  
Few other countries showed much interest in the Indian proposal.  British diplomats 
at the United Nations calculated that most governments would follow their 
traditional voting patterns, with the Afro-Asian countries and the Eastern bloc firmly 
behind the Indians and with most other countries willing to follow any lead taken by 
the Western powers.  If it were to come to a straight vote on inscription the initial 
odds favored India, especially if the United States remained non-committal.66 
The Indians appear to have been genuinely shocked at the level of hostility 
generated by their proposal, particularly among the Latin Americans.  They soon 
abandoned the idea of United Nations trusteeship for Antarctica and replaced it with 
a vague notion of “peaceful utilization.”67  In an attempt to steer the item away from 
the vexed question of sovereignty, the Indians highlighted their fears of nuclear 
weapons testing in Antarctica as the main reason for wanting to raise the question of 
Antarctica at the United Nations.68  They feared that such tests would alter the 
                                                 
65 British Embassy Oslo to Foreign Office, 25 June 1956.  TNA, FO 371/119836. 
66 For a detailed analysis of probable voting intentions see UK Delegation to United Nations 
(Crosthwaite) to Foreign Office, 14 August 1956.  TNA, FO 371/119838.   
67 According to a report by the Australian High Commissioner in New Delhi, the Indians had dropped 
the idea of Trusteeship within a week of first making their proposal. UK High Commission in India to 
Foreign Office, 24 February 1956.  TNA, FO 371/119835. 
68 For example, this was the line taken by Nehru in a debate in the Lok Sabha on 14 April, 1956. 
Debate in Indian Parliament (Lok Sabha) 14 April 1956.  TNA, FO 371/119836. 
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climate of the Southern Hemisphere to the detriment of India.69  The Indians 
suggested that even if the British themselves had no intention to test hydrogen 
bombs, the Commonwealth countries would not stand in the way of the United States 
conducting tests.70  When drafts of the Indian explanatory memorandum were finally 
circulated, the Indians made a veiled reference to nuclear testing: 
 
Modern science is likely to reveal many possibilities for the peaceful 
utilization of a region hitherto regarded as unproductive.  At the same time 
the influence of the Antarctica [sic] on the climatic and related conditions 
throughout the world, while obviously considerable, requires further study.  
Any disturbance of the equilibrium of natural forces in this area might lead to 
incalculable consequences for the world as a whole involving the animal and 
plant life.  In view of these facts and bearing in mind the size of the area, its 
international importance and the growing interest in it, the Government of 
India consider that in order to strengthen universal peace it would be 
appropriate and timely for all nations to agree and to affirm that the area will 
be utilized entirely for peaceful purposes and for the general welfare.  All 
nations should agree further to harmonize their actions to this end and to 
ensure also that no activities in the Antarctica [sic] will adversely affect 
climatic and other natural conditions.71 
 
This represented a subtle challenge to the British Empire’s justification of its 
sovereignty in Antarctica through environmental authority.  The Indians implied that 
rather than safeguarding the natural environment, existing political arrangements in 
the Southern Continent in fact threatened to adversely disrupt global climate 
systems.  Fears of nuclear testing in Antarctica were not without precedent.  In 
                                                 
69 See, for example, UK Delegation at United Nations to Foreign Office, 28 March 1956.  TNA, FO 
371/119835.  The Indians mentioned their fears of nuclear testing to the North Americans: 
Memorandum of Conversation (between Lall and Samuel dePalma), 5 March 1956. USNA, 
702.022/3-556.  Menon appears to have put the question most dramatically, speaking of “blowing off 
the ice-cap.”   
70 UK Delegation at United Nations to Foreign Office, 1 March 1956.  TNA, FO 371/119835. 
71 UK Delegation at United Nations to Man, 26 July 1956.  TNA, FO 371/119838. 
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February 1955 a Soviet newspaper article had suggested that United States was 
interested in Antarctica for the purposes of testing nuclear weapons.72  By March 
these rumors had spread to Santiago, where the left-leaning press published articles 
that claimed that Great Britain wanted to test a hydrogen bomb in Antarctica.73  
Although these reports appear to have been malicious rumor, some British officials 
did indeed consider the possibility that Antarctica might be useful for atomic 
weapons testing.74  They were not prepared to make any commitments to the Indians 
for fear of further limiting areas available for nuclear tests.75 
Britain responded to India’s challenge to its scientific legitimacy by 
attempting to reassert its scientific authority, while at the same time trying to 
undermine Indian scientific credentials.  The Foreign Office referred Indian fears 
about nuclear testing in Antarctica to the Atomic Energy Authority.76  A year earlier, 
British nuclear scientists had considered the question of Soviet nuclear testing in the 
Arctic.  Noting that it would take at least 100,000 tons of uranium 235 to melt all the 
ice at the North Pole, and that a single atomic bomb contains only a “matter of 
kilograms of this material,” they responded that Indian fears about blowing off the 
Antarctic icecap were “scientific rubbish.”77  In writing to the UN Department to 
                                                 
72 United States Embassy Moscow to Department of State, 7 February 1955.  USNA, 702.022/2-755. 
73 United States Embassy Santiago to Department of State, 14 March 1955. USNA 702.022/3-1455.    
By mid-1956, Chilean rumors suggested that the United States had a nuclear weapon so powerful that 
it could only be tested in Antarctica. Rudecindo Ortega (Embajador de Chile a la N.U.) al Ministro de 
RR.EE., 17 August 1956.  RR.EE., “Utilización Pacífica de la Antártida.” 
74 For example, in a Foreign Office minute concerning an approach to the United States regarding the 
Indian suggestion, J.D. Murray noted that “there is presumably the possibility that we might in future 
wish to use the area ourselves for nuclear tests.” J.D. Murray Minute, 15 May 1956.  TNA, FO 
371/119836. 
75 D.V. Bendall Minute, 25 June 1956.  TNA, FO 371/119836. 
76 R.A. Thompson (Atomic Energy Authority) to Wilson (FO), 7 March 1956.  TNA, FO 371/119835. 
77 The scientists at the Atomic Energy Authority had also suggested that even “if all the ice at the 
North Pole were to be melted, the depth of the oceans of the world would be increased by only about 
2.5 inches.” 
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inform them of the scientific conclusions a Foreign Office official claimed “there is, 
of course, much more ice at the North Pole than at the South.”  Less than two years 
later, IGY research would reveal that this British assertion was itself “scientific 
rubbish,” but at the time it was a statement of the best available scientific opinion.78  
Confident in their own scientific misconceptions, British officials challenged India’s 
lack of knowledge of Antarctica.79  The British also claimed that India’s proposal to 
discuss Antarctica at the United Nations threatened to undermine the already high 
level of international co-operation going on as part of the IGY.  If India really 
wanted to contribute positively to the future of the Southern Continent, British 
officials insinuated, they should send scientists to Antarctica (at no small expense) to 
participate in the international research program. 
Even if Indian fears of the consequenes of nuclear testing in Antarctica were 
fantastical, their proposal to raise the Antarctic question at the United Nations still 
represented a real threat to Britain’s position in Antarctica, as well as those of 
Australia and New Zealand.  Commonwealth officials toyed with inoffensive ways 
of getting the Indians to withdraw their proposal or to make it less potentially 
damaging to their sovereignty claims.  One suggestion was to constrain the debate to 
a discussion of United Nations funding for the World Meteorological Organization’s 
IGY data collection center.80  But despite India’s newfound interest in Antarctica’s 
                                                 
78 Widespread echo-sounding experiments conducted by the United States during the IGY would 
reveal the Antarctic ice cap to be an average of several kilometers thick, rather than the several 
hundred meters that had previously been thought.  This had tremendous implications for thinking 
about the past and current climate trends as it appeared to show that northern and southern 
hemispheres did not necessarily demonstrate that same warming and cooling trends.  The results also 
led to an increase in the estimates of the amount of water in the world by 10 percent.  See John C. 
Behrendt, Innocents on the ice : a memoir of Antarctic exploration, 1957 (Niwot, Colo, 1998).   
79 UK High Commission in India to Foreign Office, 24 February 1956.  TNA, FO 371/119835. 
80 G. Jockel (Geneva) to Department of External Affairs (Canberra ), 10 April 1956.  TNA, 
FO371/119836. 
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weather and climate, this idea came to nothing.  Attempts to convince India that the 
United States was not planning nuclear tests in Antarctica similarly failed to 
convince India to withdraw its proposal.81  At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers 
Meeting, June/July 1956, attempts were made to persuade Nehru that, in relation to 
the Anglo-Argentine-Chilean tensions in the Antarctic Peninsula, “there has seldom 
been a more peaceful dispute between nations than this one.”82  But Nehru was 
unreceptive to this argument and had “nothing to say” when the British Foreign 
Minister raised the Antarctic question with him.83    
It quickly became apparent that the only way to get the Indians to back down 
would be to suggest that they might be defeated in a vote on inscription.  
Commonwealth opposition to India was made more difficult by their reliance on 
Indian support in other areas of the world, particularly in Cyprus, and in the possible 
need “to sabotage quietly any efforts [the communists] make to secure an 
undesirably large expansion of the Security Council and E.C.O.S.O.C. [Economic 
and Social Council].”84  Several departments within the Foreign Office advised 
against opposing the Indians at all, but others, led by the United Nations department, 
argued that the wisest course would be to attempt to block inscription.85  Given this 
precarious diplomatic balancing act, British officials thought that it would be best to 
                                                 
81 United States Embassy Canberra to Secretary of State, 13 April 1956. USNA, 702.022/4-1356. 
82 The briefing notes included the fact that the British, Argentines and Chilean personnel living in the 
Antarctic Peninsula regularly played football matches against one another.  Brief for the Secretary of 
State (CRO) Commonwealth Prime Ministers Meeting –Antarctica, June 1956.  TNA, FO 
371/119836. 
83 Jasper to P.H. Corner (New Zealand House), 6 July 1956.  TNA, FO 371/119837. 
84 Crosthwaite (UN) to Man (FO), 14 August 1956.  TNA, FO 371/119838. 
85 The head of the UK delegation stated that he felt a “strong disinclination to let the Indians get away 
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because we don’t want to risk opposing them.”  UK Delegation to UN to Foreign Office, 25 May 
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rely upon Argentina and Chile to take the lead in opposing the Indian proposal, 
despite being rivals in the Antarctic Peninsula.  As the British Embassy in Buenos 
Aires pointed out, such co-operation was only possible due to the overthrow of Perón 
in the previous year, and the consequent scaling back of Argentina’s antagonistic 
foreign policy, especially in Antarctica.86  The British representative at the United 
Nations stressed that it would be impossible to defeat inscription without the support 
from the Latin American caucus.87  At a meeting held at the Commonwealth 
Relations Office on 24 August, 1956, there was general agreement that “the Latin 
Americans should if possible be encouraged to lead the opposition to inscription in 
New York,” with the added consideration that “it was clearly wisest that the UK 
should not play a prominent part.”88 
Despite Indian claims that Argentina and Chile were softening their attitude 
towards a United Nations’ debate on Antarctica, the two South American 
governments in fact continued to oppose the proposal.89  In their attempt to defeat the 
inscription of the item, Chile and Argentina were happy to cooperate, at a distance, 
with the Commonwealth countries.90  Alongside their appeal to the Latin American 
Caucus, the Argentines and Chileans also lobbied the Indian Government directly.  
They suggested that the Indian item was endangering a vague notion of “third world” 
                                                 
86 Evans (British Ambassador to Buenos Aires) to Foreign Office, 8 May 1956.  TNA, 
FO371/119829. 
87 UK Delegation to United Nations to Foreign Office, 25 May 1956.  TNA, FO371/119836. 
88 Record of Meeting held at the Commonwealth Relations Office, 24 August 1956.  TNA, FO 
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89 Man Minute, 11 May 1956.  TNA, FO 371/119836. 
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Commonwealth governments did not believe “a discussion in the United Nations would be useful that 
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solidarity, by forcing the Latin Americans to diverge from their traditional policy of 
voting for the inscription of any debate.  The most colorful example of Latin 
American Antarctic diplomacy came in the person of Miguel Serrano, the Chilean 
representative in India.  A poet and a mystic, Serrano had traveled to Antarctica on 
board the first official Chilean expedition to the southern continent in 1947.  He was 
an unrepentant Nazi sympathizer who fostered the myth that Adolf Hitler had fled 
from Germany in 1945 to a secret bunker in Antarctica, which had been established 
by the German Antarctic expedition of 1938-39.91  In India, he enjoyed a good 
relationship with Nehru, and, some suggested, an inappropriately good relationship 
with Nehru’s daughter, Indira Gandhi.92  Serrano attempted to use these connections 
to influence the Indian Prime Minister against inscription of the Antarctic item.93 
For all Miguel Serrano’s personal diplomacy and direct appeals to the Indian 
Government, what really mattered was the threat that the South American Caucus, 
together with the Old Commonwealth and Western Europe, would raise enough 
votes to defeat a vote on inscription and thereby embarrass India.  The Chileans and 
the Argentines both did their own lobbying and calculations in New York, and they 
realized that a vote on inscription would be a close contest.94  On 13 September, at a 
meeting of the Latin American Caucus, the two South American claimant nations 
“argued violently” against inscription of the Indian item.95  The caucus agreed that 
its president, Ambassador Trujillo, from Ecuador, should approach Arthur Lall and 
                                                 
91 This is described in Serrano, La Antártica y otros mitos. 
92 Pinochet de la Barra, Medio siglo de recuerdos antárticos: memorias. 86.  
93 Miguel Serrano’s efforts against inscription are described in detail in RR.EE., “Utilización Pacífica 
de la Antártica.” 
94 See, for example, Rudecindo Ortega, Embajador de Chile a las NN.UU. al Ministro de RR.EE., 17 
August 1956.  RR.EE.,  “Utilización Pacífica de la Antártida.” 
95 US Delegation to United Nations to Secretary of State, 14 September 1956. USNA, 702.022/9-
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advise him against pressing the matter.  However, India’s permanent representative 
failed to reply to the Latin Americans and two weeks later the Caucus met again.  
This time they authorized Trujillo to tell Lall officially that the twenty Latin 
American countries would vote against inscription.96  For a moment, it appeared that 
this approach had convinced the Indians to drop their item, but then Trujillo over-
played his hand.  The Ecuadorian diplomat announced India’s decision to the Latin 
American press, and this breech of confidence caused the Indians to renege on their 
promise to withdraw the “Peaceful Utilization of Antarctica” item from the General 
Assembly’s agenda.   
Up until the last moment the United States remained adamant that, while it 
saw “no need for discussing Antarctica in the United Nations at this time,” it would 
not oppose inscription.97  Referring to the 1956 Presidential elections, British 
officials guessed, “no new President of the United States (whether Eisenhower or 
Stevenson) would want to start off by offending India.”98  However, the united Latin 
American bloc put considerable pressure on the United States to oppose inscription.  
The North Americans faced a stark choice between offending India and offending 
their Latin American neighbors.  On 5 November, Ware Adams, the State 
Department’s Director of United Nations Political and Security Affairs, wrote to the 
US Mission in New York informing them that official policy had been changed and 
that the United States would oppose inscription.  The United Nations department had 
strongly recommended that the United States should support the Latin Americans 
“on the grounds that we will be needing their support badly on other matters at this 
                                                 
96 US Delegation to United Nations to Secretary of State, 28 September 1956. USNA, 702.022/9-
2856. 
97 Office Memorandum from Samuel DePalma (IO:UNP), 9 August 1956. USNA, 702.022/8-956. 
98 Man Minute (Referring to Crosthwaite’s letter), 20 August 1956.  TNA, FO 37/119838. 
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General Assembly.”  When the Indians got word of the United States’ decision, the 
possibility of losing a vote on inscription greatly increased, and they decided, as 
honorably as possible, to withdraw the item.   
On 14 November 1956, at the organizational meeting of the Eleventh General 
Assembly, Krishna Menon made a speech withdrawing India’s proposal to debate 
Antarctica.  The British delegation sent the official transcript to London with some 
satisfaction: 
 
In explanation Mr. Krishna Menon said that the Indian Delegation would be 
withdrawing the item in view of the heavy agenda with which the Assembly 
was faced as a result of the inscription of the emergency items on the Middle 
East and Hungary.  Moreover, certain exploration and investigation was now 
taking place in Antarctica.  Nevertheless the Indian Delegation still attached 
great importance to the item but did not think that it need to be considered at 
this session of the Assembly.  Their decision to withdraw the item did not 
mean that they were abandoning it.99 
 
The obvious cause of this withdrawal was the United States’ decision to vote against 
inscription and the threat of defeat for India that this brought with it.100  But the 
developing Suez crisis also played a role.  By November, the United Kingdom’s 
High Commission in India reported Menon’s “almost total preoccupation” with the 
Suez Crisis.101  Unlike at the beginning of the year when the Antarctic item had first 
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TNA, FO 371/119838.   
101 UK High Commission in India to Foreign Office, 11 October 1956.  TNA, FO 371/119838. 
 274 
been proposed, Menon now had something substantive to talk about at the United 
Nations.102 
Without opposition from both the British Commonwealth and the Latin 
American blocs, it is unlikely that the Indians would have withdrawn their proposal 
to raise the Antarctica Question at the United Nations.  The British, Australians, and 
New Zealanders could not have defeated inscription on their own, not least because 
they were wary of openly opposing the Indians.  Opposition from the Latin 
American bloc proved to be the decisive factor against the Indian item: firstly 
because it destroyed the idea of “Third World Unity” that the Indians hoped to foster, 
and secondly because the demands of Pan-Americanism eventually forced the United 
States to oppose the proposition.  But in terms of voting arithmetic, the South 
Americans could not have won on their own either.  The tacit alliance between the 
British Commonwealth and Latin America, while distant, was acknowledged on both 
sides.  The British strategy to oppose inscription explicitly involved “letting others 
take the lead,” and they recognized the power of Argentine and Chilean opposition.  
Despite the bitter sovereignty dispute in the Antarctic Peninsula, Britain, Argentina 
and Chile proved that they could work together when their collective interests 
depended upon it.  Such a working relationship, with its agreement to disagree on 
certain questions, set an important precedent for the co-operation implicit to the 
Antarctic Treaty of 1959.  
The fact that the “Antarctic Question” was not raised at the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1956 had other important implications for the future of 
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Antarctica.  It is difficult to imagine that the members of the United Nations would 
have allowed twelve countries to sign the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and form an 
“exclusive club,” if they had already had experience of debating Antarctica.  More 
concretely, the fears and discord generated by the prospect of a United Nations 
debate led United States officials to re-think their indecisive Antarctic policy, and 
seek a resolution – on their own terms – as rapidly as possible.  Over the next three 
years, this United States policy shift proved to be one of the major driving forces 
towards the Antarctic Treaty.  In 1958, India again thought about raising the 
Antarctic Question at the United Nations, but by this stage negotiations towards a 
treaty were already underway, and the Indian proposal met with much less sympathy.  
India’s ideas were not completely ignored in the eventual settlement of the Antarctic 
question.  Indian fears of nuclear testing, for example, found their way into the text 
of the Antarctic Treaty at the insistence of Argentina.103  Nevertheless, it was 
opposition to the Indian proposal, more than the proposal itself, that had the most 
lasting impact on the history of Antarctica.  The unlikely alliance that developed 
between the British Commonwealth and Latin America against discussion of 
Antarctica at the United Nations ought to be seen alongside the tri-partite naval 
agreement first signed in 1948, and Julio Escudero’s modus vivendi idea, as an 
important foundation of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959.   
 
THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF WHALING 
Throughout the late 1950s, but away from the immediate political concerns 
of the sovereignty dispute and the IGY, the members of the International Whaling 
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Commission (IWC) were desperately attempting to reach an agreement to halt the 
collapse of Antarctic whaling industry.104  Since the end of the Second World War, 
over-fishing had decimated whale stocks and by the mid 1950s the whaling industry 
was on the brink of collapse.105  In 1946 the IWC had set the annual quota for whale 
catch at 16,000 Blue Whale Units (BWU).  It quickly became apparent that this 
number was too high to be sustainable.  Catches were only maintained by killing less 
productive whale species, while the more popular whales faced extinction.  By the 
late 1950s, the majestic blue whale, the largest living creature on earth, had almost 
disappeared.  Although figures for whale catch and revenue in the Falkland Islands 
Dependencies remained relatively steady, the figures masked an imminent crisis.106  
The free market quota system – a free-for-all until the total quota had been reached – 
encouraged investment in modern, efficient whaling fleets.107  As a result, the total 
whaling capacity far exceeded the number of whales permitted to be caught.  As a 
consequence of this investment, few whalers were willing to reduce the quota, even 
though they could clearly see the problem of over-fishing.  Antarctic whaling, as 
practiced in the mid-1950s, was fundamentally unsustainable. 
The participation of the Soviet Union in the Antarctic whaling industry made 
the resolution of the over-fishing problem more difficult and brought Cold War 
rivalries into the international politics of whaling.108  The Soviet Union had been 
sending the Slava whaling fleet to Antarctic waters since the late 1940s.  There was 
widespread suspicion among western countries that the Soviet ships were blatantly 
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disregarding the IWC quota system, but there was no easy way to prove this nor to 
do anything about it.  Additionally, there were fears that Soviet whaling activities 
went beyond the simple catching of whales and included geopolitical objectives.109  
These fears were well founded: scientists on board the whaling vessels initiated a 
substantial program of oceanographic research that would be continued during the 
IGY.  Oceanography offered several potential strategic benefits, not least the 
production of maps and charts for submarines, and was among the most politically 
sensitive scientific activities of the early Cold War.  This research was a long way in 
front of that of any other country, and was of particular concern to the United States.   
Alongside the difficulties posed by Soviet whaling to the work of the IWC, 
the activities of other individual states and whaling companies threatened to further 
decrease whale populations.110  The most famous incident took place in 1955 off the 
coast of Peru.  The whaling fleet of the Greek shipping magnate Aristotle Onassis 
came into conflict with the governments of Peru and Chile, which claimed that he 
was violating their national waters.111  The governments of Japan and the 
Netherlands, relative newcomers to the Antarctic whaling industry were, somewhat 
surprisingly, unwilling to co-operate fully with the IWC quota system.  The Japanese 
had been given special dispensation to participate in the whaling industry by General 
Douglas Macarthur, while Germany had been refused permission.  Some of these 
“rogue whaling states” were employing cutting-edge whaling technology, which 
gave them less incentive for co-operation with the IWC quota system.    
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Throughout the 1950s, ever-greater efficiency within the whaling industry 
compounded the problems of over-fishing.  Modern technology enabled whalers to 
maintain their catch figures despite declining whale populations.  Whaling 
companies attempted to harness radar technology developed during the Second 
World War to locate whales.  They also used aircraft to search for targets for the 
whale catchers.112  Factory ships became more adept at processing the whole whale, 
rather than abandoning everything but the valuable whale oil, while at the same time 
increasing the capacity for processing more whales: the vessels built in the aftermath 
of the Second World War were the most efficient ever seen.  Even the weather 
forecasting service initiated by Sir Miles Clifford made whaling more productive and 
less dangerous by maximizing the days spent at sea catching whales.  However, none 
of these developments was sustainable.  All they offered were short-term solutions 
that enabled the whaling industry to remain profitable while hastening the demise of 
Antarctic whaling. 
The inability to resolve the problem of over-fishing created a mood of 
resigned acceptance among whalers.113  Whalers sought ways to make as much 
money as possible before the industry sank.  Norwegian whalers led calls for a less 
market-driven quota system based on historical levels of participation in the whaling 
industry.  In making this case, the Norwegians and others drew on a “Tragedy of the 
Commons” scenario.114  In an open environment such as the Southern Ocean, 
freedom for all, they argued, would lead to tragedy for everybody.  Norway’s rivals, 
however, tended to focus on the fact that a quota system based on past levels of 
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participation in the industry would give the Norwegians by far the largest quota.  The 
politics of self-interest tended to underlie even the most rational conservation 
proposals.  Newcomers to the Antarctic whaling industry argued that they had as 
much right as anybody else to fish in the Southern Ocean.  These apparently 
irreconcilable positions created an atmosphere of mutual suspicion in which it looked 
increasingly less likely that anything could be done to prevent the impending 
collapse of Antarctic whale populations. 
International negotiations over the future of the Antarctic whaling industry 
took place outside the immediate scope of the dispute over the sovereignty of the 
Antarctic Peninsula and the area covered by Antarctic whaling was much larger than 
the region contested by Britain, Argentina, and Chile.  Nevertheless, the international 
politics of whaling and the predicted collapse of the whale stocks did have an 
important, if indirect, influence on the course of the dispute.  In the period following 
the Second World War, despite repeated attempts to get involved in the industry, 
neither Argentina nor Chile had a substantial presence in the industry, although the 
Argentine-owned Pesca company continued to function.115  As a consequence they 
both viewed the IWC with suspicion.  Although both South American countries were 
initial signatories of the IWC, neither ratified it until after the end of the sovereignty 
dispute.   
In contrast to its two South American rivals, Great Britain played a central 
role in both the whaling industry itself and in the negotiations over the future of 
whaling.  The British Empire’s original claims to the Falkland Islands Dependencies 
had been based on the desire to tax and regulate the nascent Antarctic whaling 
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industry, and its justification for ownership was based partly on the promise of 
stewardship of Antarctica’s marine resources.  However, since the late 1920s, 
pelagic whaling based on large self-supported factory ships had diminished Britain’s 
capability both to tax and to regulate.  Although the shore stations on South Georgia 
continued to provide significant revenues, by the mid-1950s, Britain’s presence in 
Antarctica was no longer economically self-sufficient.  The escalation of FIDS 
activities in response to Perón’s Antarctic Dream had been paid for by the British 
taxpayer, rather than by taxes on the whaling industry.  This was anathema to the 
political economy of Britain’s Empire.   
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Colonial Development Office had 
sponsored a scheme to increase Britain’s share of Antarctic whaling profits.  
Officials reasoned that any project to bolster the British presence in the Falkland 
Islands Dependencies would be good for Britain’s case in the sovereignty dispute, 
especially if it generated additional revenue.  However, potential investors had been 
frightened off by the political instability caused by the sovereignty dispute.  
Uncertainty surrounded the question of whether Britain would maintain control of 
the region, and there was an unwillingness to get caught in the middle of disputing 
countries.  There was also something backward looking in plans for another shore-
based whaling company in an age where modern factory ships had come to dominate 
the industry.  
The experiences of Salvesen, the major British company involved in the 
whaling industry, in many ways encapsulated Britain’s experiences of Antarctic 
whaling during the 1940s and 1950s.  Based at Leith harbor, near Edinburgh, 
Salvesen had been involved in the Antarctic whaling industry since the first decade 
of the twentieth century.  During the enforced break of the Second World War, the 
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company lost almost all its whaling vessels.  In 1946, the company began again with 
two purpose-built factory ships, although neither of these vessels was quite as 
modern or efficient as the most technologically advanced vessels that would be built 
in Japan and the Netherlands.  During the 1950s the directors of Salvesen were well 
aware that they were participating in an industry that was chasing fewer and fewer 
whales with greater and greater capacity.  The wranglings over quota systems at the 
IWC proved frustrating for men whose job it was to catch whales.  As the decade 
progressed, Salvesen began to sell off its whaling fleet and further diversify its 
business activities, shifting its focus from whaling to logistics.116   
An increasing awareness that the Antarctic whaling industry was 
unsustainable contributed to a gradual change in British attitudes towards 
sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies.  This shift was generally 
noticeable only through a decline in the enthusiasm for Antarctica’s economic 
resources.  Fewer officials looked upon whaling as a solution to the world’s food 
problems, and there was increasingly less attachment to the retention of exclusive 
British sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies. 
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Chapter 9: The International Geophysical Year, 1957-58 
Between 1957 and 1958, the International Geophysical Year (IGY) 
dominated the politics of the Antarctic sovereignty dispute.  This massive 
international research endeavor, which had been planned since 1950, led to an 
unprecedented level of scientific research across Antarctica and consummated the 
relationship between politics and science.  Besides the three countries directly 
involved in the dispute, nine other nations took part in Antarctic research.  The 
United States and the Soviet Union had by far the largest projects, and both 
superpowers established scientific bases across the continent.  New Zealand, 
Australia, France, and Norway – the other claimant countries – all participated with 
substantial research programs.  Citing historical precedents or geographical 
proximity, Belgium, Japan, and South Africa also conducted Antarctic research as 
part of the IGY.  As a consequence of this international activity, the number of bases 
on the Antarctic continent increased from 20 in 1955 to 48 during the IGY, and the 
twelve counties spent an estimated $280 million on Antarctic research.1   
Despite growing interest, the Antarctic Peninsula region remained very much 
the preserve of Great Britain, Argentina, and Chile.  Only the United States sought to 
unsettle the contentious status quo by building a base in the disputed territory.  For 
their part, scientists from Britain, Argentina, and Chile, generally constrained their 
research to the parts of Antarctica claimed by their governments, and none of these 
three countries built a research base outside the boundaries of their territorial claims.2  
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However, the three countries with a direct interest in the sovereignty dispute took 
very different attitudes towards the IGY.  Great Britain, which had been involved in 
the project from the beginning, embraced it whole heartedly.  Argentina and Chile 
remained relative outsiders and viewed it with a great deal more suspicion.   
Stemming from Cold War rivalries and from the vexed question of territorial 
sovereignty, the IGY developed something of a Jekyll and Hyde personality.  On the 
one hand, it was characterized by international co-operation, the sharing of scientific 
data, and the exchange of scientific personnel.3   On the other hand, the IGY offered 
the various participants a worldwide stage upon which to compete with each other in 
demonstrating their scientific prowess.  The performance of science became an 
acknowledged tactic in broader struggles over Antarctic sovereignty, not least 
because scientific results often had strategic implications.  Political competition was 
a fundamental part of the IGY: countries interested in the question of Antarctic 
sovereignty felt that they could not be excluded from the scientific endeavor.    At 
the same time as scientists co-operated and competed, they also learned more about 
Antarctica.  This increasing knowledge of the continent, which often included the 
realization that Antarctica was not the Frozen El Dorado that many had believed, 
changed attitudes towards the continent.  These changing attitudes would have 
important political implications.  These three elements – co-operating, competing, 
and learning – took place concurrently, and it is often difficult to separate them.  In 
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dynamic and unforeseen ways, the IGY had a major impact on the political history of 
Antarctica.   
 
BRITISH PARTICIPATION 
In the aftermath of the Suez crisis of late 1956, Harold Macmillan replaced 
Anthony Eden as Prime Minister.  The crisis had led to a significant rupture in 
Anglo-American relations.  Upon taking office, the new Prime Minister instituted a 
reevaluation of Britain’s strategic priorities that became known as the “audit of 
empire.”4  With the need to placate US anti-colonial sentiment in the backs of their 
minds, British officials assessed which colonies were worth holding onto and which 
were not.  Very often the criteria were economic, but decisions were also made based 
on strategy, constitutional development, the desire of the local population for 
independence, and vague notions of “prestige.”  The results were published in May 
1957 in an internal report entitled Future Constitutional Development in the 
Colonies.5  The audit of empire gave a facade of order and control to what was in 
fact a chaotic situation.  The reality “on the ground” was that the British were losing 
control throughout much of its colonial empire.  Nationalist sentiments were surging 
and Britain lacked the ability to suppress them.  The genius of Harold Macmillan 
was to infuse the inevitable process of decolonization with the myth of an orderly 
and pre-ordained handover.   
In a few terse paragraphs, Future Constitutional Development in the Colonies 
concluded that the Falkland Islands themselves could be given an independent 
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government with no loss to British prestige.  The population was almost entirely 
British, and the colony would remain loyal to Britain after independence.  Since the 
Falkland Islanders were largely self sufficient, the British exchequer would neither 
gain nor lose through the establishment of an independent government.  
Interestingly, by 1957, the strategic value of the Falkland Islands had become almost 
entirely linked to Antarctica: “the strategic importance of the Falklands to the United 
Kingdom is primarily as a base from which to support Commonwealth interests in 
the Antarctic, and depends on a regime attached to the United Kingdom 
connection.”6  Argentine claims to the Falkland Islands presented the only danger of 
independence: 
 
Provided withdrawal of UK jurisdiction did not also involve withdrawal of 
UK protection, there would be no vacuum to be filled by an outsider.  If 
however, protection were also withdrawn, the Falkland Islands would be in 
danger of occupation by Argentina, and the abandonment of a racially British 
population to such a fate would be discreditable and severely damaging to 
prestige.7 
 
Although the report mentioned that there was “no sign of demand for constitutional 
change,” it made very little reference to the political desires of the Falkland 
Islanders. 
In contrast to the Falkland Islands themselves, the report noted that the 
Falkland Islands Dependencies had practically no permanent population.  The 
strategic interests of the Dependencies depended, in part, upon the possibility of 
                                                 
6 Ibid. Since the British takeover of the Falkland Islands in 1833, the islands had lost much of their 
strategic value for a number of reasons including opening of the Panama Canal, long distance flight, 
and the development of inter-continental ballistic missiles.   
7 Ibid. 
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discovering minerals of strategic importance.  Otherwise, the strategic influence of 
the Dependencies was largely negative: “it is important to the Commonwealth to 
deny it as a base to a potentially hostile power.”8  While that “potentially hostile 
power” was most probably the Soviet Union, lingering bitterness about the neutrality 
of Argentina and Chile during the Second World War may also have played into 
these calculations.  Because of the claims of Argentina and Chile, British sovereignty 
in the Dependencies depended on the activities of the Falkland Islands Dependencies 
Survey.  These activities cost the British taxpayer £200,000 a year, in addition to the 
revenue from whaling taxes which was also spent on the Survey.  Although the 
situation remained complicated, the economic costs of maintaining British 
sovereignty in the Dependencies were difficult to justify unless valuable minerals 
could be found: 
 
Our withdrawal from Antarctica would mean a loss of UK prestige and 
influence, especially in scientific circles.  It might also involve the loss of 
strategic minerals, but this will be easier to evaluate when the results have 
been assessed of the work done during the International Geophysical Year.  
Argentina and/or Chile, which have claims (partly competing) to the 
Dependencies, would probably step in if the UK withdrew.9 
 
The authors of Future Constitutional Development in the Colonies envisioned the 
IGY as playing an integral role in Britain’s decision whether or not to maintain its 
claims to exclusive sovereignty over the Falkland Islands Dependencies.   
Britain’s contribution to the IGY became closely connected with competing 
ideas about the future of empire.  From the Government’s point of view, the 




demands of Macmillan’s “audit of empire” imposed a definite agenda onto Britain’s 
participation in the IGY.  Scientists were given the implicit task of assessing the 
economic worth of the Dependencies.  The scientists themselves were generally 
happy with this situation.  They were learning to play the funding games of “big 
science,” which meant that they had to portray their work as politically and 
economically useful in order to be given the necessary resources.10  Most British 
scientists simply got on with the research they wanted to do, without regard for the 
underlying political motivations.  If they needed money they would stress the 
usefulness of their work.  A few idealists murmured words of discontent, but overall 
Britain’s IGY effort represented a harmonious mix of government and scientific 
interests.  
The most obvious contribution to Britain’s assessment of the economic 
potential of the Falkland Islands Dependencies was Peter Mott’s aerial survey.  
Although this was not officially part of the IGY – mapping did not fall into any of 
the categories listed by ICSU – the project directly overlapped with the IGY, and can 
be seen as an important part of Britain’s contribution.11 
Sir Vivian Fuchs, an eminent Cambridge geologist and the head of the 
Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey, became the most adept at promoting the 
political merits of his IGY plans.12  Fuchs wanted to travel by land across the whole 
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of Antarctica, periodically measuring the depth of the ice.  It was no coincidence that 
Fuchs’ “Commonwealth Trans-Antarctic Expedition” would also attempt to 
complete the shattered dream of Ernest Shackleton’s 1914-16 expedition, and would, 
as was widely publicized, complete the entire traverse on territory claimed by the 
British Commonwealth.  In reference to Fuchs’ expedition, US diplomats reported 
comments made by Sir Anthony Eden while he was still Prime Minister: 
 
Sir Anthony Eden is reported to have said that the UK has no wish to extend 
its influence beyond those areas, which had been “recognized as ours.”  For 
that reason, he said, the route of the Trans-Antarctic Expedition, long though 
it was, crossed only Commonwealth territory; but the UK did intend to 
maintain the “right to our wide areas” and to explore them.13 
 
In seeking to maintain the spirit of imperial vitality demonstrated by the conquest of 
Everest in 1953, Fuchs invited the New Zealander Sir Edmund Hillary to join the 
expedition.  The plan was for Hillary to travel to and from the South Pole from the 
Ross Sea (in the New Zealand Sector), laying food and fuel for Fuchs’ return 
journey.  Meanwhile, Fuchs would travel from a newly build British base on the 
Weddell Sea (in the Falkland Islands Dependencies) and would keep going past the 
Pole all the way to the Ross Sea.  Both parts of the expedition would utilize tractors, 
but there would still be sufficient man hauling and crevasse crossing to infuse the 
journey with the requisite sweat, toil, and danger. 
In the planning stages of the IGY, the Commonwealth Trans-Antarctic 
Expedition had polarized official thinking about the British contribution.  Some 
officials, most notably Sir Miles Clifford, thought that such an expedition would take 
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funding away from the more useful work of surveying the Falkland Islands 
Dependencies.  But as soon as the expedition set off, it captured the public 
imagination, not only in Britain but also around the world.  Even the Chilean press 
got caught up in telling the story of Fuchs and Hillary’s epic traverse of the Antarctic 
continent.14  In an age of big science and Cold War tension, there was something 
reassuringly human scale about the Commonwealth Trans-Antarctic Expedition, 
which explicitly recalled the romance of the “heroic age” of Antarctic exploration.  
As in the earlier period, there was no shortage of human drama for the world press to 
comment upon.  Sir Edmund Hillary decided that he wanted to be the third 
expedition leader to reach the South Pole, and he sped across the ice from the Ross 
Sea much faster than Fuchs could manage from the other side of the continent.  
Besides the aerial survey and the Trans-Antarctic expedition, Britain 
constructed six new bases for the IGY and increased the number of people wintering 
in Antarctica from 57 in 1955 to 127 during 1957-58.15  The flagship scientific 
project was the Royal Society’s construction of Halley Station on the Weddell Sea.16  
The involvement of a non-governmental organization was intended to give Halley 
the appearance of a purely scientific enterprise, and the members of the Royal 
Society went to some lengths to distance themselves from political questions of 
sovereignty.  Nevertheless, Halley was a permanent base (unlike the base constructed 
by Vivian Fuchs for his expedition) located within the Falkland Islands 
Dependencies.  The close geographical proximity to Argentina’s Base Belgrano 
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intensified the political stakes.  In order to counter Argentine arguments that there 
was no scientific need for a base so close to their own, British scientists explained 
that they would be conducting different kinds of scientific experiments – focusing in 
particular on upper atmospheric observations – thereby legitimizing the location of 
Halley Base.17  Here, once again, scientific arguments were used on both sides of 
what continued to be an essentially political dispute.      
Alongside the British participation in IGY Antarctic research, several 
Commonwealth countries conducted their own investigations in the southern 
continent.  The Commonwealth Trans-Antarctic expedition was, as it sounded, a 
joint venture among Commonwealth countries.  Next to Britain, New Zealand 
contributed the most in turns of financial resources, participants, and the construction 
of Scott Base on the Ross Sea, but other Commonwealth countries, including 
Australia and South Africa, also supported the expedition.18  These two latter 
countries, especially Australia, made extensive contributions of their own to the 
Antarctic section of the IGY.  Before the IGY, Australia already occupied one base 
(Mawson) in the sector that it claimed, which had for a time been the only permanent 
base on the Antarctic continent outside of the Peninsula region.  During the IGY 
Australia constructed a second base, and doubled the number of personnel in the 
Antarctic.  The government in Canberra was particularly worried about the presence 
of Soviet bases on the Antarctic continent, which were established within the 
Australian claim, and could potentially be used for missile or submarine strikes on 
Australia itself.  South Africa, for its part, concentrated research efforts on 
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meteorological work on the Prince Edward Islands, a small group of islands mid-way 
between South Africa and Antarctica, and during the IGY South Africans made 
significant contributions to the development of Antarctic meteorology.19  By the 
mid-1950s, the various Commonwealth countries with interests in Antarctica were 
all pursuing their own national agendas, but there was a significant overlap of 
interests and the “Commonwealth bloc” remained an important grouping in Antarctic 
politics.   
 
SOUTH AMERICAN PARTICIPATION 
By the mid-1950s, South American interest in Antarctica had, to some extent, 
become detached from the material reality of the continent.  In Argentina and Chile, 
the Antarctic Peninsula had become, above all, a patriotic cause.  Whether or not 
Antarctica had any economic or strategic use mattered much less than the fact that 
the region had come to be seen as an integral part of both South American countries.   
A Report for the United States National Security Council on the IGY noted that: 
“Argentina and Chile take a pronounced nationalistic and emotional attitude toward 
their respective and, to a considerable extent, conflicting claims, over the Drake 
Straits and the Palmer Peninsula.”20  As a consequence of this emotional attachment, 
and in contrast to the views of Great Britain and the United States, the two South 
American countries saw the IGY as more of a threat than an opportunity.  This had 
been demonstrated by their attitudes towards the Paris planning meeting in 1955.  
The IGY, with its foundations in free and open scientific access to the continent, 
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clearly went against the normal workings of exclusive sovereignty.  The IGY also 
changed the rules of engagement for the Antarctic sovereignty dispute: scientific 
research came to matter much more in demonstrations of sovereignty than simple 
occupation of the region.  This new emphasis on science was more problematic for 
Chile than for Argentina, which already had an established record of scientific 
achievement in the region. 
In Argentina, the military government of the Revolución Libertador had a 
distinctly nationalist and geo-political outlook and was suspicious of the political 
intentions of the IGY.  In particular, the Argentines worried about the prospects of 
the Soviet Union establishing a base in the Antarctic Peninsula region.21  However, 
the military government also realized that they were in a good position to take 
advantage of the increasing connection between science and politics, and they 
resolved to put on a good show during the IGY.  This, they hoped, would boost 
Argentina’s scientific prestige in the region and, through this, strengthen their 
political claims.22   
Perón’s acquisition of an icebreaker, and the recent establishment of a base 
on the shore of the Weddell Sea, in fact put Argentina in an excellent position to take 
a leading role in IGY science.  Although the overthrow of Perón had temporarily 
hampered the scientific work being conducted by Hernán Pujato in Base Belgrano, 
the infrastructure was already in place to accelerate the research programs during the 
IGY.  At the various Antarctic planning meetings Argentine delegates repeatedly 
argued that the presence of Base Belgrano on the southeastern corner of the Weddell 
                                                 
21 Klaus Dodds, Geopolitics in Antarctica: views from the Southern Oceanic Rim, Polar research 
series (Chichester; New York, 1997). 
22 Rodolfo Panzarini, "Intereses Científicos Argentinos en el Antártico," Instituto Antártico 
Argentino, Contribuciones Científicos  (1959). 
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Sea meant that the construction of other bases in the same region was unnecessary 
and would lead to duplication of observations and research.  From a scientific 
perspective, the Argentines had a good case: there were plenty of places in 
Antarctica without any bases at all.  But the IGY was about more than science.  Both 
Britain and the United States had plans to construct bases in the same area – Britain 
actually wanted to build two bases – and these plans had more to do with politics 
than science.  Argentine diplomacy was unsuccessful in preventing the establishment 
of Britain’s Halley and Shackleton bases, and the United States’ Ellsworth base.  
Nevertheless, as science and politics increasingly blurred, Argentina was still in a 
very good position to demonstrate its scientific credentials during the IGY.    
As one immediate result of their growing awareness of the relationship 
between science and politics, the Argentine Antarctic Institute resolved to publish 
more of its scientific findings.  Prior to 1955, there had been no systematic 
publication strategy for Argentine scientists returning from Antarctica, although 
books and articles did appear.  Between 1955 and 1959 the Argentine Antarctic 
Institute published 47 scientific “contributions.”23 Apart from the large focus on 
campaigns and expeditions (over one third) there was no significant political trend in 
the type of scientific research being published.  Biology and geology were high on 
the list mainly because the Peninsula region lends itself to such studies.  The relative 
scarcity of publications on meteorology, oceanography and cartography reflects the 
fact that the National Meteorological Service, the Navy and the Instituto Geográfico 
                                                 
23 The number of articles dealing with various themes: campaigns/expeditions (16); biology (10); 
geology (5); institutional (5); geophysics (3); meteorology (2); oceanography (1); cartography (1); 
human ecology: (1); other (3).  Instituto Antártico Argentino, Contribuciones Científicos, Autores-
Titulos-Resumes Nos. 1-305, 1959-1983 (Buenos Aires, 1983). 
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Militar each continued with their own research independently of the Antarctic 
Institute.   
In preparation for the IGY, a scientific department was formally integrated 
into the Instituto Antártico in 1956.24  The permanent scientific staff was made up of 
four geologists, two biologists, two geophysicists, one physiologist, one chemist, one 
meteorologist, and one glaciologist.  The head of the scientific department was Otto 
Schneider, a geophysicist.  The inclusion in the scientific department of several 
scientists who had earlier worked with Pujato suggests a certain political pragmatism 
among both the scientists themselves and the Institute.    
During the IGY, all eight of Argentina’s permanent stations participated in 
some way with the IGY research, as did several research ships and temporary 
scientific bases.25   Research was done in ten main areas: meteorology, 
geomagnetism, the aurora, the ionosphere, glaciology, seismology, oceanography, 
tides, gravity and biology.  The aurora research is an interesting example since it 
took place at all eight permanent stations and was coordinated by the Instituto 
Antártico.  Each station conducted a visual observation of the night sky for three 
hours every day and gave a detailed description of the aurora where it was present.  
On special alerts and the so-called “World Days” additional observations were taken.  
The official report to SCAR noted that: 
 
All stations were equipped with cellulose acetate color filters and with a 
special auroral clinometer.  Some stations had, in addition, red and green 
                                                 
24 Santiago Mauro Comerci, "La Ciencia Argentina en el Antártico: El Insituto Antártico Argentino," 
Instituto Antártico Argentino, Contribuciones Científicos  (1979). 
25 Instituto Antártico Argentino, Report to SCAR on Antarctic Scientific Activities During the 
International Geophysical Year, 1957-1958 (Buenos Aires, 1960). 
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interference filters.  Aerological sounding theodolites were used by some 
observers for detailed observation of azimuths and elevation angles.26   
 
Additionally, Base Belgrano, which had been established by Hernán Pujato, was 
equipped with an Alaskan type “all sky camera.” This camera took 24 hour 
continuous recordings during the dark season, and continuous nocturnal readings for 
the period between March and September 1958.   By this stage there appears to have 
been no direct political motivation behind the type of research conducted, although, 
importantly, all Argentina’s Antarctic research during the IGY took place within the 
sector that Argentina claimed.   
Tragedy came to Argentina’s IGY efforts in October 1958, when the 
Argentine vessel Guarrain sank in Antarctic waters with the loss of 36 lives.27  This 
was the biggest single loss of life during the IGY (and indeed, in Antarctic 
exploration to this point).  Prestige was now so intricately connected with the 
question of territorial rights that the Argentine government did what it could to 
downplay this incident, fearing that it could reflect negatively on Argentina’s 
sovereignty claims.28 Given the extreme conditions of the Antarctic continent, the 
lack of experience, and the number of expeditions, it is surprising that there were not 
more tragedies of this sort.   
In Chile, after a long period of hesitation the government named General 
Ramón Cañas head of the Chilean Planning Commission of the IGY.  As well as 
being one of the country’s leading authorities on Antarctica, Cañas was also one of 
                                                 
26 Ibid.   
27 Sullivan, Assault on the unknown; the International Geophysical Year. 298. 
28 Pierrou, La Armada Argentina en la Antártida. 
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Chile’s leading geo-political theorists.29  He had lobbied hard for Chilean 
involvement in the IGY and in his capacity as head of the National Committee of 
Geography, Geodesy, and Geophysics, the General had already made outline plans 
for a scientific research program for the 1957-58 summer.  Although Ramón Cañas 
was, in many ways, an obvious choice to head the Chilean Planning Committee of 
the IGY, his geo-political attitude towards scientific research did not fit neatly into 
the strictly empirical, materialist, and politically neutral conception of science 
propounded by ICSU.  Chile’s embrace of the “science” of geopolitics can be seen in 
part as a response to the country’s relative scientific weakness.30  Chile was the 
poorest country to take part in the Antarctic section of the IGY, and could not 
compete with the scientific programs of its territorial rivals in the Antarctic 
Peninsula.  By presenting a different way of looking at the world, geopolitics offered 
a subtle challenge to the scientific authority that was being imposed upon Chile.    
The actual contribution of Chile to the IGY reads very similarly to that of 
Argentina, although on a reduced scale: auroral observations with an “all sky 
camera,” meteorology reports sent to weather central, glaciology, oceanography, 
gravitational studies, seismology and participation in the various “World Days.”31  
The Chileans built a scientific base especially for the IGY, which they named Base 
Risopatrón after the Chilean Geographer who proposed the idea of an “American 
Antarctica.”32   Unfortunately, this base burned down in March 1958, severely 
                                                 
29 For a biography of General Cañas, see Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional, Donación General Cañas 
Montalva: Catálogo del Fondo Bibliográfico. 
30 Howkins, “Chilean Antarctic Science, 1946-1959.” Paper presented to the SCAR History of 
Antarctic Science Conference in Santiago, September 2006. 
31 Full details of the Chilean contribution can be found in Volume 41 of the Navy’s Hydrographical 
Bulletin covering the years 1957-1963. 
32 Luis Risopatrón, a famous geographer, was one of the first Chileans to write about Antarctica.  
Risopatrón, La Antártida americana. 
 297 
hampering Chilean scientific efforts.  Just as Escudero and others had feared, the 
Chilean contribution to the IGY was, in relative terms, much less than most of the 
other countries with political interests in the region.  In the new era of Big Science in 




On a global scale, the IGY brought about an open display of scientific rivalry 
between the United States and the Soviet Union.  On 4 October 1957, officially as 
part of its IGY research, the Soviet Union successfully launched Sputnik, the first 
ever earth-orbiting satellite. 33  A month later Sputnik II took a dog into space.  Early 
in 1958, after several failed attempts, the United States responded with the launch of 
its own Explorer and Vanguard satellites.  The newly initiated “space race” cast a 
long shadow over the IGY.  Science offered the superpowers an arena to compete 
without going to war, but at the same time, many of the scientific discoveries and 
technological innovations had important military and political implications.  
Antarctic research was no different.  Both the United States and the Soviet Union 
made scientific decisions regarding Antarctic IGY research at the highest political 
level, and both put significant economic resources into this research.34  The two 
super-powers had a very similar approach to the Antarctic sovereignty: both refused 
to recognize any existing claims and reserved their own rights over the entire 
                                                 
33 Needell, Science, Cold War and the American state: Lloyd V. Berkner and the balance of 
professional ideals.  See Chapter 12: “IGY Satellites and the Launch of Sputnik.” 
34 In Washington, leading scientists frequently briefed the Operations Coordinating Board and the 
National Security Council. 
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continent.  But throughout the IGY, there was constant speculation that one or both 
of the superpowers would make formal sovereignty claims.    
IGY related US activity in Antarctica had begun in the 1954-55 season with a 
reconnaissance expedition by the icebreaker Atka.  Hoping to assuage world fears 
about the military intentions of this voyage, Eisenhower announced, “the USS Atka 
was operating in the Antarctic on a preliminary logistical operation in preparation for 
the scientific expedition that would be undertaken in connection with the IGY of 
1957-1958.”35   In the following Antarctic summer the US Operation Deepfreeze 
established bases at Little America and McMurdo.  Late in 1956, Admiral George 
Dufek became the first man to stand on the South Pole since Scott, and the United 
States proceeded to construct the Amundsen-Scott base at the South Pole.  It was 
perhaps symbolic of changing times and changing power structures that when Sir 
Edmund Hillary became only the third man to lead a party overland to the South Pole 
as part of Fuchs’ Trans-Antarctic expedition, he was greeted there by the inhabitants 
of an American base, who had been flown in by airplane.  The triumph of technology 
over muscle-power was there for all to see, even if the British muttered to themselves 
vague accusations of US “cheating” by not doing things the hard way.36  
During the 1956-57 season, with the support of the icebreaker USS Staten 
Island, Finn Ronne attempted to establish a base on the southwestern shore of the 
Weddell Sea.  But after being unable to find a suitable location, his group 
constructed Ellsworth Base on the eastern shore, only thirty-five miles from 
                                                 
35 Editorial Note, 2 March 1955. FRUS, 1955-57, Volume 11, United Nations and General Matters, 
no. 298. 
36 Hillary and Fuchs’ book about the expedition clearly revels in the physical difficulty of the journey, 
even though both parties used tractors.  Vivian Fuchs and Edmund Hillary, The crossing of 
Antarctica; the Commonwealth Trans-Antarctic Expedition, 1955-1958 (London,, 1958). 
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Argentina’s Base Belgrano and also close to Britain’s Halley Base.  This would be 
the only base in the disputed region that was not British, Argentine or Chilean.37  As 
in 1947, Finn Ronne was chosen to lead the expedition into disputed territory, 
although this time his expedition was officially sponsored by the United States 
Government.38  Besides Little America, McMurdo, Amundsen-Scott, and Ellsworth, 
the United States built four other bases in Antarctica, from all of which they 
conducted a variety of scientific experiments.  Of particular importance were a series 
of overland expeditions that sought to measure the depth of the ice.39  Also central to 
United States IGY activity was the establishment of a Weather Central at Little 
America, which gathered together meteorological data from all the IGY research 
being conducted in Antarctica.  Walter Sullivan, a reporter from the New York Times, 
accompanied and wrote about many of these expeditions and experiments.40  These 
reports, together with extensive coverage in journals such as National Geographic, 
helped to popularize United States’ activities in Antarctica.   
As United States’ scientists went about their activities in Antarctica, the CIA 
worried about Soviet activities in the region and prepared a series of reports.41  In 
one of these reports, completed in January 1958, the CIA summarized Soviet 
participation in the IGY.  The report noted that the Soviet Union had a tradition of 
                                                 
37 In fact, Ellsworth base was located to the east of the region claimed by Chile, but inside the region 
disputed by Argentina and Britain.   
38 His previous expedition had been private, but had the official sanction of the government.  See 
Chapter 4, “The Scramble for Antarctica.” 
39 For an account of this ice-depth work, see Behrendt, Innocents on the ice : a memoir of Antarctic 
exploration, 1957. 
40 As well as his reporting for the New York Times Sullivan wrote books about the IGY and 
Antarctica.  Sullivan, Assault on the unknown; the International Geophysical Year. Walter Sullivan, 
Quest for a continent (New York, 1957). 
41 The CIA prepared a series of secret reports about Soviet activities in Antarctica, which included 
“Geographic Intelligence Report: Soviet Interests, Intentions, and Plans for Antarctica,” 27 January 
1958.  USNA, CIA database, CIA-RDP79-01009A001800030001-9. 
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earth science research: since the communist revolution, Russian scientists had been 
“charged to aid the fatherland in the struggle against nature.”  The Soviets also had 
considerable experience of research in the Arctic regions.  This background made 
expansion into the Antarctic a natural progression, both in terms of scientific 
questions and in terms of logistical expertise.  The CIA report noted that, prior to the 
IGY and with the exception of weather data – which Soviet scientists exchanged 
with the World Meteorological Organization – the Soviet Union had not shared any 
of its earth science results.  In making this observation the author of the CIA report 
stressed the strategic importance of earth science data in such fields as seismology 
and oceanography.  In this way the IGY had therefore served one of Lloyd Berkner’s 
principal political objectives in getting the Soviet Union to reveal at least some of its 
scientific capabilities.  But it also demonstrated that in many fields the Soviets were 
ahead of the United States.  As the IGY progressed, the CIA feared that the United 
States was being outdone in Antarctic research by the Soviets.42  Despite this 
scientific preeminence, the CIA concluded that there was no evidence that the Soviet 
Union was about to make a claim to Antarctica, although they were certain that their 
rivals would stay in Antarctica after the end of the IGY. 
Modern Soviet scientific interest in the Antarctic had begun in 1948, when 
the Soviet whaling fleet began to be accompanied by an oceanographic research 
vessel.  Late in 1955, following its declaration of intent to participate in IGY 
Antarctic research, the Soviet Union launched its “First Official Expedition” to 
Antarctica using the ice-breakers Ob and Lena.  This expedition established the 
Mirny base on the coast of the territory claimed by Australia.  In the following 1956-
                                                 
42 See, for example, National Security Council Report, NSC 5804/1, 8 March1958.  NSA, Presidential 
Directives PD00545.  
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57 season, the Soviet Union attempted to establish two inland bases, including one at 
the pole of relative inaccessibility (Sovetskaya).  Both of these attempts failed due to 
hostile conditions and technical problems.  However, during the following summer 
(1957-58), the Soviets overcame these difficulties and constructed the Vostok and 
Sovetskaya bases deep in the interior of the continent.  From these two bases 
valuable research work was conducted, especially on the meteorology of the interior 
of the continent.  Throughout the IGY, the Soviet Union carried out oceanographic 
investigations and survey work around the coasts of the entire continent.  In this way 
they sought to demonstrate their refusal to recognize sovereignty claims to 
Antarctica.  
Alongside the four Commonwealth countries, Argentina and Chile, and the 
two superpowers, four other nations participated in IGY research in Antarctica: 
France, Norway, Belgium, and Japan.  France and Norway were both claimant 
countries and they established bases inside their respective claims.  With the consent 
of Norway, Belgium and Japan established bases within the Norwegian claim.  This 
region was relatively accessible, but had little coverage by scientific bases.  Both 
these countries had traditions of Antarctic exploration, and their participation did 
little to upset the question of sovereignty in the region.  Nevertheless, the 
participation of countries without a direct stake in Antarctic sovereignty or direct 
political rivalries helped to give Antarctic IGY research a greater sense of 
internationalism and genuine scientific endeavor.  This scientific idealism would be 
harnessed in the following years, above all by Great Britain and the United States, to 
bring about settlement of Antarctica’s political difficulties.   
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Chapter 10: The Antarctic Treaty, 1958-59 
In the wake of the International Geophysical Year (IGY) of 1957-58, officials 
from the twelve nations participating in scientific research in Antarctica met in 
Washington D.C. to discuss the political future of the Southern Continent.  After 
over a year of preliminary negotiations, the actual Antarctic Conference lasted from 
October to December 1959.  The result of this conference was the signature of the 
Antarctic Treaty on 1 December 1959 (See Appendix).  In relation to the sovereignty 
dispute, the most important part of the treaty was Article IV, which suspended – or, 
in the official pun of the negotiations, “froze” – all sovereignty claims to Antarctica.1  
A sense prevails in Antarctic historiography that the International Geophysical Year 
(IGY) of 1957-1958 led, almost inexorably, to the Antarctic Treaty of 1959.2  The 
international goodwill generated through scientific co-operation, the traditional 
argument goes, laid the foundations for the agreement that created a “continent 
dedicated to peace and science.”  While there is some truth in this interpretation, it 
tends to over-idealize the role of science as a force “above politics,” and it 
underestimates the fragility of the Antarctic Treaty negotiations.  It also tends to 
overlook the political impact of the actual scientific results of the IGY.   
In combination with other important factors – including the ongoing Cold 
War and the post-Suez acceleration of British decolonization – the scientific results 
of the IGY helped to convince British officials that the maintenance of exclusive 
                                                 
1 The duration of the Antarctic Treaty was initially set at 30 years, but was extended a further 50 years 
by the Madrid Environmental Protocol of 1991.  The Antarctic Treaty is therefore set to be reviewed 
in 2041.   
2 See, for example, Beck, The international politics of Antarctica, Lewis, A continent for science; the 
Antarctic adventure, Martin, A history of Antarctica, Philip W. Quigg, A pole apart: the emerging 
issue of Antarctica (1983).  
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political sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies was not worth the 
diplomatic and economic costs involved.  The IGY seemed to confirm what many 
had already suspected: Antarctica was not the frozen El Dorado of popular 
imagination.  Combined with the decline of the Antarctic whaling industry 
(discussed in chapter seven), the dawning realization that there was little prospect of 
Antarctic mineral wealth turned the Falkland Islands Dependencies into an economic 
liability.  Fear of Soviet intentions in Antarctica added an urgency to the British 
strategic re-evaluation.  In common with its policy throughout the empire, Great 
Britain came to desire an “informalization” of its interests in Antarctica, retaining 
political influence without the need for exclusive control.3  In close alliance with the 
United States and its Commonwealth partners, the British officials used the scientific 
goodwill generated by the IGY, together with widespread fears of Soviet intentions 
in Antarctica, to push for limited internationalization of the continent.  In a series of 
secret meetings held in Washington in late 1957 and early 1958, representatives from 
Great Britain, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand thrashed out their plans 
for an internationalization of the continent, which would avoid, at all costs, the 
genuinely anti-colonial prospect that Antarctica would be taken over by some form 
of United Nations regime.   
In both Argentina and Chile, government-sponsored publicity campaigns to 
raise awareness of national rights in Antarctica had proved successful.  For example, 
all maps of Argentina and Chile by law had to include the respective Antarctic 
sectors.4  Argentines and Chileans had come to view the Antarctic Peninsula as an 
“integral part” of their national territories.  As a consequence, the two South 
                                                 
3 Louis and Robinson, "The Imperialism of Decolonization." 
4 The legal requirement for maps of Argentina and Chile to show Antarctica continues today.   
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American countries were less affected by the scientific results of the IGY.  Argentine 
and Chilean claims to sovereignty were rooted in their belief in the inherent rightness 
of their cause: Antártida Argentina was Argentine and Antártica Chilena was 
Chilean simply because they were.  As early as 1947, the Foreign Minister of Chile, 
Raúl Juliet had stated: 
 
But even if there was nothing of value, even if in the Chilean Sector there 
was not but the cold and desolate prolongation of the fatherland, there would 
exist on our part the obligation to preserve and defend it, precisely for that 
reason: that it is the southern part of Chile, an integral part of her soil.5 
 
The economic potential of Antarctica, while not irrelevant, did not alter the 
perceived fact of South American sovereignty.  The Argentine and Chilean 
governments were therefore less willing to participate in the Antarctica negotiations, 
since they realized that any internationalization of the southern continent could be 
interpreted as a cession of their national territories.  However, as with the IGY, both 
South American countries found themselves swept along by the tide of events.  
Fearing both Soviet intentions and alternative, more truly international solutions in 
the United Nations, the Argentines and Chileans deemed it better to protect their 
interests from within an international conference than to remain outside.   
Even as the twelve nations that had participated in IGY Antarctic research 
gathered in Washington D.C. to discuss the political future of Antarctica, the 
outcome remained uncertain.  There was nothing inevitable about the signature of the 
Antarctic Treaty.  At the preliminary negotiations, the Russians initially proved 
                                                 
5 Address of the Minister of Foreign Relations, Raúl Juliet Gomez Before the Chilean Senate, 21 
January 1947.  RR.EE., “Antártico 1939-1952” (Chilean Translation). 
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intransigent in their refusal to discuss any matters of substance.  The South American 
representatives made frequent assertions of their sovereignty rights and sought to 
impede the creation of an international regime.  At the Antarctic conference itself, 
the Argentines in particular were determined to push to negotiations to their limits, 
possibly hoping to cause a breakdown in the discussions.6  The Argentine delegation 
introduced two controversial measures.  The first was a limit to the proposed 
“freedom of scientific investigation” in Antarctica, which was one of the pillars of 
the conference.  The second was a proposal expressly to ban nuclear explosions in 
Antarctica.  This latter suggestion brought Cold War rivalries into the heart of the 
Antarctic conference, and for a while it looked to jeopardize the outcome.  
Ultimately, however, there proved to be sufficient desire for a limited form of 
internationalization among the participating countries – including, quite remarkably, 
the two super-powers – to bring about the signature of the Antarctic Treaty.7  By 
achieving the retention of British political influence without the need for formal 
control, this outcome represented a success for British diplomacy.  For Argentina 
and Chile, the outcome was more of a mixed result: their national claims had been 
suspended, but they found themselves members of an “exclusive club.”  Although 
the three nations disputing the ownership of the Antarctic Peninsula region continued 
to champion the righteousness of their cause, the signature of the Antarctic Treaty 
effectively brought an end to the active phase of the sovereignty dispute.   
 
                                                 
6 Scilingo, El Tratado antártico; defensa de la soberanía y la proscripción nuclear. 
7 The agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union was decisive.  For a more detailed 
discussion of the super-power role in the creation of the Antarctic Treaty see Klotz, America on the 
ice: Antarctic policy issues., and Moore, "'Diplomacy, Public Opinion and the 'Fractalization' of U.S. 
Antarctic Policy, 1946-1959". 
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RESULTS OF THE IGY 
In a sense, the scientific results of the IGY began to emerge before the IGY 
had even started.  The 1956-57 summer season had witnessed tremendous 
preparatory activity for the IGY, including the construction of the US Amundsen-
Scott station at the South Pole.  Never before had there been so many scientists in 
Antarctica.  Many of them settled in for the winter; others returned home to oversee 
IGY activities from a distance.  Throughout the IGY and into 1959, the results of the 
IGY trickled into the various data centers around the world.8  It would take years for 
all the data to be fully processed, but initial analyses and impressions had important 
implications for the sovereignty dispute.9 Hundreds of scientists and a handful of 
policymakers had experienced the Antarctic environment at first hand, and now had 
more of a practical understanding of the continent.10  Fantasies of Antarctica as a 
frozen El Dorado, bursting with buried treasure, could not survive such close 
scrutiny.  The most important political results of the IGY were the negative ones: 
what was not found.11  Scientists did not discover any economically viable mineral 
resources.  These results were often associated with the non-IGY research taking 
place alongside the official international program, in fields deemed too politically 
                                                 
8 The results of the IGY were a truly international endeavor.  Perhaps surprisingly, given all the 
underlying political tensions, the reality of shared scientific data matched the rhetoric.  Scientific 
results were pooled into international “data centers” from where scientists from all the participating 
countries could analyze them.  Scientists held international conferences to discuss their findings, and 
the results were published in international scientific journals.  From a purely scientific perspective the 
IGY had been a great success. 
9 For example, conference of meteorologists met in Melbourne.  Symposium of Antarctic Meteorology 
(Melbourne 1959). 
10 Even Britain’s Prince Philip traveled to Antarctica during the IGY. 
11 Problem with negative data and “what if” history.  Many countries participated in the Antarctic 
section of the IGY with the explicit purpose of assessing the economic potential of Antarctica.  It is 
impossible to know what would have happened if exploitable mineral resources had been found, but it 
is easy to speculate that the history would have been very different. 
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sensitive for international co-operation, such as geology and mapping.  Official IGY 
research did, however, contribute to the awareness that Antarctica had no immediate 
economic value: glaciology, for example, revealed that the ice was too thick and 
meteorology showed that the weather was too hostile for viable economic extraction 
of minerals.12 The IGY did not really change the Antarctic environment, but it did 
fundamentally change human perceptions of that environment. 
There was no single defining moment when scientists declared that there 
were no easily exploitable mineral deposits to be found in Antarctica.  Rather, there 
was a gradual realization that Antarctica would not prove to be the frozen El Dorado 
of popular imagination (although in some ways dreams persisted13).  This 
unspectacular realization would have significant political consequences.  British 
officials in particular viewed the IGY as a scientific “audit of empire.”  As the results 
filtered in they seemed to confirm what many already had already suspected: that 
Antarctica contained little of immediate economic worth.  The growing realization 
that Antarctica held little intrinsic economic value, combined with the impending 
collapse of the Antarctic whaling industry, contributed to Britain’s growing desire to 
resolve the question of sovereignty in Antarctica.14  The advantages of maintaining 
exclusive sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies increasingly seemed to 
                                                 
12 The fact that the unclaimed sector was now thought to be mostly under-water reduced US interest 
in making claims. National Security Council Report, NSC 5804/1, 8 March 1958.  NSA, Presidential 
Directives PD00545. 
13 The Antarctic Treaty would be designed to permit economic exploitation as and when sufficiently 
valuable minerals were found.  These debates would be become particularly important during the 
1980s.  Brian Roberts noted: “The US aide memoire was cautiously worded, but included reference to 
most of the main features which had been agreed in the informal quadripartite discussions.  No 
reference was made, however, to the need for arrangements to control activities aimed at the 
exploitation of mineral resources.  (This omission was in deference to the views of the Australians, 
who wished if possible to retain exclusive sovereign rights in this respect).” Brian Roberts, “Historical 
Note to the Antarctic Treaty Conference,” 1959.  SPRI, MS1308/9. 
14 Brian Roberts, “Historical Note to the Antarctic Treaty Conference,” 1959.  SPRI, MS1308/9. 
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justify neither the diplomatic headaches it caused, nor the expense it incurred.  The 
Cold War, in particular, and the damage caused by the Antarctic dispute to the 
Western Alliance, made the resolution of sovereignty in Antarctica imperative.15  
Following the Suez Crisis of 1956, the late 1950s were a period of rapid change 
throughout the colonial empire.  Despite its peripheral location, Antarctica was 
caught up in the icy winds of change.   
The British did not simply give up on their colonial empire.  Rather, Britain’s 
overarching policy towards the “transfer of power” – in theory if not always in 
practice – was to maintain economic and political influence without the need for 
continued formal control.16  In some ways this imperialism of decolonization held 
out the prospect of a return to a state of “informal imperialism,” which had served 
the country so well during the nineteenth century with its mantra “informal control 
where possible, formal control where not.”17  Just as the British hoped to retain 
influence by keeping the newly independent countries of Africa within the 
Commonwealth and maintaining economic and cultural connections, they hoped to 
maintain British influence in Antarctica without the need for formal control.  In 
Antarctica, science rather than economics would provide the tool with which the 
British would seek to maintain their influence.  On the one hand, the international 
goodwill generated by the IGY offered a focal point for negotiation.  Such an attitude 
                                                 
15 The most pressing issue regarding Antarctica that faced British policy makers was the increasing 
presence of the Soviet Union in the continent.  The fear of communism in Antarctica was a fear 
shared by the United States, Britain’s Commonwealth partners (particularly those in the Southern 
Hemisphere), and with Argentina and Chile, the Governments of which, at this point, were 
vehemently anti-communist.  Intelligence revealed that the Soviets were taking a lead in Antarctic 
science, and there were fears that they were building submarine bases in the continent.  It was 
acknowledged that the Russians intended to stay after the end of the IGY. 
16 Louis and Robinson, "The Imperialism of Decolonization." 
17 Robinson and Gallagher, "The Imperialism of Free Trade." 
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built on the supposed internationalism of science, and on co-operation within the 
international scientific community.18  Science could be presented as being “above 
politics,” although most people at the time realized that it was not.  On the other 
hand, science as a means of understanding the natural world was an area in which the 
British had a traditional strength.  By the late 1950s, in the new age of “Big 
Science,” Britain had certainly fallen behind both the United States and the Soviet 
Union (as evidenced by lack of British participation in the “space race”).  But British 
scientists remained at the forefront of global science, as Sydney Chapman’s 
chairmanship of the IGY clearly demonstrated.  In any hierarchy based on scientific 
endeavor, the British believed that they would rise to the top.  More cynically, 
requirements for scientific research offered a means of keeping anti-colonial "trouble 
makers” out of Antarctic decision making.   
 
ICY WINDS OF CHANGE 
The process that would culminate in the signature of the Antarctic Treaty of 
1959 began as a series of secret negotiations between Britain, the United States, 
Australia, and New Zealand.19  Beginning in August 1957, with the IGY barely 
started, officials from these four countries met periodically in Washington D.C. to 
discuss the political future of the Antarctic continent.20  As a working paper for these 
                                                 
18 Science allowed countries to discuss essentially political issues without talking about explicit 
questions of sovereignty, administration, or jurisdiction.  From the very beginning of the dispute, at 
the same time as the three sides had used scientific to demonstrate their rights, science had also been 
seen as a means of diffusing tension.   
19 Berguño, “Intellectual Origins of the Antarctic Treaty.” Paper presented to 2nd SCAR history of 
Antarctic science workshop, Santiago, September 2006. 
20 Memorandum of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Washington, 
10 January 1958.  FRUS, 1958-60, Volume 2.  United Nations and General International Matters 
Source, no.264.  (Source: Department of State, State-JCS Meeting: Lot 61 D417.  Top Secret.) 
 310 
meetings, Britain produced an extensive plan for the internationalization of 
Antarctica.21  This working paper was approved by the Cabinet Ministers involved in 
Antarctica (Foreign Office, Colonial Office, Admiralty, and Treasury), as a basis for 
the quadripartite negotiations, but it did not yet have the stamp of official policy.22  
The suggestions put forward in the working paper are quite astounding in terms of 
their scope and the degree of internationalization proposed.  The British envisioned 
the creation of an international council with a two- tiered structure: effectively an 
international government with its own bureaucracy. 
The quadripartite negotiations had two inter-connected goals.  Firstly, they 
addressed the question of how to respond to the growing Soviet presence in 
Antarctica.  Secondly, they discussed what sort of territorial arrangements could best 
resolve the political uncertainty of Antarctica – especially the three-way dispute in 
the Antarctic Peninsula – and limit communist influence in the continent.  Central to 
the negotiations was the discussion of how to keep “trouble makers” out of 
Antarctica, meaning how to keep the question off the agenda of the United Nations.23 
In the delicate balancing act of making the Antarctic Treaty acceptable to 
international opinion without opening the continent to genuine international control, 
science offered a useful tool.  At one meeting, Lord Hood, the British Ambassador in 
Washington, suggested that “the Soviet puppets and other undesirables could be 
excluded by applying the criterion proposed in the US paper, namely that countries 
participating in the preparation of the statute should have ‘a direct and substantial 
                                                 
21 H.G.M. Bass (CRO) to High Commissions in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa, and 
India, 28 Jan 1958.  TNA, FO 371/131905. 
22 H.A. Hankey Minute, 10 January 1958.  TNA, FO 371/131905. 
23 British Embassy Washington to Foreign Office, 14 January 1958.  TNA, FO 371/131905. 
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interest’ in Antarctica.”24  In order to show such “direct and substantial” interest, a 
country would have to be performing scientific research in the continent.  The British 
delegation to the United Nations continued to worry about the prospect of the 
“Antarctic Question” being raised at the UN: “it seems to us that it would be well 
worth while offering the principal trouble-makers any possible concessions outside 
the UN.  Here, in the Assembly of 82 members, the price we might have to pay for 
an agreed scheme would probably be higher.”25  In private, British officials fully 
acknowledged the role of science as an exclusionary gatekeeper.   
The initial US position was to exclude the Soviet Union completely from an 
international regime for Antarctica.  The North Americans proposed the creation of 
an 8-power condominium including the seven claimant powers and the United 
States, which would be accompanied by a US claim to the unclaimed sector of 
Antarctica (and possibly other sectors).  The British believed that the exclusion of 
the Soviet Union would be diplomatically untenable, and they advocated the creation 
of an international regime including both the United States and the Soviet Union 
without the need for an official US claim, which they thought might further 
destabilize the situation and incite the Russians into making claims of their own.  As 
the talks progressed, US officials (especially in the State Department) were coming 
around to the British way of thinking, and by January 1958 the United States had 
produced proposals for internationalization that involved the Soviet Union (in the 
                                                 
24 Ibid. 
25 United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations to Foreign Office, 18 January 1958.  TNA, FO 
371/131905.  The UK delegation added “it would, we think, be useful to explain the plans for a 
conference to the Secretary General before they are put forward publicly.  His influence, one way or 
the other, would prove an important factor.” 
 312 
conference if not necessarily in the regime) and, according to British officials, “were 
already very much more acceptable.”26 
In January 1958, the US State Department presented Britain, Australia, and 
NZ with its revised plans for an international regime for Antarctica, which would 
include negotiation with the Soviet Union, accompanied by a possible US territorial 
claim.27  Although the British felt that an international regime would have a greater 
chance of success if it was not accompanied by such a proclamation of rights, they 
went along with the US suggestion.  The State Department wanted the plan for 
internationalization to be launched publicly in the middle of 1958 and thought it best 
to begin discussions with Chile, France, and Norway immediately (Argentina was in 
the middle of an election campaign).  The Australians and New Zealanders, 
supported by the British, were more hesitant.  They wanted to make sure that there 
was first agreement among the four governments participating in the secret 
quadripartite negotiations before the plans were shared with other interested 
countries.  The Australians and New Zealanders also reacted with “horror” to a US 
suggestion that Japan should be invited to participate, saying that Japan had 
renounced all rights in Antarctica in the peace treaty that ended the Second World 
War and should not now “be allowed to creep in by the back door.”28 
The Australian government took the toughest line at the negotiations, fearing 
a continuation of the Soviet presence in the Australian Antarctic sector.  They were 
                                                 
26 H.A. Hankey minute, 10 January 1958.  TNA, FO 371/131905. 
27 Memorandum From the Special Adviser on Antarctica (Daniels) to the Secretary of State.  
Washington, 14 January 1958.  FRUS, 1958-60, Volume 2, United Nations and General International 
Matters, no.265.  (Source: Department of State, Central Files 702.022/1-1458.  Secret.  Drafted by 
Daniels and sent through S/S and Murphy, who initialed it.) 
28 British Embassy Washington to Foreign Office, 14 January 1958.  TNA, FO 371/131905. 
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in fact quite keen for the United States to make a claim.29  In January 1958, the 
Australian Cabinet met to discuss the internationalization of Antarctica, and they 
came out strongly against the proposals being discussed in Washington.30  This 
Australian position threatened to ruin any prospects for an international regime and 
the resolution of the Anglo-Argentine-Chilean dispute.  However, British officials 
noted optimistically that the Australian position was not final.31  In contrast to the 
Australians, Mr. Nash, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, was in favor of some 
form of internationalization.  His idealistic attitude in fact went even further, and he 
willingly contemplated a genuine internationalization of Antarctica under the 
auspices of the UN.   
Australian intransigence on the Antarctic question at the Washington talks 
coincided with British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan’s visit to the Antipodes in 
January and February 1958.  He went first to New Zealand where he held talks with 
Prime Minister Nash.  At talks on 23 January, the two Prime Ministers discussed the 
Antarctic question and ways “to move Australians to a more amenable position.”32  
Macmillan and Nash concurred that an Antarctic conference leading to some form of 
limited international regime for Antarctica was the best course of action.  In the 
discussions the two leaders agreed on three points: 
 
(i) UK, US and NZ now hold similar views, but Australians had apparently 
turned against idea of internationalization, at least with Russian participation. 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
30 H.A.A. Hankey Minute, 24 January 1958.  TNA, FO 371/131905. 
31 Ibid. 
32 UK High Commissioner in New Zealand to Comomonwealth Relations Office, 24 January 1958.  
TNA, FO 371/131905. 
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(ii) There was no prospect of general settlement on basis of national claims, 
particularly since Chilean and Argentine disputes with UK could not, because 
of their refusal, be brought to arbitration, maintenance of UK position against 
Chilean and Argentine claims involved wasteful expenditure. 
(iii) As long as national claims were pursued there would be no agreement.  
Hence an international scheme was only feasible solution.33 
 
Macmillan believed Australia’s position on maintaining territorial sovereignty to be 
“unrealistic.”  Interestingly, the British Prime Minister wanted to “broaden the basis 
of any international authority.”  Drawing again on the justification of practicality, he 
even contemplated the inclusion of India, adding, “we would not want the Afro-
Asians to propose some impractical scheme.”  Macmillan concluded by saying that 
the British idea was to “freeze” claims.  Nash agreed to this “on the basis that claims 
would be in suspended animation.” 
Macmillan’s suggestion to Nash that India should be included in the 
international authority for Antarctica immediately raised alarm bells among British 
officials.34  In a telegram from the Commonwealth Relations Office in London to the 
UK High Commissioner in Australia, British officials noted, “Indian membership of 
High Authority (Governing Body) has never been seriously contemplated by us and 
would almost certainly arouse strong American and presumably Australian 
opposition.”  While the CRO noted that the inclusion of India might help to “buy off 
potential Afro-Asian opposition to the scheme as a whole and act as insurance 
against possible trouble at the UN from that quarter,” they added that everything 
really depended on the Russian attitude.  The CRO went on to outline the objections 
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
34 Commonwealth Relations Office to UK High Commissioner in Australia, 28 January 1958.  TNA, 
FO 371/131905. 
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to Indian participation, in order that these could be put to Macmillan before his 
meeting with the Australian Prime Minister.35    The official condescension towards 
the idea of Indian participation in an international regime reveals much about 
Britain’s plans for retaining political influence in a postcolonial Antarctica, and the 
exclusionary practices that would be used to bring these plans about.   
Following the Prime Minister’s visit to New Zealand, a series of press leaks 
began to reveal the nature of the discussions on the future of Antarctica.  On the 27 
January, The Times reported that Macmillan had stated that “Australia was 
particularly interested in the suggestion by Mr. Nash, the New Zealand Prime 
Minister, that the Antarctic should be put under UN Trusteeship,” and that he would 
be discussing this proposal with the Australian Government.36  The British Prime 
Minister appears to have made no such statement.  However, on 29 January, the New 
Zealand Prime Minister did make a statement that came close to jeopardizing the 
secrecy of the quadripartite negotiations.37   
In February 1958, in response to the press leaks, Harold Macmillan, the 
British Prime Minister, made a statement in Canberra calling for Antarctica to be a 
free zone and not a base to be fought over for military ends.  This statement won him 
praise in the international press.38  A leaked report on the front page of the Daily 
                                                 
35 Commonweatlh Relations Office to UK High Commissioner in Australia, 28 January 1958.  TNA, 
FO 371/131905. 
36 The Times, cutting dated 27 January 1958.  TNA FO 371/131905. 
37 In Washington, Daniels commented that “the chances of maintaining secrecy have been somewhat 
lessened by Mr. Nash’s recent public statement.” British Embassy Washington to Foreign Office, 30 
January 1958.  TNA, FO 371/131905. 
38 See, for example, article in the Giornale D’Italia.  Javier Lira Merino (Embajada de Chile en Italia) 
al Ministerio de RR.EE., 14 February 1958.  RR.EE., “Año Geofísico Internacional.  Officios llegados 
1956 al 1959.” 
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Telegraph on 12 February gave a “fairly accurate resume” of the British position on 
Antarctica, to the apparent annoyance of the Foreign Office.39   
Although Britain and the United States had certain differences of opinion 
regarding Antarctica, particularly concerning the question of claims, by this stage the 
two countries were in broad agreement over the need for some sort of international 
regime.  British and American officials worked in partnership to achieve this desired 
solution.  Following Macmillan’s statement, the United States set about deciding 
how best to internationalize Antarctica.  There was agreement between the two 
countries that that the United States, rather than Great Britain, was best placed to 
initiate an international discussion on the future of Antarctica.  But there remained 
internal debate over whether or not the Soviet Union should be invited to join and 
whether the United States should make a territorial claim to Antarctica.40 This latter 
question had dogged US Antarctic policymaking for the previous twenty years.41  By 
early March 1958, the Eisenhower Government had agreed upon a course of action 
                                                 
39 Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Posts, 15 February 1958.  
FRUS, 1958-60, Volume 2, United Nations and General International Matters, no. 267.  (Source: 
Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/2-1558.  Secret.  Drafted by Daniels on Feb 14; cleared 
by Murphy, ARA, and EUR; and approved and signed by Herter.  Sent to BA, Santiago, Paris, Oslo, 
Brussels, Moscow, Ottawa, Tokyo, New Delhi, Pretoria, Mexico City, and Rio de Janeiro, and 
repeated to Canberra, London, and Wellington).   
40 Memorandum of Discussion at the 357th Meeting of the NSC, Washington, 6 March 1958.  FRUS, 
1958-60, Volume 2, United Nations and General International Matters, no. 268.  (Source: Eisenhower 
Library, Whitman File.  Top Secret; Eyes Only.  Prepared by Gleason on March 7).  See also, Brian 
Roberts, “Historical Note to the Antarctic Treaty Conference,” 1959.  SPRI, MS1308/9: “... had no 
regrets that the US Government had put out, as their own, proposals which had originated from a 
British initiative.  Since they are not themselves claimants and have never recognized the claims of 
others in the Antarctic, the Americans were in a stronger position than we ourselves to convene a 
Conference.  Also it was felt that for us to take the initiative would be interpreted as a sign of 
weakness on our part by the Argentines and Chileans, whose attitude towards participation in the 
Conference might have hardened accordingly.” 
41 Klotz, America on the ice: Antarctic policy issues. Moore, "Tethered to an Iceberg: United States 
Policy toward the Antarctic, 1939-49." Moore, "Bungled publicity: Little America big America and 
the rationale for non-claimancy 1946–61." 
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to follow, which was set out in NSC 5804/1.42  They would seek agreement for an 
Antarctic organization that would include the Soviet Union; if this failed they would 
attempt to reach a consensus with the seven claimant powers.  
The United States Government regularly consulted with Britain, Australia, 
and New Zealand.  The British backed the United States and felt that the 
arrangement would be open to less criticism in the United Nations if the countries 
involved went ahead “full steam” taking into consideration potential objections that 
might be voiced.43  Lord Hood, the British representative at these meetings felt that 
“an effective, well-rounded program would impress members of the UN and the UN 
would then be more likely to leave ‘hands off.’”  The decision to invite the Soviet 
Union was taken because of fear of Russian plans in the Antarctic, and the “Red 
Scare” would also prove to be a useful tool to frighten Argentina and Chile into 
participation.44   On 24 March 1958, the United States government widened the 
consultation process to include all eleven nations that would be invited to participate 
in the negotiations.45  Before calling for such a conference, US officials wanted to 
know whether there would be broad acceptance of the two basic objectives:   
 
                                                 
42 National Security Council Report, NSC 5804/1, 8 March 1958.  NSA, Presidential Directives 
PD00545. 
43 Memorandum of a Conversation, Embassy of NZ, Washington, 10 March 1958.  FRUS, 1958-60, 
Volume 2, United Nations and General International Matters, no. 270.  (Source: Department of State, 
Central Files, 702.022/3-1058.  Secret.  Drafted by Luboeansky.) 
44 Acta de la Sección Antártica, 14 October 1958.  RR.EE., “Departamento de Limites: Comisión 
Chilena Antártica, 1949-56.  1958.” 
45 Aide Memore From the Department of State to Certain Embassies, 24 March 1958.  FRUS, 1958-
60, Volume 2, United Nations and General International Matters, no. 271.  (Source: Department of 
State Central Files, 702.022/3-2458.  Secret.  Drafted by Daniels on March 21; cleared by ARA, EUR, 
FE, AF, IO, and L; and handed to representatives from the Embassies of Argentina, Australia, 
Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, Norway, NZ, the Union of South Africa, the Soviet Union, and the 
UK.) 
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a) Freedom of scientific investigation throughout Antarctica by citizens, 
organizations, and governments of all countries; and a continuation of the 
international scientific cooperation which is being carried out so successfully 
during the current IGY. 
b) International agreement to ensure that Antarctica be used for peaceful 
purposes only. 
 
Within the US Government, several members of the Operations Coordinating Board 
voiced their concern that consultation with the Soviet Union “violated the spirit, if 
not the words of NSC 5804/1.46  General Cutler, for example, alleged that the State 
Department had “decided to go off on its own.”  Nevertheless, upon receiving 
generally favorable replies to its enquiry, the State Department pushed ahead with its 
plans, and, in May, President Eisenhower issued invitations to eleven nations to meet 
in Washington for preliminary negotiations.47   
The twelve nations that participated in the Washington negotiations were 
those that had conducted scientific research in Antarctica during the IGY.  This 
choice of participants confirmed the relationship between science and politics in 
Antarctica.48  During the negotiations, the question of which countries could 
participate caused one of the major disagreements, with the Soviet Union fearing that 
it could be isolated because of the exclusion of other Eastern Bloc countries.  The 
other eleven countries generally wished to maintain the small select group of 
                                                 
46 Preliminary Notes on the OCB Meeting, 9 April 1958.  FRUS, 1958-60, Volume 2, United Nations 
and General International Matters, no. 272. (Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62D 430.  
Secret.  No drafting information appears on the source text.) 
47 Editorial Note, 28 April 1958.  FRUS, 1958-60, Volume 2, United Nations and General 
International Matters, no. 274.   
48 Circular Airgram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts, 20 June 1958.  FRUS, 
1958-60, Volume 2, United Nations and General International Matters, no. 275.  (Source: Dep of 
State, Central Files, 399.829/6-2058.  Official Use Only.  Drafted by Daniels on June 13 and cleared 
with ARA, EUR, FE, IO, L and NEA.) 
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“interested” countries that they believed would be more workable.  India’s proposals 
to raise the Antarctic question at the United Nations also gave importance to the 
question of who had the right to participate.  The criterion that a country must be 
active in Antarctic scientific research to get a seat at the political negotiating table 
offered a convenient means of controlling participation without appearing blatantly 
exclusionary.   
 
ARGENTINE AND CHILEAN RESPONSE 
Neither the Argentine nor the Chilean governments were particularly keen on 
the idea of internationalizing Antarctica.  Early in the discussions, both governments 
let the United States know that they would oppose any solution that involved the 
sacrifice of claims.49  In reply to Harold Macmillan’s call for internationalization, the 
Chilean Foreign Ministry issued a statement rejecting any such moves.50  Similarly, 
in response to the preliminary enquiries of the United States regarding an Antarctic 
conference, the Chilean ambassador in Washington replied that he personally 
thought the proposal a fine idea, but was not sure whether his government agreed.51  
After greater consideration, involving members of Committee of Foreign Relations 
from both Legislative Chambers, the Chileans felt that they could not be left outside 
such negotiations initiated by the United States.52  The Chilean Antarctic 
                                                 
49 Memorandum of a Conversation, Embassy of NZ, Washington, 10 March 1958.  FRUS, 1958-60, 
Volume 2, United Nations and General International Matters, no. 270.  (Source: Department of State, 
Central Files, 702.022/3-1058.  Secret.  Drafted by Luboeansky). 
50 Undated Memorandum (mid-1958), Ministerio de RR.EE.  RR.EE.,  “Departamento de Limites: 
Comisión Chilena Antártica, 1949-56.  1958.” 
51 Preliminary Notes on the OCB Meeting, 23 April 1958.  FRUS, 1958-60, Volume 2, United 
Nations and General International Matters, no. 273.  (Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 
62D 430.  Secret.  No Drafting information appears on the source text.) 
52 Undated Memorandum (mid-1958), Ministerio de RR.EE.  RR.EE.,  “Departamento de Limites: 
Comisión Chilena Antártica, 1949-56.  1958.” 
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Commission, however, could not be convened in time to give its response to the 
invitation.53  Upon accepting the US invitation, the Chilean Government made it 
clear that its situation was distinct from those nations which had possessions in the 
Antarctica that could be classified as “colonial.”54 
With attendance at the Washington meeting already decided upon, the 
Chilean Antarctic Commission met in July to discuss the present state of Antarctic 
policy.55  The majority of the members of the Commission expressed their agreement 
with the decision to send a delegation to the preliminary conference: to be excluded 
would have been more dangerous than to attend, and attendance alone did not mean 
Chile had to comply with any of the resolutions of the meeting.  They discussed 
favorably the prospect that the United States would cede their East Base in 
Marguerite Bay, held out as a carrot by the North Americans.  General Cañas was 
happy with the prospect of receiving this base, and he suggested that everything 
should be done to achieve this result as quickly as possible, “for the psychological 
influence that this would have on world opinion.”  He also wanted Base Risopatrón 
to be reconstructed.  There was also further discussion of the creation of an Antarctic 
Institute to oversee Chile’s scientific labors in Antarctica. Over the course of the 
IGY, especially when it looked like it would lead into political negotiations, General 
Cañas seems to have become disillusioned with the direction events were going, and 
he was replaced as head of the Chilean IGY Commission.  In relation to the 
Antarctic Treaty negotiations in Washington, Cañas noted forcefully: “I am a 
                                                 
53 It seems like the proposals caught Chile unawares: for example, they had to convene a reconstituted 
Antarctica Commission and they were unable to reconstruct Base Risopatrón. 
54 Comisión Chilena Antártica, 22 July 1958.  RR.EE., “Departamento de Limites: Comisión Chilena 
Antártica, 1949-56.  1958.” 
55 Comisión Chilena Antártica, 23 July 1958.  RR.EE., “Departamento de Limites: Comisión Chilena 
Antártica, 1949-56.  1958.” 
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skeptic.  In each one of these accords we are losing rights.  In Antarctica the weapon 
is science (científica).  There is a war for dominion and the weapon is science 
(científica).”56  The General had urged Chilean participation in the IGY to protect 
Chilean rights, not to see them diminished. 
By the late 1950s, many people in Argentina and Chile – quite possibly the 
majority of the electorate in both cases – had come to believe firmly that Antarctica 
belonged to their respective countries.57  To give up claims to Antarctica would 
therefore be tantamount to ceding national territory.  Such popular attitudes reflect 
the success of twenty years of government propaganda, hardened by growing 
nationalism.  Whereas twenty years earlier the two South American Governments, 
especially the Chileans, had struggled to convince people of the efficacy of their 
claims, by this stage public opinion was to some extent driving government policy 
by demanding that no concessions be made with respect to Antarctic sovereignty.   
 
PREPARATORY NEGOTIATIONS 
By early June 1958, all eleven countries invited to the preliminary 
negotiations had accepted.58  On 13 June, informal meetings began in Washington, 
mostly in the Board Room of the National Academy of Sciences.59  Most of the 
                                                 
56 Pinochet de la Barra, Medio siglo de recuerdos antárticos: memorias. 
57 It is very difficult to gauge public opinion directly in either country.  However, the behavior of the 
governments in both countries, at the negotiations in Washington and in the subsequent ratification 
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representatives hoped to begin discussion of substantive matters in order to lay the 
groundwork for the proposed conference, but the Soviet Union wished to limit the 
talks to procedural matters and the question of where and when to hold a conference.  
The Russian delegation also insisted that other countries with a desire to participate 
should be invited to join.  In the early days of the preliminary negotiations, the 
obdurate Soviet position significantly delayed progress.60   
Another hurdle was the hard-line position adopted by Argentina and Chile 
regarding their sovereignty claims in Antarctica.  Something of a siege mentality 
developed between the two South American claimants, which might be seen as a 
tacit revival of the earlier idea of a “South American Antarctica.”61  Early in the 
meeting, the Chilean and Argentine delegations set out their positions with long 
diatribes on their rights to the southern continent.  Neither country wished for an 
early conference, despite the risk that the matter might be discussed in the United 
Nations.62 Enrique Gajardo, the Chilean representative, made it clear that Chile 
considered Antarctica part of its metropolitan territory, “as much as Chiloé or any 
other province,” adding once again that the Antarctic Peninsula was a geological 
extension of Chilean territory.63  This position, he explained, would determine 
                                                                                                                                          
Confidential.  Addressed to the Department of State Duty Officer.  The source text is initialed by 
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Chile’s attitude towards the Treaty.  He left no doubt among the other delegates that 
Chile would oppose any “internationalization” of its territory.  The Chilean 
representative reported that the presence of the Soviet Union at the meetings gave the 
preliminary negotiations a political, rather that a technical or juridical, character.  He 
added that the Soviet investment in the IGY had military and strategic objectives, 
including the possible stationing of guided missiles.64  This fear of the Soviet Union 
– played up by the Great Britain and the United States – provided a significant 
motivation for Argentina and Chile to cooperate with the rest of the “Free World” 
powers.   
Throughout the preliminary negotiations, Chile and Argentina maintained a 
close alliance based on the Vargara-La Rosa protocol of 1948.65  Gajardo reported 
that their co-operation was such that immediately after a speech by the Chilean 
delegate, “the Argentine delegate would immediately seek the floor to support the 
Chilean position.”  The Chilean delegate informed the Chilean Antarctic 
Commission that Chile should act as “Lord of the House” in Antarctica, inviting 
other countries to conduct scientific research in its territory.  The Argentine-Chilean 
alliance was bitterly opposed by General Cañas, who saw such actions as taking 
Chile towards a condominium with Argentina.66   
The twelve countries all agreed on the “pacific use” of Antarctica.  Indeed, 
the Soviet Delegation surprised the other participants with its zealous advocacy of 
complete pacifism.67  Chile and Argentina had to defend the participation of Armed 
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Forces in Antarctic research and logistical operations.  In this position they were 
supported by Great Britain.  In relation to the suspension of territorial claims there 
were widely divergent views.68  The Soviet Union initially did not want the question 
of sovereignty claims to be dealt with at all at this stage.  The other eleven countries 
– especially Argentina, Chile, Australia, and Great Britain – expressed that the 
suspension of claims was a sine qua non of the Treaty, and without it, scientific 
freedom would be impossible.   
By November 1958, the Soviet position had softened a little, and its 
delegation declared that it would be willing to discuss certain substantive matters 
during the preliminary negotiations.69  This was a major breakthrough, since without 
such prior discussion a number of the other participants refused to agree to a 
conference.  However, although there was a general acceptance that Washington 
should be the place to host the conference, plans to hold it in early 1959 were 
frustrated by continued disagreements over such issues as freezing the legal status 
quo, the inclusion of the high seas, the use of military personnel for peaceful 
purposes, provisions for an adequate inspection system, and the membership of the 
proposed treaty.70  Great Britain and Australia remained adamant that the major 
substantive issues should be agreed upon before the start of a conference, hoping to 
avoid last minute surprises or embarrassment and wanting to make sure that Russia 
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should have no excuse to decline to attend the conference and “posing in the General 
Assembly as champions of Powers which had not been invited to join the 12.”71  The 
talks continued through the early months of 1959, and gradually a consensus 
emerged, at least over what should be discussed.72  
Throughout the preliminary conference, the United States, Great Britain and 
their “Free World” allies continued to worry about Soviet intentions in Antarctica.  
At a Operations Coordinating Board meeting in December 1958, for example, the 
CIA reported that the Soviet intention was to replace the United States as the leading 
power in the Antarctic region.73 Their plans included establishing a network of new 
scientific bases, utilizing a nuclear powered icebreaker, including the Poles in 
Antarctic research and even launching earth satellites from both the North and the 
South Poles.  It was believed that polar launching of spacecraft would be safer due to 
the reduced presence of a radiation layer of electrified particles, although the CIA 
was not convinced that the Soviet Union yet had the technical capabilities to conduct 
such launches.  The North Americans realized that they were falling behind the 
Soviet Union in the fields of oceanography, traverses in the unclaimed sector, 
observations by rocketry, and satellite tracking systems.74  Mr. Christian Herter, 
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Former Governor of Massachusetts and Under Secretary of State, recalled that in his 
briefing for the meeting, he thought it appropriate to cite “Seward’s Folly” as a 
benchmark in US thinking on near-pole geography.  He said he realized that the 
citation and his view on the potential importance of Antarctic might lead to the area 
becoming known as “Herter’s Folly.”75  Wexler briefed at these meetings saying that 
the Soviets were good at sharing meteorological data, but did not share 
oceanographic data that took longer to develop.76  By the end of May 1959, the 
informal working group on Antarctica agreed that a conference for the drafting of the 
Antarctic Treaty would be held in Washington D.C. beginning on 25 October.77  
 
THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE 
As a statement of the importance of the negotiations to Great Britain, 
Macmillan’s Government appointed Sir Esler Dening, a former ambassador to Japan 
and a man of great experience within the Colonial Empire, to head its representation 
at the Washington Conference.  Other international delegates of “high caliber” began 
to arrive in Washington from the beginning of October 1959.78 As a demonstration 
of the uncertainty of the negotiations, the conference actually opened ten days earlier 
than planned on 15 October.  Despite the months of preparatory negotiations, when 
the twelve countries met in Washington for the official Antarctic Conference, 
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77 Memorandum of Discussion at the 48th Meeting of the Informal Working Group on Antarctica, 23 
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nobody knew exactly what form any “Antarctic Treaty” would take, or indeed, 
whether such an agreement could even be reached.  The United States was the only 
country to prepare a complete draft Treaty as a working paper for the conference.79  
The Soviet Union stated that it agreed with all articles except for the first, sixth, 
seventh, and ninth, for which it submitted its own re-drafts.80  Other countries, 
including Great Britain, submitted redrafts of particular articles that they wanted to 
see changed.81   
The dynamic force behind the conference was Ambassador Paul C. Daniels 
of the United States, although he was not universally popular with the other 
delegations.  As the State Department’s Antarctic specialist, Daniels had been one of 
the leading players in the quadripartite meetings on the future of Antarctica since 
mid-1957.  Shortly before the conference opened, Daniels reported his personal 
views on the proceedings to the Operations Coordinating Board.82  He was up front 
that he believed that the Treaty’s administrative measures would serve as a basis for 
a “supra-national administration of Antarctica,” although he wished to play this 
down during the negotiations.  The OCB was keen to gain the utmost propaganda 
points out of the conference: “if handled correctly,” Mr. Harr believed, “the US 
could be placed in a positive, enlightened and cooperative posture, indicating we are 
moving ahead in the resolution of international problems and serving as a case of 
deeds not words in the present East-West atmosphere.”  Daniels said that he felt it 
more important to get a good treaty first and then make propaganda, to which Harr 
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agreed, stating “it is best not to kiss the cook until you taste the cookies.”  Other 
members of the OCB saw the Antarctic conference as an opportunity to gauge the 
possible Soviet attitude in the upcoming Geneva test ban negotiations, showing, once 
again, that far from being a “Pole apart,” Antarctica had come to occupy a central 
place in East-West relations.  Especially during the early part of the conference, the 
two superpowers remained on relatively amicable terms during the negotiations, the 
heads of delegation, for example, meeting informally to discuss the conference 
proceedings.83 
The first serious crisis in the negotiations occurred before the conference had 
even begun.  At a party for the delegates, Andreani, the French member of the 
working group, stated that he had just received instructions from his government not 
to accept any freezing clause relating to sovereignty.84  French government lawyers 
apparently questioned the legal validity of such a clause in French law.85  After some 
wavering, the Argentine delegation appeared to support Article IV, although the 
Chilean position remained unknown into the conference.86  By the second week of 
the conference, the French position had become a stumbling block that many 
delegates felt could not be overcome without a change in the official instructions.  
On October 20, the French proposed that paragraph 1c) of Article IV should be 
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deleted.87  This raised objections from all the other delegations, with the Argentines 
and Chileans saying that they accepted the draft form of Article IV in principle, but 
would like to see some of the wording improved.88   
The Argentines and Chileans wished to dispense with discussion of the term 
“treaty” altogether, feeling that it preordained the result of the conference.  
According to Brian Roberts, the South Americans “made themselves thoroughly 
unpopular by obstructive tactics and long speeches,” although, importantly, they 
were forced to give way when they found themselves in a complete minority.   In 
contrast, Roberts noted that the Soviet Delegation was generally cooperative, adding, 
“it is unusual to see the Russians in such complete accord.”   
The Argentine delegation initially focused on their objections against Article 
II, the freedom of scientific investigation.  This was one of the points that many felt 
had been accepted by everybody.  The Argentines feared that the current wording of 
the article would give the Russians complete freedom to do whatever they liked in 
Antarctica, with the consequent erosion of national sovereignty for the claimant 
powers.  This was something that public opinion in Argentina could not accept.  The 
Argentina position was supported by the Chilean delegation, but only half-heartedly, 
and the Chileans later let the other delegations know that they would accept the 
article in its present form.  When pressed in private negotiations with the Australians, 
New Zealanders, Chileans, United States, and British, the Argentine delegation 
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admitted that what it really wanted was the power of veto by claimant powers to be 
implicit in Article II: this was quite obviously unacceptable to non-claimants, 
including the United States, which did not recognize any sovereignty claims.  
Roberts reported that in private discussion on October 20, 1959: 
 
The Argentine first informed Sir Esler privately that he could only accept his 
proposal with the addition of the words “the greatest possible measure of” 
before “freedom”.  When Sir Esler replied that he could not agree to this 
since it would certainly not be acceptable to other delegations, he said “then 
there will be no Treaty.”89  
 
The British appeared willing to help the Argentines appease public opinion in 
Argentina, even going as far as drafting a new Article II.90  The Soviet, New 
Zealand, and Japanese delegations refused to accept the Argentine insistence on the 
addition of “the greatest possible” before “freedom in scientific investigation.”91  
The head of the Argentine delegation reported to the other heads of delegations, “any 
obligation stronger than an agreement to cooperate would not be acceptable to 
Argentina and, if insisted upon, would force Argentina to withdraw.”92  On October 
21, however, a New Zealand proposal to limit scientific freedom to that “initiated 
and applied during the IGY” seemed to offer a possible resolution of the impasse 
created by Argentina’s objections to complete scientific freedom.   
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Shortly after objecting to the article on scientific freedom, in discussion of 
the first article on the “peaceful utilization” of Antarctica, the Argentine delegation 
dropped a second bombshell on the conference by proposing a complete ban on 
nuclear explosions:  “Nuclear tests and explosions of any type, regardless of their 
character and purposes, shall be prohibited.”93  This proposal came completely out of 
the blue.  The Soviet amendment to Article I expressly called for a ban on all 
weapons tests in Antarctica, but this went much further by ruling out nuclear 
explosions of all types, including those for peaceful purposes.  With echoes of 
India’s worries in 1956, the Argentine delegate argued that the grounds for such an 
exclusion were fears of “radiation danger.”  By introducing the question of nuclear 
explosions into the proceedings, with all its resonances with the Cold War, the 
Argentines appeared to be (deliberately) attempting to destabilize the conference.  
The goodwill between the two superpowers that Brian Roberts had noted the 
previous week rapidly evaporated.  The Chilean delegation made a passionate speech 
saying that they could not contemplate any limitations on their right to self-defense 
under the Rio Treaty (which stretched to the South Pole), further politicized 
proceedings.   
The United States objected to the Argentine proposal for a complete ban on 
nuclear explosions on the grounds that nuclear explosions did not fall within the 
objects of the conference, and was a matter for the Geneva conference on Nuclear 
Tests.94  Additionally, the North Americans felt that a nuclear ban might 
“dangerously limit scientific enquiry.”  However, after agreeing that Article I was 
not the ideal place to discuss nuclear weapons, the Argentines, in partnership with 
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the Australians, proposed an entirely new article that would deal with the nuclear 
question: 
 
No nuclear or thermo-nuclear experiments or explosions of a non-military 
nature, and no disposal of fissionable waste material shall take place in 
Antarctica except after notice to and consultation among the High 
Contracting Parties.95 
 
It was immediately agreed to change the initial clause to: “No detonations of nuclear 
or thermo-nuclear devices of a non-military nature.”  After receiving instructions 
from his government, the Soviet delegate took a somewhat surprising stance.  Rather 
than rejecting the Argentine-Australian proposal, the Soviet Union proposed to make 
the ban on nuclear explosions in Antarctica even more absolute by terminating the 
proposal with the word “Antarctica,” thereby eliminating the escape clause “except 
after notice to and consultation among the High Contracting Parties.”96  Moscow’s 
newly acquired pacificism caught the United States and Great Britain by surprise, 
although the Soviet delegation added that they could accept a Treaty which had no 
such Article: if it was to be anti-nuclear it was to be very anti-nuclear.  New Zealand 
supported the Russian call for a total nuclear prohibition.   
The Argentines had brought the Cold War into the heart of the meeting, and 
this threatened to disrupt the relatively close working relationship between the 
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United States and the Soviet Union.  The British tried to come up with a phrase that 
would not use the terms “detonation” or “explosion,” which were felt to be too 
militaristic for the conceived “peaceful purposes” of nuclear materials.97 
Another major stumbling block was the question of accession: who should be 
able to join the Treaty?  The Soviet Union proposed unlimited accession by other 
countries, while the United States and almost all the other countries favored a 
restricted access based on an active scientific presence in Antarctica, and limited to 
those countries who were members of the United Nations and their specialist 
agencies.98  The Russians were particularly worried about being isolated as the only 
Eastern Bloc country in the Treaty and resented the possible exclusion of countries 
such as the People’s Republic of China and East Germany, which were not members 
of the United Nations.  Interestingly, the Soviet Union supported the idea that 
membership should be limited to countries carrying out scientific research in 
Antarctica.99  Chile, in particular, took the most exclusionary stance, arguing that no 
accession clause was necessary, since all twelve IGY Antarctic participants were 
present at the conference.100   This elitism from a government that had formerly 
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stressed the “imperial” nature of some claims to Antarctica was a further blow to 
anti-colonialism in Antarctica.   
Other points of contention included the question of whether or not there 
should be mandatory reference to the International Court of Justice of any 
disagreements between contracting parties, the boundaries covered by the proposed 
Treaty, the duration of the Treaty, and the idea of an administrative committee, and 
the question of legal jurisdiction in Antarctica.  The Soviet Union, Argentina, and 
Chile all opposed mandatory reference to the International Court of Justice, while 
others, including Great Britain, thought this would be a useful framework to resolve 
disputes.101  The United States was adamant that high seas should be excluded from 
the boundaries of the region to be covered by the Antarctic Treaty.  This question 
was made more difficult by the annual expansion and contraction of the Antarctic 
“continent” due to the freezing and melting of the sea ice.  On the question of 
duration, Argentina and Chile supported a limited ten-year time period, while others, 
including Great Britain, argued that the Treaty should have no time limit.  The 
countries opposed to a fixed duration suggested “that it would create a bad 
psychological effect to suggest that the treaty was temporary in nature, and pointing 
out that the contemplated Administrative Committee would be able to make 
recommendations for changes in the treaty when considered necessary.”102  The idea 
of an administrative committee was a particularly controversial suggestion, since it 
gave the Treaty the appearance of setting up an international government. 
                                                 
101 Brian Roberts’ Antarctic Conference Journal: change in writing procedure.  22/10/1959.  SPRI, 
MS1308/9. 
102 Memorandum From the Head of the US Delegation to the Conference on Antarctica (Phleger) to 
the Secretary of State, 26 October 1959.  FRUS, 1958-60, Volume 2, United Nations and General 
International Matters, no. 299. 
 335 
Such were the apparently irreconcilable differences between the twelve 
participating nations that it looked, for a while, as if no Treaty would be reached.  
After a visit by the French legal adviser, the French delegation agreed to the 
inclusion of section 1(c) in Article IV, thereby overcoming a fundamental 
disagreement.103  However, going into November, three pressing concerns persisted: 
“(1) accession and the relationship of the treaty to third parties; (2) use of fissionable 
material; and (3) an article on the revision of the treaty.”104  Additionally, the 
question of scientific freedom remained to be completely resolved, despite 
concessions by Argentina and the Soviet Union.   
On the question of fissionable material, the Russians proved particularly 
obdurate.  They seemed to fear that the “Free World” countries would benefit from 
any exemption clause to the detriment of the Eastern Bloc.  Such fears were 
connected to the question of accession and the fact that Russia felt itself to be in an 
isolated minority of one within the negotiations.  Nevertheless, Russian objections 
seem to have had an element of irrationality to them given that they supported either 
no mention of nuclear explosions or a complete prohibition.  On 10 November, the 
Argentine Parliament passed a resolution calling for a complete ban on nuclear 
explosions in Antarctica.105  This resolution was clearly designed to put pressure on 
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the Treaty negotiators and legitimize Argentina’s position.  Australia and Chile 
supported the Argentine stance, although the Chilean delegate later “said he thought 
there should be permission for peaceful explosions in connection with scientific 
investigation of Antarctica or its development.”106  The United States did not like the 
idea of a prohibition of peaceful nuclear explosions, although they reasoned: 
 
The inclusion of such a provision might have the effect of making Argentina 
and Chile view the treaty as providing a positive benefit to protection against 
fallout, that might go far toward overcoming their objections to Article II 
which they regard as a derogation to their sovereignty.107 
 
There was a precarious diplomatic balancing act.  The United States was very keen 
to have Argentina and Chile on board, principally for the sake of unity among its 
Cold War allies.   
On 16 November, the Argentine delegate declared that his Government 
would accept the revised compromise version of Article II, on the condition that an 
Article be included on nuclear explosions (with a unanimous consent clause, but 
including the high seas).  The Soviet delegation, by then the only country insisting 
upon a complete ban, stalled the negotiations to consult with its government.108  The 
United States negotiated with Argentina in order to get it to remove the inclusion of 
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the high seas.109  For a while it looked like the whole conference could founder on 
this question.  The Soviet Delegation received instructions not to accept the 
provision that permitted such explosions with the prior consent of the contracting 
parties.  The delegate stated “that this was for the reason that the prohibition of 
nuclear explosions was a matter of principle and not subject to waiver, making 
reference to the Geneva meetings.”110 
Right until the end of November, it remained uncertain whether any 
agreement could be reached.  US officials feared that the Soviet Union had decided 
that it did not want a treaty, and that their delegation was trying to wreck the 
negotiations.111  In the end, the Soviet Union compromised on the “prior consent” 
clause of the nuclear question, while the United States accepted the exclusion of UN 
Specialized agencies.112  In the nature of all compromises not everybody was happy, 
but the resulting formulation offered a way forward and ensured that the negotiations 
would not collapse.  A thirty-year duration for the Treaty proved acceptable to all 
parties: not short enough to be seen as temporary, but not long enough to be seen as 
indefinite.  Without the genuine desire of both the United States and the Soviet 
Union to reach a Treaty, these compromises would not have been made and there 
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would have been no Antarctic Treaty.  On 1 December 1959, the representatives of 
the twelve countries signed the Antarctic Treaty.  The Treaty then had to be ratified 
by all twelve signatories before coming into effect.   
 
 339 
Conclusion: From Imperialism to Globalization 
The signng of the Antarctic Treaty created a limited international regime for 
the Antarctic continent that brought an end to the active phase of the sovereignty 
dispute between Britain, Argentina, and Chile (See Appendix).  Describing the 
political developments of Antarctica immediately after the Second World War, the 
environmental historian Stephen Pyne has written: 
 
Never subject to colonialism in any meaningful way, Antarctica was 
increasingly caught up in the rhetoric and politics of postwar anti-
colonialism.  It became, in the words of worried observers, a ‘continent in 
search of sovereignty.’  More aptly, it became a continent in search of an 
alternative to sovereignty.1   
 
The “alternative to sovereignty” initiated by the Antarctic Treaty was not a genuine 
internationalization of the sort proposed by India when it attempted to raise the 
“Antarctic Question” at the United Nations.  Rather, it was a limited, members-only 
regime, in which sovereignty claims were suspended, not surrendered, and in which 
the signatories continued to exercise an active political influence within the Antarctic 
Treaty System.  Instead of diminishing the political influence of the twelve 
signatories, the Antarctic Treaty reformulated and retained their influence.   The 
Antarctic Treaty was not a completely closed regime: it contained mechanisms for 
other countries to accede, either as consultative or observing members.2  But from its 
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outset, the conduct of “substantial scientific research” in Antarctica was the price of 
admission to this “exclusive club”, and this cost did not come cheaply.3  Scientific 
claims to environmental authority continued to legitimize the political rights of 
members of the Antarctic Treaty System, just as they had done for imperial powers 
before the signature of the treaty.  The Antarctic Treaty System itself became a sort 
of “Frozen Empire” for the government of Antarctica.   
This dissertation has suggested that the history of the Antarctic sovereignty 
dispute should be seen alongside the wider history of European decolonization that 
was taking place around the world at the same time.  In a sense, the Antarctic Treaty 
itself can be seen as a treaty of decolonization, especially from the British 
perspective.  By the terms of the Treaty the seven claimant nations willingly 
suspended their rights to exercise the traditional attributes of territorial sovereignty: 
the right to exclusive legal jurisdiction, the right to exclude others, the right to station 
military personnel, and so forth.  But what came next?  Sovereignty was not 
transferred to an independent nation state with a seat at the United Nations.  Rather, 
sovereignty was handed over to an international treaty system in which individual 
nation states continue to retain significant political influence.  The limited 
international regime created by the Antarctic Treaty was qualitatively different from 
the exclusive sovereignty claims that preceded it.  In a sense, the Antarctic Treaty 
created the world’s first “globalized” continent, and contemporary studies of 
“globalization” offer a useful way of thinking about the changes and continuities 
contained in the creation of the Antarctic Treaty System. 
                                                 
3 During the IGY the 12 nations participating in Antarctic research between them spent $280 million.  
Sullivan, Assault on the unknown; the International Geophysical Year. 305-306. 
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This chapter will begin by looking at the ratification of the Antarctic Treaty 
by Britain, Argentina, and Chile.  Their contrasting attitudes towards the limited 
internationalization of the continent can be seen from the debates that took place 
over the ratification of the Treaty.  The second section will consider the nature of the 
Antarctic Treaty System.  It will examine the transition “from imperialism to 
globalization” in Antarctica, paying particular attention to the reformulation and 
retention of political interest in the continent.  The final section will suggest that 
post-1959 Antarctica remains an excellent place for “doing environmental history” 
and examining the interconnections between human activity, human understanding, 
and the environment.  By the terms of the Treaty, Antarctica became a “Continent 
for Science,” and claims to environmental authority continue to be used to justify 
political influence.  
 
RATIFICATION 
Following the signng of the Antarctic Treaty in Washington D.C. in 
December 1959, the treaty needed to be ratified by each of the twelve signatories in 
order to go into effect.4  The respective attitudes of Britain, Argentina, and Chile 
towards the Antarctic Treaty can be seen from the debates that took place over its 
ratification.  The different views expressed during these debates also reflect the 
multiplicity of possible interpretations of the Antarctic Treaty.  The absence of any 
formal administrative structures left the legal nature of the Antarctic Treaty 
deliberately vague.  This vagueness proved to be a particular strength during the 
                                                 
4 Article XIII required unamimous ratification in order for the Treaty to go into effect.  See Appendix. 
 342 
ratification process, since the signatory governments could present the Treaty in 
ways that best suited their individual requirements.  
On 31 May 1960, Great Britain became the first of the signatories to ratify 
the Antarctic Treaty.  The ratification Bill passed through Parliament with relatively 
little opposition.  The signature of the Antarctic Treaty represented a success for 
British diplomacy and for the Conservative government of Harold Macmillan.  
British politicians and officials had attained more or less exactly what they wanted. 
Limited internationalization effectively brought an end to the active phase of the 
sovereignty dispute with Argentina and Chile, while retaining British claims in a 
state of suspended animation and maintaining an active British role in the political 
decision making process within the Antarctic Treaty System.  The sovereignty 
dispute had become costly both economically and diplomatically, and especially 
after the scientific advances made during the IGY, it no longer looked as if 
Antarctica was worth the costs of maintaining exclusive sovereignty.  One of the 
biggest fears of British policy makers in relation to Antarctica had been the fear of 
setting a dangerous precedent that could be detrimental to other parts of its colonial 
empire.  The Antarctic Treaty offered an honorable way for Britain to withdraw from 
the direct contest for Antarctic sovereignty, with no adverse consequences.  In fact, 
by successfully substituting their contested formal claim to the Falkland Islands 
Dependencies with a virtually uncontested informal influence within the Antarctic 
Treaty System, the British arguably strengthened their political position in 
Antarctica. 5 
                                                 
5 Thus the “decolonization” of Antarctica closely follows the argument set out in Louis and Robinson, 
"The Imperialism of Decolonization." 
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The eagerness with which the British Parliament ratified the Antarctic Treaty 
also offers a different way of thinking about the “decline” of the British relationship 
with Argentina and Chile over the course of the twentieth century.  Britain’s 
economic relationship with Chile had faded long before the outbreak of the active 
phase of the sovereignty dispute; Britain’s economic relationship with Argentina 
went into rapid and terminal decline precisely in the period between 1939 and 1959.  
From a diplomatic perspective, however, the Antarctic Treaty might be seen as an 
unlikely and unprecedented alliance between Great Britain, Argentina, and Chile.  
Even in the heyday of supposed British “informal empire” in South America, Britain 
had often been unable to bend either Argentina or Chile to its diplomatic will.  This 
was revealed most starkly by the two countries’ neutrality throughout most of the 
First and Second World Wars.6  But by the late 1950s, the mutual fear of 
communism had the power to bring the three countries together in a way that 
opposition to fascism never had.  The collapse of Britain’s economic interests in 
South America might therefore be seen as heralding a new era of closer diplomatic 
alignment.  By this stage all three of these countries were largely beholden to the 
interests of the United States, and their alliance was part of a much broader grouping 
of the so-called Free World countries.  This new found alliance was not reflected in 
particular fondness, especially between Britain and Argentina, but it was an alliance 
nonetheless.7  Such an observation suggests that the decline of British interests in 
South America was in fact a nuanced process in which decline was not absolute.   
                                                 
6 Humphreys, Latin America and the Second World War. 
7 The mutual antipathy between Britain and Argentina would be revealed by the Argentine invasion of 
the Islas Malvinas in 1982 and the subsequent war with Great Britain.  But even during this conflict 
the relationship between Britain and Argentina within the Antarctic Treaty System did not break 
down.  Beck, The international politics of Antarctica. 177.   
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In Argentina the ratification of the Antarctic Treaty proved to be a lot more 
contentious.8  One of the leading intellectual opponents to ratification of the Treaty 
was Doctor Alberto Candiotti, a former ambassador of Argentina to Great Britain.  
Between the signature of the Treaty in December 1959 and the final Congressional 
Debate over its ratification in April 1961, Candiotti published a series of newspaper 
articles, pamphlets, and books condemning its provisions and arguing vehemently 
against its incorporation into Argentine law.  He sought the opinions of leading 
authorities in constitutional law in order to argue that any treaty that ceded any part 
of Argentine territory was a violation of the Argentine constitution, the highest goal 
of which was to preserve the country’s territorial integrity.  In an open letter to 
President Frondizi published in La Prensa newspaper on 13 March 1961, Candiotti 
argued: 
 
If our governments do not sign documents that signify a diminution of the 
solidity of our Antarctic rights, the problems of limits in our large territory in 
the southern continent will resolve themselves in our favor, before the 
population of the Argentine Republic reaches 100 million inhabitants.  By 
then we will also have recuperated full sovereignty over all our islands in the 
South Atlantic. 9 
 
Such arguments drew upon the deep sentiments of territorial nationalism and 
geopolitical theory, which Argentine governments had been actively fostering for the 
previous twenty years.   
                                                 
8 For a full discussion of the ratification debate in Argentina, see Miryam Colacrai, "Continuidades y 
Cambios en la Política Antártica Argentina desde 1959 hasta el presente: conjugación de factores 
internos y externos" (Argentina, 2003). 
9 Quoted in Ibid. 65. 
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In order to counter such hostile opinions, President Frondizi made a highly 
publicized trip to Deception Island in March 1961.10  In a sense, Frondizi was 
fighting for his very political survival, since this was a period of intense military 
opposition to his government, especially from the Army.11  Speaking at the 
Argentine base on the island, the President made a two-part case for the ratification 
of the Treaty.  Firstly, he argued that the Treaty in no way diminished Argentine 
claims to Antarctic sovereignty.  Rather, the president suggested, the Treaty in some 
senses represented a form of international recognition for Argentine claims, since it 
made explicit reference to “existing territorial claims.”  Secondly, Frondizi made an 
idealistic case that Argentine participation in the treaty represented a new moral 
advance in the conduct of international diplomacy.  He cited the anti-nuclear clause 
in the treaty as an example of Argentine participation positively influencing the 
course of international diplomacy and pushing the Cold War in the direction of 
disarmament and reconciliation.12  Argentina could not be expected to assert such an 
influence, he suggested, if it remained outside the newly created Antarctic Treaty 
System.  Such arguments sought to put a positive spin on what most officials in his 
government viewed as the inevitability of Argentine participation in such a system.  
Most of these officials were political realists and they realized that the weight of 
international opinion was, by this stage, firmly opposed to the exercise of national 
sovereignty claims in Antarctica.  
Despite the best efforts of the President, the passage of the Antarctic Treaty 
through the Chamber of Deputies in the Argentine Congress remained difficult.  The 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
11 Potash, The army & politics in Argentina. 
12 This argument is also made particularly forcefully in Scilingo, El Tratado antártico; defensa de la 
soberanía y la proscripción nuclear. 
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debate took place in April 1961, and it was attended by the Ministers of Foreign 
Relations and Defense as well as the heads of the armed forces.  It divided along 
party lines, with the opposition UCRP stridently opposed to the ratification of the 
treaty.  Borrowing from the arguments of Candiotti and others, the opposition 
deputies argued that ratification would imply an immediate internationalization of 
the Antarctic continent and that this represented a “sell out” of Argentine territory.  
The opposition also attacked members of the armed forces for supporting the treaty.  
Deputies from Frondizi’s own party reiterated the President’s own arguments in 
making the case that ratification was a defense, and even a partial recognition, of 
Argentina’s rights rather than a renunciation.  In the end, the ratification bill passed 
Congress due to the ruling party’s majority.   
 In Chile, the ratification process was contested in a similar fashion.13  Critics 
of the Treaty argued that it represented a sell-out of Chilean national rights.  One of 
the leading opponents to ratification was General Cañas Montalva, one of the 
country’s leading geopolitical theorists, but by this stage he enjoyed relatively little 
influence within the government.  The geopolitical establishment more generally 
rejected the Antarctic Treaty in principle, but there was sufficient political realism to 
understand that this was not the worst possible political outcome for Chilean 
Antarctic interests.  The government of President Alessandri had vested relatively 
little in Antarctica, and the President himself had no particular fondness for 
Antarctica.  Perhaps the most significant question for Chilean legislators was 
whether or not Argentina would ratify the Treaty.  If the Argentines were not going 
to incorporate the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty into national law, then the 
                                                 
13 Pinochet de la Barra, Medio siglo de recuerdos antárticos: memorias. 
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Chileans did not want to set a bad precedent by ratifying it themselves.  
Consequently, the Chilean ratification process closely followed that of Argentina.  
Eventually, the two South American governments agreed to ratify the Treaty on the 
same day in order to avoid any problems.   
On 23 June 1961, Argentina, Chile, and Australia became the final three 
countries to ratify the Antarctic Treaty, thereby bringing its provisions into effect.  
The Australians had also dragged their feet over ratification due to fears, similar to 
those in South America, that the Treaty represented a surrender of national interests 
in Antarctica to the advantage of the Soviet Union.  The unanimous ratification of 
the Antarctic Treaty represented quite a remarkable coming together of divergent 
political interests.  Without the participation of Argentina and Chile, the limited 
internationalization of Antarctica would probably have been impossible.  The two 
South American nations ultimately deemed it politically expedient to give up on their 
once vehement anti-imperialism in favor of membership of an “exclusive club.”  
Their “collaboration” helped to legitimate the reformulation of imperial influence 
into the Antarctic Treaty System, and diminished the possibility of a united “Third 
World” challenge to this newly created Frozen Empire.  This attitude is perhaps best 
understood as a continuation of the “imperial” element of Argentine and Chilean 
claims to Antarctica.   
 
FROM IMPERIALISM TO GLOBALIZATION 
By the terms of the Antarctic Treaty, the immediate exercise of Antarctic 
sovereignty passed from individual nation states to an international treaty system.  
This marked a significant development in the history of Antarctica.  From a British 
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perspective in particular, the signature and ratification of the Antarctic Treaty might 
be seen as a somewhat anomalous form of decolonization.  Rather than handing 
colonial authority to a national government, as was happening at the same time 
throughout the European colonial empires, the seven claimant nations handed power 
to an international treaty system, in which they retained significant political 
influence.  From a South American perspective, this formulation is more problematic 
since the outcome that both Argentines and Chileans most desired would have been 
universally accepted international recognition for their national claims to Antarctic 
sovereignty.  Whether or not the Antarctic Treaty is classified as treaty of 
decolonization is largely a semantic question, but it undoubtedly created an 
innovative and unique international system.  
Following the ratification of the Antarctic Treaty, it could be argued that 
Antarctica became the world’s first “globalized continent” since it came to be 
governed by an international treaty system rather than by individual nation states.  
Historical studies of globalization offer one of the most useful ways of thinking 
about the changes and continuities brought about by the Antarctic Treaty of 1959.14  
Globalization is a comparatively recent term, and this is not how the people at the 
time understood the creation of the Antarctic Treaty System.  Scholars of 
globalization tend to define the term in two ways.15  Firstly, and least 
problematically, globalization is viewed as a quantitative change: “a process that 
transforms economic, political, social, and cultural relationships, across countries, 
                                                 
14 The historiography of globalization draws upon the vast and expanding social science literature on 
the subject.  For an early example of historical, as opposed to social-science, interpretations of 
globalization see Bruce Mazlish and Ralph Buultjens, Conceptualizing global history, Global history 
(Boulder, 1993). 
15 For a useful discussion of the definitions of globalization, see A. G. Hopkins, Globalization in 
world history (New York, 2002). 
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regions and continents by spreading them more broadly, making them more intense 
and increasing their velocity.”16  Secondly, and more problematically, globalization 
can be defined as instituting qualitative changes in these global processes.  
Depending on the chosen definition, it is possible to make a case for various “periods 
of globalization” when these changes have taken place.  The strongest chronological 
case is made for a contemporary period of globalization, in the present and recent 
past, which is qualitatively distinct from earlier periods of international exchange.17  
Whether or not there have been earlier periods of globalization, it is this recent 
period of “post-colonial” globalization that most concerns scholars of Antarctica, 
since the Antarctic Treaty System can be seen as part of the global processes taking 
place at this time.  Both quantitative and qualitative definitions of the term can be 
helpful for thinking about the nature of the Antarctic Treaty System, and its 
relationship to the imperial and national sovereignty claims that preceded it.  Did the 
Antarctic Treaty System represent something entirely new, or was it merely an 
acceleration of existing processes?  In posing this question, the Antarctic Treaty 
System can serve as a case study – albeit it a quite unique case study – of 
contemporary, post-colonial globalization. 
The Antarctic Treaty System exemplifies many of the contradictions and 
paradoxes inherent in contemporary globalization.18  As a limited international 
regime, the Treaty System was at the same time “above the nation” and dependent 
upon individual nation states.  Its creation saw its signatories suspend many of their 
political rights, but at the same time it reformulated and retained much of their 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 16. 
17 The exclusive association of globalization with the contemporary era has been challenged by a 
number of historians 
18 For a discussion of these contradictions, see Hopkins, Globalization in world history. 
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political influence.  While loudly championing its own idealism, the Antarctic Treaty 
created a vastly unequal relationship between those countries on the inside of the 
exclusive club, and those left on the outside. All of these contradictions and 
paradoxes could be applied to the idea of contemporary globalization more 
generally, which has seen the power of nation states both eroded an enhanced, and 
imperialism both brought to an end and reformulated.   
The Antarctic Treaty established one of the world’s most successful and 
long-lasting international systems of territorial government.  Its members generally 
meet once a year in a different city around the world to discuss and agree upon 
collective policies for the administration of Antarctica.  To its great credit, the 
Antarctic Treaty System has kept human activity in the Southern Continent peaceful: 
the Hope Bay incident of 1952 remains the only time that shots have been fired in 
anger.  The anti-nuclear provisions within the Antarctic Treaty acted as a model and 
a precedent for wider scale nuclear test ban treaties during the Cold War, and 
peaceful scientific relations in Antarctica more generally helped to foster East-West 
understanding.   Several scholars have proposed the Antarctic Treaty System as a 
model for future global government.19 Antarctica has also been suggested as an 
analogy for the internationalization of space.20  
Despite its successes, the exclusionary nature of the Antarctic Treaty System 
has not gone unnoticed.  During the 1980s, Malaysia led a “Third World” assault on 
the “exclusive club” that governed Antarctica.21  This was a period when there was, 
once again, a great deal of speculation about the economic worth of Antarctica – the 
                                                 
19 Berkman, Science into policy: global lessons from Antartica. 
20 Philip C. Jessup and Howard Jack Taubenfeld, Controls for outer space and the Antarctic analogy, 
Columbia University studies in international organization (New York, 1959). 
21 Beck, The international politics of Antarctica. 284-297. 
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idea of Antarctica as a “Frozen El Dorado” seemed to be both enduring and cyclical.   
The members of the Antarctic Treaty System were trying to negotiate a minerals 
regime to facilitate and regulate economic prospecting and resource extraction in 
Antarctica.  In many ways the Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, 
picked up where Krishna Menon and the Indians had left off with their attempts to 
raise the Antarctic question in the United Nations during the late 1950s.  By the 
1980s, however, India had established a “substantial scientific interest” in Antarctica 
and become a consultative member of the Antarctic Treaty System in the hope of 
winning its slice of any economic dividend.  Unable to create a powerful alliance, the 
Malaysians faced an uphill struggle in their campaign against the Antarctic Treaty 
System, and ultimately failed to win any major concessions.  But the Malaysian 
criticisms did play some part in the breakdown over the negotiation of a “minerals 
regime” for Antarctica, and its replacement with the Madrid Environmental Protocol 
of 1991, which made Antarctica the most protected environment in the world. 
Historical studies of globalization offer a particularly promising way to look 
at the history of Antarctica following the signature of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959.  
By studying the twenty-year period leading up to the limited internationalization of 
Antarctica, this dissertation provides an excellent starting point for such an analysis.  
It has shown that there was nothing coincidental about the retention of the 
signatories’ political influence into the Antarctic Treaty System.  Rather, this was the 
result of deliberate policy on the part of Britain, the United States, and others: the 
globalization of Antarctica was skewed in favor of its member’s interests from the 
very beginning.  Closely connected to this retention of interest, studies of 
globalization also offers an excellent framework for the examination of the continued 
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importance of science and the environment – two categories that are often thought to 
be “above the nation” – within the Antarctic Treaty System.   
 
A CONTINENT FOR SCIENCE 
This dissertation has suggested that Antarctica provides an excellent location 
for “doing environmental history” and investigating the dynamic interaction of 
human activity, human understanding, and the natural environment.  By the terms of 
the 1959 Treaty, Antarctica became a “continent for science.”22  Article II decreed: 
 
Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and cooperation toward that 
end, as applied during the International Geophysical Year, shall continue, 
subject to the provisions of the present Treaty.23 
 
This scientific freedom – with its tacit assumption of being “for the good of 
humanity” – gave a moral authority to the Antarctic Treaty System.24  Such an 
assumption was not so very different from the British Empire’s claim to 
environmental authority, or from the environmental nationalism of Argentina and 
Chile.  
 Science provides the principal mechanism for the retention of the signatories’ 
political influence within the Antarctic Treaty System.  As British and North 
American officials had hoped, the requirement for a country to be conducting 
                                                 
22 Lewis, A continent for science; the Antarctic adventure. 
23 See Appendix. 
24 In justifying Britain’s claims to the Falkland Islands Dependencies, Sir Miles Clifford, the 
Governor of the Falkland Islands, declared that Britain had asserted its sovereignty in order to 
regulate the whaling industry, “for the good of humanity.” Miles Clifford: “Broadcast Address by His 
Excellency the Governor, 22 February 1948.  RHL, MISS.  Brit Emp.s 517 4/1 “Falkland Islands 
1946-1957: Clifford.”   
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“substantial scientific research” in Antarctica in order to have a seat at the political 
table functioned as a powerful barrier to entry, and had the desired outcome of 
keeping potential “trouble makers” firmly on the outside.   It was no coincidence that 
Britain, together with the United States and the Soviet Union, continued to dominate 
the scientific institutions that came to exercise an unprecedented authority in 
governing Antarctica.  The Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR), 
established in 1958 as a way to continue the scientific co-operation of the IGY, has 
its international headquarters at the Scott Polar Research Institute in Cambridge, 
England.25  It was from here that Brian Roberts and others plotted Britain’s Antarctic 
strategy over the course of the sovereignty dispute.  In the first twenty years of the 
Antarctic Treaty System, the recommendations of SCAR had a tremendous and 
virtually uncontested influence on the resolutions passed by the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meetings.26  The British Antarctic Survey, the Instituto Antártico 
Argentino, and Instituto Antártico Chileno, continue to serve political purposes and 
exercise a significant influence on contemporary Antarctic policy making.27  
 During the Antarctic sovereignty dispute, changing perceptions of the 
Antarctic environment – and in the case of declining whale populations, changes in 
the environment itself – had important political consequences.  In a sense, 
developments in Antarctic science itself acted against exclusive claims to imperial 
and national sovereignty.  The sciences upon which the British established their 
                                                 
25 Discussion of the relationship between the Antarctic Treaty and SCAR began as early as 13 
Octorber 1958 in a US-Australian discussion. FRUS 1958-60.  Volume 2.  United Nations and 
General International Matters.  1958-60. 277.  Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, 
Washington, October 13, 1958. 
26 See the Antarctic Treaty Secretariat’s historical database: 
http://reco.ats.aq/ats.reco/index.aspx?lang=e (Accessed on 24 March 2008). 
27 In all the first two cases cases these are institutions that are directly descended from the era of the 
sovereignty dispute.  The Chilean Antarctic Institute was not founded until 1964. 
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“environmental authority” tended to conceive of the world as a relatively stable 
place.  The new paradigm of geophysics, however, was founded upon a 
fundamentally dynamic and unstable view of the world. This new paradigm was less 
amenable to imperial exploitation in the traditional sense, since it offered little sense 
of permanence, and less possibility of control. The International Geophysical Year of 
1957-58, for example, revealed that the geological continuity between the Andes 
mountains and the Antarctic Peninsula – used by both Argentina and Chile as a 
marker of their sovereignty – was in fact a lot more complicated than geologists had 
traditionally suggested.  But this changing scientific paradigm did not imply an end 
to the connection between science and politics in Antarctica.  Indeed, just as South 
American nationalists had once argued that the Antarctic environment itself made a 
case for Argentine and Chilean sovereignty, proponents of the Antarctic Treaty 
System now argue that the “supranational” nature of the Antarctic environment 
makes a case for the international government of Antarctica, themselves 
appropriating the Antarctic environment to suit their political case.28 
Importantly, the enduring hegemony of Antarctic science stems from the fact 
it seems to offer the best way of understanding the Antarctic environment.29  During 
the active period of the sovereignty dispute, an improved scientific understanding of 
the continent gave the countries competing for Antarctic sovereignty practical 
advantages in the contest for sovereignty.  Improved weather forecasting, for 
example, could prevent a ship from becoming caught in a storm or stuck in the pack 
ice with embarrassing, or even tragic, consequences.  Claims to environmental 
                                                 
28 Greenpeace and other environmental organizations also use the environment itself to make a case 
for a “World Park” in Antarctica.  See, Griffiths, Slicing the silence: voyaging to Antarctica.   
29 Fogg, A history of Antarctic science. 
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authority were not completely “constructed” and scientific knowledge corresponded 
in a powerful fashion to the reality of the Antarctic environment.  Today’s fears of 
global warming (a particularly globalized environmental problem) make scientific 
knowledge about the Antarctic environment a particularly pressing issue.  It was 
during the IGY that scientists started to take systematic measurements of the Carbon 
Dioxide content of the atmosphere.  These measurements have created continuous 
sets of data that have demonstrated an anthropogenic increase in greenhouse gases.  
Changes in the earth’s climate threaten to have a significant impact upon Antarctica.  
In turn, environmental changes in Antarctica, especially the collapse of the West 
Antarctic Ice Sheet, could lead to devastating environmental consequences for 
people throughout the world, irrespective of national boundaries.  Scientific 
understanding of the Antarctica’s environmental reality is therefore tremendously 
important.   
By the terms of the Madrid Protocol of 1991, the Antarctic continent became 
the most protected environment in the world.  The negotiation of the protocol 
represented an attempt to maintain Antarctica as a pristine wilderness. 30  It put an 
end to discussion of the exploitation of minerals in Antarctica (at least in the medium 
term), it prohibited the importation of any non-native species (with the exception of 
people), and it prohibited the extraction of any Antarctic material.  Through the 
imposition of “sites of special scientific interest” the Protocol placed strict limits on 
places that can and cannot be visited by non-scientists.  Above all, the Environmental 
Protocol confirms the enduring hegemony of science and scientists in Antarctica.  
                                                 
30 In the last decade or so, the idea of wilderness has been challenged by a number of environmental 
historians.  See for example, William Cronon, Uncommon ground: rethinking the human place in 
nature (New York, 1996).  Generally, this challenge has yet to reach Antarctica.    
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Due to the relative simplicity of its human-nature-culture interactions, the southern 
continent starkly epitomizes the fundamental tension between benign environmental 
protection and less benign environmental control. This dissertation contributes to this 
debate by showing that on-going claims to environmental authority in Antarctica 
have a direct connection to the continent’s imperial past: for better or for worse, the 
Antarctic Treaty System is today’s Frozen Empire. 
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Appendix: Official Text of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty 
The Governments of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, the French 
Republic, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Union of South Africa, the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, and the United States of America, 
Recognizing that it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall 
continue for ever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become 
the scene or object of international discord; 
Acknowledging the substantial contributions to scientific knowledge 
resulting from international cooperation in scientific investigation in Antarctica; 
Convinced that the establishment of a firm foundation for the continuation 
and development of such cooperation on the basis of freedom of scientific 
investigation in Antarctica as applied during the International Geophysical Year 
accords with the interests of science and the progress of all mankind; 
Convinced also that a treaty ensuring the use of Antarctica for peaceful 
purposes only and the continuance of international harmony in Antarctica will 
further the purposes and principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; 
Have agreed as follows: 
 
Article I 
1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be 
prohibited, inter alia, any measure of a military nature, such as the establishment of 
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military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military manoeuvres, as well as 
the testing of any type of weapon. 
 
2. The present Treaty shall not prevent the use of military personnel or 
equipment for scientific research or for any other peaceful purpose. 
 
Article II 
Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and cooperation toward that 
end, as applied during the International Geophysical Year, shall continue, subject to 
the provisions of the present Treaty. 
 
Article III 
1. In order to promote international cooperation in scientific investigation in 
Antarctica, as provided for in Article II of the present Treaty, the Contracting Parties 
agree that, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable: 
 
    a. information regarding plans for scientific programs in Antarctica shall 
be exchanged to permit maximum economy of and efficiency of operations; 
    b. scientific personnel shall be exchanged in Antarctica between 
expeditions and stations; 
    c. scientific observations and results from Antarctica shall be exchanged 
and made freely available. 
 
2. In implementing this Article, every encouragement shall be given to the 
establishment of cooperative working relations with those Specialized Agencies of 
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the United Nations and other technical organizations having a scientific or technical 
interest in Antarctica. 
 
Article IV 
1. Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as: 
 
    a. a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of 
or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica; 
    b. a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis of 
claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether as a result of 
its activities or those of its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise; 
    c. prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its 
recognition or non-recognition of any other State's rights of or claim or basis of 
claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. 
 
2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall 
constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new 
claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica 
shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force. 
 
Article V 
1. Any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal there of radioactive 
waste material shall be prohibited. 
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2. In the event of the conclusion of international agreements concerning the 
use of nuclear energy, including nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive 
waste material, to which all of the Contracting Parties whose representatives are 
entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX are parties, the 




The provisions of the present Treaty shall apply to the area south of 60° 
South Latitude, including all ice shelves, but nothing in the present Treaty shall 
prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State 
under international law with regard to the high seas within that area. 
 
Article VII 
1. In order to promote the objectives and ensure the observance of the 
provisions of the present Treaty, each Contracting Party whose representatives are 
entitled to participate in the meetings referred to in Article IX of the Treaty shall 
have the right to designate observers to carry out any inspection provided for by the 
present Article. Observers shall be nationals of the Contracting Parties which 
designate them. The names of observers shall be communicated to every other 
Contracting Party having the right to designate observers, and like notice shall be 
given of the termination of their appointment. 
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2. Each observer designated in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 
of this Article shall have complete freedom of access at any time to any or all areas 
of Antarctica. 
 
3. All areas of Antarctica, including all stations, installations and equipment 
within those areas, and all ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking 
cargoes or personnel in Antarctica, shall be open at all times to inspection by any 
observers designated in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. 
 
4. Aerial observation may be carried out at any time over any or all areas of 
Antarctica by any of the Contracting Parties having the right to designate observers. 
 
5. Each Contracting Party shall, at the time when the present Treaty enters 
into force for it, inform the other Contracting Parties, and thereafter shall give them 
notice in advance, of 
 
    a. all expeditions to and within Antarctica, on the part of its ships or 
nationals, and all expeditions to Antarctica organized in or proceeding from its 
territory; 
    b. all stations in Antarctica occupied by its nationals; and 
    c. any military personnel or equipment intended to be introduced by it into 





1. In order to facilitate the exercise of their functions under the present 
Treaty, and without prejudice to the respective positions of the Contracting Parties 
relating to jurisdiction over all other persons in Antarctica, observers designated 
under paragraph 1 of Article VII and scientific personnel exchanged under sub-
paragraph 1(b) of Article III of the Treaty, and members of the staffs accompanying 
any such persons, shall be subject only to the jurisdiction of the Contracting Party of 
which they are nationals in respect of all acts or omissions occurring while they are 
in Antarctica for the purpose of exercising their functions. 
 
2. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, and 
pending the adoption of measures in pursuance of subparagraph 1(e) of Article IX, 
the Contracting Parties concerned in any case of dispute with regard to the exercise 
of jurisdiction in Antarctica shall immediately consult together with a view to 
reaching a mutually acceptable solution. 
 
Article IX 
1. Representatives of the Contracting Parties named in the preamble to the 
present Treaty shall meet at the City of Canberra within two months after the date of 
entry into force of the Treaty, and thereafter at suitable intervals and places, for the 
purpose of exchanging information, consulting together on matters of common 
interest pertaining to Antarctica, and formulating and considering, and 
recommending to their Governments, measures in furtherance of the principles and 
objectives of the Treaty, including measures regarding: 
 
    a. use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only; 
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    b. facilitation of scientific research in Antarctica; 
    c. facilitation of international scientific cooperation in Antarctica; 
    d. facilitation of the exercise of the rights of inspection provided for in 
Article VII of the Treaty; 
    e. questions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica; 
    f. preservation and conservation of living resources in Antarctica. 
 
2. Each Contracting Party which has become a party to the present Treaty by 
accession under Article XIII shall be entitled to appoint representatives to participate 
in the meetings referred to in paragraph 1 of the present Article, during such times as 
that Contracting Party demonstrates its interest in Antarctica by conducting 
substantial research activity there, such as the establishment of a scientific station or 
the despatch of a scientific expedition. 
 
3. Reports from the observers referred to in Article VII of the present Treaty 
shall be transmitted to the representatives of the Contracting Parties participating in 
the meetings referred to in paragraph 1 of the present Article. 
 
4. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall become 
effective when approved by all the Contracting Parties whose representatives were 
entitled to participate in the meetings held to consider those measures. 
 
5. Any or all of the rights established in the present Treaty may be exercised 
as from the date of entry into force of the Treaty whether or not any measures 
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facilitating the exercise of such rights have been proposed, considered or approved as 
provided in this Article. 
 
Article X 
Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to exert appropriate efforts, 
consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to the end that no one engages in 
any activity in Antarctica contrary to the principles or purposes of the present Treaty. 
 
Article XI 
1. If any dispute arises between two or more of the Contracting Parties 
concerning the interpretation or application of the present Treaty, those Contracting 
Parties shall consult among themselves with a view to having the dispute resolved by 
negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other 
peaceful means of their own choice. 
 
2. Any dispute of this character not so resolved shall, with the consent, in 
each case, of all parties to the dispute, be referred to the International Court of 
Justice for settlement; but failure to reach agreement on reference to the International 
Court shall not absolve parties to the dispute from the responsibility of continuing to 




    1. a. The present Treaty may be modified or amended at any time by 
unanimous agreement of the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to 
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participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX. Any such modification or 
amendment shall enter into force when the depositary Government has received 
notice from all such Contracting Parties that they have ratified it. 
    b. Such modification or amendment shall thereafter enter into force as to 
any other Contracting Party when notice of ratification by it has been received by the 
depositary Government. Any such Contracting Party from which no notice of 
ratification is received within a period of two years from the date of entry into force 
of the modification or amendment in accordance with the provision of subparagraph 
1(a) of this Article shall be deemed to have withdrawn from the present Treaty on the 
date of the expiration of such period. 
    2. a. If after the expiration of thirty years from the date of entry into force 
of the present Treaty, any of the Contracting Parties whose representatives are 
entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX so requests by a 
communication addressed to the depositary Government, a Conference of all the 
Contracting Parties shall be held as soon as practicable to review the operation of the 
Treaty. 
    b. Any modification or amendment to the present Treaty which is approved 
at such a Conference by a majority of the Contracting Parties there represented, 
including a majority of those whose representatives are entitled to participate in the 
meetings provided for under Article IX, shall be communicated by the depositary 
Government to all Contracting Parties immediately after the termination of the 
Conference and shall enter into force in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 
1 of the present Article 
    c. If any such modification or amendment has not entered into force in 
accordance with the provisions of subparagraph 1(a) of this Article within a period of 
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two years after the date of its communication to all the Contracting Parties, any 
Contracting Party may at any time after the expiration of that period give notice to 
the depositary Government of its withdrawal from the present Treaty; and such 




1. The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States. It 
shall be open for accession by any State which is a Member of the United Nations, or 
by any other State which may be invited to accede to the Treaty with the consent of 
all the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the 
meetings provided for under Article IX of the Treaty. 
 
2. Ratification of or accession to the present Treaty shall be effected by each 
State in accordance with its constitutional processes. 
 
3. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited 
with the Government of the United States of America, hereby designated as the 
depositary Government. 
 
4. The depositary Government shall inform all signatory and acceding States 
of the date of each deposit of an instrument of ratification or accession, and the date 
of entry into force of the Treaty and of any modification or amendment thereto. 
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5. Upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by all the signatory States, 
the present Treaty shall enter into force for those States and for States which have 
deposited instruments of accession. Thereafter the Treaty shall enter into force for 
any acceding State upon the deposit of its instruments of accession. 
 
6. The present Treaty shall be registered by the depositary Government 
pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
 
Article XIV 
The present Treaty, done in the English, French, Russian and Spanish 
languages, each version being equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of 
the Government of the United States of America, which shall transmit duly certified 
copies thereof to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States. 
 
The Antarctic Treaty 
signed in Washington on 1 December 1959 
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